JUDGMENT : L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. In relation to the properties held by one Smt. Venkata Ramanamma, three suits were filed before the Court of the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. Out of the decrees passed therein, three appeals were filed. A learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the appeals, and four LPAs have arisen, out of the common judgment. These two LPAs have survived the compromise of the two other LPAs. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as arrayed in L.P.A. No. 218 of 1993. 3. The facts, in brief, are as under: Smt. Venkata Ramanamma was possessed of fairly vast extents of properties. Herself and her husband, Gundaiah (Senior), have adopted a person, whose name is also Gundaiah (Junior), the 1st respondent herein. The appellant in these LPAs i.e., Grandhi Surya Prakasam, is the brother's son of Venkata Ramanamma. Stating that Venkata Ramanamma executed Settlement Deed, Ex. A.9,on 07.04.1967, settling upon him, the properties mentioned as plaint A, B, C and D schedules, in absolute terms, the appellant filed O.S. No. 230 of 1970 for partition and separate possession of the same. By the time the suit was filed, Venkata Ramanamma was no more. Before that suit came to be filed, certain developments have taken place. 4. It has already been mentioned that Ex. A.9 is said to have been executed on 07.04.1967. The 3rd respondent herein filed O.S. No. 173 of 1969 against Venkata Ramanamma, the 1st respondent herein, and a tenant, for the relief of partition of the plaint schedule properties. According to her, Venkata Ramanamma executed Agreement of Sale, on 26.11.1966, Ex. B.91, in respect of the properties shown in the schedule therein, and that it was followed by Sale Deed, dated 26.08.1968, Ex. B.92. On this basis, she prayed for partition. 5. A compromise decree was passed in O.S. No. 173 of 1969 on 03.11.1969, as between the 3rd respondent, on one hand, and Venkata Ramanamma and the 1st respondent, on the other hand. The tenant was set ex parte. However, on an application filed by the tenant, the ex parte decree, to the extent it concerns his interests, was set aside, and the suit was restored to file. 6. The 1st respondent i.e., Junior Gundaiah, was a minor, when the compromise decree was passed in O.S. No. 173 of 1969. The tenant was set ex parte. However, on an application filed by the tenant, the ex parte decree, to the extent it concerns his interests, was set aside, and the suit was restored to file. 6. The 1st respondent i.e., Junior Gundaiah, was a minor, when the compromise decree was passed in O.S. No. 173 of 1969. After he attained the age of majority, he filed O.S. No. 297 of 1969 in the same Court, with a prayer to set aside the compromise decree. 7. All the three suits were clubbed and heard together. Through a common judgment, dated 31.10.1979, the trial Court (a) passed a preliminary decree in O.S. No. 230 of 1970 in favour of the appellant in respect of the plaint A and D schedule properties, and as regards plaint B and C schedule properties, the trial Court held that Venkata Ramanamma, who executed Ex. A.9, Settlement Deed, held just a life interest in respect of 1/8th share, and she has no right to execute that Deed of Settlement, (b) dismissed O.S. No. 173 of 1969, taking the view that once Venkata Ramanamma executed Ex. A.9, Settlement Deed, on 07.04.1967, she has no right to execute Ex. B.92, Sale Deed dated 26.08.1968, in respect of plaint B schedule properties in favour of M. Subbalakshmi, the 3rd respondent, that too, without participation of the beneficiary under the settlement i.e., the appellant, and (c) decreed O.S. No. 297 of 1969, setting aside the compromise decree, dated 03.11.1969, passed in O.S. No. 173 of 1969. 8. The 1st respondent, Jr. Gundaiah, filed A.S. No. 645 of 1980 before this Court, feeling aggrieved by the decree in O.S. No. 230 of 1970 for partition of plaint A and D schedule properties. According to him, Venkata Ramanamma did not have any right to execute Ex. A.9, Settlement Deed, in favour of the appellant. The appellant herein filed cross-objections in that appeal, feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, in so far as it concerns plaint B and C schedule properties. 9. The 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi, filed A.S. No. 825 of 1980, feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of O.S. No. 173 of 1969. The same lady filed A.S. No. 1251 of 1980, challenging the decree in O.S. No. 297 of 1969. 10. All the three appeals and the cross-objections were heard together, by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi, filed A.S. No. 825 of 1980, feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of O.S. No. 173 of 1969. The same lady filed A.S. No. 1251 of 1980, challenging the decree in O.S. No. 297 of 1969. 10. All the three appeals and the cross-objections were heard together, by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Through a common judgment, dated 14.08.1991, the learned Single Judge allowed A.S. Nos. 825 and 1251 of 1980 and the cross-objections in A.S. No. 645 of 1980, to the extent indicated in that judgment, and dismissed A.S. No. 645 of 1980. 11. Feeling aggrieved by the decrees in A.S. Nos. 645 and 825 of 1980, the 1st respondent herein i.e., Jr. Gundaiah, filed LPA Nos. 254 and 255 of 1992. However, they have been compromised, as between the parties. In view of the compromise said to have been arrived at, between the concerned parties, the 1st respondent has not pursued the LPA Nos. 254 and 255 of 1992, and they stood dismissed. 12. The subject matter of these two appeals is the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge vis-a-vis the plaint B schedule properties. 13. Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that having reversed the finding of the trial Court in relation to the plaint B schedule properties, the learned Single Judge erroneously upheld the sale through Ex. B.92. He contends that there was any amount of suspicion, if not illegality, in respect of Ex. B.91, the alleged Agreement of Sale, in favour of the 3rd respondent, and the role of the 4th defendant in O.S. No. 230 of 1970 was, in fact, adversely commented by the trial Court. He contends that assuming that Ex. B.91 is true and genuine, once it was followed by a valid transfer of absolute title, in favour of the appellant, in relation to the plaint B schedule properties, there was no basis or entitlement for Venkata Ramanamma to execute Ex. B.92, Sale Deed. Placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Kondapalli Satyanarayana Vs. B.92, Sale Deed. Placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Kondapalli Satyanarayana Vs. Kondapalli Mayullu and others AIR 1999 AP 170 the learned counsel submits that at the most, the appellant can be said to be the trustee vis-a-vis the property covered by Exs.A.9 and B.91, and a valid title could have accrued to the 3rd respondent, if only a suit for specific performance was filed and a decree in that behalf was passed by a competent Court. 14. Sri B. Jagannadha Sastry, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the 3rd respondent, on the other hand, submits that there was any amount of uncertainity, as to the description of the properties between the plaint schedule, on one hand, and Ex. A.9, on the other hand. He submits that the learned Single Judge has disagreed with the trial Court, as regards the role attributed to the Advocate of Venkata Ramanamma and with that, the entire attack upon Exs.B.91 and 92 ceases to exist. The learned counsel further submits that the settlement under Ex. A.9 was subject to several contingencies and Venkata Ramanamma did not have the right to execute Ex. B.92, and that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in this behalf does not warrant any interference. 15. It was almost a test for the Court of the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada, to handle the three suits. Highly complicated facts were taken note of and common issues were framed as under: Issues: 1) Whether the plaint A schedule properties are the absolute properties of late Tamana Venkata Ramanamma? 2) Whether late Tamana Venkata Ramanamma has 1/4th share in the plaint B, C and D schedule properties with absolute rights or she got only 1/8th share with life interest? 3) Whether the said Venkata Ramanamma purchased properties in her name with the income of her husband Gundaiah's ancestral properties, and as such, those properties form part of the joint family properties of Gundaiah and the first defendant? 4) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 12.10.1957 by Gundaiah in favour of his wife is true, valid and binding on the 1st defendant? 5) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1967 executed by late Venkata Ramanamma is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 4) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 12.10.1957 by Gundaiah in favour of his wife is true, valid and binding on the 1st defendant? 5) Whether the Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1967 executed by late Venkata Ramanamma is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 6) Whether the Sale Agreement dated 26.11.1966 and the registered Sale Deed dated 26.08.1968 relied upon by the 3rd defendant as having been executed by late Venkata Ramanamma in her favour are true, valid supported by consideration and binding on the plaintiff? 7) Whether the 3rd defendant is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1967 and the mistake in the survey numbers mentioned therein? 8) Whether the 3rd defendant is a nominee for the 4th defendant as contended by the plaintiff? 9) Whether the 4th defendant is not a necessary or proper party to the suit? 10) Whether the 2nd defendant is a necessary or proper party to the suit? 11) Whether Matoori Suryavathi is a necessary or proper party to the suit? 12) Whether the compromise decree and other proceedings in O.S. No. 173 of 1969 on the file of the Sub Court, Kakinada are valid and binding on the plaintiff? 13) Whether the will dated 20.09.1969 and codicil dated 19.01.1970 set up by the defendants 5 to 7 are true and valid and executed by late Venkata Ramanamma in a sound and disposing state of mind? 14) Whether the suit, as framed, is for partial partition, and as such, not maintainable? 15.) Whether the suit is bad for multifariousness? 16) Whether the Lease Deed dated 16.01.1970 in respect of Item I of the plaint A schedule set up by the defendants 8 to 11 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 17) Whether the plaintiff is entitled a) for declaration of title to plaint A schedule property and 1/4th share in plaint B, C and D schedule properties? b) for recovery of possession of plaint A schedule property after ejecting the defendants? c) for partition of plaint B, C and D schedule properties into 4 equal shares and recovery of one share? d) For the profits claimed? Additional issue framed as per order, dated 08.09.1978 on I.A. No. 2748/78. Whether the 15th defendant is a tenant of the plaint B schedule lands, and so, whether this Court has no jurisdiction to evict the 15th defendant? d) For the profits claimed? Additional issue framed as per order, dated 08.09.1978 on I.A. No. 2748/78. Whether the 15th defendant is a tenant of the plaint B schedule lands, and so, whether this Court has no jurisdiction to evict the 15th defendant? Additional issue framed as per order, dated 15.12.1978, on I.A. No. 4103/78. Whether the Settlement Deed, dated 07.04.1967, is vitiated by undue influence? 16. Having regard to the value of the property or the nature of contest between the parties, voluminous evidence was adduced. On behalf of the appellant, P.Ws.1 to 10 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.60 were filed. On behalf of the contesting defendants, D.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.111 were filed. 17. The amount of attention, that had to be paid by the trial Court, can be gauged from the fact that a common judgment, running into 300 typed pages, was rendered. By the time it reached this Court, the controversy got narrowed down. Taking note of the same, this Court framed the following points, in the three appeals and cross-objections before it: 1) Whether items 1 to 3 of plaint A schedule properties constitute the absolute properties of Venkata Ramanamma? 2) Whether Venkata Ramanamma has got life estate or absolute estate in B and C schedule properties under Ex. B.9 will? 3) What share in B and C schedule properties was got by Venkata Ramanamma under Ex. B.9 will? 4) Whether Ex. B.91 Agreement of Sale dated 26.11.1966 and Ex. B.92 Sale Deed dated 26.08.1968 even if true, are not valid and binding on the respondents in A.S. Nos. 825 and 1251 of 1980? 5) Whether the compromise decree in O.S. No. 173 of 1969 is liable to be set aside? 6) Whether Ex. A.9 Settlement Deed executed by Venkata Ramanamma in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 230 of 1970 on 07.04.1967 is true and valid? 7) To what relief? The result in the appeals has already been indicated. 18. Now, the points, that arise for consideration before us, are: 1) Whether the appellant derived any title under Ex. A.9? 2) Whether Exs.B.91 and 92 can be treated as legal, and whether they had the effect of conveying title to the property mentioned therein, in favour of the 3rd respondent? POINT NO. 18. Now, the points, that arise for consideration before us, are: 1) Whether the appellant derived any title under Ex. A.9? 2) Whether Exs.B.91 and 92 can be treated as legal, and whether they had the effect of conveying title to the property mentioned therein, in favour of the 3rd respondent? POINT NO. 1: Though the litigation started for partition of quite large extents of properties mentioned in plaint A, B, C and D schedules, the controversy, as of now, is only in relation to plaint B schedule properties. The total extent mentioned therein is Acs. 18.00 and the plaintiff claimed 1/4th share therein. It has already been mentioned that the trial Court took the view that Venkata Ramanamma held just a life estate, to the extent of 1/8th share in that property, and that she did not have any right to convey any valid title in respect of the said property, to others and, accordingly, rejected the claim of the appellant. 19. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Single Judge took the view that Venkata Ramanamma held 1/4th absolute share in the plaint B schedule properties. That finding is not challenged by any of the respondents herein. The said issue having assumed finality, it needs to be seen, as to whether there was any valid conveyance of the plaint B schedule property in favour of the appellant. 20. Ex. A.9 is the document, through which, Venkata Ramanamma conferred absolute rights in favour of the appellant, not only in relation to plaint B schedule properties, but also in respect of plaint A, C and D schedule properties. This document was held proved, as required under law. The contention advanced by the contesting parties that it is vitiated on account of certain factors, was repelled by the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge. Once Ex. A.9 is held as proved, the inescapable conclusion is that the appellant derived title in respect of 1/4th share held by Venkata Ramanamma in plaint B schedule properties. The point is, accordingly, answered. Point No. 2: This point is inter-related to the first one. Had there not been any further developments, subsequent to Ex. A.9, the matter would have ended there. The 3rd respondent claimed rights vis-a-vis the plaint B schedule properties, under Ex. B.92, dated 26.08.1968. The point is, accordingly, answered. Point No. 2: This point is inter-related to the first one. Had there not been any further developments, subsequent to Ex. A.9, the matter would have ended there. The 3rd respondent claimed rights vis-a-vis the plaint B schedule properties, under Ex. B.92, dated 26.08.1968. It is important to mention that this document came into existence more than one year after Ex. A.9 was executed in favour of the appellant. Obviously, to sustain the transaction covered by Ex. B.92, the 3rd respondent took the plea that it was preceded by Ex. B.91, an agreement of sale, dated 26.11.1966. This document, if taken as true, would be anterior to Ex. A.9, in point of time. 21. The appellant made strenuous efforts to demonstrate that Ex. B.91 was brought into existence, and the Advocate of Venkata Ramanamma, who was impleaded as defendant in 230 of 1970, was instrumental in bringing about it. While the trial Court accepted that contention, this Court has set aside the same. In our view, the role, said to have been played by the 4th defendant in O.S. No. 230 of 1970, hardly matters. The legality or otherwise of Ex. B.91 does not depend upon the nature of advice tendered by the Advocate or his proximity to the parties to the transaction. It has to be decided on its own merits, with reference to the relevant provisions of law. 22. Ex. B.91 is the Agreement of Sale, in relation to the plaint B schedule properties. The attack to this document by the appellant is that the transaction itself is tainted by undue influence and misuse of fiduciary relationship. This ground, at the most, could have been raised by the person, who executed the document. A third party cannot take the plea of undue influence, as long as the person, who executed the document, did not have any such grievance. No effort was made to establish that the signature on Ex. B.91 is not that of Venkata Ramanamma. Therefore, Ex. B.91 has to be taken as proved and valid. 23. Now, comes the question, as to whether Ex. B.92, which is executed on the strength of Ex. B.91, is legal and valid. If no substantial developments have intervened Exs.B.91 and B.92, no illegality can be said to have crept into the transaction. It has already been mentioned that Venkata Ramanamma executed Ex. 23. Now, comes the question, as to whether Ex. B.92, which is executed on the strength of Ex. B.91, is legal and valid. If no substantial developments have intervened Exs.B.91 and B.92, no illegality can be said to have crept into the transaction. It has already been mentioned that Venkata Ramanamma executed Ex. A.9 on 07.04.1967, settling her properties in plaint A, B, C and D schedule properties, conferring absolute upon the appellant. With that, she ceases to have any right to convey those very properties, or at least, the plaint B schedule properties in favour of third parties. The position in law that obtains, under the circumstances would be that Ex. B.91, Agreement of Sale, does not by itself become untenable or illegal, but it becomes enforceable not against the original executant, but against the person, who derived title from the executant under Ex. A.9. In this process, had she been so advised, the 3rd respondent ought to have taken steps to get the Sale Deed executed by the appellant herein, who derived title under Ex. A.9. However, ignoring the appellant, she obtained a Sale Deed from Venkata Ramanamma under Ex. B.92. Since Venkata Ramanamma divested herself of the rights vis-a-vis the plaint B schedule properties through Ex. A.9, she has no right or entitlement to execute Ex. B.92. The learned Single Judge did not deal with this aspect in detail, but has simply upheld Ex. B.92. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Single, in this regard, cannot be sustained. 24. One inconsistency has crept into the common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. While answering point No. 5, which was in relation to the validity of compromise decree in O.S. No. 173 of 1969, the learned Single Judge held that the compromise decree cannot be sustained in law. However, obviously, on account of the complicated nature of the facts, a different result was indicated at the end. It has already been mentioned that O.S. No. 297 of 1969 was filed by the 1st respondent, with a prayer to set aside the compromise decree in O.S. No. 173 of 1969 and the trial Court decreed O.S. No. 297 of 1969. Aggrieved by the decree in O.S. No. 297 of 1969, the 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi filed A.S. No. 1251 of 1980. Aggrieved by the decree in O.S. No. 297 of 1969, the 3rd respondent i.e., M. Subbalakshmi filed A.S. No. 1251 of 1980. In view of the finding on point No. 5, A.S. No. 1251 of 1980 ought to have been dismissed. However, obviously, by mistake, it was observed that the said appeal is allowed. This aspect needs to be corrected. 25. The point is, accordingly, answered. 26. For the foregoing reasons, we allow both the appeals and hold that a) the appellant derived valid legal rights to the extent of 1/4th share in the plaint B schedule properties in O.S. No. 230 of 1970 under Ex. A.9, and b) the transfer of that very property in favour of the 3rd respondent through Ex. B.92 is contrary to law. 27. There shall be no order as to costs. 28. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in both the appeals shall stand disposed of.