Judgment : 1. The partners of a firm had filed a suit for dissolution of the firm, for rendition of accounts and for the appointment of a receiver. The appellant was not a party to the suit. During the pendency of the suit, the Official Receiver, representing the firm, arraigned as the first defendant , had with the permission of the court, which was granted as per order dated 1-6-2002, entered in to an agreement, dated 24-4-2002, to sell agricultural land bearing Survey nos. 59 and 60, measuring in all about 9 acres and 39 guntas, of Halage vaderahalli, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore south taluk, to the appellant. The appellant is said to have paid the sale consideration and was also put in possession of the property. 2. The appellant, a registered Trust, which intended to establish an educational institution on the above said land was required to obtain permission to purchase and hold agricultural land, albeit for non -agricultural purposes, from the competent authorities, had also obtained such permission in due course, under Section 109 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'KLR Act', for brevity). However, one of the defendants had opposed the sale and had filed an application in that regard. The trial court had allowed that application by an order dated 30-10-2002 and the earlier order dated 1-6-2002 was recalled and the sale was indefinitely postponed, till the disposal of the suit. Finally, when the judgment was delivered, it is contended that the trial court did not consider the agreement made in favour of the appellant, but had directed the sale of the said property by public auction. The appellant being aggrieved by this is in appeal before this court. Incidentally, the appellant is said to have filed a civil suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale in its favour, in OS 6203/2008, pending on the file of the Court of the City Civil Judge , Bangalore. As the appellant was not a party to the suit, an application is filed seeking leave of this court to appeal. It is that application which is considered by this Order. As the appellant was not a party to the suit, an application is filed seeking leave of this court to appeal. It is that application which is considered by this Order. It is the grievance of the appellant that in view of the subsisting agreement of sale in respect of the property in question, in favour of the appellant, if the property is brought to sale by public auction - the pending suit of the appellant would be frustrated and the appellant would be put to loss, which is not capable of being compensated in terms of money. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a large number of authorities to assert that the appellant has a right to challenge the appeal in the light of established principles as regards the right of an aggrieved party to file an appeal against a judgment in a proceeding to which the appellant was not a party. 4. However, it is noticed from the sequence of events pertaining to the transaction under which the appellant claims a right, has been considered by the trial court at length and it is thereafter that the trial court has consciously negated the agreement of sale in favour of the appellant. Hence it is the limited aspect of whether the trial court was justified in overlooking the claim of the appellant, that would fall for consideration in deciding the present application seeking leave to appeal. It is found by the trial court, in the course of its judgment that one Puttuswamy, who was one of the Official Receivers appointed in the proceedings, had made an application in IA no.57 seeking permission to sell the above said land. The trial court had passed an order dated 11-2-2002 observing that there was no urgent need to sell the properties and any such sale was deferred to be considered at the final disposal of the suit. Yet another application was filed in IA no.60, inspite of the above order, seeking the same relief of permission to sell the property. This was on the footing that the Official Receiver on behalf of the first defendant, had entered into an agreement to sell the said property, dated 22-4-2002, in favour of the appellant herein. There was no prior permission obtained in this regard. The trial court had granted the permission, ignoring its earlier order. This was on the footing that the Official Receiver on behalf of the first defendant, had entered into an agreement to sell the said property, dated 22-4-2002, in favour of the appellant herein. There was no prior permission obtained in this regard. The trial court had granted the permission, ignoring its earlier order. Defendant no.8 is said to have then filed an application, in IA no.62 seeking a reconsideration of the order passed on IA no.60. The same was allowed and the Order permitting the sale of the property was stayed. The said Order was challenged by way of a writ petition in the writ jurisdiction of this court in WP 46270 to 273/2002, by the Official Receiver. The petition was disposed of with the following observations : "Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Petitioner receiver appears to have entered into an agreement without prior permission of the court. The receiver is a representative of the Court and functions under the guidance and directions of the Court. A receiver cannot take decisions on his own, particularly in the matter of immovable property of the firm in respect of which he is appointed a receiver and cannot take decisions by himself either to enter into an agreement or to sell the property in favour of any person. The Petitioner approached the court with an application praying for permission indicating that he has already entered into an Agreement to sell the property in favour of a particular educational trust. That in itself was an act which was not befitting the role of a receiver. The Trial Court having passed an order earlier on I.A.No.57 indicating that the property in question need not be sold and the question of selling the property could be considered only on the culmination of the suit, there was no occasion for the receiver to have ventured into for agreeing with third persons to sell the particular property. It is obvious that the petitioner receiver has evinced much more interest than was necessary and justified, in the discharge of his role as a receiver. The conduct of the receiver does not inspire confidence of this court to warrant interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and for issue of consequential directions to the Trial Court by setting aside the orders passed on I.A.Nos. 62 to 65. The conduct of the receiver does not inspire confidence of this court to warrant interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and for issue of consequential directions to the Trial Court by setting aside the orders passed on I.A.Nos. 62 to 65. At any rate, there is no case made out for interference with the orders passed on I.A.No.62." This order was challenged before the apex court, by one of the legal representatives of defendant no.4. The same was dismissed, with liberty to seek such permission at the appropriate time. There is no indication that there was any further application seeking such permission to sell the property, made by any of the parties, before the trial court thereafter. As the appellant has filed a suit seeking specific performance of contract, of the agreement executed by the Official Receiver, which was the subject matter of the above proceedings, whether there is an enforceable contract subsisting in favour of the appellant which is to be considered in that case, would be foreclosed if this court should express its opinion, hence no opinion is expressed in that regard. It would follow that the appellant having already chosen to enforce the said agreement, the validity or otherwise of the same cannot be addressed in this appeal. The appellant 's application seeking leave of this court to file the appeal is hence rejected. One other limb of argument canvassed is that irrespective of the above agreement of sale dated 22-4-2002, the appellant claims to be an assignee of the right and interest of a partner of the firm and legal representatives of another deceased partner, having acquired such right under two registered deeds of assignment dated 13-1-2010 and 8-12-2011. It is hence contended that the appellant as such assignee would have sufficient interest to file the appeal, notwithstanding that he was not a party to the suit. The above development which again does not appear to have been brought to the attention of the court below and which is only now sought to be established by seeking to adduce additional evidence before this court, may at best enable the appellant to claim under the said assignors to any rights and interest that they could claim. The above development which again does not appear to have been brought to the attention of the court below and which is only now sought to be established by seeking to adduce additional evidence before this court, may at best enable the appellant to claim under the said assignors to any rights and interest that they could claim. This circumstance is however, not relevant in so far as the claim to any right under the agreement of sale which is set up, in questioning the impugned judgment by which the properties of the firm are to be sold by public auction. Consequently, the application seeking leave to file the appeal is rejected and hence the appeal fails.