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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 950 (MP)

Baldev Singh v. State of M. P.

2013-08-13

Sujoy Paul

body2013
ORDER 1. Since common questions of facts and law are involved in these two matters, on the joint request of parties these matters are analogously heard and decided by this common order. 2. Facts are taken from WP No. 2009/2013. Petitioner is a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), who was promoted by the State Government by order dated 4.11.2010 in scale of 15600-39100+5400 (Grade pay). A preliminary enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and thereafter the Superintendent of Police also considered the matter. However, the impugned charge sheet is issued by the Director General of Police (DGP) on 06.07.2012 (Annexure P/1). 3. The petitioner in other writ petition (WP No.7902/2012) is also a Deputy Superintendent of Police and charge sheet in the said case is also issued by the same authority/DGP. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings is assailed in these petitions on the ground that petitioners are falsely implicated and the allegations mentioned against them are factually incorrect. For example, it is contended by Shri Katare that the petitioner is subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the impugned charge sheet for crime No. 136 whereas preliminary report is for crime No. 130. In addition, it is contended that the documents desired by the petitioners are not furnished to them. 4. The bone of contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the appointing authority of the petitioners is the State Government. Drawing the attention of this court to the Schedule appended to Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1966 (hereinafter called as ‘CCA Rules’), it is contended that DSP is a Class-II post and the appointing authority of the said post in column No. 2 is mentioned as the State Government. Thus, the DGP has no competence to issue the charge sheet. In support of this contention, the judgments reported in AIR 1996 SC 2289 (Jai Jai Ram and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow and others) and 2007 (III) MPJR 265 (P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and Ors.) are cited. Lastly, it is submitted that non-supply of documents despite demand runs contrary to the judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 ( State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha). 5. Lastly, it is submitted that non-supply of documents despite demand runs contrary to the judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 ( State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha). 5. The bone of contention of petitioners is that the impugned charge sheet is issued under Rule 14 of CCA Rules, which is a charge sheet for imposition of major punishment. Major punishment can be imposed only by the appointing authority and, therefore, initiation of disciplinary proceedings can also be only by the the appointing authority. 6. Smt. Nidhi Patankar, learned Govt. Advocate, per contra, relied on the circular dated 26.3.1983, whereby the powers are delegated to the DGP to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and impose minor punishment. This order is issued in the name of Governor of M.P. On the strength of the judgment reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 (Union of India and others v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana), she submits that at this stage no interference on charge sheet is warranted. By placing reliance on a recent judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 2012 SC 2250 (Secretary, Min. of Defence and Ors. v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha), it is contended that no fault can be found in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the DGP. 7. I have heard learne dcounsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. I deem it proper to first deal with the contention regarding competence of DGP to issue charge sheet. 9. As per Rule 14 of CCA Rules, charge sheet can be issued by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority is defined in Rule 2 (d) of the CCA Rules . Rule 2 (d) reads as under: “2(d)- ‘Disciplinary authority’ means the authority competent under these rules to impose on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule 10.” 10. A bare perusal of the definition of “disciplinary authority” makes it crystal clear that the authority which has competence to inflict major or minor punishment is the disciplinary authority. Putting it differently, the authority, who can impose any punishment as mentioned in Rule 10 of CCA Rules, is treated as disciplinary authority. Thus, even the authority who is competent to inflict any minor punishment is a disciplinary authority. 11. The question is whether DGP can be treated as disciplinary authority. On the strength of the circular dated 26.3.1983 produced by the learned Govt. Thus, even the authority who is competent to inflict any minor punishment is a disciplinary authority. 11. The question is whether DGP can be treated as disciplinary authority. On the strength of the circular dated 26.3.1983 produced by the learned Govt. Advocate, it is apt to consider Rule 13 of the CCA Rules. The plain reading of this rule makes it crystal clear that the Governor or any other authority empowered by him, by general or special order, may initiate the disciplinary action. The circular dated 26.3.1983 reads as under: e/;izns’k ‘kklu x`g ¼iqfyl½ foHkkx vkns’k Hkksiky fnukad 26-03-1983 Øekad 1 ¼ch½ 31@83@c&4@2] jkT; ‘kklu lkekU; iz’kklu foHkkx ds Kkiu Øekad viBuh;@1@83@dk-iq-iq@83] fnukad 28 Qjojh 1983 esa fufgr funs’kkas ds varxZr iqfyl egkfuns’kd ,oa iqfyl egkfujh{kd dks f}rh; Js.kh jktif=r Lrj ds vf/kdkfj;ksa @deZpkfj;ksa ds fuEufyf[kr vf/kdkjksa dks izR;k;kstu iw.kZ :i ls rRdky izHkko ls vkxkeh vkns’kksa rd ds fy;s djrk gS%& 1- LFkkukarj ds vf/kdkjh & ;g vf/kdkjh iwoZ esa gh iqfyl )kjk egkfuns’kd dks vkns’k Øekad fnukad 9 twu 82 }kjk izR;k;kstu 3404@5578@82@2&c@2 fd;k tk pqdk gSA 2- lHkh izdkj ds vodk’kksa & iw.kZ vf/kdkj dh Loh—fr ckor~ 3- n{krkjks/kd [kksyus ckor~ & iw.kZ vf/kdkj 4- jkT; lhek ds ckgj dh vuqefr & iw.kZ vf/kdkj 5- foHkkxh; tkap fLFkr djus ,oa & iw.kZ vf/kdkj y?kq’kkfLr vf/kjksfir djus ckor~ e/;izns’k ds jkT;iky ds uke ls rFkk vkns’kkuqlkj gLrk{kj@& ¼jkelthou½ mi lfpo] e/;izns’k ‘kklu 12. This circular shows that the powers are delegated by the Governor to the DGP to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose minor punishment. Thus, a conjoint reading of Rule 2 (d), 13 and 14 of CCA Rules makes it crystal clear that the DGP becomes the disciplinary authority and is competent to issue the charge sheet against the petitioners. 13. In the considered opinion of this Court, the contention that only such authority can initiate the major disciplinary proceedings who is competent to impose major punishment on the petitioner, is misconceived and runs contrary to settled legal position. The law is well settled and makes a specific distinction between initiation of disciplinary proceedings and imposition of punishment. In other words, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding is different than the power to impose punishment. This question is decided by the Supreme Court way back in 1970 in case of State of M.P and others. The law is well settled and makes a specific distinction between initiation of disciplinary proceedings and imposition of punishment. In other words, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding is different than the power to impose punishment. This question is decided by the Supreme Court way back in 1970 in case of State of M.P and others. v. Shardul Singh, reported in 1970 JLJ SN 9 = (1970)1 SCC 108 . This view is consistently followed by the Supreme Court in catena of judgments and recent judgment in Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra). The judgments cited by Shri Katare deal with imposition of punishment and do not deal with the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. 14. Thus, in view of the settled legal position, I have no hesitation to hold that no fault can be found in issuing the charge sheet by the DGP. 15. Dealing with the remaining contentions, in the considered opinion of this Court, the other submissions are regarding factual aspect of the matter. Whether the allegations against the petitioners are factually correct or not, cannot be gone into at the stage of charge sheet. In other words, the scope of judicial review at the stage of charge sheet is limited. Correctness of the allegations cannot be gone into at this stage as held by the Supreme Court in catena of judgments including (1994) 3 SCC 357 (Union of India and others v. Upendra Singh) which was followed in (1997) 7 SCC 101 (Govt. of T.N. v. K.N. Ramamurthy). Thus, for these reasons no interference is warranted by this Court. 16. So far as the contention that the documents have not been supplied to the petitioner, the petitioner can apprise the enquiry officer regarding the same and if despite that proceedings continues, the petitioners are at liberty to assail it before departmental enquiry forum at appropriate Stage. 17. for the reasons stated above, I find no reason to interfere in the matter. The petitions are meritless and are hereby dismissed. No costs.