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2013 DIGILAW 953 (RAJ)

Pritam Singh v. State Farm Corporation of India Limited

2013-05-09

P.K.LOHRA

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, an employee of the respondent Corporation, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for assailing legality and validity of impugned award dated 19th June 2001 (Annex.4) passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Sri Ganganagar (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the learned Tribunal'). 2. Challenging the impugned award, the petitioner has inter-alia averred in the writ petition that at the threshold of his service career he was appointed as Machineman under the Central State Farm, Suratgarh w.e.f. 17th July 1961 and his said appointment was made substantive w.e.f. 1st of July 1965. While emphasising his unblemished service career, the petitioner has also stated in the writ petition that since inception of his service career he has discharged his duties without any interruption but in want of requisite outlet of promotions despite rendering 15 years services no promotion/other service benefits have been accorded to him. As per the version of the petitioner, an incumbent having experience of 15 years is eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman in accordance with the rules governing the province of promotion. Asserting with full emphasis at his command, the petitioner has also stated in the writ petition that at the time of his initial appointment and confirmation he was having requisite qualification for the post of Machineman. The grievances as reflected from the pleadings of the petitioner are that although he was eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman but no endevour was made by the respondents to consider his candidature for promotion. Highlighting his afflictions, the petitioner has also averred in the writ petition that number of his juniors working in the cadre of Machineman were promoted to the post of Chargeman but his candidature was ignored by the respondents. Citing the example of one Mr. B.L. Sehgal, the petitioner has alleged that after his retirement in the year 1987 as Chargeman, the petitioner submitted a representation on 27th of July 1987 calling upon the respondents to consider his case for promotion but the said representation was not paid any heed by the respondents. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted representations from time to time ventilating his grievances but all those representations went in vain. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted representations from time to time ventilating his grievances but all those representations went in vain. Quoting the examples of some other incumbents, who were transferred in the office of Corporation at Suratgarh in the capacity of Machineman, the petitioner has categorically averred in the writ petition that although they were transferred due to misconduct/disciplinary action, yet they were promoted in the cadre of Chageman. The petitioner has further averred in the writ petition that denial of consideration of his candidature for promotion was absolutely arbitrary and illegal action of the respondents and therefore being aggrieved from the omissions and commissions of the respondents, he raised an industrial dispute before the conciliation officer by taking shelter of Section 10 read with Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1947'). The industrial dispute raised by the petitioner was entertained by the conciliation officer and despite sincere efforts being made by the conciliation officer, no settlement could be arrived at between the rival parties and therefore in these situations, the conciliation officer forwarded its failure report to the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government on consideration of the failure report, found that industrial dispute is in existence between the rival parties and consequently vide its notification dated 16th of September 1995 referred the industrial dispute of the petitioner for adjudication before the learned Tribunal. 3. In terms of the averments in the writ petition, the petitioner has submitted his statement of claim before the learned Tribunal and the statement of claim was replied by the respondents. After submission of reply to the statement of claim, the rival parties adduced their documentary and oral evidence. On conclusion of the evidence of the rival parties, the learned Tribunal adjudicated the reference by the impugned award and answered the reference against the petitioner. 4. On behalf of the contesting respondents, reply to the writ petition was submitted. In the return, while refuting the claim of the petitioner for promotion, the respondents have averred that promotion is not a matter of right for an employee and it is governed by a set of rules and an incumbent cannot claim promotion dehors the rules. As per the version of the respondents, the petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman as per the rules governing the said province. As per the version of the respondents, the petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman as per the rules governing the said province. Joining the issue with the petitioner on the issue of promotion, the respondents have categorically averred in the reply that as per rules, mode for recruitment to the post of Chargeman is 75% by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment. Adverting to the channel of promotion, the respondents have placed on record Annex.R/1 wherein under the caption "Channel of Promotion" following recitals are contained: "Mechanics and Sr. Tractor Operators (within minimum of 2 years experience as Mechanics with 5 years service in the cadre. Should be Matriculate with ITI Certificate in diesel/petrol engines. 5. On the strength of Annex.R/1, the respondents have submitted in their reply that petitioner was only 9th Class Pass and as such he was not eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman. With their reply, the respondents have also placed on record Annex.R/2, the list of employees depicting the actual post on which the incumbents are working. Apart from it, a list of incumbents promoted to the post of Chargeman of 1984 was also annexed. Laying emphasis on Annex.R/2 & 3 the respondents have submitted in the reply that the employees named in these lists are not working on the post of Machineman as asserted by the petitioner. The positive assertion of the petitioner that certain employees were transferred from Suratgarh office of the Suratgarh office of the Corporation on account of misconduct/disciplinary action was also refuted by the respondents in their reply and so also the allegation that those employees were promoted as Chargeman. Commenting on the transfer of the employees, the respondents have averred in the return that the transfer orders were issued keeping in view administrative exigencies during the interregnum period of 1975 to 1990. According to respondents, amongst the employees who were transferred, some of them were holding the post of either Mechanic or Assistant Chargeman. Defending the impugned award stoutly, the respondents have averred in the reply that the learned Tribunal has passed the impugned award after thoroughly examining the evidence and other materials available on record and therefore no interference with the impugned award is called for in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. 6. After submission of reply to the writ petition, on behalf of petitioner rejoinder was submitted and the averments contained in the reply were reiterated. In rejoinder, the petitioner has also stated that administrative control of the Central State Farm, Suratgarh was transferred by the Government of India to respondent Corporation w.e.f. 1st August 1969 and as a consequence of it, vide order dated 7th June 1976 the services of the petitioner were also placed at the disposal of the respondent Corporation. The petitioner has also asserted in the rejoinder that while implementing the decision of the Central Government and taking over the administrative control of the Central State Farm Suratgarh an assurance was given by way of a decision by the respondent Corporation not to adversely affect the interest of the employees of the erstwhile Central State Farm, Suratgarh after the said transfer by the Government of India. Narrating the facts about a litigation launched by the employees' union, the petitioner has also asserted in the rejoinder that the litigation finally ended upto Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.47 of 1977 and the Division Bench upheld the verdict of the learned Single Judge of dismissal of the writ petition. According to the petitioner, the outcome of the said litigation was founded on a settlement which was arrived at between representatives of the workmen and the management on 9th October 1969 whereby management of the respondent Corporation agreed not to alter rules and conditions of service contrary and detrimental to the existing rules and conditions of service of the employees. Taking shelter of the settlement, the petitioner has also pleaded that the said settlement is binding on the parties by virtue of Section 18 of the Act of 1947. Attacking the recruitment rules Annex.R/1, the petitioner has alleged in the rejoinder that change in the service conditions is dehors the law as it is in contravention of mandatory provisions contained under Section 9A of the Act of 1947. On the strength of this plea, the petitioner has asserted that Annex.R/1 cannot be pressed into service vis-`-vis him. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. On the strength of this plea, the petitioner has asserted that Annex.R/1 cannot be pressed into service vis-`-vis him. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ankur Mathur, has vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal, while adjudicating the reference made by the appropriate Government, has not examined the matter in its entirety, and as such, it has committed manifest error of law, which is apparent on the face of record in adjudication of the dispute referred by the appropriate Government. Mr. Mathur, the learned counsel, while assailing the impugned award, has contended with full emphasis at his command that despite rendered umpteen years of services, the petitioner has not been promoted to the post of Chargeman and even the factum of stagnation in service career was not properly appreciated by the learned court below while answering the reference in negative. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that an employee is entitled atleast for one promotion in his entire career or in the alternative to abate stagnation in his service career, the employer should take requisite measures in the form of offering pecuniary benefit by way of upgradation. As per Mr. Mathur, this very vital issue ought to have been examined by the learned Tribunal and by not doing so the learned Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error while passing the impugned award. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that on the strength of settlement which was arrived at between the employees' union and the Corporation, which is binding by virtue of Section 18 of the Act of 1947, denial of promotion to the petitioner is unjust and improper, and therefore, impugned award is not sustainable. Mr. Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also taken shelter of Section 9A of the Act of 1947 and would urge that altering service conditions to the detriment of the employees including the petitioner without making compliance of the mandatory provisions contained therein is a very vital issue which deserves due credence. The precise submission of Mr. Ankur Mathur is that altering service conditions of the employees detrimental to their interest dehors Section 9A of the Act of 1947 is a decision of the Corporation which is void ab-initio and as such denial of relief to the petitioner by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. 8. The precise submission of Mr. Ankur Mathur is that altering service conditions of the employees detrimental to their interest dehors Section 9A of the Act of 1947 is a decision of the Corporation which is void ab-initio and as such denial of relief to the petitioner by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained. 8. E. Converso, learned counsel for respondent Corporation has urged that the learned Tribunal while adjudicating the reference has examined the matter threadbare and thereafter has answered the reference in negative which cannot be faulted in the light of rules governing the province of promotion. Mr. Shishodia, the learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that promotion cannot be claimed by an employee as a matter of right and right of an employee is confined to that of consideration in accordance with law. Buttressing his submissions with full emphasis, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the learned court below has examined the matter in the light of relevant service rules and has thereafter declined the relief to the petitioner which requires no interference in exercise of certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Joining the issue with the learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 18 and Section 9A of the Act of 1947, Mr. Manish Shishiodia, the learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted with full emphasis that the said issue was never pressed before the learned court below and therefore the petitioner is precluded from raising this issue before this Court while invoking certiorari jurisdiction. According to learned counsel for the respondents, a plea which was never raised before the inferior tribunal/court, cannot be permitted to be raised by an aggrieved party invoking supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for rival parties and scanned the impugned award and other materials on record.On a bare perusal of the impugned award, it is crystal clear that the learned Tribunal has examined and thrashed out afflictions of the petitioner in its entirety and thereafter it has reached to its logical conclusion that claim of the petitioner is not sustainable. While discussing the relevant recruitment/promotion rules, the learned Tribunal has opined in clear and unequivocal terms that the petitioner was not eligible for promotion to the post of Chargeman under the old set of rules as well as the new recruitment rules framed by the Corporation. This finding of the learned Tribunal is based on proper appreciation of material on record and law governing the province of promotion and the same cannot be categorized as a perverse finding in the factual background of the instant case. The legal position is no more res-integra that right of an individual for promotion is not an absolute right and such right is confined to that of consideration as per mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, strictly in accordance with law. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner founded on Section 18 and Section 9A of the Act of 1947 appears to be quite attractive but from the impugned award it is clearly discernible that no such plea was ever raised by the petitioner before the learned court below. It is a trite law that an aggrieved individual invoking certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court cannot be permitted to raise a plea which was not a subject matter of judicial scrutiny before the inferior tribunal/court. That apart, a glance at the impugned award makes it amply clear that while adjudicating the reference, the learned court below has addressed on this issue in the light of old rules governing the province of promotion as well as the new rules for promotion. The learned Tribunal, after analyzing the matter, has recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner's claim for promotion to the post of Chargeman is not sustainable under both the set of rules. As this finding is recorded by the learned Tribunal after considering the relevant rules, the irresistible conclusion of this Court is that the learned court below has not committed any error much less an error apparent on the face of record in adjudication. 10. The Apex Court while considering the issue regarding change in the policy for promotion rendering existing employees ineligible for promotion, has held in clear and unequivocal terms that it is the sole prerogative of the employer to lay down eligibility for promotion. 10. The Apex Court while considering the issue regarding change in the policy for promotion rendering existing employees ineligible for promotion, has held in clear and unequivocal terms that it is the sole prerogative of the employer to lay down eligibility for promotion. The Apex Court in case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shiv Ram Sharma & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 653 : 1999 (I) CLR 1021 (SC) has answered the said question in Para 6 of the verdict with clarity and precision. Para 6 of the judgment is reproduced as infra: 6. The law is well settled that it is permissible for the Government to prescribe appropriate qualifications in the matter of appointment or promotion to different posts. The case put forth on behalf of the respondents is that when they joined the service the requirement of passing the matriculation was not needed and while they are in service such prescription has been made to their detriment. But it is clear that there is no indefeasible right in the respondents to claim for promotion to a higher grade to which qualification could be prescribed and there is no guarantee that those rules framed by the Government in that behalf would always be favourable to them. In Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, 1968 (1) SCR 185 , it was held by this Court that once appointed an employee has no vested right in regard to the terms of service but acquires a status and, therefore, the rights and obligations thereto are no longer determined by consent of parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. The High Court has also noticed that there was an avenue provided for promotion but the prescription of the qualification was not favourable to respondents. The principle of avoiding stagnation in a particular post will not be with reference to a particular individual employee but with reference to the conditions of service as such. As long as rules provide for conditions of service making an avenue for promotion to higher grades the observations made in T.R.Kothandaramans case [supra] stand fulfilled. In that view of the matter, we do not think the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petitions filed by the respondents. 11. As long as rules provide for conditions of service making an avenue for promotion to higher grades the observations made in T.R.Kothandaramans case [supra] stand fulfilled. In that view of the matter, we do not think the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petitions filed by the respondents. 11. The present writ petition of the petitioner is laid for invoking certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court which is to be exercised with great care and circumspection. The Apex Court in case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 has summed up undermentioend parameters for exercising supervisory jurisdiction in Para 38 (4) to (8) of the verdict: (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. 12. Therefore, viewed from any angle, in my considered opinion, no interference with the impugned award is called for.The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.Writ petition dismissed. *******