JUDGMENT ROSHAN DALVI, J. 1. The Petitioner has challenged the order of Sessions Court, Mumbai dated 4th July, 2007 allowing the Revision Application No.1261 of 2007 against the order of the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM), 40th Court, Girgaum, Mumbai refusing to discharge the accused in the case, Respondent No.2 herein of offences punishable U/s.363 and 506 (ii) of Indian Penal Code (IPC) upon seeing a prima facie case also U/s.366 of the IPC and accordingly committing the case to the Sessions Court. By the impugned order the Judge, Sessions Court, Mumbai set aside the order of the learned ACMM dated 3rd October, 2006 and discharged Respondent No.2 not only in respect of offence U/s.366 of IPC, which was prima facie seen by the Magistrate, but also Section 363 and 506 (ii) of IPC and consequently the order of committing the case to the Sessions Court itself and remanding the case for being tried by the learned Magistrate's court for the remaining charges U/s.323, 324, 342, & 354 of IPC. 2. The incident from which the offences emanated took place on 6th September, 2003 / 7th September, 2003. The Petitioner and Respondent No.2 were friends and in a relationship. On 6th September, 2004 they were with their friends to celebrate the birthday party of one of their friends. In the early hours of 7th September, 2003 a dinner was arranged for them in Lush Hotel, Phoneix Mill compound, Lower Parel, Mumbai. All the friends proceeded there in a car. The Petitioner was in the car of Respondent No.2. They alone were in that car. Respondent No.2 instead of proceeding to Lush Hotel from Pedder Road turned his car at Haji Ali Junction and proceeded towards his home in Cuffe Parade, Mumbai. At about 1 p.m. they came into the compound of his building. The Petitioner refused to come out of the car. Respondent No.2 pulled her out by force, lifted her and took her to his house. In his home he beat her with his hands, struck her head and caused injuries. At 2 p.m. his parents came home when the father of Respondent No.2 took the Petitioner back to her house. 3. On 7th September, 2003 the Petitioner went to the house of her friend whose birthday party was celebrated on 6th September, 2003. She returned to her home the next day. At 2 p.m. his parents came home when the father of Respondent No.2 took the Petitioner back to her house. 3. On 7th September, 2003 the Petitioner went to the house of her friend whose birthday party was celebrated on 6th September, 2003. She returned to her home the next day. She went for medical treatment to her Doctor, one Dr. Poddar, on 10th September, 2003. She went to lodge her complaint on 11th September, 2003. She was sent to Nair Hospital for medical check up and then sent home. She lodged her initial complaint on 12th September, 2003. 4. The Petitioner's complaint is of being taken by Respondent No.2 to his house instead of the dinner at Lush hotel and of being beaten up there and of being treated by her Doctor and later of having taken a medical check up in Nair Hospital. 5. Later she has filed the further statement which is her second statement to the police. It is on a computer printout. The Petitioner who was present before the Court stated to Court that she herself typed it on the computer of police station. It is shown to be dated 19th August, 2003, a date prior to the incident. That may be an error. It is signed by the Police Inspector also on 19th August. It bears a rubber stamp of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sr. P.I. and PI crime dated 29th 03. The statement is in furtherance of her statement given on 12th September, 2003. 6. In that statement a Petitioner has made out the case of being molested which was not stated earlier due to embarrassment. It shows that she mentally prepared herself after explaining the facts to her mother and made her statement voluntarily. The facts of molestation are in paragraph 4 of the statement. Paragraph 5 has described certain injuries which are stated to be related to molestation. 7. It would be mentioned that the Petitioner has exhibited certain photographs of certain injuries to the Petitioner but the injuries described in paragraph 5 of the 2nd statement dated 19th August, 2003 are not shown in the photographs. No medical report of these injuries is also produced. 8. On 6th February, 2004 another supplementary statement of the Petitioner is filed. That statement refers to the initial statement dated 12th September, 2003 and certain correspondence which is confirmed as true and correct. No medical report of these injuries is also produced. 8. On 6th February, 2004 another supplementary statement of the Petitioner is filed. That statement refers to the initial statement dated 12th September, 2003 and certain correspondence which is confirmed as true and correct. The further statement is because she was asked more about the incident upon which she has stated that Respondent No.2 contacted her through his mobile phone on her landline. 9. It may be mentioned that this 3rd statement bears no reference to the 2nd statement. In fact Mr. Jethmalani argued that the supplementary statement is wholly inconsistent with the earlier statement and therefore, improbable as compared with the contents of the FIR and other materials on record and hence would be required to be discarded as held in the case of Anand R. Kalwani Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2005 (I) (2006) DMC 177. 10. The statement of the watchman of the building of Respondent No.2 corroborates the fact of Respondent No.2 driving into the building at about 1 a.m. on 7th September, 2003 and pulling out Petitioner from the car and lifting her and taking her to his house. It also corroborates the fact of the father of Respondent No.2 taking the Petitioner out at about 2 a.m on 7th September, 2003 in his car and returning home alone after about 35 to 40 minutes. 11. The case of the Petitioner of having been taken to house of Respondent No.2 instead of the dinner party where they were proceeding and forcibly taking her into his house by lifting her up is prima facie seen and corroborated. The further case of the Petitioner made out in the first statement of being beaten up by Respondent No.2 is shown in the photographs annexed to the petition. The fact of she being extricated by the father of Respondent No.2 and taken home is also seen to be been corroborated. 12. The case of being beaten up is further corroborated in the various statements of the friends of the parties including the friend whose birthday party was attended and to whose house the Petitioner had gone the next day. 13. The case of molestation made out by the Petitioner on 19th August, 2003 is not corroborated in any of these statements, though their statements have been recorded on 18th September, 2003, 10th October, 2003, 12th November, 2003 etc. 13. The case of molestation made out by the Petitioner on 19th August, 2003 is not corroborated in any of these statements, though their statements have been recorded on 18th September, 2003, 10th October, 2003, 12th November, 2003 etc. Of course, the friends would not know what transpired regarding any allegations of molestation. The Petitioner alone would know that fact. However, the Petitioner's second statement dated 19th August, 2003 has described injuries related to the molestation. Her friend whose birthday was being celebrated has made supplementary statement in which she has confirmed her earlier statement dated 18th September, 2003 and added about the injuries caused to the Petitioner. These injuries are a swollen face, a blackish stain near the eye and reddish marks on her back and left hand. She claims to have taken photographs. These appear to be photographs annexed to the petition. These also do not show the injuries caused by molestation as described in the 2nd statement of the Petitioner dated 18th August, 2003. The undated supplementary statement of the Petitioner's friend would be any time after 18th September, 2003. As late as on that day also no statement about the injuries due to molestation described in paragraph 5 of the second statement dated 19th August, 2003 are stated by the friend of the Petitioner. 14. It is upon the aforesaid facts that impugned order dated 4th July, 2007 would have to be considered. It may be bear repetition to state that in that order not only the charge U/s.366 of IPC is set at naught, but also U/s.363 and 506 (ii) of IPC. Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner argued that for the charges that remained and for which the case was remanded to the learned Magistrate's Court upon setting aside the order of committal are punishable only with imprisonment or fine and that such an order is obtained by fraud to see that Respondent No.2 who must face trial for more grave offences would be let out upon payment of some fine alone. 15. Upon impugning the order dated 4th July, 2007 the Court must consider the correctness of such order and not see the aftermath of the order. It may be mentioned that even if the charges triable only by Magistrates are to be tried, not in all cases the conviction ends up only with fine. 15. Upon impugning the order dated 4th July, 2007 the Court must consider the correctness of such order and not see the aftermath of the order. It may be mentioned that even if the charges triable only by Magistrates are to be tried, not in all cases the conviction ends up only with fine. It would depend upon facts of each case and the learned Magistrate would surely consider the facts of this cases at the time of sentencing. 16. The chronology of what transpired upon the Petitioner's complaint is also required to be seen as a case of fraud is sought to be made out. There have been various divergent orders. 17. Initially the learned ACMM, 40th Court, Girgaum, Mumbai rejected the application of discharge of Respondent No.2 and not only sought to proceed upon the prosecution case made out U/s. 363, 342, 324, 354, 323 and 506 (ii) of the IPC but saw a prima facie case U/s.366 of IPC exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and committed the case to the Sessions Court. The Revision Petition was filed by Respondent No.2 being Revision Petition No.1261 of 2007 challenging the order of rejection of discharge and the committal of the case. Under the impugned order the order of rejection of discharge was set aside. The discharge application was allowed and Respondent No.2 came to be discharged U/s. 363, 366 and 506 (ii) of the IPC. Since the remaining charges were triable by the Magistrate the case was remanded to the learned Magistrate's Court. In the meantime the case upon being committed was taken up by the Sessions Court. The Miscellaneous Application being M A No.244 of 2007 was filed by Respondent No.2 in the Sessions Court for discharge. The discharge application came to be rejected on 10th April, 2007 upon the Sessions Court seeing that the charge U/s.366 is not groundless. The application for the case being remanded back to the learned Magistrate's Court was not allowed as the charge U/s.366 was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. 18. The discharge application came to be rejected on 10th April, 2007 upon the Sessions Court seeing that the charge U/s.366 is not groundless. The application for the case being remanded back to the learned Magistrate's Court was not allowed as the charge U/s.366 was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. 18. A criminal application being Criminal Application No.1340 of 2007 came to be filed in this Court by Respondent No.2 on 13th April, 2007 challenging the orders of Sessions Court dated 10th April, 2007 and of the Magistrate's Court 3rd October, 2006 and in the alternative to direct the Revision Application filed by Respondent No.2 against the order of the learned Magistrate dated 3rd October, 2006 to be heard. This application came to be withdrawn on 25th April, 2007 by Respondent No.2 but upon a condition that the Sessions Court would not proceed until the Revision Application was disposed off. Hence though the main prayer of challenge to the order rejecting the discharge application in the Sessions Court as also in the Magistrate's Court dated 10th April, 2007 and 3rd October, 2006 came to be given up, Respondent No.2 sought to be heard in the Revision Application. That Revision Application came to be heard and disposed off under the impugned order. 19. The essence of all these applications and orders is the same. A prima facie case under the various offences under which the Respondent No.2 has to be charged and tried is to be seen. The chaos was because of multiple applications and multiple orders. It is compounded by the fact that in all the courts the other applications are not brought to the notice of the Court. It is contended by the Petitioner that it is a gross fraud. Though a fraud in that behalf is not seen, mismanagement of case certainly is. This is the malaise of the justice system. Instead of proceeding in one Court and obtaining an order, the parties, for whatever reason, seek to make more than one application and do not fully agitate them. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that because the criminal application has been withdrawn the order dated 10th April, 2007 has attend finality. If that was only the application and only order it would stand to reason. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that because the criminal application has been withdrawn the order dated 10th April, 2007 has attend finality. If that was only the application and only order it would stand to reason. However, though the revision application filed by the Petitioner was not until then disposed off, the learned Judge upon committing of the case has considered the application of Respondent No.2 for discharge. The learned Judge cannot be faulted. The Respondent No.2 not only filed a discharge application before the Sessions Court but also revision application from the order of the learned Magistrate. He is, therefore, alone responsible for the orders to be passed therein. Both such applications being the revision application as also discharge application in the Sessions trial itself must come up before a Single Court. That would be the elementary basis of good court management. However, both these applications were taken up by different courts. The resultant orders have been contradictory. The resultant chaos is that though Respondent No.2 appears to be satisfied with the impugned order he has not brought to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge at the time of the passing of the impugned order, that this discharge application came to be rejected by the Sessions Court trying the case. 20. It has been sought to be argued on his behalf that that was an inferior Court because it was the Assistant Sessions Judge whereas the revision application would come up before Additional Sessions Judge. The argument does not require to be countenanced. Both the applications must be before the same Court but were assigned to two different Judges. The revision application came up before the Judge not taking up trial. It is upon this chaos that the allegations of fraud have been made. 21. However, the material aspect to consider only is whether impugned order deserves to be interfered with. The learned Judge in the revision application would require to see the case made out U/s.363 and 506 (ii) of IPC in respect of which Respondent No.2 has been discharged. Case U/s.363 would not be attracted because the Petitioner was not a minor and could not be kidnapped from the lawful guardianship. The case U/s.506 (ii) IPC was not made out and has not even been much pressed. Case U/s.363 would not be attracted because the Petitioner was not a minor and could not be kidnapped from the lawful guardianship. The case U/s.506 (ii) IPC was not made out and has not even been much pressed. What is seriously pressed is the offence U/s.366 which was not made out upon initial complaint which came to be seen by the learned Magistrate in the order dated 3rd October, 2006 as the offence been attracted despite the police report. Section 366 runs thus : 366 Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a terms which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; (and whoever, by means of criminal intimation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid). 22. The learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order has considered that the Petitioner was not abducted for being compelled to marry Respondent No.2 against her will on the date of the incident. He has also considered that she was not abducted with an intent that she would be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. In fact there has been no complaint of any illicit intercourse with the Petitioner even after second statement dated 19th August, 2003. The entire initial complaint was of being beaten in the house of Respondent No.2. The further statement is of being molested in the house of Respondent No.2 and sustaining injuries due to molestation. The First Information Report shows that Petitioner and Respondent No.2 were going by car with the consent of the Petitioner. When Respondent No.2 deviated to go to Cuffe Parade instead of Lower Parel and took a 'u' turn at the Haji Ali Junction, the Petitioner did not resist or shout. The First Information Report shows that Petitioner and Respondent No.2 were going by car with the consent of the Petitioner. When Respondent No.2 deviated to go to Cuffe Parade instead of Lower Parel and took a 'u' turn at the Haji Ali Junction, the Petitioner did not resist or shout. The learned Judge considered that Section 366 would be attracted in cases of abduction for the purpose of marriage but that was not the case of the petitioner. She was not taken to the house of Respondent for the purpose of marriage. Her statement shows that Respondent No.2 asked her why she was not marrying him and that itself was not sufficient to constitute an offence U/s.366 of the IPC. The learned Judge considered certain judgments relating to whether the term “marry” required going through a form of marriage, whether valid or not, but the case of the Petitioner was not that she was taken for the purpose of marriage. 23. The learned Judge has also considered how the offences U/s.363 and 506 (ii) of the IPC were not made out and with which there is not much dispute. 23. It is argued that the impugned order has not considered the supplementary statement dated 19th August, 2003. However, the statement dated 19th August, 2003 also does not show the intent of Respondent No.2 to abduct the Petitioner to marry her against her will or to force her or seduce her to illicit intercourse. That statement shows the description of molestation during the hour that Respondent No.2 beat up the Petitioner and caused bodily injuries. 24. Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner drew my attention to the case of Tarkeshwar Sahu Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), (2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases 560 in which a minor girl was forcibly taken to the Gunti of the accused with the intention of committing illicit intercourse upon her. Section 366 was applied. That would have no bearing upon this Case in which despite taking the Petitioner to his house it was not alleged by the Petitioner that any illicit intercourse was perpetrated upon her. Though, therefore, the intent of the accused would have to be seen in abducting the Petitioner, the intent to marry her on that day or to have illicit intercourse with her on that day has not been shown. 25. Though, therefore, the intent of the accused would have to be seen in abducting the Petitioner, the intent to marry her on that day or to have illicit intercourse with her on that day has not been shown. 25. Though the treatment meted out to the Petitioner prima facie appears to be rather gross, an offence U/s.366 is not made out as seen by the learned Magistrate as also learned Sessions Court in orders dated 3rd October, 2006 and 10th April, 2007. It may be mentioned that the learned Magistrate himself saw a prima facie case U/s. 366 of IPC which was not made out by the prosecution, the second statement supplementary statement notwithstanding. It is also seen that the learned Sessions Judge has not considered in detail the ingredients of Section 366 of IPC to apply them to facts of the case made out by the Petitioner in her first statement read with her second statement. All that the learned Judge has observed is upon “FIR and a statement” it was seen that the accused was “doing all the activities” after bringing the victim Petitioner without her consent to his house with a view to get sexual pleasure and he has threatened her that he would rape the victim. The supplementary statement dated 19th August, 2003 shows : “he was doing all this without may consent to get sexual pleasure. It was then when he also stated that he could raped him in public and nobody would stop him. 26. Though this statement would show abhorrent behaviour of Respondent No.2, it would not show that the Petitioner was abducted by Respondent No.2 with an intent to seduce her to illicit intercourse. The statement stated to have been made by Respondent No.2 is not of seduction but of threat. 27. It is accordingly seen that the impugned order cannot be faulted. The only aspect that remains is that the order dated 10th April, 2007 of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in the Criminal trial remains though the trial has been stayed by the order of this Court dated 25th April, 2007. In view of the fact that by the reasoned impugned order the case has been remanded to the learned Magistrate's Court and the order committing the case to the Sessions Court is itself set side, all the orders passed upon such committal would accordingly not survive. In view of the fact that by the reasoned impugned order the case has been remanded to the learned Magistrate's Court and the order committing the case to the Sessions Court is itself set side, all the orders passed upon such committal would accordingly not survive. Of course, Respondent No.2 should have taken an additional direction in that behalf as the time of disposed of the Revision application. 28. It is argued on behalf of the Respondent No.2 that during the course of the last decade since the filing of initial complaint itself, no proceedings have been taken by the Petitioner and only after charge has been framed by the learned Magistrate upon the remand of the case that this petition has been filed. The Petitioner indeed has no role to play in the criminal prosecution in all justice system. It is the victims alone who are victimised by being constrained to remain in absentia. The parties most required to be heard are the least heard in the system upholding the right of natural justice of all but the victims. It is only as late as in 2005 by latest amendment that a modicum of the right of hearing to a victim has been granted albeit only in appeal consequent upon the insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC. The Petitioner as the victim may not have known all that transpired in decade since her complaint was filed. What ever that has been done has been between the prosecution and accused, Respondent No.2. Upon the charges being framed by the learned M M, 18th Court, Girgaum on 13th June, 2012 summons came to be issued upon complainant, the Petitioner herein, in September, 2012. It is then that the Petitioner made inquiries and is stated to have found all that transpired to file this Writ Petition on 9th October, 2012. The Petitioner cannot but be heard as the Petitioner is the least to blame for the delay, if any. It is the sorry state of affairs that the complaint such as this remained to be tried for as long as decade since it was filed. The Petitioner certainly has to be heard in this Petition and the impugned order has to be tested. However, upon such test it cannot be seen to be faulted. It does not require any interference. 29. The Petitioner certainly has to be heard in this Petition and the impugned order has to be tested. However, upon such test it cannot be seen to be faulted. It does not require any interference. 29. It has been argued on behalf of the Petitioner that once the case was committed to the Sessions Court, the subsequent flow of the case would be under Chapter 16 of the CrPC alone as held in the case of Sudhir And Ors. Vs. State of MP a/w. State of MP Vs. Lavkush & Ors., (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 688. 30. However, this cannot take away the right of any accused to file a revision application against the order of committal and or of rejection of his discharge application. In any event upon the impugned order being passed allowing the revision application and setting aside the order of the learned ACMM dated 3rd October, 2006, various other incidental orders have been passed including setting aside the order of committal of the case to the Sessions Court itself. Consequently, the subsequent flow upon committal cannot continue under chapter 16 of the CrPC. In fact upon that the orders passed in the interregnum in the case which was committed to the Sessions Court would become infructuous and that incidental order and direction in that behalf has to be passed. That alone would have to be considered in this Writ Petition. Upon seeing that the impugned order has correctly considered the non-applicability of Section 366 to the facts of the case and the consequent effect of the committal of the case, all orders passed including the order dated 10th April, 2007 would become in-fructuous. 31. Respondent No.2, therefore, will have to be tried by the learned Magistrate for the offences made out upon the complaint of the Petitioner read along with the supplementary statement. The complaint would be tried on its own merits. 32. The Writ Petition stands dismissed.