JUDGMENT 1. - By the instant writ petition, the petitioners have implored to quash the impugned order dated 23rd of March 2001 (Annex.2) passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer. 2. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, by the impugned order has partly allowed the revision petition of the petitioners under Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Colonization (Allotment & Sale of Government land in Indira Gandhi Canal Colony Project Area) Rules 1975 against the order of the Colonization Commissioner, Bikaner camp Jaisalmer. 3. Challenge to the impugned order has been thrown by the petitioners after almost a decade. The learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Prem Dayal Bohra has argued that the petitioners are poor persons and therefore being unaware about the law of limitation have not been able to challenge the impugned order. Therefore, considering the fact that they are poor agriculturists, some latitude is required to be given to them to pursue the remedy against the impugned order. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the averments contained in the writ petition. 5. The legal position is no more res-integra that for availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, no period of limitation is prescribed but the extraordinary jurisdiction is required to be exercised on equitable considerations and an incumbent invoking equitable jurisdiction must approach the writ court at the earliest and delay and laches on his part is obviously fatal. In the instant case, the order impugned was passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue on 23rd of March 2001 and the present petition has been filed after lapse of a decade. From a bare perusal of the averments contained in the writ petition it is amply clear that the petitioners have miserably failed to explain extraordinary and inordinate delay of a decade. 6. True it is that for invoking the writ jurisdiction, no period of limitation is prescribed but the period of limitation prescribed for initiating civil proceedings can be taken into account as a guiding factor. A litigant, who is totally callous and negligent vis-`-vis his rights, cannot be granted indulgence by this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The Apex Court in case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. A litigant, who is totally callous and negligent vis-`-vis his rights, cannot be granted indulgence by this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. The Apex Court in case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 48 , while examining the issue relating to period of limitation for availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has made following observations in Para 14 of the verdict: 14. The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a wellsettled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction, has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defeats equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefor, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above. 7. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefor, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above. 7. Applying the ratio decidendi of the judgment in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar's case (supra), I am not inclined to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order on the ground of delay and laches and the petitioners are liable to be non-suited solely on the ground of delay and laches.Resultantly, the present writ petition is hereby dismissed summarily.No order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******