Judgment : 1. The appellant has challenged his conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on a trial held by the Special Judge, Bangalore Rural. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal are as under: P.W. 3-Anjanappa and P.W.4-Mahadevamma are the parents of P.W. 2-Madesha. On 26-1-2001 at about 7.30 p.m. P.W. 2-Madesha went to Muneshwara Temple and at that time there was a quarrel between accused 1 and P.W. 2-Madesha and accused 1 had bet P.W. 2 who in turn came to the house and complained the act of the accused. In turn P.W. 3-Anjanappa went near the temple and questioned accused 1 the reason to beat his son and abusing him by referring to his caste. After this incident when P.W. 3Anjanappa was returning to the house, accused came and it is alleged that accused 2 bet him and accused 1 the appellant herein inflicted a blow with the knife on the abdomen and thereby P.W. 3-Anjanappa sustained grievous injuries and cried. At that time P.W. 4-Mahadevamma and others intervened and rescued the injured P.W. 3. Immediately the injured was shifted in a tractor to Jayashree Hospital and has admitted for treatment. In the circumstances P.W. 3 submitted his complaint-Ex P. 2 on the aforesaid facts and it came to be registered by P.W. 14 in Crime No. 14 of 2001 and Ex. P. 2-complaint and FIR-Ex P.15 were sent to the Magistrate. During the investigation the statements were recorded, the spot mahazar-Ex. P. 3 was held in the presence of P.W. 1 and others. Sketch Ex. P. 1 was drawn, the clothes of the injured M.Os. 1 and 2 were seized under the mahazar-Ex. P. 3. The appellant was arrested and at his instance M.O. 3-knife was recovered under the mahazar-Ex P.4. The would certificate and caste certificate were collected and on completion of the investigation a charge-sheet came to be laid against accused 1 and 2 for the charge under Sections 323, 307 read with Section 34 of IPC and under Section 3(1)(X) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). During the trial the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 16, got marked the documents-Exs. P. 1 to P. 20 and M.Os. 1 to 3. During the trial the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 16, got marked the documents-Exs. P. 1 to P. 20 and M.Os. 1 to 3. The statement of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. No defence evidence was led. The Trial Court after hearing the Counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the material on record acquitted accused 2 and convicted accused 1 (appellant herein) for the charges under Sections 326 and 323 of IPC and he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 3,000/-, in addition to the compensation of Rs. 12,000/- for the offence under Section 326 of IPC and lesser sentence was awarded for the offence under section 323 of IPC. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed. 3. I have heard Sri H.P. Leeladhar, learned Counsel for the appellant and also the learned High Court Government Pleader. 4. The point that arise for my consideration is: “Whether the appellant has made out any grounds to warrant interference in his conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Sections 326 and 323 of IPC?” 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant would contend that except the injured P.W. 3, his wife-P.W. 4 and son-P.W. 2, none other witnesses have supported the case of he prosecution and therefore he submits that the conviction ordered by the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence of interested persons is not acceptable in law. So also it is his contention that P.W. 3 had sustained the injuries in an accident and there is sample material on record to prabobalise the defence of the appellant. It is also his submission that there are material discrepancies and omissions in the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 and therefore the conviction is bad in law. So also it is his submission that there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR and hence he would submit that the injured has chosen to implicate the appellant falsely taking disadvantage of delay that occurred in lodging the FIR. He also submits that the Investigating Officer-P.W. 14 has suppressed the complaint of P.Ws. 2 and 4 and registered Ex. P. 2 with the sole purpose to implicate the appellant as there were complaints against him about thefts in the villages. He also submits that the Investigating Officer-P.W. 14 has suppressed the complaint of P.Ws. 2 and 4 and registered Ex. P. 2 with the sole purpose to implicate the appellant as there were complaints against him about thefts in the villages. So also he would contend that though P.W. 2 had sustained bleeding injuries, his evidence is inconsistent with the evidence of the other witnesses. He would also submit that the other witnesses having turned hostile, the conviction based solely on the evidence of the injured and the close relatives deserves to be set aside. On this grounds he has sought for setting aside the conviction and sentence ordered. 6. On the other hand, learned High Court Government Pleader supporting the judgment and order of the Court below contends that P.W. 3 is the injured and his evidence is corroborated by P.Ws. 2 and 4 and also the medical evidence and therefore he submits that the conviction is based on the sound principles of law. 7. Scrutiny of the material placed on record reveals that P.W. 9-Manjunatha, P.W. 10Appayyappa, P.W. 11-Muniyappa and P.W. 15-Vijaykumar are the other independent witnesses examined by the prosecution and said to have witnessed the incident and they have turned hostile and nothing is elicited by the prosecution in their cross-examination to bring on record any incriminating circumstances. Therefore, so far as the proof of incident is concerned, it is the evidence of P.W. 2-Madesha son of injured P.W. 3-Anjanappa and Mahadevamma-P.W. 4 is available for appreciation and to consider as to whether the prosecution is able to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. 8. As per the version of these aforesaid injured and related witnesses it is stated that on the date of the incident P.W. 2-Madesha has gone to the temple and at that time there was a quarrel between the accused and P.W 2-Madesha. On this aspect of the matter there are some omissions and discrepancies and in the course of the evidence something more than what is stated in the complaint is deposed by these witnesses. On this aspect of the matter there are some omissions and discrepancies and in the course of the evidence something more than what is stated in the complaint is deposed by these witnesses. Anyhow, so far as the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act of 1989 is concerned, the accused is acquitted by the Trial Court for the charge and therefore I do no think that the said omissions or discrepancies which have been brought on record are material so far as the offences for which the appellants have been convicted by the Trial Court. There is some discrepancy as to whether P.W. 3 injured had gone to the temple or to the playground. It is not brought in the evidence of the witnesses as to whether the playground is abutting the temple or not. In that context, whether P.W. 3 had gone to the temple and whether P.W. 2 sustained injury is also not a material discrepancy. 9. As per the version of the prosecution, P.W.3 was near his house at the time of the second incident. Both the accused came near the house of P.W. 3 and accused 2 is said to have bet P.W. 3, whereas, accused 1 said to have stabbed over the abdomen with the knife. This version so far as the assault with the knife is concerned, the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 is consistent and cogent. To this extent, I do not find any omissions in the version of the prosecution. The question as to whether in what position accused 1 caused assault over the abdomen with the knife is also not a material improvement or discrepancy in the evidence of the prosecution, as it is the version of these three witnesses that the appellant used knife which was brought by him in the assault on P.W. 3 over his abdomen. 10. The prosecution has examined P.W. 8-Dr. Roshan Kumar who treated P.W. 3 the injured and the injury certificate has been produced at Ex. P.8. Perusal of the injury certificate would reveal that the injured was brought to the hospital with the history of assault. At the place where the history is mentioned in the injury certificate, the letters RTA were mentioned in the initial stage, they were corrected and later the word assault has been written. P.8. Perusal of the injury certificate would reveal that the injured was brought to the hospital with the history of assault. At the place where the history is mentioned in the injury certificate, the letters RTA were mentioned in the initial stage, they were corrected and later the word assault has been written. Anyhow, perusal of the injury certificate would reveal that there was a stab wound over the abdomen exposing the omentum. The doctor has certified that the injury is grievous. P.W. 3-Anjanappa had sustained only one injury over his abdomen. In the cross-examination of P.W. 8 a suggestion has been made that in case if any corrections are done in the register maintained, the corrections will be countersigned or initialed by the person correcting it. But so far as the world RTA scored off in the history column, there is no initial and therefore it is submission of the learned Counsel that it was a case of an accident (Road Traffic Accident) and the doctor has purposely scored off the word RTA and mentioned the word assault. It is relevant to note that the doctor who is on duty in the hospital may admit many injured persons in an accident and even if by oversight he has mentioned the word RTA and has scored off the same, the mere fact that the correction is not initialed, itself is not sufficient to attribute mala fides on the part of the doctor. If really it was a case of an accident, there was no reason for the doctor-P.W. 8 to mention the word as assault by scoring of the word RTA, particularly in the cross-examination of P.W. 8. No mala fides have been attributed to P.W. 8 to implicate the appellant in a case of assault. That apart, except the stab wound on the abdomen, there are no other injuries over the body of the injured P.W. 3. In case if P.W. 3 had sustained to the injury in an accident, it is rather improbable that he would have sustained only one stab injury over the abdomen. So, this circumstance which is brought on record in the evidence of P.W. 8 would clearly reveal that it was not a case of RTA, but it is a case pertaining to an assault. So, this circumstance which is brought on record in the evidence of P.W. 8 would clearly reveal that it was not a case of RTA, but it is a case pertaining to an assault. Therefore, the evidence of P.W. 8 cannot be discarded solely for the reason that he has mentioned wrongly the word RTA in the history column. In this context if the evidence of P.W. 8 and the injury certificate Ex. P. 8 are looked into, the doctor is of the opinion that this injury would be caused by a sharp edged weapon like knife. Therefore, the medical evidence led by the prosecution also supports the version of the injured. 11. Generally an injured does not implicate an innocent and does not leave a person who has really caused the harm. Under this principle, the evidence of the injured P.W. 3 is looked into, if he had really sustained the injuries in an accident, he would have gone to a Tribunal for compensation instead of making a complaint against the appellant. The evidence of the injured stands at a higher footing and it cannot be lightly rejected. There are no reasons for the injured P.W. 3 to implicate the appellant. No mala fides are brought on record for false implication. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the medical evidence and the evidence of the injured is convincing, acceptable and also trustworthy. 12. So far as the delay in FIR is concerned, no doubt it is stated by the injured P.W. 3 that the police came to the Hospital and received his complaint on which he had put the thumb impression, P.W. 14 returned to the police station, registered at 3.30 a.m, the FIR as reached the Magistrate on the next day at 3.00 p.m. It is true that there is some delay in dispatch of the FIR to the Magistrate. But, that itself is not a ground to reject the version of the prosecution unless there is material on record to misuse the delay to implicate the appellant falsely. In the absence of such material, the delay itself cannot be a ground to reject the version of the prosecution. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Puttaiah alias Putta v State of Mysore (ILR 1973 Kar. In the absence of such material, the delay itself cannot be a ground to reject the version of the prosecution. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Puttaiah alias Putta v State of Mysore (ILR 1973 Kar. 1145 (DB) wherein there was delay in the FIR in a case for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. As the case on hand is a case of an injured person, the principles laid down therein are not applicable. 14. It is stated in the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 4 that when they came to the hospital, the appellant enquired them about the incident and took their thump impression. But as could be seen from the evidence of P.W. 14-the Police Sub-Inspector, he went to the hospital at 3.00 a.m and received the written complaint of P.W. 3 and returned to the police station at 3.30 a.m. and on the basis of the written complaint registered a case in Crime No. 14 of 2011. Mere version of P.Ws. 2 and 4 that they were enquired by the Police Officer prior to the registration of the complaint itself is not a ground to accept their version and to say that the police have recorded the complaint of either P.W. 2 or P.W.4. Before registration of the complaint, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 while giving evidence inadvertently might have stated that the police recorded statement soon after they went to the hospital. Such statements are insufficient to disbelieve the version of the prosecution. 15. In the evidence-P.W. 3 states that he was unconscious for three days after the incident. But perusal of the evidence of P.W. 14 reveals that the complaint was received at 3.00 a.m. on 27-1-2001. From this it is very much clear that he was not unconscious at the time when the complaint was submitted by him and even in the chief examination and the cross-examination he has stated that the police received his complaint and the complaint came to be registered by P.W. 14. Witnesses some time exaggerate their agony by such statements. Such type of inadvertent and stray admission are insufficient to disbelieve their true version. That apart, the clothes of the injured were seized under the mahazar and the mahazar witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. Witnesses some time exaggerate their agony by such statements. Such type of inadvertent and stray admission are insufficient to disbelieve their true version. That apart, the clothes of the injured were seized under the mahazar and the mahazar witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that the nicker and lungi which were bloodstained have not been seized by the police. From the material placed on record it reveals that the shirt and banyan M.Os. 1 and 2 were seized by the Police Officer and they were bloodstained. But mere fact that the other two clothes of the injured were not seized is not a ground to discard the consistent evidence of the injured and his relatives. 16. When P.W. 3 himself states that he put the thumb impression on Ex. P. 2, whether it is attested or not assumes no importance. That apart, though in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 2 to 4 some omissions have been brought on record, the accused has not brought these omissions to the notice of the Investigating Officer in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 14 and 16. In these circumstances, the omissions though not material was not brought to the notice of the Investigating Officer. From the appreciation of the material placed on record, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the conviction ordered by the Trial Court. 17. The appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Surinder Kaur and Another v State of Haryana AIR 2004 SC 1747 : 2004 SCC (Cri.) 926 : 2004 Cri. L.J. 1765 (SC) : 2004 AIR SCW 1295 : (2004)4 SCC 109 ) This is a matter relating to the offence under Section 304-B of IPC, wherein some of the accused were acquitted and the husband was convicted and the Apex Court taking into consideration similar set of allegations against the husband as well, acquitted him of the said charge. This principle do not applied to the case on hand, as the appellant is a person who caused assault with a knife and was responsible for the stab injury, whereas accused 2 is said to have bet him for which there is no medical evidence for the act of accused 2. This principle do not applied to the case on hand, as the appellant is a person who caused assault with a knife and was responsible for the stab injury, whereas accused 2 is said to have bet him for which there is no medical evidence for the act of accused 2. Therefore, the mere fact that accused 2 is acquitted, is not a ground to grant an acquittal for the appellant (accused 1). 18. So far as the sentence is concerned, the appellant was in custody for about three months. Taking into consideration the fact that he has caused assault with knife over the abdomen of the injured and there was no fault on his part, a reasonable sentence has to be imposed. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part affirming the conviction of the appellant for the charge under Sections 323 and 326 of IPC. The sentence for the offence under Section 323 of IPC is confirmed the sentence for the offence under Section 326 is modified. The appellant is ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine and compensation ordered by the Trial Court with the default sentence. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. The appellant is entitled to set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The Trial Court is directed to secure the presence of the appellant to undergo the sentence.