JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal seeks to challenge the order passed by the Additional District Judge (Junior Division), No.1, Alwar dated 29.11.2007 whereby the first appeal preferred by the plaintiff-respondent has been allowed and the matter has been remanded back to the trial court with certain observations. 2. At the outset, it may be noted that present appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar dated 29.11.2007 and there is no interim order passed by this Court in the present appeal. 3. Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for specific performance and perpetual injunction contending that he entered into an agreement for purchase of plot measuring 48x60 feet with the defendant Satish Kumar for a sale consideration of Rs. 6,500, out of which Rs. 5,500 was accepted as advance. The agreement was attested by notary public on 26.1.1982. Despite various reminders, the defendant did not get the sale deed registered. The plaintiff served legal notice upon the defendant. The plaintiff has then throughout remained ready and willing to get the sale deed registered, which defendant failed to execute. Hence, the decree was passed in the terms prayed for. 4. The defendant in written statement contended that the sale deed in regard to the disputed plot has already been executed on 3.8.1982 in favour of one Rajendra Kumar Gupta and he was already put in possession on 6.8.1982. The agreement to sale was time barred and was disputed. In the agreement, it was clearly stipulated that the agreement to sale was to be executed within two months and that period has expired long back. The plot is in possession of Rajendra Kumar, who is the bona fide purchaser. The learned trial court by upholding the objection of limitation of the defendant, dismissed the suit. The appellate court however remanded the matter by the following observations. The plot is in possession of Rajendra Kumar, who is the bona fide purchaser. The learned trial court by upholding the objection of limitation of the defendant, dismissed the suit. The appellate court however remanded the matter by the following observations. " 14- izLrqr ekeys esa nksuksa i{kksa ds vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij bl ckjs esa fookn dk fo"k; gS fd oLrqr% fookfnr IykWV VqdM+ksa esa gksus ls mldk djkj ds le; c;ukek iathd`r gks ldrk Fkk ;k ugha\ ;g rF; dk iz'u gS] dsoy dkuwu dk iz'u ugha gSA ,slk mYys[k fookfnr bdjkjukesa esa ugha gksus dk D;k vlj gS\ ;g Hkh rF; dk iz'u gSA izLrqr ekeys esa oknh us fnukad 10-2-2003 dks uksfVl dks nsus dk D;k izHkko gS\ ;g Hkh rF; dk iz'u gS] dsoy dkuwu dk iz'u ugha gSA uksfVl feyus o bUdkjh ls izLrqr ekeys esa okn gsrq ifjlhek 'kq: gksrh gS ;k ugha\ ;g Hkh rF; dk iz'u gSA mYys[kuh; gS fd rF; dk iz'u fcuk lk{; ds r; ugha gks ldrk gSA " 5. Shri Satish Khandelwal, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court had dismissed the suit as time barred and the appellate court ought not to have interfere with the finding recorded by the trial court. In remanding, the trial court could not have directed fresh consideration on different issue other than on the question of limitation. It was contended that in agreement, time was essence of the contract and since the suit was not filed within time, the suit was rightly dismissed. It is not clear as to why if the defendant did not take any steps to get the sale deed registered or take remedy for specific performance of the agreement for a period between 1982 to 2003, the suit was barred by limitation as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act. It was therefore liable to be dismissed. 6. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the appellate court indicates that the appellate court merely remanded the matter with certain guidelines and clarifications to the trial court. The matter is still pending before the trial court. It was therefore liable to be dismissed. 6. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the appellate court indicates that the appellate court merely remanded the matter with certain guidelines and clarifications to the trial court. The matter is still pending before the trial court. The appellate court directed that the trial court ought to have also examine whether the plot being in pieces in different parts could be registered at the time of contract and it was also directed that the trial court should examine the fact of omission of such a stipulation in the agreement. The plaintiff served on the defendant notice on 10.02.2003, whereas the defendant in written statement has denied having received any such notice. This fact should also be born in mind by the learned trial court. Besides, the learned appellate court observed that whether the limitation would start to run from receipt of notice or refusal is a question of law. All these questions are to be decided simultaneously by appropriate evidence. 7. Shri Aditya Narain Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that as per the amendment made in the provisions of Order 14, Rule 2 CPC all the issues should have been decided simultaneously. The trial court could not have dismissed the suit only on limitation as a preliminary issue. Learned counsel cited the judgment of this Court in Prabhu Dayal & Ors. v. Girdhari Lal-2000 (3) WLC (Raj.) 234 and argued that this Court on analysis of provisions of Order 14, Rule 2 has held that issue of limitation cannot be said to be a issue of law because decisions on this issue would depend both on facts as well as law. In that case, the matter was remanded to the trial court to decide it afresh on all these issues. 8. In view of the aforesaid judgment in Prabhu Dayal and also in view of provisions of Order 14, Rule 2 CPC, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment in remanding the matter to the trial court as all that would happen would be that the appellant would be required to meet the case of the plaintiff respondent on all the grounds raised in the suit. This appeal in my considered view does not raise any question of law, much less any substantial question of law.The appeal is therefore dismissed.Appeal Dismissed. *******