JUDGMENT Biplab Kumar Sharma, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 30.11.2005 and 25.05.2006 respectively passed by the disciplinary and appellate authority of the respondent Bank discharging the petitioner from service with superannuation benefits. The petitioner while was serving as Assistant/Teller under the respondent Bank at Silchar was served with the following charge sheet dated 14.07.2003 with the allegation of defrauding the Bank by way of misappropriation in draft account. ALLEGED MISAPPROPRIATION IN DRAFT ACCOUNT EXPLANATION It has been alleged that while officiating as teller at Silchar Branch, you have defrauded the Bank by way of misappropriation in draft account. You have deposited less amount in draft account in respect of the under noted drafts and have issued drafts for higher amount. Thereby you have perpetrated fraud in Bank's drafts account. By your such action you have misutilised the teller draft issue system and exposed the bank to huge financial loss. It is further alleged that you have prepared all the under noted draft vouchers as your handwriting is appearing in all the vouchers. Please, therefore, submit your explanations within 15 days from the date of receipt of this explanation as to why appropriate disciplinary action will not be initiated against you for the aforesaid gross misconduct committed by you. In case we fail to receive any reply from you within a period of 15 days from the receipt of this letter, it will be presumed that you have nothing to submit. Sd/- Lead District Manager 2. In response to the said charge sheet, the petitioner submitted his written statement on 26.09.2003 taking the plea of not defrauding the Bank by way of misappropriation in draft account, rather helping the Bank in recovering the amount from the purchaser by draft. However, in the said written statement he also stated that due to mental stress he could not recollect as to what actually happened and that discrepancies might had occurred due to such mental stress. For a ready reference, the said written statement dated 26.09.2003 is also reproduced below: To, Lead District Manager, State Bank of India, Lead Branch Office, Haflong Dear Sir, Alleged Misappropriation In Draft Account Explanation In response to your Memo No. LB/NCH/23/290 dated the 12th September 2003, most humbly and respectfully I beg to submit my explanation as under: 1. For a ready reference, the said written statement dated 26.09.2003 is also reproduced below: To, Lead District Manager, State Bank of India, Lead Branch Office, Haflong Dear Sir, Alleged Misappropriation In Draft Account Explanation In response to your Memo No. LB/NCH/23/290 dated the 12th September 2003, most humbly and respectfully I beg to submit my explanation as under: 1. That Sir, I never defrauded the Bank by way of misappropriation in Draft account as alleged rather I helped the Bank in recovering the lesser amount from the purchasers of the Drafts, when the Assistant General Manger, State Bank of India, Regional office, Silchar called me at his chamber on 16.04.2003 and pointed out the discrepancies in I.O.R. and asked me to recover the difference amounts from the purchasers of Drafts. Accordingly, the amount recovered from the concerned purchasers and deposited the amount of Rs. 35,000/- by means of Banker's cheque No. 120027 dated 19.04.2003 for Rs. 31,000/- and Banker's cheque No. ..... dated 21.04.2003 for Rs. 4000/-. 2. That Sir, while going to office, I met a serious head injury due to a scooter accident in 1991 and I have been under medical treatment till now. Recently a symptom develops. I cannot realise what happens to me for a fraction of moment. The attending Doctor has advised me that this is a temporary affect of medicine which will subside automatically and also advised me to avoid mental stress and strain. During the material period, my youngest daughter was suffering from acute aliment leading to hospitalise her. Under the influence of medicine and mental stress and strain due to hospitalisation of my youngest daughter, I cannot recollect exactly what happened during the material period. 3. In view of what has staged above, I have the honour to inform that since my joining I have been discharging my duties faithfully, diligently and honestly with full satisfaction of my superiors under whom I worked. The alleged discrepancy might have happened due to the facts as stated above. However, I helped the Bank to recover the difference amounts when pointed out to me. I, therefore, deny the allegation of defrauding the Bank by way of misappropriation in draft account as levelled against me. The alleged discrepancy might have happened due to the facts as stated above. However, I helped the Bank to recover the difference amounts when pointed out to me. I, therefore, deny the allegation of defrauding the Bank by way of misappropriation in draft account as levelled against me. Considering the facts stated above, I, therefore, request you to kindly absolve me from the alleged charge and reinstate me so that I can serve the Bank with full satisfaction of all. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Abbas Ali) Assistant (CAI) (Now under suspension) 3. Before proceeding any further with the matter, it will be appropriate to refer to the pleaded case of the petitioner upto to the stage of issuance of the said charge sheet and the reply thereto. In paragraph-2 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated about his scooter accident on 17.08.1991 with head injury which he had allegedly suffered in the said accident. In paragraph-3 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that on 13.04.2003, the Bank Manager of the respondent Bank in which the petitioner had been serving directed him to report to the Assistant General Manager of the Bank at Regional Office at Silchar. In paragraph-4 of the writ petition, the petitioner as stated about his meeting with the Assistant General Manager (AGM) who in turn had allegedly told him about pending investigation in respect of fraud in draft account in the branch where the petitioner had been serving as officiating teller. The petitioner was directed to cooperate with the Investigating Officer (I.O.). 4. In paragraph-5 of the writ petition, the statement made is that on 19.04.2003, the petitioner met the I.O. who took him to the chamber of the AGM and in his chamber both the officers promised that if the petitioner would make the admission and pay the amount recovering the loss to the Bank, no action in the matter would be taken. Accordingly, the petitioner wrote a letter to the AGM after preparing a draft of Rs. 31,000/- making good to the earlier loss caused to the Bank. In paragraph-6 of the writ petition, the petitioner has referred to Annexure-II statement made before the I.O. Annexure-I is the draft of Rs. 31,000/-. 5. By the aforesaid draft of Rs. Accordingly, the petitioner wrote a letter to the AGM after preparing a draft of Rs. 31,000/- making good to the earlier loss caused to the Bank. In paragraph-6 of the writ petition, the petitioner has referred to Annexure-II statement made before the I.O. Annexure-I is the draft of Rs. 31,000/-. 5. By the aforesaid draft of Rs. 31,000/- the petitioner made good to the loss that was caused to the Bank and by Annexure-II statement he admitted the charge that was levelled against him. For a ready reference, the relevant portion of the said statement of the petitioner is quoted below: confirmed that I have issued all the above 9 drafts from teller counter when I officiated as teller at Silchar Branch. As I were in serious mental agony, I prepared the above draft vouchers. I confirmed my handwriting on the above draft vouchers except 681706. I cannot recollect what had happened to the original vouchers. Due to my mental agony drafts of higher amount are issued by me. The excess amount is refunded by me now. I was passing through extreme mental stress, agony and tension during this period. I was working almost in an unconscious state of mind and do not know how such a thing happened. I am returning the money which the Bank was suppose to loss and beg to request Bank to kindly take a lenient view on me. I also request to provide me opportunity for rectification. 6. In the writ petition, the petitioner has attributed the aforesaid refund of alleged defrauded amount to the promise allegedly made out to him that upon such refund and admission no action would be taken against him. As to what was his reply to the charge sheet has been noted above, in the said reply the petitioner virtually admitted the facts alleged in the charge sheet. Significantly, in the said reply there is no whisper to the aforesaid plea of promise being made out to him to drop the charges once he had admitted the guilt. Even if such a promise was made out to him, the petitioner, if was not guilty of the charges, ought not to have admitted the allegations. 7. Significantly, in the said reply there is no whisper to the aforesaid plea of promise being made out to him to drop the charges once he had admitted the guilt. Even if such a promise was made out to him, the petitioner, if was not guilty of the charges, ought not to have admitted the allegations. 7. In due course an enquiry was conducted by appointing an enquiry officer and on conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report and it was forwarded to the petitioner on 02.05.2005 asking for his comments. The enquiry officer as per his Annexure-XIII report found the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. On receipt of the representation made by the petitioner on 13.05.2005 against the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority in consideration of the entire materials on record passed the Annexure-XIV order dated 03.11.2005 discharging the petitioner from service with superannuation benefits, i.e. pension, provident fund, gratuity as would be due otherwise under the rules or regulation prevailing at the relevant point of time and without disqualification from future employment. Thus, although the expression "discharged from service" has been used in the impugned order, but in fact same is in the form of compulsory retirement as the petitioner would be entitled to superannuation benefits. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of penalty, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the appellate authority and the appellate authority by its Annexure-XXIII order dated 25.05.2006 having rejected the same, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing the instant writ petition. 8. I have heard Mr. A.B. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. J.P. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Mr. S.S. Sarma, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent Bank. I have considered the entire materials on record including the disciplinary proceeding file. 9. Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that the petitioner having not admitted any charge of misappropriation, the disciplinary authority ought to have considered that aspect of the matter dispassionately instead of proceeding with the matter and that too, on the basis of the purported admission on the part of the petitioner. 9. Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that the petitioner having not admitted any charge of misappropriation, the disciplinary authority ought to have considered that aspect of the matter dispassionately instead of proceeding with the matter and that too, on the basis of the purported admission on the part of the petitioner. Referring to the procedure to be followed in the matter of initiation of departmental proceeding, he submitted that the act and/or conduct attributed to the petitioner having not constituted any misconduct, the disciplinary authority ought not have initiated disciplinary proceeding with eventual discharge of the petitioner from service. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that subsequent to the impugned departmental proceeding and the orders thereof, the petitioner having been acquitted in the criminal case that was registered against him pertaining to the incident, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and quashed. On conclusion of the argument advanced by him, a written argument was submitted detailing the submissions made and referring to certain case laws. 10. Mr. S.S. Sarma, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent Bank countering the above argument submitted that the petitioner being a bank employee was required to maintain absolute integrity. As regards the plea relating to the principles of natural justice that has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he emphasised that those principles should not be stretched that far so as to result in injustice and mockery of those principles. He submitted that the petitioner himself having admitted the charges and no prejudice having been pleaded so far as the procedure adopted in the enquiry is concerned, the impugned orders are not liable to be interfered with. 11. As recorded above, Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner in his elaborate argument submitted that there was gross violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was only provided with the photo copies of the documents exhibited during the course of hearing and that inspire of request being made by the petitioner he was not supplied with the originals. The whole basis of the argument of Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner was on the emphasis of alleged violation of the principles of natural justice. The whole basis of the argument of Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner was on the emphasis of alleged violation of the principles of natural justice. On being pointed out about the own admission of the petitioner regarding the facts alleged in the charge sheet, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that such purported admission cannot lead to inference that the petitioner is guilty of the charge that was levelled against him. 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. An argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner was subsequently acquitted in the criminal case purportedly relating to the same incident, the impugned orders are liable to be interfered with. Needless to say that the degree of proof in both the proceedings is quite distinct and different. While in a departmental proceeding it is preponderance of probability, in a criminal proceeding the charge is required to be established beyond all reasonable doubt. In this connection, I may gainfully refer to the decisions reported in (1991) 2 SCC 716 (Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education Vs. K.S. Gandhi & Ors.); (1996) 6 SCC 417 (State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena & Ors.) and AIR 1999 SC 1514 (Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Anr. Vs. A. Gopalan). 13. In K.S. Gandhi (supra), it was observed thus. 37. It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred, as much as is practical, as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries. 14. In B.K. Meena (supra), the Apex Court dealing with same issue observed thus. 17. There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed. 15. In A. Gopalan (supra), dealing with the same issue, somewhat under similar circumstances, the Apex Court observed thus. 6. We have heard Shri V.C. Mahajan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri K.M.K. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. Shri Nair has submitted that since the respondent has been acquitted by the criminal court on the charge of withdrawal of Rs. 8000, the Tribunal was right in holding that the finding regarding the first charge could not be sustained. Shri Nair has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India 1. The said decision does not lend support to the said submission of Shri Nair. In that case the Court has rejected the contention that disciplinary proceedings could not be continued in the face of the acquittal in the criminal case and has held that the nature and scope of the criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This is so because in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that in view of the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court on the charge relating to withdrawal of Rs. 8000 the finding on the first charge in the departmental proceedings cannot be upheld and must be set aside. The Tribunal was also not right in taking the view that even though the second charge of misappropriation of the sums of Rs. 379 and Rs. 799 realised as customs duty was established, the punishment of compulsory retirement that was imposed on the respondent could not be sustained. The Tribunal was also not right in taking the view that even though the second charge of misappropriation of the sums of Rs. 379 and Rs. 799 realised as customs duty was established, the punishment of compulsory retirement that was imposed on the respondent could not be sustained. Having regard to the fact that the second charge related to misappropriation of funds for which the punishment of compulsory retirement could be imposed the Tribunal, in exercise of its jurisdiction, could not direct the appellate authority to review the penalty imposed on the respondent. 16. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the petitioner having been acquitted subsequently in the criminal proceeding, the impugned orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authority became nonest The standard of proof required in both the proceedings being quite distinct and different about which discussion have been made above, the petitioner cannot take the plea that the disciplinary authority is bound to follow the decision in the criminal case by reversing its own order. 17. Much was argued about violation of the principle of natural justice. However, on perusal of the entire disciplinary proceeding file and also the writ petition, nothing is discernible that at any stage, the petitioner had pleaded any prejudice caused to him in conducting the departmental proceeding. As has been held by the Apex Court in State Bank of India, Patiala Vs. S.K. Sarma reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 , the interest of justice demands that guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which did not cause failure of justice should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are measures to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end that would be counter productive exercise. Making a distinction between substantive nature and procedural in character in respect of rules/regulation/statutory provision, it was held by the Apex Court that in case of violation of procedural provision and violation thereof cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held. 18. In the enquiry proceeding the petitioner was represented by his defence Assistant one Shri Bidyut Deb. Making a distinction between substantive nature and procedural in character in respect of rules/regulation/statutory provision, it was held by the Apex Court that in case of violation of procedural provision and violation thereof cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held. 18. In the enquiry proceeding the petitioner was represented by his defence Assistant one Shri Bidyut Deb. After the preliminary enquiry held on 7.6.2004, regular hearing started on 16.6.2004, on which date documents relating to misappropriation in bank draft account were exhibited along with some other documents including the cheques by which the petitioner had refunded the misappropriated amount. On production of the documents, the petitioner submitted before the Enquiry Officer that some of the documents did not contain the full text. Objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner, without however, pleading anything as to how the same had caused any prejudice to his defence. Be that as it may, on subsequent date of hearing, all the documents had been produced but the petitioner raised objection on the ground of non-production of the same at the earliest opportunity which was overruled by the Enquiry Officer and rightly so. 19. It was not the case of the petitioner that the documents produced and exhibited on behalf of the disciplinary authority were not authentic and that the production of the same on a subsequent date caused any prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. As noted above, the charge and the defence of the petitioner stair on the fact of it to show that the petitioner had admitted his guilt. His defence that he had refunded the misappropriate amount on later dates as was instructed by his superior authority with the promise to drop the charge against him, cannot be accepted, inasmuch as, firstly the petitioner ought not to have acceded to the said advice if he had not misappropriated the amount, and secondly, when the purported promise did not materalise with the initiation of the proceeding against him, he ought to have referred to the said promise. He did nothing of this sort and later on took the plea that because of his head injury which he had allegedly sustained way back in 1991 as against commission of the misconduct in 2001 when the incident occurred, there might have been discrepancies. He did nothing of this sort and later on took the plea that because of his head injury which he had allegedly sustained way back in 1991 as against commission of the misconduct in 2001 when the incident occurred, there might have been discrepancies. Such plea of the petitioner is not at all sustainable as at no point of time he had expressed any reservation regarding the work allotted to him and inability on his part to do such job. 20. Above being the position, I do not find any merit in the submission regarding violation of the principle of natural justice. In this connection, I may gainfully refer to the decision in Canara Bank Vs. V.K. Awasthy reported in AIR 2005 SC 2090 . In the said case it has been held in that in absence of any ground of prejudice or violation of the principle of natural justice either in the memorandum of appeal or at the time of hearing before the appellate authority, the order of punishment imposed on the Bank employee was not liable to be interfered with. As in the instant case, in the said case also the respondent was a Bank employee. The charges levelled against him were proved in the enquiry. It was found that the bank employee failed to discharge his duty with utmost integrity and devotion and his acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. The Apex Court dealing with the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, held that interference in the quantum of punishment was not called for. In paragraphs 8, 9, 22 and 27 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed thus: 8. Natural justice is another name for common-sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 9. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 9. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence. 22. It is to be noted that the detailed charge-sheets were served on the respondent employee who not only submitted written reply, but also participated in the proceedings. His explanations were considered and the inquiry officer held the charges to have been amply proved. He recommended dismissal from service. The same was accepted by the disciplinary authority. The proved charges clearly established that the respondent employee failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and his acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. In the appeal before the prescribed Appellate Authority, the findings of the inquiry officer were challenged. The Appellate Authority after analysing the materials on record found no substance in the appeal. 27. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham 47 this Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paras 31 and 32, which read as follows: (SCC pp. 478-80) 31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarised as follows: (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury 32 test. (2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational - in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU 33 principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay 48, Brind 39 and Smith 49 as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at the decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19 and 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of 'proportionality'. There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to 'irrationality', there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in 'outrageous' defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain 'Ranjit Thakur 50'. 21. It was submitted that the amount involved being meagre (Rs. 35,000/-) and the same having been deposited by the petitioner, the extreme penalty of discharging the petitioner from service ought not have been imposed Suffice it to say that the amount involved is immaterial, it is the honesty and integrity which matter much. As has been held by the Apex Court in Municipal Committee Vs. Krishnan Bihari reported in (1996) 2 SCC 714 , in case of forgery there cannot be any other punishment other than dismissal from service. Any sympathy shown in such case is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large, it is the act misappropriation that is relevant. 22. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. K. Guruswamy reported in (1996) 7 SCC 114 , upholding the dismissal of the respondent, the Apex Court held that interference with the punishment on the ground of being disproportionate was not warranted as the officer was involved in corruption. 23. As has been held by the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Mohd. K. Guruswamy reported in (1996) 7 SCC 114 , upholding the dismissal of the respondent, the Apex Court held that interference with the punishment on the ground of being disproportionate was not warranted as the officer was involved in corruption. 23. As has been held by the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Ayub Naz reported in AIR 2006 SC 856 , it is not for the writ court to substantiate any penalty in lieu of the one decided to be fit by the disciplinary authority. 24. Much was emphasised that the purported admission was not voluntary on the part of the petitioner. However, there is no pleading to that effect in the writ petition. What has been stated is that the petitioner was promised by the Bank officers that in case of admission to refund the defrauded amount, there would be no disciplinary proceeding. The petitioner himself has annexed the statement that was made by him before the I.O. which clearly indicates that there was clear admission on his part about the misconduct committed by him involving financial irregularities and that too, in a financial institution like Bank. 25. In Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1972 SC 32 , the Apex Court observed that the facts speak for themselves. In the said case, the police officer remained absent without leave and also resorted to demonstration against the action of the superior officer. In such circumstances, it was held by the Apex Court that indiscipline was fully established. In the instant case also, as noted above, the facts speak for themselves. The petitioner having admitted those facts virtually admitted the charges levelled against him. 26. In Addl. District Magistrate Vs. Pravakar Chaturvedi reported in (1996) 2 SCC 12 , the person concerned had admitted to have received an amount of Rs. 21,000/- which he allegedly could not deposit on account of carelessness. The Apex court observed that such a statement could not have been said to have been brought about by coercion. It was held that when the respondent No. 1 was guilty of misappropriation of Rs. 21,000/- for a couple of months, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal was uncalled for or was grossly disproportionate. 27. In Vice Chairman, KVS Vs. It was held that when the respondent No. 1 was guilty of misappropriation of Rs. 21,000/- for a couple of months, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal was uncalled for or was grossly disproportionate. 27. In Vice Chairman, KVS Vs. Gidharilal Yadav reported in (2004) 6 SCC 325, the Apex Court finding that the respondent had admitted the fact alleged in the charge sheet observed that the facts admitted need not be proved. In paragraph-11 of the said judgment, it was observed thus. 11. ...It is also a well-settled principle of law that the principles of natural justice should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala 1 this Court has noticed that: (SCC p. 324, paras 49-50) 24. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that if a party after having proper notice chose not to appear, he at later stage cannot be permitted to say that he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing. The question had been considered by a Bench of this Court in Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta 2 of which two of us (V.N. Khare, C.J. and Sinha, J.) are parties wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held: (SCC p. 506, para 29) 29. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby. 25. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far. (See also Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India 3 and Canara Bank v. Debasis Das 4.) In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 5 whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Reddy, this Court held: (SCC p. 477, para 97) '97. 25. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far. (See also Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India 3 and Canara Bank v. Debasis Das 4.) In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 5 whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Reddy, this Court held: (SCC p. 477, para 97) '97. Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed.' 28. As referred to above, in the case of S.K. Sarma (supra), the Apex Court has dealt with the concept of prejudice that is often alleged by the delinquent. Prejudice must be demonstrated with definite pleadings and materials and not by mere statement that prejudice was caused to the delinquent. Even in case of non-furnishing of enquiry report because of which violation of the principle of natural justice is alleged, the Apex court has held that prejudice caused for non-furnishing the enquiry report must not only be pleaded, but also must be shown with definite materials. 29. In State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Urrora reported in (2001) 6 SCC 392 , the Apex court referring to the decision in S.K. Sarma (supra) and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Anr. Vs. B. Karmakar & Ors. reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 , held that non-furnishing of enquiry report would not be fatal to the order of punishment unless prejudice is shown. As in the said case, in the instant case also, the petitioner has emphasised on the principle of natural justice only in reference to non-furnishing of documents in original, but without showing and not even pleading that the same resulted in any prejudice to his case. As in the said case, in the instant case also, the petitioner has emphasised on the principle of natural justice only in reference to non-furnishing of documents in original, but without showing and not even pleading that the same resulted in any prejudice to his case. This aspect of the matter has been discussed by the Apex court in Oriental Insurance Company vs. S. Bala Krishnan reported in AIR 2001 SC 2400 in which also in absence of any prejudice shown, it was held that non-furnishing of enquiry report did not vitiate the order of penalty. 30. The decisions on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance are mainly on the principle of natural justice. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the facts alleged in the charge sheet having not disclosed any misappropriation, the petitioner could not have been held guilty of the charges levelled against him. It was also argued that non-furnishing of the list of witnesses, list of documents and non-furnishing of original documents resulted in gross violation of principle of natural justice. While it is true that the list of witnesses and documents were not furnished alongwith the charge sheet, but as disclosed by the petitioner himself, same was furnished to him after issuance of the charge sheet and thus he was aware of the same. No prejudice was also pleaded and/or agitated during the course of hearing. 31. The decisions on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to, are as follows: (1) 2009 (3) GLT 222 State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. P. Zadenga (2) 1997 (2) GLT 398 Llekhraj Rana Vs. Inspector General of Police (3) AIR 1961 SC 1070 Jagadish Prasad Saxena Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (4) (2009) 2 SCC 570 Roop Sigh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (5) (2001) 9 SCC 523 Pepsu Road Transport Corporation Vs. Lachhman Dass Gupta & Anr. (6) 2012 (3) GLT 217 Tripura Rehabilitation Plantation Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bhaskar Choudhury. 32. I have carefully gone through the decisions which are mainly on the principles of natural justice. As discussed above, the petitioner having not demonstrated any prejudice caused to him in conducting the departmental enquiry and he himself having admitted the fact stated in the charge sheet, in fact, admitted the guilt and for that matter the charge itself. 32. I have carefully gone through the decisions which are mainly on the principles of natural justice. As discussed above, the petitioner having not demonstrated any prejudice caused to him in conducting the departmental enquiry and he himself having admitted the fact stated in the charge sheet, in fact, admitted the guilt and for that matter the charge itself. That being the position, while appreciating the principles laid down in the said decisions, I do not find any ground to apply the said principle to the case of the petitioner. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed, without, however, any order as to costs. Petition dismissed