Order Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Raju Giri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of all the Respondents/ Bihar State Financial Corporation. 2. The petitioner, while invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article-226 of the Constitution of India, has prayed for quashing of an order, contained in Memo no.1102 dated 21.08.2001 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition), whereby in the departmental proceeding, Respondent no.2/ the Managing Director, Bihar State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”) has inflicted punishment of demotion of rank and deduction of pay in original pay scale of the lower rank of Deputy Manager from the post of Manager. The petitioner has further prayed for quashing of appellate order i.e. Annexure-2 to the writ petition, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against order of punishment was rejected. 3. Short fact of the case is that the petitioner was posted as Branch Manager, Gaya in the Corporation in the year 1985. During the period of his posting, on 05.12.1985 official jeep bearing Registration No.BHI-6518 was stolen from the office premises, regarding which an F.I.R. was lodged as per information given by the petitioner. The claim for insurance, which was made by the Corporation, was repudiated on the ground that as per insurance cover note, it was affective from 4.00 P.M. of 05.12.1985, whereas theft was committed in the morning of 5th December, 1985. Of course, the insurance claim was rejected earlier, the Corporation on 31.05.1993 sought an explanation from the petitioner as to why loss suffered by the Corporation i.e. to the tune of Rs.80, 000/- (eighty thousand) be not recovered from the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, filed his reply on 14.06.1993 explaining his defence. Thereafter, no action was taken by the Corporation, but after about two years i.e. on 26.05.1995 vide Annexure-9 charges were framed against the petitioner and departmental proceeding was initiated. In the proceeding altogether four charges were levelled against the petitioner, which are as follows:- 1. While he was posted as Branch Manager, Gaya of the Corporation, he callously neglected the renewal of insurance of Staff Jeep No.BHI-6518 after 30.11.85 till 5.12.85 at 4.00 P.M. and the office vehicle was stolen on 5.12.85 at 7.00 A.M. causing wrongful loss to the Corporation. 2. While he was posted as Branch Manager, Gaya of the Corporation, he callously neglected the renewal of insurance of Staff Jeep No.BHI-6518 after 30.11.85 till 5.12.85 at 4.00 P.M. and the office vehicle was stolen on 5.12.85 at 7.00 A.M. causing wrongful loss to the Corporation. 2. It is established that no advance step for renewal of insurance was taken by him and left the vehicle uncovered till the theft causing wrongful loss of Rs.80, 000/- to the Corporation. 3. In case no.2950/85 (State Vrs. Jagdish Prasad) U/S 379 of I.P.C, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gaya has passed serious stricture against him and further observed doubt of his connivance in the matter of theft of the office jeep. 4. The above charges clearly establish that Shri Kansyakar has left the vehicle un-insured till the theft took place and has acted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Corporation causing wrongful loss of Rs.80,000/-. 4. Of course, in the departmental enquiry, no oral evidence was brought on record, only on the basis of show cause filed by the petitioner, the departmental proceeding was concluded. Fact remains that in the departmental enquiry, three conducting officers were appointed and finally the third conducting officer submitted his report on 26.02.1999. A copy of enquiry report was also communicated to the petitioner asking him to file his response, which was replied by the petitioner. Though, the enquiry report was submitted in the month of February,1999, again the Corporation did not take any step and at belated stage vide order, contained in Annexure-1 i.e. order dated 21.08.2001, punishment order was inflicted on the petitioner, as indicated above. Against the order of punishment, the petitioner immediately preferred an appeal before the competent authority, which was kept pending for a long time and finally, it was rejected by the Board of Directors on 16.07.2003 that too after retirement of the petitioner. Both the orders i.e. order of punishment and order of the appellate authority have been assailed in the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the order of disciplinary authority, has firstly argued that though four charges were levelled against the petitioner, all the charges were inter-connected and main charge against the petitioner was Charge no.2. Both the orders i.e. order of punishment and order of the appellate authority have been assailed in the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the order of disciplinary authority, has firstly argued that though four charges were levelled against the petitioner, all the charges were inter-connected and main charge against the petitioner was Charge no.2. While referring to enquiry report at page-54, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Charge no.2 i.e. “It is established that no advance step for renewal of insurance was taken by him and left the vehicle uncovered till the theft causing wrongful loss of Rs.80,000/- to the Corporation” was not proved against the petitioner. According to learned counsel for the petitioner once Charge no.2 was not established, there was no occasion for the disciplinary authority to inflict punishment in the matter. It has further been argued that though the conducting officer had exonerated the petitioner from Charge no.2, the disciplinary authority without assigning any reason for disagreement with Charge no.2 has passed order of punishment. He submits that once the main charge was not proved against the petitioner during the enquiry, the disciplinary authority, while disagreeing with the finding of enquiry officer, was required to assign reason and sought explanation from the petitioner on the said point. This mandatory provision was not complied with by the disciplinary authority and, accordingly, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the order of the disciplinary authority, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the order of the appellate authority i.e. Annexure-2 to the writ petition also assign no reason for rejection of the appeal. He submits that it is settled principle of law that once an appeal is filed, the appellate authority, whether there is statutory provision for recording reason or not, is required to succinctly assign reason either for agreeing with the appeal or rejecting the appeal. In the present case, nothing has been indicated save and except the words “rejected the appeal”. Accordingly, it has been prayed to set aside both the orders. 6. Sri Raju Giri, learned counsel for the Respondents/ Corporation has vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner. In the present case, nothing has been indicated save and except the words “rejected the appeal”. Accordingly, it has been prayed to set aside both the orders. 6. Sri Raju Giri, learned counsel for the Respondents/ Corporation has vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner. He submits that there were serious lapses on the part of the petitioner and due to the said reason, the Corporation has suffered a loss of Rs.80000/-, that was cost of the Jeep. He submits that insurance cover of the vehicle was already expired on 30.11.1985, even then the petitioner being the Branch Manager had not taken any step for getting the vehicle insured. According to Sri Giri, a fabricated stand was taken by the petitioner. After the vehicle was stolen, the petitioner had taken step to get the vehicle insured. Keeping in view seriousness of the charges, according to Sri Giri, there is no requirement for interference with either of the orders. 7. Besides hearing the parties, I have also perused the materials available on record. Fact remains that in this case the alleged occurrence of misconduct against the petitioner had occurred in the year 1985. It is not a case of Respondents/Corporation that the Corporation was not aware about such misconduct, even though no sincere effort was taken by the Corporation to initiate proceeding against the petitioner. However, in the year 1993 only an explanation was sought for from the petitioner, which was explained by the petitioner in the year 1993 by filing a detailed explanation. Though explanation was submitted in the year 1993, again the Corporation did not take any step. Suddenly, in the year 1995 vide Annexure-9 i.e. order dated 26.05.1995 charges were framed against the petitioner and the enquiry officer was appointed to conduct enquiry against the petitioner. It is not in dispute that in this case altogether three conducting officers were appointed, but none of the conducting officers had taken any step for early conclusion of the enquiry. Finally, third conducting officer concluded its enquiry and submitted the same in the year 1999. It is not in dispute that in this case altogether three conducting officers were appointed, but none of the conducting officers had taken any step for early conclusion of the enquiry. Finally, third conducting officer concluded its enquiry and submitted the same in the year 1999. Again the disciplinary authority sat over the matter for about two years and in the year 2001, he has come out with an order inflicting punishment, as indicated above, against the petitioner that too without assigning any reason as to whether he was in agreement with entire finding of the conducting officer or disagreed with the report. Nothing is on record to show the reason for disagreement with the enquiry report and major punishment was imposed against the petitioner. It is settled law that if the disciplinary authority is intending to differ with the enquiry report, he has to assign reason for differing with the same, which is missing in the present case. Moreover, in a stale matter, departmental proceeding was initiated after about 10 years from the alleged misconduct committed against the petitioner. In a case reported in 1990 (Supp)SCC 738; State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh & Anr., the Apex Court had approved the order of the Administrative Tribunal , in which even initiation of departmental proceeding after 12 years was quashed. It would be appropriate to refer paragraph-4 of Bani Singh’s case( supra), which is as follows:- “4. The appeal against the order dated December 16,1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case, there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal’s orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.” 8. The callous approach adopted by the Respondents is further evident from the fact that though after the order of punishment the petitioner filed appeal, no decision was taken by the appellate authority. In the meanwhile, the petitioner retired from his service on 30th April, 2003. Only after retirement of the petitioner, the appellate authority rejected the appeal that too without assigning any reason. 9. In view of the facts and circumstances as discussed above, the Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case for interference with both the orders and accordingly order of the disciplinary authority, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition and the order of the appellate authority, contained in Annexure-2 to the writ petition are hereby set aside and the writ petition stands allowed with all consequential benefits. 10. It is made clear that the Respondents are required to complete all formalities giving all consequential benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 11. The writ petition stands allowed.