ORDER : 1. This order shall dispose of the petition filed by the petitioners under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code for quashing of the final report bearing No. 143/2012 dated 26-11-2012 whereby the charge-sheet has been filed against the petitioners for having committed offence under section 13(1)(d) and section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with sections 109, 409, 420 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code. 2. The proceedings are pending before the learned Special Court (constituted for the Prevention of Corruption Act), Indore as Special Case No. 06/2012. According to the petitioners, it has been submitted that FIR of this case was registered on 24-10-2007 being Crime No. 38/2007 wherein the name of the petitioners were not mentioned but after investigation their name was incorporated as accused persons alleging that they are guilty of committing offence under section 13(1)(d) and section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with sections 109, 409, 420 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code. 3. It is submitted that in the final report Annexure P-1, the petitioners have been alleged to have committed the aforesaid offence while discharging their duties as Naib Tehsildar, Tappa Gautampura, Tehsil-Depalpur, District Indore. Besides submitting that petitioners have no nexus with the aforesaid crime, it is also submitted that the services of the petitioners are regulated by the Revenue Department, whereas the sanction has been granted by the Law Department solely on the ground that there is delay in discharging the duties on the part of the petitioners, even though Revenue Authorities strongly opposed to grant sanction. 4. Besides taking the ground of delay, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners also submitted that no cognizance should have been taken of RRC against the petitioners who were acting as judicial officers, in terms of section 31 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code 1959. It is also submitted that the petitioners could not be penalised for the acts done while exercising judicial power in terms of the provisions of Judges Protection Act, 1985. It is also submitted that the petitioners could not be penalised for the acts done while exercising judicial power in terms of the provisions of Judges Protection Act, 1985. It is also submitted that the fault and guilt lies on the officers of the M.P. Khadi Gramodyog who without any initial verification sanctioned loan to the ineligible persons and therefore the story narrated by the respondent against the petitioners is imaginary, hypothetical and merely based on presumption because it is the officials belonging to the M.P. Khadi Gramodyog who were negligent in discharging their duties and who did not contact the Revenue authorities regularly for recovery of the loan. The culpability is further aggravated considering the fact that under the provisions of section 147 of the Code, they are entrusted with the power of Tehsildar for recovery of margin money of loan from any defaulter. Even though number of grounds have been taken in the petition, learned senior counsel for the petitioners primarily argued before us two points in support of this petition: (1) The sanction granted in this case by Law department was not tenable inasmuch as the Revenue department controls the service conditions of the petitioners to grant sanction. (2) It has been argued that the petitioners being Tehsildar were admittedly officers and were performing the judicial function and therefore they should be protected under the Judges Protection Act. 5. As far as the question of grant of sanction by the Law department is concerned, the petitioners had filed a petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code earlier also before this Court vide M. Cr. C. No. 532/2013 which has been dismissed with liberty to file fresh petition, but debarring the petitioners from raising the question of sanction. The order Annexure P-33 is reproduced hereunder:- “Shri Piyush Mathur, learned senior counsel with Shri Anshuman Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri Deepak Rawal, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 and 3. Shri Arvind Gokhale, learned counsel for respondent No. 2/Lokayukt. Learned senior counsel seeks leave to withdraw the M. Cr. C. with liberty to file a fresh petition challenging FIR as also prosecution. The M. Cr. C. is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition challenging the FIR as also prosecution except the point of sanction. Shri Arvind Gokhale, learned counsel for respondent No. 2/Lokayukt. Learned senior counsel seeks leave to withdraw the M. Cr. C. with liberty to file a fresh petition challenging FIR as also prosecution. The M. Cr. C. is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition challenging the FIR as also prosecution except the point of sanction. However, granting of liberty will not be construed that we had expressed any opinion on merits.” 6. When the aforesaid order was brought to the notice of the learned senior counsel he rightly did not press the point relating to challenge to the sanction. Even otherwise this ground relating to challenge is no more res integra in view of order dated 23rd July, 2013 passed in the case of Omprakash Verma S/o Ghisalalji Verma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Writ Petition No. 5193/2009 [2014 (3) MPLJ 717] and other connected matters and also in the case of B.S. Bisoria vs. State of M.P. decided on 24th July, 2013 in W.P. No. 8734/2013. In view of the aforesaid, the only point needs to be considered i.e. the petitioners were protected by Judges Protection Act. The petitioners have referred to sections 31 and 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code which reads as under:- “31. Conferral of status of Courts on Board and Revenue Officers - The Board of a Revenue Officer, while exercising power under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force to enquire into or to decide any question arising for determination between the State Government and any person or between parties to any proceedings shall be a Revenue Court. 32. Inherent power of Revenue Courts - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” Sections 11 and 147 are also relevant which are reproduced hereunder:- “11. Revenue Officers - There shall be the following classes of the Revenue Officers, namely: Commissioners (including Additional Commissioners); Settlement Commissioner (including Additional Settlement Commissioners); Collectors (including Additional Collectors); Settlement Officers; Sub-Divisional Officers; Assistant Collectors; [Joint Collectors (including Deputy Collectors)]; [Deputy Settlement Officers;] Assistant Settlement Officers; Tahsildars (including Additional Tahsildars); Superintendents of Land Records; Naib Tahsildars. 147. Revenue Officers - There shall be the following classes of the Revenue Officers, namely: Commissioners (including Additional Commissioners); Settlement Commissioner (including Additional Settlement Commissioners); Collectors (including Additional Collectors); Settlement Officers; Sub-Divisional Officers; Assistant Collectors; [Joint Collectors (including Deputy Collectors)]; [Deputy Settlement Officers;] Assistant Settlement Officers; Tahsildars (including Additional Tahsildars); Superintendents of Land Records; Naib Tahsildars. 147. Process for recovery of arrear - An arrear of land revenue payable to Government may be recovered by a Tahsildar by any one or more of the following processes:- (a) by attachment and sale of movable property. (b) by attachment and sale of the holding on which arrear is due and where such holding consist of more than one survey number or plot number by sale of one or more of such survey numbers or plot numbers as may be considered necessary to recover the arrears: Provided that no holding shall be sold for the recovery of any dues of a co-operative society without first exhausting the procedure prescribed in section 154-A. (bb) by attachment of holding on which arrear is due and letting the same under section 154-A. (bbb) by attachment of any other holding belonging to the defaulter which is used for the purposes of agriculture and letting the same under section 154-A. (c) by attachment and sale of any other immovable property belonging to the defaulter: Provided that the process specified in clauses (a) and (c) shall not permit the attachment and sale of the following, namely:- (i) the necessary wearing apparel, cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the defaulter, his wife and children, and such personal ornaments, as, in accordance with the religious usage, cannot be parted with by any woman. (ii) tools of artisans and, if the defaulter is an agriculturist, his implements of husbandary, except an implement driven by mechanical power and such cattle and seed as may, in the opinion of the Tahsildar, be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such. (iii) articles set aside exclusively for the use of religious endowments. (ii) tools of artisans and, if the defaulter is an agriculturist, his implements of husbandary, except an implement driven by mechanical power and such cattle and seed as may, in the opinion of the Tahsildar, be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such. (iii) articles set aside exclusively for the use of religious endowments. (iv) house and other buildings (with the materials and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for the enjoyment) belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him: Provided further that the process specified in clause (b) shall not permit attachment and sale of holding where the defaulter holds: (i) six hectares or less than six hectares of land in the Scheduled Area. (ii) four hectares or less than four hectares of land in other areas. Explanation - For the purpose of this proviso “Scheduled Area” means any area declared to be Scheduled Area within the State of Madhya Pradesh under paragraph 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 7. Bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions goes to show that for the purpose of seeking protection of Judges Protection Act, the person concerned has to show that the cause of action for filing prosecution against him relates to something done by him while exercising adjudicatory jurisdiction i.e. to say that he is deciding the lis as Judicial Officer. 8. As far as the facts relating to filing of the prosecution in this case as has been mentioned by the petitioners themselves clearly goes to show that what was being sought to be done by the petitioners to recover certain loans based upon recovery certificate for realization of loan of M.P. Khadi Gramodyog, Bhopal, whereas when the aforesaid job was entrusted petitioners were also Tehsildar with respect to the Tehsil in which the incumbents from whom the loan was to be recovered was the residents. The petitioners took the matter very casually and did not take any steps for recovery of loan even for a period of three years. It is delay which was caused on their behalf and the reason for proceeding ahead with the case. 9. Some facts which have been mentioned by the petitioners themselves in this petition are being reproduced hereunder for the sake of reference:- “4. It is delay which was caused on their behalf and the reason for proceeding ahead with the case. 9. Some facts which have been mentioned by the petitioners themselves in this petition are being reproduced hereunder for the sake of reference:- “4. That, the Petitioner No. 1 submits that he was posted under an order dated 17-6-2002 as Naib Tehsildar in District Indore and was posted as Naib Tehsildar, Tappa Gautampura, Tehsil-Depalpur, district Indore by an order dated 4-10-2003 issued by the Collector, Indore and was given dditional charge of Naib Tehsildar, Depalpur by an order dated 23-7-2003 issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Depalpur, district Indore. The petitioner remained there till 8-6-2004. 5. That, the petitioner No. 1 further submits that while his posting as Naib Tehsildar, Tappa Gautampura, Tehsil Depalpur, district Indore, a Revenue Recovery Case (hereinafter referred to as “RRC”) No. 121/RRC/2003 dated 6-3-2003 (Annexure P/3) was issued from the office of Collector, District Indore addressed to Shri Prabhat Kabra, Tehsildar Depalpur. 6. That, Shri Kabra the then Tehsildar Depalpur, marked the same to the petitioner No. 1 without observing the formality of its registration by the W.B.N. (Wasil Baki Navis) Branch. Though the superior officer of the petitioner No. 1 had marked the RRC to the petitioner on 17-3-2003, the petitioner No. 1 under the influence and direction of the superior officer took the cognizance of the same immediately under the impression that the RRC is duly registered by the W.B.N. Section. 7. That, the petitioners submit that the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 258 (1) and section 258 (2) (lxx) read with section 155(c) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 has framed Rules dated 11-1-1960 (Annexure P/4) providing for procedure for recovery of money as arrears of land revenue under section 155 of the Code. Rule 1 provides for making on an application in writing to the Tehsildar by the person or local authority desirous of recovery of any sum as an arrear of land revenue. Rule 2 provides that such application shall contain the following particulars:- (A) The person or local authority to whom the sum is due. (B) The person from whom the sum is due. (C) The sum due. (D) The provisions of law under which the sum is recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. (E) The process by which the sum may be recovered. (B) The person from whom the sum is due. (C) The sum due. (D) The provisions of law under which the sum is recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. (E) The process by which the sum may be recovered. (F) The property against which the process may be executed. That, a bare perusal of the RRC (Annexure P/3) manifestly reveals that there were material alterations/overwriting in descriptions of defaulter, address was also not succinctly mentioned, the property mortgaged for security of loan was also not mentioned. Thus, on account of aforesaid material deficiencies in the aforesaid RRC, the petitioner No. 1 marked the said RRC to Shri Chandra Shekhar Parmar, the then Patwari Halka No. 6 and handed over the same to his Reader and instructed him to communicate the same to the P.H. No. 6 to get his report so as to ascertain the correct description of the defaulter so that further action may be taken by the petitioner No. 1.” 10. The aforesaid paragraphs thus goes to show that for one year no action was taken by the petitioners for recovery of the amount from the defaulters. Simultaneously, with respect to the second case also there was a delay of more than two years. The facts as stated by the petitioners itself goes to show that there was delay on the part of the petitioners in taking steps about the recovery of various amounts. Except for passing on the responsibility on others, no further explanation has been given. Even otherwise, this Court is not to sit in appeal. The factual aspects are to be looked into by the concerned trial Court. 11. As far as we are concerned, we may only refer to the circumstances leading to filing of the prosecution against the petitioners as are mentioned in the sanction order and for which it is referred to paragraph 6 to paragraph 11 and reads as under:- xxx xxx xxx 12. Since the work assigned to the petitioners was only ministerial work i.e. to recover the dues from the defaulters on the basis of the recovery certificate and which act on the their part do not include any judicial function. We are of the considered view that petitioners are not entitled to protection under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 as claimed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. 13. We are of the considered view that petitioners are not entitled to protection under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 as claimed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. 13. So far as the other issues are concerned it is required to be looked into by the trial Court as the issues are of the factual matrix. As far as the issue of sanction is concerned, we have already precluded the petitioners' question of grant of sanction of the earlier order passed, of which reference has been made above. 14. Consequently, without commenting on the merits of the case, we do not find it a fit case to exercise our powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code and accordingly the petition is dismissed. Misc. Cr. C. as per rules.