Judgment : Antony Dominic, J. 1. Petitioner is the mother of one Gopakumar @ Gopan. In this writ petition, she challenges Ext.P1 order passed by the second respondent under section 3 of the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', detaining Gopakumar (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu', for short). 2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the detenu is an accused in Crime Nos.250/07, 115/11, 233/11, 2124/12 and 1098/12 at the Town North Police Station, Palakkad. He is also an accused in Cr.Nos.253/08, 309/13 and 267/13 of the Hemambika Nagar Police Station, Palakkad. Further, he is an accused in Cr.No.233/09 on the file of the Kalamassery Police Station in Ernakulam district. Referring to the involvement of the detenu in the above criminal cases, involving offences specified in section 2(t) of the Act, the third respondent submitted Ext.P3 report dated 26.6.2013 to the second respondent, enclosing Ext.P5, the order granting bail to the detenu in Cr.No.309/13 mentioned above. He also submitted Ext.P4 dated 12.7.2013, a further report, to the second respondent, enclosing Ext.P6, the order granting bail to the detenu in Cr.No.267/13. In these reports, the third respondent requested that steps be initiated for classifying the detenu as a 'Known Rowdy' as provided under section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and on that basis, to detain him under section 3, in order to prevent him from continuing his anti-social activities. 3. Based on the above materials submitted by the sponsoring authority, the second respondent, the detaining authority, passed Ext.P1 order dated 18.7.2013, classifying the detenu as a 'Known Rowdy' under section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and ordering his detention as provided in section 3(1). The Government of Kerala, in exercise of its powers under section 3(3) of the Act, approved the order of detention by order dated 31.7.2013. Subsequently, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 12.8.2013 and based on the report submitted by the Board, the Government, in compliance with section 10(4) of the Act, passed order dated 25.9.2013, confirming Ext.P1 order of detention. It is in this background, this writ petition has been filed by the mother of the detenu seeking to challenge Ext.P1 order and to set the detenu at liberty by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 4. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. It is in this background, this writ petition has been filed by the mother of the detenu seeking to challenge Ext.P1 order and to set the detenu at liberty by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 4. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the detaining authority was guilty of non-application of mind. According to the learned counsel, along with Exts.P3 and P4 reports, the sponsoring authority, the third respondent, had submitted Exts.P5 and P6 orders granting the detenu bail in Cr.Nos.309/13 and 267/13, which are dated 1.6.2013 and 4.7.2013 respectively. Counsel contended that in these orders, stringent conditions were incorporated by the Sessions Court and that those conditions were sufficient to prevent the detenu from continuing antisocial activities. It is stated that it was without even adverting to this aspect or giving any consideration to the same that the detaining authority passed Ext.P1 order classifying the detenu as a 'Known Rowdy', as provided in section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and ordering his detention under section 3. 6. The second contention raised was that the detenu was not supplied all the materials relied on by the detaining authority while passing Ext.P1 order. The counsel contended that in Ext.P1, the detaining authority had relied on an earlier order of detention and the report then made by the Advisory Board, on the basis of which, the detention order was revoked. He also contended that in the detention order, the detaining authority has relied on the report of confidential investigation and police station records which were also not supplied to the detenu. 7. The third contention raised by the counsel was that the representations made by the detenu in exercise of his rights under section 7 of the Act were neither appropriately considered by the Government nor forwarded to the Advisory Board. 8. Appearing on behalf of the respondents, learned Government Pleader contradicted each one of these contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner and contended that the order of detention is legally sustainable. 9. We shall deal with the contentions raised at the Bar now. 10. The first contention, as we have already mentioned, is that the detaining authority is guilty of non-application of mind. 9. We shall deal with the contentions raised at the Bar now. 10. The first contention, as we have already mentioned, is that the detaining authority is guilty of non-application of mind. Among the various criminal cases that were relied on while passing Ext.P1 order, Cr.Nos.267/13 and 309/13 are the two cases registered against the detenu in the year 2013 at the Hemambika Nagar Police Station, Palakkad. Facts pleaded show that in pursuance of the above, the detenu was arrested on 7.5.2013 and that by Ext.P5 order dated 1.6.2013, the detenu was enlarged on bail in Cr.No.309/13. Despite the order, he remained in judicial custody in Cr.No.267/13 and was released only after he was granted bail by Ext.P6 order dated 4.7.2013. Both Exts.P5 and P6 orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge are conditional. The conditions specified in Ext.P5 are the following: 1. The petitioners shall report before the Investigating Officer in between 9 a.m. And 11 a.m. On all Modays and Thursdays commencing from 13th June, 2013 for a period of three months or till the filing of the final report in the case in question, whichever is earlier. 2. The petitioners shall not tamper with the evidence or influence the witnesses. 3. The petitioners shall not involve in any offence while on bail. In case of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions, the respondent is at liberty to move for cancellation of bail. In Ext.P6, it is specifically ordered that the detenu shall appear before the Investigating Officer at 10 am on every Wednesdays until the investigation is completed. Although Exts.P5 and P6 were available with the detaining authority, there is no reference to Exts.P5 or P6 anywhere in Ext.P1 order. 11. However, learned Government Pleader contended that if Ext.P1 order is read in its totality, it would show that Exts.P5 and P6 orders were available with the detaining authority and that the detaining authority had knowledge about these orders. 12. 11. However, learned Government Pleader contended that if Ext.P1 order is read in its totality, it would show that Exts.P5 and P6 orders were available with the detaining authority and that the detaining authority had knowledge about these orders. 12. The law is settled that when an accused in a criminal case, who is enlarged on bail with conditions, is sought to be detained in preventive detention, it is incumbent on the part of the detaining authority to consider whether the bail conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenue from continuing to indulge in anti-social activities and despite the conditions, if the detaining authority is still satisfied that the detenu requires to be detained, the authority is still at liberty to pass an order of detention. In other words, the duty of the detaining authority is that he should pointedly consider the order passed by the court granting bail to the detenu and the conditions thereof and after due application of mind, should pass orders, either to detain or not to detain the detenu. This very issue has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Joseph v. State of Kerala [2011 (1) KLT 272], where, in paragraphs 12 to 15, it has been held thus: “12. The learned counsel alternatively argues that if, as a matter of fact, the detaining authority were satisfied that the detenu was on bail from 8.4.10 on the basis of Ext.P3 order, it was incumbent on the detaining authority to consider whether such order granting bail passed very recently/immediately/shortly prior to the order of detention, was sufficient to ensure the result of preventing commission of future crimes (i.e., antisocial activities). For that purpose the conditions imposed in the said recent order granting bail must have been considered by the detaining authority. The detaining authority must have pointedly considered whether the conditions imposed in that order granting bail were sufficient to achieve the result of preventing the detenu from committing anti-social activities. Of course, it was open to the detaining authority to feel that in spite of such a recent order granting bail subject to very strict conditions as indicated in Ext.P3 further preventive detention was necessary. To come to that question, mind must have been properly and pointedly applied. Of course, it was open to the detaining authority to feel that in spite of such a recent order granting bail subject to very strict conditions as indicated in Ext.P3 further preventive detention was necessary. To come to that question, mind must have been properly and pointedly applied. On that aspect proper application of mind can never take place without and before the detaining authority peruses Ext.P3 order, considers the nature of conditions imposed and the possibility of the detenu committing offences later in spite of such conditions of bail. 13. It is significant that the detaining authority did not apply his mind to Ext.P3 order. Nay, it is not disputed that the sponsoring authority i.e., the 3rd respondent also did not forward such a crucial document to the detaining authority for his consideration. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision of the detaining authority was one of moment and of great consequence so far as the detenu is concerned. His cherished sacrosanct constitutional right of personal liberty and freedom was infringed not because he committed any offence; but because the executive authority anticipated or prophesised that he may commit such offences in future and hence needs to be deterred from committing such offences. Proper application of mind is mandatory. Without and before considering Ext.P3 order and the question whether the very strict conditions 1 to 4 imposed in Ext.P3 is sufficient to deter the detenu from committing future offences, a proper application of mind cannot be said to have taken place. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner argues that there is costly, vital and fatal non-application of mind to the relevant and vital circumstances. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a host of precedents ending with the decision in Philip v. State of Kerala (2009 (3) KLT SN 32 (C. No.35)). There is no dispute with the proposition of law that all relevant circumstances must be considered and that mind must be applied specifically and pointedly to all relevant circumstances before a valid order of detention is passed. In this case, we note that the order and the grounds of detention reveal confusion of thought in the mind of the detaining authority as to whether the detenu was on bail or in judicial custody on the relevant date i.e., 13.5.10. In this case, we note that the order and the grounds of detention reveal confusion of thought in the mind of the detaining authority as to whether the detenu was on bail or in judicial custody on the relevant date i.e., 13.5.10. Even if we ignore that and accept the contention that the detaining authority knew that the detenu was on bail, the fact remains that Ext.P3 order granting bail subject to draconian conditions was not placed before the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority; nor did the detaining authority pointedly apply his mind to the question whether in spite of those conditions an order of preventive detention deserves to be passed under S. 3 of the KAAPA. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been no proper application of mind.” 13. Again, this issue came up for consideration of this Court in Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India [2012 (2) KHC 160(DB)], where, it has been held thus: “15. Secondly and clearly the conclusion is inevitable that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the relevant information. This could be due to the refusal on the part of the sponsoring authority to place the bail orders before the Magistrate. But, at the same time, the Magistrate also cannot wash his hands by saying that the materials was not before him. He could have posed the question as to what are the conditions in the bail orders. He was aware that the detenu had been arrested and was in judicial custody till 22.7.2011. We must therefore take it that the detaining authority was aware that bail had been granted. If that be so, he could have certainly insisted on seeing the bail order. Apparently, he has not made any attempt in the said direction. The result is that the detaining authority has been oblivious to the bail conditions. 16. Now the further question arises as to whether the Additional D.G.P. could sustain the detention on the basis of the dictum laid down in Sunitha Mujeeb Rehman v. State of Kerala (2010 (4) KLT478). 17. We feel that the said decision is distinguishable on the facts. 16. Now the further question arises as to whether the Additional D.G.P. could sustain the detention on the basis of the dictum laid down in Sunitha Mujeeb Rehman v. State of Kerala (2010 (4) KLT478). 17. We feel that the said decision is distinguishable on the facts. That was a case where as noted in paragraphs 24 and 25 which we have extracted the detaining authority was apparently aware of the conditions attached to the order granting bail and had still found that detention is necessary. In this case the Magistrate does not say that the detenu is a person who can not be deterred from indulging in antisocial activities by the conditions imposed on him. The bail conditions were known to the Magistrate in Sunitha Mujeeb's case. But, in this case, going by the order the Magistrate was not certainly aware of the bail conditions. 18. More importantly, this is a case where as noted bail was granted on 20.7.2011. One of the conditions imposed in the order granting bail is that the detenu shall not involve in any other crime while on bail. Bail order is passed on 20.7.2011. The order of detention is passed on 27.9.2011. Learned Additional D.G.P. would, after getting instructions, also submit that after the date of the bail order and after being enlarged on bail, the detenu has not committed any crime. No doubt, his case is that the detenu violated one of the bail conditions, namely, that he should report before the police officer. But, as far as the crucial condition in the bail order that he shall not involve in any crime we can proceed on the basis that the said conditions had not been flouted by the detenu. Unlike the fact situation in Sunitha Mujeeb's case where as noted by the Bench the bail conditions were geared to secure the interests of investigation in that case, in this case the conditions include the condition that the detenu shall not involve in any crime. This condition we are of the view is germane and crucial in a proceeding under S.3 of the Act. This was indeed vital information which may have turned the case in favour of the detenu that is to say had this condition been considered by the Magistrate the Magistrate may have come to a different conclusion. This condition we are of the view is germane and crucial in a proceeding under S.3 of the Act. This was indeed vital information which may have turned the case in favour of the detenu that is to say had this condition been considered by the Magistrate the Magistrate may have come to a different conclusion. Therefore this was vital information which was not placed before the Magistrate. On that score alone the order of detention is liable to be interfered with. The order of detention is liable to be interfered also on the ground that the said bail condition has not even been considered by the detaining authority. There is non application of mind to a relevant and vital aspect of the matter. 19. The learned Additional D.G.P. would submit that even if the conditions of bail had been placed before the Magistrate he still may have ordered detention for which indications are present in the order. We would think that this argument cannot hold good and we feel that the reasoning in paragraph 19 of the judgment in Sunitha Mujeeb's case provides a complete answer which we have extracted above. 20. Another contention raised by the Additional D.G.P. is that this is a case where the detenu had violated one of the bail conditions, namely he should report before the police station. Learned counsel for the petitioner denies the allegation. He would at any rate say that the remedy of the police officer would have been to bring it to the notice of the Court and to seek cancellation of the bail. Whatever that be we are of the view that even proceeding on the basis that detenu had not complied with the said condition it may not have any bearing on the issue relating to non application of mind to the vital aspect that the Sessions Court had granted bail subject to the condition that the detenu should not involve in any crime. If the detaining authority had the order granting bail before him the detaining authority would have certainly posed the question as to whether the detenu has committed any crime thereafter. At least the detaining authority would have considered the question as to whether the condition in the bail order that he should not involve in any other crime is insufficient to deter the detenu from carrying on the undesirable activities. At least the detaining authority would have considered the question as to whether the condition in the bail order that he should not involve in any other crime is insufficient to deter the detenu from carrying on the undesirable activities. This exercise has apparently not been done by the detaining authority. We are therefore of the view that the order of detention is vitiated for non application of mind to the relevant aspects and therefore the order detention cannot be sustained.” 14. This principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in M.Ahamedkutty v. Union of India [(1990) 2 SCC 1] and Anant Sakharam Raut v. State of Maharashtra [(1986) 4 SCC 771], which were quoted in paragraph 18 of the judgment in G.Reddeiah v. Govt. of A.P. [(2011) 2 SCC 389]. 15. Thus, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention passed without adverting to or considering the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court enlarging the detenu on bail in Cr.Nos.267/13 and 309/13 of the Hemambika Nagar Police Station is fatal to Ext.P1 order deserves to be accepted. 16. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding non-supply of documents. Learned counsel contended that in Ext.P1 order, the previous order of detention and the report of the Advisory Board were referred to and relied on. According to the counsel, on the detention of the detenu, these documents were not supplied to him and that therefore, his right to make representation as provided in section 7 of the Act, has been affected. 17. However, learned Government Pleader contended that a reading of Ext.P1order itself would show that the detaining authority has only made reference to the previous order of detention and the report then made by the Advisory Board only for stating complete factual details and that those were neither relied on nor did they form part of the grounds of detention, requiring them to be supplied to the detenu. Therefore, according to her, non-supply of the earlier order of detention or the report of the Advisory Board did not vitiate the order of detention in any manner. 18. Therefore, according to her, non-supply of the earlier order of detention or the report of the Advisory Board did not vitiate the order of detention in any manner. 18. In support of the contention that any material that is referred to or relied on should be supplied to the detenu, counsel for the petitioner relied on different judgments of this Court, Praseetha v. State of Kerala [2009 (4) KHC 382 (DB)], Rekha Gopakumar v. State of Kerala [2012 (4) KLT 990], and of the Apex Court Smt.Shalini Soni v. Union of India [1980 CRL. L. J. 1487] and Union of India v. Ranu Bhandari [(2008) 17 SCC 348]. It is true that these judgments relied on by the counsel would support his contention that any order that is referred to or relied on by the detaining authority to order the detention of a person should be supplied to him. 19.However, as rightly contended by the learned counsel, in larger bench decisions of the Apex Court in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B.Gujaral [AIR 1981 SC 1191] and State of Tamil Nadu v. Abdullah Kadher Batcha [(2009) 1 SCC 333], a different view has been taken. 20. A reading of these judgments shows that when a contention of this nature is urged, it is the duty of this Court to see whether non supply of any document caused any prejudice to the case of the detenu and that the duty of the respondents is to supply documents which form part of the grounds of detention by reliance and not documents that are merely referred to for stating the facts. These principles are laid down in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) which reads thus: “5. Shri Jethmalani's submission was that the detaining authority was under an obligation to supply along with the grounds, copies of all documents to which reference was made in the grounds irrespective of whether such documents were or were not relied upon in making the order of detention. He submitted that the very fact that the documents were mentioned in the grounds established that the documents were relied upon in making the order of detention. We are unable to agree with the submission of Shri Jethmalani. He submitted that the very fact that the documents were mentioned in the grounds established that the documents were relied upon in making the order of detention. We are unable to agree with the submission of Shri Jethmalani. True, it was observed in some cases that copies of documents to which reference was made in the grounds must be supplied to the detenu as part of the grounds (vide Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 431). But these observations must be read in the context in which they were made. In Shalini Soni's case, for example, the observations were made immediately after stating that "grounds" in Art. 22 (5) did not mean mere factual inferences but meant factual inferences plus factual materialwhich led to such factual inferences.In Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1983 the Court observed (at p. 1989) : "It is difficult to see how the detenu can possibly make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention." The stress was upon the words "relied upon". In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCR 832 at pp. 848, 849: (AIR 1975 SC 550 at pp. 560, 561) the Constitutional requirement of Art. 22 (5) was stated as insistence that basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is, therefore, clear that every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds of detention is not an infringement of Art. 22 (5), fatal to the order of detention. It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority, making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation, that amounts to a violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Art. 22 (5). In our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention. In our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention. In the case before us we are satisfied that such were the two documents, copies of which were not furnished to the detenu. We are satisfied that the documents cannot be said to be documents which were relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention. Therefore, the detenu could not properly complain that he was prevented from making an effective representation. There was no violation of the right guaranteed by Art. 22 of the Constitution.” 21. Similarly, paragraphs 4 to 7 of the judgment in Abdullah Kadher Batcha (supra) reads thus: “4. The High Court observed that in view of non-supply of the documents a protection available under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, was violated. The High Court further held that in the absence of the required documents the detention was rendered illegal and accordingly the habeas corpus petition was allowed. 5. In support of the appeal, it has been stated that the documents in question which were requested by the detenu to be supplied had nothing to do with the order of detention. It was pointed out that there is a difference between the narration of facts and the ground of detention. Undisputedly, the copy of the order in the writ petition which was sought was in fact supplied though at a later point of time. It is not understood as to how the order passed in the writ petition which was dismissed can be a document about which the detenu had no knowledge. The High Court erroneously came to the conclusion that the relied upon documents were not supplied. Actually, the factual scenario is just to the contrary. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the State, the documents were read over and an endorsement to that effect has been made by the detenu. 6. In Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of T.N. it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 173, para 8) “8. We may make it clear that there is no legal requirement that a copy of every document mentioned in the order shall invariably be supplied to the detenu. 6. In Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of T.N. it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 173, para 8) “8. We may make it clear that there is no legal requirement that a copy of every document mentioned in the order shall invariably be supplied to the detenu. What is important is that copies of only such of those documents as have been relied on by the detaining authority for reaching the satisfaction that preventive detention of the detenu is necessary shall be supplied to him. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order granting bail has been supplied to him. Application for bail has been submitted by the detenu himself when the order of detention was passed which was subsequent to the order granting bail. We cannot comprehend as to how a prior order rejecting bail would be of any relevance in the matter when it was later succeeded by the order granting bail. But learned counsel emphasised that the counter filed by the Department was a relevant document, a copy of which has not been supplied to him.” The view in Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran case was reiterated in J. Abdul Hakeem v. State of T.N. and Sunila Jain v. Union of India. 7. The court has a duty to see whether the non-supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court has not examined as to how the non-supply of the documents called for had any effect on the detenu and/or whether the non-supply was prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because copies of some documents have (sic not) been supplied, they cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as relied upon documents. While examining whether non-supply of a document would prejudice a detenu, the court has to examine whether the detenu would be deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document. Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced.” 22. Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced.” 22. In our view, having read Ext.P1 order, we are inclined to think that the detaining authority has merely made reference to the earlier order of detention and the report of the Advisory Board for the limited purpose of stating the facts and has not relied on any of those documents and those documents do not form part of the grounds of detention. Since the law is settled in the Apex Court judgments in the cases of Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) and Abdullah Kadher (supra) that only those documents which form part of the grounds of detention need be supplied to the detenu, we are satisfied that the documents referred to above do not form any of those records and therefore, their non-supply would not render Ext.P1 order illegal. 23. The second part of his contention was that the confidential information and police station records relied on by the detaining authority were not supplied to the detenu. In paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit, though the second respondent has admitted to have relied on the confidential information and police station records, according to him, his obligation under section 7(2) of the Act is to supply only those documents which are relevant and that it was therefore, that the documents in question were not supplied to the detenu. However, this argument is not available to the respondents in view of the principles laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in P.K.Bose v. Secretary to Government [2010 KHC 6203], where, in paragraph 18, it has been held thus: “18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As seen from the recommendation of the Superintendent of Police and the Detaining Authority, apart from these normal registration of criminal cases, there appears to be some information which is stated to be confidential and available with the Superintendent of Police, the recommending Authority has brought the detenu under the category of “known rowdy” or “known goonda”. What is this material? What is this material? That is not placed or disclosed before the Detaining Authority or the Advisory Board or before this Court. At this stage, we hasten to add that it is not necessary to disclose to the detained person each and every secret or confidential material, if the same affects the interest of internal security or national security or the facts, if disclosed, would reveal the identity of any confidential source. In the present case, it is not the case of the Detaining Authority that such disclosure of the alleged secret/confidential material would disclose or reveal the very identity of any confidential source or the disclosure of which will be against the interest of internal security or national security and as such there was no inhibition for the authorities to disclose the same to the detenu or refer to the same in detail in the detention order. As such, we find that the non-disclosure of this alleged confidential or secret material seriously affects the defence of the detenu. It is also not in dispute that the Detaining Authority has except stating that it has considered all the materials placed by the recommending Authority, has not given attention to the alleged secret or confidential material available with the Superintendent of Police. In view of the same, as the foundation for the recommendation under S.3(1) of KAAPA is also based on certain secret or confidential information, non-furnishing of the same either to the detenu or to the Detaining Authority, in our view, vitiates the entire detention order. In our view, the referral Division Bench has lightly brushed aside this aspect and has held against the detenu. As such, this ground itself is sufficient to hold that non-furnishing of the alleged secret/confidential information by the recommending Authority to the detenu and to the Detaining Authority would initiate the entire proceedings and the detention order becomes illegal and unsustainable one.” 24. In view of the above, we have to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents were duty bound to have supplied the confidential information and police station records relied on against the detenu and the qualifying words contained in section 7(2) would not absolve them of that liability. 25. In view of the above, we have to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents were duty bound to have supplied the confidential information and police station records relied on against the detenu and the qualifying words contained in section 7(2) would not absolve them of that liability. 25. Now that we have accepted the first contention in full and the second contention in part, urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not necessary to deal with the third contention of the petitioner that representations were not forwarded to or appropriately considered either by the Government or the Advisory Board. In the result, we set aside Ext.P1 order detaining Gopakumar @ Gopan and direct that he be released forthwith, unless he is required to be detained in some other case.