JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused-petitioner against the order dated 19.11.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track) No. 2, Bikaner (for short, 'the Revisional Court' hereinafter) in Criminal Revision Petition No. 5/2008, whereby the learned Revisional Court has rejected the revision petition filed by the petitioner and upheld the order dated 17.12.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kolayat (for short the trial Court hereinafter), whereby the learned trial Court took the cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 471 and 120B I.P.C. against the petitioner in connection with F.I.R. No. 29/2003, Police Station, Kolayat, Distt. Bikaner. 2. Brief facts, necessary for disposal of this petition, are that one Narayan Ram submitted a complaint before the learned trial Court on 17.4.2003, while alleging therein that his father Bhanwara Ram and grandmother Jamuna were holding an agricultural land measuring 15.2 Bighas in Village Sankhla Basti. In March, 2003, accused-Sona Ram came to their Village and informed the villagers that he has mortgaged 15 Bighas of land of Bhamvara Ram, father of the petitioner by impersonating himself as son of Bhanwara Ram. The complainant thereafter visited the Regional Rural Bank, Branch Guda, where he came to know that Sona Ram took a loan of Rs. 25,000/- on the basis of land certificate showing Sona Ram as son of Bhanwra Ram. It is further alleged in the complaint that the said certificate was prepared by the petitioner Mohan Lal, Who was holding the charge of Office Kanungo at that time in the office of the Revenue Department of the area concerned. It is also alleged in the complaint that the petitioner had issued a forged land certificate in the name of Sona Ram showing him as son of Bhanwara Ram, and Sona Ram thereafter obtained the loan on the basis of said certificate from the Bank and, therefore, the accused persons have committed offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. The complaint filed by the complainant-Narayan Lal was forwarded under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the Police Station, Kolayat, where an F.I.R. No. 29 dated 18.4.2003 was registered against the petitioner and other co-accused. Police investigated the matter and after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. was filed against the petitioner and other accused-persons. 3. The learned trial Court vide order dated 17.12.2004, took the cognizance against the petitioner and other co-accused persons for the aforesaid offences. Being aggrieved with this, the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Revisional Court and the Revisional Court has dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 19.11.2008. Hence, this misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the learned trial Court as well as the Revisional Court have failed to take into consideration that no cognizance can be taken against the petitioner for the alleged offences in view of the provisions of Rule 170 of the Rajasthan Service Rules (for short 'the RSR' hereinafter) and as per Rule 7 of the Pension Rules, 1996 (for short 'the Rules of 1996' hereinafter). It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint was filed on 17.4.2003 in respect of an event took place on 4.8.1997 and the learned trial Court took the cognizance against the petitioner for the alleged offences on 17.12.2004, whereas the petitioner was retired from service on 31.3.2001 and, therefore, as per the provisions of Rule 170 of the RSR and Rule 7 of the Rules of 1996, no criminal proceedings can be initiated against the petitioner in relation to an incident took place four years before the date of complaint. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Omprakash v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2004(2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 922. 5. In is further argued that before taking cognizance against the petitioner for the alleged offences, no prosecution sanction, as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C., was obtained and, therefore, also the order of taking cognizance in bad in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Choudhary v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF) reported in 2008 AIR SC 1937. 6. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Choudhary v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF) reported in 2008 AIR SC 1937. 6. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not committed any forgery by issuing the certificate showing Sona Ram as son of Bhanwara Ram as the document was prepared by the accused under his own signature and even if the contents mentioned in the certificate were incorrect, it cannot be said that the document prepared by the petitioner was forged. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the incident, for which the complaint was filed by the petitioner, was of the year 1997 and the cognizance against the petitioner was taken in the year 2008 and as such the inordinate delay was caused in taking cognizance against the petitioner and, therefore, also the order of taking cognizance is liable to be quashed. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Md. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2010 Cri.L.J. 2223 , as well as of this Court in Shiv Charan & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2012 Cri.L.J. 211. 7. The learned counsel for tire petitioner has further contended that the learned Revisional Court has wrongly negated the contention of the petitioner in respect of bar of taking cognizance after four years of the date of the event, for which the complaint was made, while observing that the provisions of RSR has no overriding effect over the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the RSR and the Rules of 1993 are special laws and the provisions of the said laws have an overriding effect over procedure provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2001 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 627. 8. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2001 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 627. 8. On the strength of above arguments, the counsel for the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the orders dated 17.12.2004 and 19.11.2008 passed by the learned trial Court and the Revisional Court respectively. 9. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor and the counsel appearing for the respondents have supported the orders passed by both the Courts below and contended that the petitioner has committed offence punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 471 and 120-B I.P.C. by issuing the forged certificate in favour of Sona Ram by showing him as son of Bhanwara Ram and on the strength of the said certificate, Sona Ram obtained loan from the Bank and, therefore, no interference is called for. 10. Having considered the arguments of both the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the impugned orders, this Court finds that there is no merit in this petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the strength of the provisions of Rule 170 of RSR and Rule 7 of the Rules of 1996 to the effect that the criminal proceedings cannot be initiated against the petitioners for the event took place before four years from the date of filing the complaint is not liable to be accepted in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath reported in (1989) 1 SCC 321 , wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions of Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, which are similar to the provisions of Rule 170 of the RSR as Rule 7 of the Rules of 1996, has held as under: "4. It has been urged by learned counsel for the appellant that Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules has been misinterpreted by the High Court in holding that the said Rule placed an embargo on initiating judicial proceedings for prosecution of a Government servant on the expiry of four years of the cause of action or the event referred to in the said rule and the High Court committed an error of law in taking the said view. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the view taken by the High Court was correct and in view of Rule 2.2 the First Information Report against Kailash Nath and the prosecution as against Mangal Singh Minhas were rightly quashed. In order to appreciate the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties with regard to the scope arid interpretation of Rule 2.2, it would be useful to extract the relevant portion of sub-rule (b) of Rule 2.2. It reads: (b) The Government further reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Govt, if in a departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement. Provided that: (1)....... (2)....... (3) No such judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the officer was in service, whether before his retirement or during his reemployment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution: Explanation. - For the purpose of this rule - (a )...... (b) a judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted - (i) in the case of a criminal proceedings on the date on which the complaint or report of the police officer on which the Magistrate takes cognizance is made; 5. There is no dispute that Punjab Civil Service Rules have been framed by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred on him by Article 309 of the Constitution and that Rule 2.2 occurs in Chapter II of Volume II of the Rules dealing with "Ordinary Pension". It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that keeping in view the scope of Article 309 as also the purpose of Rule 2.2, the said rule cannot be interpreted to be a rule placing an embargo on prosecution of a Government servant on the expiry of a period of four years from the date of cause of action or event mentioned therein. 6. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find substance in the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant. Article 309 empowers making of rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any Slate. On the plain language of Article 309, the proposition that any rule framed under this article has to be confined to recruitment and conditions of service of persons mentioned therein admits of no doubt. The rule in question certainly does not purport to regulate recruitment. The question which, therefore, presents itself for answer is whether the said rule if it is to be interpreted as one placing an embargo on institution of judicial proceedings as against a person referred to therein for prosecution in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution, as has been held by the High Court can be treated to be a rule regulating the condition of service of such a person. Learned counsel for the respondents asserts that the embargo aforesaid is a condition of service calculated to ensure a person mentioned in the said rule peace of mind after retirement. According to learned counsel for the respondent every employer wants his employee to be efficient and to achieve this object, various incentives are given. Consequently, according to learned counsel, an assurance to an employee that he shall not be prosecuted after his retirement, even though guilty of committing a grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, after the lapse of a particular time which has been fixed in the instant case as four years would fall within the purview of "conditions of service" as contemplated by Article 309. We find it difficult to agree with the submission. As explained by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 3 SCR 302 and reiterated in I.N. Snbba Reddy v. Andhra University, (1976) 3 SCR 1013 , the expression "conditions of service" means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension etc. 7. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 3 SCR 302 and reiterated in I.N. Snbba Reddy v. Andhra University, (1976) 3 SCR 1013 , the expression "conditions of service" means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension etc. 7. In the normal course what falls within the purview of the term "conditions of service" may be classified as salary or wages including subsistence allowance during suspension, the periodical increments, pay-scale, leave, provident fund, gratuity, confirmation, promotion, seniority tenure or termination of service, compulsory or premature retirement, superannuation, pension, changing the age of superannuation, deputation and disciplinary proceedings. Whether or not a Government servant should be prosecuted for an offence committed by him obviously cannot be treated to be something pertaining to conditions of service. Making a provision that a Government servant, even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or Prevention of Corruption Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counter productive. It is likely to be an incentive not for efficient work but for committing offences including embezzlement and misappropriation by some of them at the fag end of their tenure of service and making an effort that the offence is not detected within the period prescribed for launching prosecution or manipulating delay in the matter of launching prosecution. Further, instances are not wanting where a Government servant may escape prosecution at the initial stage for want of evidence but during the course of prosecution of some other person evidence may be led or material may be produced which establishes complicity and guilt of such Government servant. By that time period prescribed, if any, for launching prosecution may have expired and in that event on account of such period having expired the Government servant concerned would succeed in avoiding prosecution even though there may be sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by him. By that time period prescribed, if any, for launching prosecution may have expired and in that event on account of such period having expired the Government servant concerned would succeed in avoiding prosecution even though there may be sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by him. Such a situation, in our opinion, cannot be created by framing a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution laving down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service." 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra v. Keshav Ranichandra Pangare & Anr. reported in (1999) 9 SCC 479 , has followed the decision rendered in State of Punjab & Kailash Nath (supra), while dealing with the provisions of Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1982 and has held as under: "7. The next question is what would be the effect of Pension Rules which prescribe a period of limitation? For considering the contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to refer to relevant part of Rule 27 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, which reads as under: "Rule 27. Right of Government to withhold or with drazo pension. - (1) Government may, by order in writing, withhold or withdraw a pension or any part of it, whether, permanently or for a specified period, and also order the recovery from such pension to whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, die pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement: Provided..... Provided..... (2) (a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Government. (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Government. (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place as the Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to the departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. (3) No judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution. (4)-(6) xxx xxx xxx 8. Similar contention was dealt with by this Court in State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, (1989) SCC 321 , wherein the Court considered similar Service Rule 2.2 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules. The Court held that whether or not a Government servant should be prosecuted for an offence committed by him obviously cannot be treated to be something pertaining to conditions of service; therefore, making a provision that a Government servant even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counter-productive. Such a situation cannot be created by framing a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution laying down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service. The Court further held (in Paras 11 and 12) as under: (SCC pp. Such a situation cannot be created by framing a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution laying down an embargo on prosecution as a condition of service. The Court further held (in Paras 11 and 12) as under: (SCC pp. 329-30) (11) ....If a rule containing an absolute or general embargo on prosecution of a Government servant after his retirement for grave misconduct or negligence during the course of the service does not fall within the purview of laying own conditions of service under Article 309, such a provision cannot in the purported exercise of power under Article 309 be made by either incorporating it in the substantive clause of a rule or in the proviso thereto. In view of what has been said above and keeping in mind the scope of rule making power under Article 309 of the Constitution, the third proviso to Rule 2.2 cannot be interpreted as lying down an absolute or general embargo on prosecution of a Government servant if the conditions stated therein are satisfied. Even if on first impression the said rule may appear to be placing such an embargo it has to be interpreted by taking recourse to the well settled rule of reading down a provision so as to bring it within the framework of its source of power without, of course, frustrating the purpose for which such provision was made. Clause (b) of Rule 2.2 which can be called the substantive clause reserves to the Government the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government if, in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement. (12) The purpose of the third proviso thereto is, as is the scope of a proviso, to carve out an exception to the right conferred on the Government by the substantive clause if the conditions contemplated by the proviso are fulfilled. (12) The purpose of the third proviso thereto is, as is the scope of a proviso, to carve out an exception to the right conferred on the Government by the substantive clause if the conditions contemplated by the proviso are fulfilled. This purpose can be achieved if the said proviso by adopting the rule of reading down is interpreted to mean that even if a Government servant is prosecuted and punished in judicial proceedings instituted in respect of cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution the Government will not be entitled to exercise the right conferred on it by the substantive provision contained in clause (b) with regard to pension of such a Government servant." 9. Similarly, in the present case, Rule 27(1) provides right of Government to withhold or withdraw a pension and in that context the said rule is to be interpreted. Under the said rule, the Government may inter alia order withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part thereof, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service. It also empowers the Government to order the recovery from such pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service. In the context of the second part of sub-rule (1), sub-rule (3) is to be read and interpreted. If something is to be recovered from the pension payable to the employee then the judicial proceeding or departmental inquiry is required to be started within the period prescribed under the sub-rule (2) or (3) but that would not debar the prosecuting agency from launching the prosecution for the offence of grave misconduct. This rule is to be read with the previous Rule 26 which provides that future good conduct shall be an implied condition of every grant of pension and Government may withhold or withdraw a pension or part thereof, if the pensioner is convicted of a serious crime or is found guilty of grave misconduct. This rule is to be read with the previous Rule 26 which provides that future good conduct shall be an implied condition of every grant of pension and Government may withhold or withdraw a pension or part thereof, if the pensioner is convicted of a serious crime or is found guilty of grave misconduct. But the Pension Rules 26 and 27 do not lay down any period of limitation for prosecution or could not supersede the period of limitation prescribed under the Cr.P.C. Rule 27 is only meant for the purpose of granting, withholding or withdrawing the pension and hence its operation would be in the limited field of granting or withholding pension to the Government employees. 12. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court on similar subject, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the bar of initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner, is liable to be rejected and is hereby rejected. It seems that the above decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court had not been brought into the notice of Coordinate Bench of this Court at the time of hearing of Om Prakash's case (supra). The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) is also not applicable on the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the law Laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above referred decisions. 13. So far other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that before taking cognizance against the petitioner, no prosecution sanction, as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was obtained is considered but for rejection only. The action of the petitioner of preparation of a forged certificate has no direct nexus of the discharge of his official duty and, therefore, before taking cognizance against the petitioner for the alleged offences, it was not required for the prosecution to seek prosecution sanction from the appropriate Government. The decisions rendered in P.K. Choudhary v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF) ; Md. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., and Shiv Charan & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner have, therefore, no application on the facts of the present case. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, no case for interference is made out. The criminal misc. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., and Shiv Charan & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner have, therefore, no application on the facts of the present case. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussions, no case for interference is made out. The criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is, therefore, dismissed.Petition allowed. *******