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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 935 (MP)

Keshar Bai v. Western Coalfields Ltd.

2013-08-08

K.K.TRIVEDI

body2013
JUDGMENT K.K. Trivedi, J.:- This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 19.05.2010 said to be issued by respondents rejecting the application made by the petitioner for payment of monetary compensation. It is alleged that the husband of the petitioner by name Girija Prasad was an employee of the respondents, who died while in service on 15.02.2000. On account of his death, the petitioner made an application on 12.06.2000 seeking monetary compensation. Such an application was not considered, though forwarded to the higher authorities, and subsequently the petitioner was required to make yet another application. When nothing was done by the respondents, reminders were sent and ultimately the order impugned was issued intimating the petitioner that her application has been rejected as the same was made after 10 years of death of Ex-employee of the respondents. It is contended that in view of the provisions made in the National Coal Wage Agreement, applicable to the employees of the respondents, there was a specific provision made for payment of Rs.3000/- per month to a female dependant of an employee, who died in harness, as monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. It is specifically provided that aforesaid compensation at the rate of Rs.3000/- per month would be paid till the age of 60 years. It is contended that since the application was made pursuant to the said agreement, which was made effective with effect from 01.01.2000, it was necessary on the part of the respondents to look into the said application within time and to decide the same. However, keeping the same pending for such a long period and ultimately rejecting on the lame excuse that the application was made after a period of 10 years of death of Ex-employee is wholly unjustified and illegal. The petitioner has, thus, claimed relief to the following effect : “(i) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ and call the entire records relating to present issue of grant of monetary benefits to petitioner. (ii) direct the respondents to grant monetary benefits in lieu of employment to the petitioner from the date of sad demise of her husband. (iii) direct the respondents to pay interest on the delayed payment of monetary benefits. (ii) direct the respondents to grant monetary benefits in lieu of employment to the petitioner from the date of sad demise of her husband. (iii) direct the respondents to pay interest on the delayed payment of monetary benefits. (iv) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deemed fit and proper may kindly be granted together with the cost of writ petition.” 2. Upon service of notices of the writ petition, the respondents have contested the claim of the petitioner and have contended that in fact there was a dispute in between the petitioner and one Kachra Bai, who was claiming to be the widow of said employee Girija Prasad. Since a case was filed for grant of succession certificate in the Court of I Civil Judge, Class-I, Chhindwara, wherein the petitioner herein was made non-applicant and the said matter remained pending up to 17.06.2004, which ultimately was decided on a compromise out of Court between the parties of litigation, an application was subsequently made by the petitioner for grant of monetary compensation in the year 2006. After processing the said application since it was found that death had taken place much before and for a long period the petitioner has survived without any monetary compensation, it would not be necessary to grant the monetary assistance to the petitioner and as such the application was rightly rejected. It is contended that the petitioner under the mutual agreement with said Kachra Bai has received the money from the respondents payable towards the service dues of deceased employee and, therefore, she has the means of livelihood and no monetary compensation whatsoever was required to be paid. Considering these aspects, the order impugned has rightly been passed and the claim of the petitioner is rejected. It is further contended that there are disputed facts, which need to be proved by adducing evidence and, therefore, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable in respect of such monetary claim. It is further contended that looking to the law laid-down by the Apex Court as also by this Court, the claim made by the petitioner is hopelessly barred by limitation and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 4. It is further contended that looking to the law laid-down by the Apex Court as also by this Court, the claim made by the petitioner is hopelessly barred by limitation and as such the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 4. Undisputedly there is a statutory agreement executed on 23rd December, 2000, which has been enforced with effect from 01.01.2000. Chapter-9 of the said agreement contains specific provisions for the purposes of grant of employment or monetary compensation to the female dependant of the employees of the respondents. Since only the provision of Clause 9.5.0 is relevant for the purposes of decision in this writ petition, the said provision is reproduced below as a whole : “9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant -- Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under : (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.4,000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) the existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) the existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Standardisation Committee and finalised. Note : In the case of TISCO, the matter would be settled at bipartite level.” A bare perusal of this particular clause will reveal that there is no limitation prescribed for making of claim of monetary compensation. The only condition is that the female should not be below the age of 45 years and should not have attained the age of 60 years before making the claim. The financial status of such claimant is relevant for the purposes of taking a decision in the matter. If it was stated by the petitioner that she was having no means of livelihood and was required financial assistance, only delay in making such an application was not to come as a bar against her and only on that account the application of petitioner was not required to be rejected. This being so, when the claim was put for consideration before the Committee, the said committee categorically gave finding that looking to the circumstances the petitioner was entitled to grant of monetary compensation till she attains the age of 60 years. However, nothing has been placed on record by the respondents to indicate that such a consideration by the Committee was improperly done or was dehors the agreement itself. Virtually there is no such bar created under the scheme with respect to the delay or lapse of time for making of the application and, therefore, such a stand taken by the respondents is totally misconceived. In the case of Mohan Mahto vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 , the Apex Court considered the circumstances under which the application was made. Though the Apex Court was of the opinion that there was no limitation prescribed for making of the application but the application should have been made within time. In the case of Mohan Mahto vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 , the Apex Court considered the circumstances under which the application was made. Though the Apex Court was of the opinion that there was no limitation prescribed for making of the application but the application should have been made within time. It is to be seen that the circumstances in which the claim made in the case of Mohan Mahto (supra) was considered by the Apex Court, are not available in the present case. This being so, the findings reached by the Apex Court would not be attracted or applicable in the present case. The law laid down by the Apex Court is made applicable in similar facts and circumstances and, therefore, since the facts as indicated in the case of petitioner are totally different then the case of Mohan Mahto (supra), similar analogy would not be attracted at all. 5. It is further contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Bailal Bhai & others, AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Apex Court has categorically said that delay in filing the claim before the Court deny the right to get relief from the Court. Reading the findings recorded by the Apex Court, it is emphatically contended that the limitation though not specifically mentioned in the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for filing of a petition before the Court but the delay in approaching the Court has to be looked into and that being so, belated claims are not to be granted by this Court in exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is seen that the facts in the case are totally different. The rejection order was ultimately communicated to the petitioner in the year 2010 and she has approached this Court immediately by filing the writ petition. Unless the claim of the petitioner was rejected, she was not having any cause of action to make a complaint before this Court and, therefore, such a stand taken by the respondents again cannot be accepted. The petition is not hit by delay or laches. Unless the claim of the petitioner was rejected, she was not having any cause of action to make a complaint before this Court and, therefore, such a stand taken by the respondents again cannot be accepted. The petition is not hit by delay or laches. Similar is the situation examined by the Apex Court in the case of State of J.&K. & others vs. Sajad Ahmed Mir, AIR 2006 SC 2743 and, therefore, the analogy of law laid-down by the Apex Court would not be applicable or attracted in the case in hand. Lastly, it is put forth by learned Counsel for the respondents that in W.P. No.474/2010(S), Narendra Kumar Nayak vs. The Chief Managing Director & others, decided on 06.09.2010, this Court has held that since after 6 years of delay the members of family have approached this Court and they themselves were negligent in approaching the Court of law expeditiously, the case for grant of monetary compensation was rightly rejected. It is contended that in view of the law laid-down by this Court, the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief. 6. As has been pointed out, initially the application was filed by the petitioner in the year 2000 itself. Though an attempt is made to dispute making of such an application by the respondents by filing the return but specific denial of such a fact is not available on record. On the contrary, the application submitted by the petitioner on 12.06.2000 was given to her under Right to Information Act by the Public Information Officer of the respondents. This shows that such an application was available on record of the respondents but they have not taken any action on that application. There was no dispute brought to the Court by the other lady who was claiming to be the widow of the said deceased employee of the respondents before the Court till the year 2004. For good four years period why application made by the petitioner was not considered or decided, has not been explained by the respondents. There was no dispute brought to the Court by the other lady who was claiming to be the widow of the said deceased employee of the respondents before the Court till the year 2004. For good four years period why application made by the petitioner was not considered or decided, has not been explained by the respondents. Even otherwise, if after obtaining certain financial assistance on account of an out of Court compromise between the petitioner and aforesaid Kachra Bai, the petitioner has survived for sometime but ultimately made an application in 2006 for grant of monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment, why such an application was not decided till the year 2010, is not clear. Only this much is said that certain information was asked from the petitioner, which was subsequently provided. If the committee of the respondents has already found the petitioner entitled for grant of such benefit and referred the matter for consideration, at least cogent reasons should have been given as to why such claim of the petitioner was rejected. Nothing has been said in the rejection order except that after 10 years of death of the employee of the respondents since the petitioner has survived, she would not be entitled to grant of benefit of monetary compensation. At least the monetary compensation should have been allowed to the petitioner prospectively by the respondents keeping in view the subsequent application made in the year 2006. Having failed to do so, this Court feels it proper to grant the relief to the petitioner to the extent that she be granted the benefit of monetary compensation from the date she subsequently made application in the year 2006. This is necessary also because monetary compensation is not to be effected by payment of terminal dues of employee on account of death during service, as is clear from National Coal Wages Agreement. 7. Accordingly, this petition is allowed in part. The petitioner will get the monetary compensation from the date she made subsequent application in the year 2006, as is admitted by the respondents as they have produced the said application on record as Annexure R-2. Let the amount of compensation in terms of National Coal Wage Agreement be calculated and be paid from the date of making said application, i.e. with effect from 18.02.2006 till the petitioner attains the age of 60 years. Let the amount of compensation in terms of National Coal Wage Agreement be calculated and be paid from the date of making said application, i.e. with effect from 18.02.2006 till the petitioner attains the age of 60 years. It is disputed by learned Counsel for the respondents that the age of the petitioner is not verified. For the said purpose, the respondents would be free to put the petitioner for medical examination for the purpose of ascertainment of her age and only after getting a report in that respect, the amount of compensation as directed herein above be paid up to the said age as certified by the Medical Board. Let the aforesaid exercise be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the order passed today. 8. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein above. There shall be no order as to costs.