ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioners seek quashing of the Notification issued for construction of Link Road under Mauza Godai, Phulkaha, Thana No. 124, Circle Kanti, District Muzaffarpur under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as contained in Gazette Notification dated 17.10.2012 as well as declaration made under Section 6 of the Act and a direction on the authorities to hear the objection filed under Section 5-A of the Act. 3. The petitioners are owners of the land bearing Khata No. 117, Khesra Nos. 1715, 1808 and 2000 admeasuring 0.05 and 0.01 ½ and 0.06 decimals respectively under the aforesaid Mauza. It is the stand of the petitioners that the process of acquisition was initiated in the year 2007 and thereafter by a Gazette Notification dated 17.10.2012 a notification was issued for acquisition of 0.665 acres of land situated in Thana No. 124, Circle Kanti, District Muzaffarpur under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 dispensing with the objection under Section 5A of the Act followed by declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Aggrieved by the same the petitioners have approached this Court submitting that the petitioners’ valuable right to object under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be taken away by issuing such type of notification when there was no justifiable urgency or emergency in the matter. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it is not denied that the proposal for acquisition was initiated on 1.10.2007. Rather the statement made in the writ petition with regard to the events leading up to the said proposal has also been admitted in it and it is stated that in the year 2003 application for construction of link road to facilitate the villagers for ingress to the main road had been filed which ultimately led to the proposal and subsequently to the notification for acquisition. However, no reasons are to be found in the counter affidavit which will justify the urgency of the acquisition considering the fact that the matter has been allowed to linger for years before the notification has been issued. However, no reasons are to be found in the counter affidavit which will justify the urgency of the acquisition considering the fact that the matter has been allowed to linger for years before the notification has been issued. Justification has been attempted on the ground that the lands are not being acquired from the economically disadvantaged segment of society or people suffering handicaps and they are not likely to become homeless and deprived of their source of livelihood and shelter. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the acquisition of the land has been made keeping in view the facilities and convenience of the villagers and downtrodden needy persons for general public interest. 5. In my view, the motive for the acquisition cannot justify the action of the respondents in terms of Section 17(4) of the Act when the matter has been allowed to linger at the level of the State authorities for nearly a decade. This Court fails to understand as to how just at the time of issuance of notification for acquisition the urgency would arise. There was no sense of urgency at the stage of the State authorities when they were considering the matter of construction of link road which took them nearly 10 years from the receipt of the proposal from the local villagers and more than five years even from the stage when the proposal was mooted at the level of the State Government. Mere use of slogans like benefit to the downtrodden cannot justify the invocation of emergency clause to defeat the valuable right to object by the affected persons under Section 5-A when no urgency was shown by the respondent officials of the State when they were considering the proposal. The same is merely an eyewash to deprive the petitioners of their valuable rights, as audi alteram partem has been held by the Apex Court as well as by this Court as an important and valuable safeguard of the citizens rights. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court, the first being the case of Anand Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others : (2010) 11 SCC 241, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of which it has been laid down as follows : “47. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon two decisions of the Apex Court, the first being the case of Anand Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others : (2010) 11 SCC 241, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of which it has been laid down as follows : “47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. We have already noticed a few decisions of this Court. There is a conflict of view in the two decisions of this Court viz. Narayan Govind Gavate and Pista Devi. In Om Prakash this Court held that the decision in Pista Devi must be confined to the fact situation in those days when it was rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down a proposition contrary to the decision in Narayan Govind Gavate. We agree. 48. As regards the issue whether pre-notification and post-notification delay would render the invocation of urgency power void, again the case law is not consistent. The view of this Court has differed on this aspect due to different fact situation prevailing in those cases. In our opinion such delay will have material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate Government before the Court justifying that urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A.” 7. To the similar effect as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhy Shyam and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others : (2011) 5 SCC 553 , in paragraphs 80 to 82 of which it has been held as follows :- “80. Even if planned industrial development of the district is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of power by the State Government under Sections 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial development of an area cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on computer screen. It needs lots of deliberations and planning keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters and environmental concerns. The objective of industrial development of an area cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on computer screen. It needs lots of deliberations and planning keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters and environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, who are desirous of making investment in the State, take their own time in setting up the industrial units. Usually, the State Government and its agencies/ instrumentalities would give them two to three years to put up their factories, establishments, etc. Therefore, time required for ensuring compliance with the provisions contained in Section 5-A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be portrayed as delay which will frustrate the purpose of acquisition. 81. In this context, it is apposite to note that the time-limit for filing objection under Section 5-A(1) is only 30 days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Of course, in terms of sub-section (2), the Collector is required to give opportunity of hearing to the objector and submit report to the Government after making such further inquiry, as he thinks necessary. This procedure is likely to consume some time, but as has been well said : “8. …. Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price- a small price indeed has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law.” 82. In this case, the Development Authority sent the proposal sometime in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and preparation of documents by the end of December 2006 but it took one year and almost three months for the State Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was consumed between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the Collector in making enquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have defeated the object of the acquisition.” 8. It may also be noted that in Radhy Shyam case (supra) the Apex Court has directed the respondent to pay costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the appellants for forcing unwarranted litigation on them. 9. It may also be noted that in Radhy Shyam case (supra) the Apex Court has directed the respondent to pay costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the appellants for forcing unwarranted litigation on them. 9. In my view, on a consideration of the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions it is evident that the respondents have obviously failed in showing any reasonable ground for invocation of the emergency provision under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. For the said reasons, the Notifications dated 17.10.2012 and 5.11.2012 are quashed in so far as they concern the petitioners but the respondents are given liberty to take fresh recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act giving the petitioners opportunity to object under Section 5-A of the Act. 10. The writ application is, accordingly, allowed.