Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 08th August, 1994 ( annexure-12 to the writ petition) passed by the Registrar of Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, the respondent no. 1 herein, whereby the services of the petitioner have been terminated. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 1/6th September, 1997 ( annexure-13 to the writ petition), which, in fact, is a communication by the Assistant Registrar ( Administration), the respondent no. 3, intimating the petitioner with regard to the decision dated 28th September, 1994 regarding termination of his services w.e.f. 14th November, 1992. 2. Basic facts pertinent to the issue involved in the matter are as follows: Petitioner's father, namely, late Bhoop Narain Prasad Singh was a Driver in the Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi ( in short called as the "University"). The University is governed by the provisions of the Banaras Hindu University Act of 1910 as well as Statutes and Ordinances framed thereunder. Unfortunately, petitioner's father died in harness. The petitioner made an application for employment in the University on compassionate ground. The University has constituted a Committee, which considers the applications for appointment on compassionate ground. The Committee considered the application of the petitioner and made a recommendation to appoint him on the post of Hostel Attendant. Consequently, a letter of appointment was issued to the petitioner on 25th September, 1992. A copy of the appointment letter of the petitioner has been brought on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition and also as Annexure-CA-1 to the counter affidavit. The petitioner was directed to join his duties as Hostel Attendant in Broacha Hostel of the University. It is stated that when the petitioner submitted his joining to the Administrative Warden of Broacha Hostel, he was not allowed to join. The petitioner brought this fact to the notice of the Assistant Registrar ( Admin) of the University, the respondent no. 3, who issued a notification dated 30th September, 1992, whereby the petitioner was transferred as a Hostel Attendant, Ruiya Hostel ( Sanskrit Block). A copy of the said notification is Annexure-2 to the counter affidavit. It is stated that Administrative Warden of Ruiya Hostel also refused to get the joining of the petitioner. The petitioner brought this fact also to the notice of the respondent no. A copy of the said notification is Annexure-2 to the counter affidavit. It is stated that Administrative Warden of Ruiya Hostel also refused to get the joining of the petitioner. The petitioner brought this fact also to the notice of the respondent no. 3 vide his application dated 21st December, 1992. A copy of the said intimation is Annexure-5 to the writ petition. It appears that the petitioner was not being allowed to join his duties as Hostel Attendant, therefore, he made an application for change of his post and requested that he may be appointed as Peon, Chowkidar or Driver. Said application of the petitioner was also rejected and vide order dated 5/12th February, 1993 of the respondent no. 3 he was again asked to join at Ruiya Hostel. In compliance of the said order, petitioner again went to the Administrative Warden of Ruiya Hostel for his joining. In the meantime, the petitioner fell ill and he submitted his application for leave. A copy of the said application is on record as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. It is stated that before going to his native place, the petitioner was reporting his duties in the Central Office of the University, but he was not paid his salary. 3. The petitioner's further case is that he made several representations to the authorities of the University to allow him to join his services but all in vain. However, in the meantime, he was intimated by the respondent no. 3 vide communication dated 01/6th September, 1997 that his services have already been terminated by the University vide order dated 28th September, 1994 w.e.f. 14th November, 1992. A copy of the said communication is Annexure-13 to the writ petition. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred this writ petition in the year 1998. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the University-respondents. The stand taken by the University is that when petitioner's father died in harness, the petitioner applied for employment in the University on compassionate ground. His case was considered by the University and he was offered appointment on the post of Hostel Attendant and he was asked to report his duties to the Administrative Warden of Broacha Hostel. When the petitioner was not allowed to join at Broacha Hostel, he was transferred to Ruiya Hostel ( Sanskrit Block). His case was considered by the University and he was offered appointment on the post of Hostel Attendant and he was asked to report his duties to the Administrative Warden of Broacha Hostel. When the petitioner was not allowed to join at Broacha Hostel, he was transferred to Ruiya Hostel ( Sanskrit Block). It is further stated that Administrative Warden of Ruiya Hostel informed the respondent no. 3 that petitioner did not join his duties as Hostel Attendant in the said Hostel. Again vide order dated 12th November, 1992 the petitioner was directed to report for his duties in Ruiya Hostel. However, the petitioner did not comply with the orders of the University and requested to change his designation to that of Peon/ Chowkidar/Driver. His request was considered and turned down by a Committee constituted by the Vice-Chancellor. Thereafter, vide order dated 05th February, 1993 it was directed to the petitioner to join his duties in Ruiya Hostel, failing which disciplinary action against him would be taken as per the Rules of the University. In the counter affidavit it is further stated that when the petitioner failed to join and remained absent from his duties in an unauthorized way w.e.f. 14th November, 1992, the University by a number of letters requested the petitioner to report for his duty in Ruiya Hostel. However, when the petitioner did not comply with the same, his services were terminated in terms of the provisions of Ordinance 3( J) of the Ordinance of the University. It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that a letter dated 23rd July, 1993 was sent to the petitioner at his postal address, which was returned undelivered and the said memo was placed on the notice board of the Hostel and the Central Office, and then ultimately the services of the petitioner were terminated and communicated to him vide office order dated 12th August, 1994. 5. Heard Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri D.D. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the University-respondents. 6. Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground but without giving him any opportunity and without holding any enquiry the services of the petitioner have been terminated. 6. Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground but without giving him any opportunity and without holding any enquiry the services of the petitioner have been terminated. He further submits that the termination order was not communicated to the petitioner, therefore, the said order is not effective until it is published and communicated to the petitioner. He submits that from the pleadings of the counter affidavit it is evident that the order of termination was never communicated to the petitioner and the order of termination is in violation of Ordinance 3( J) of the Ordinance of the University. 7. Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the University, submits that since petitioner was appointed on humanitarian ground on temporary basis, no enquiry was required and his services have rightly been terminated in terms of Ordinance 3( J). 8. I have considered the respective submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is common ground that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground. Appointment on compassionate ground is in the nature of exception to the general provisions and, as such, it is always of permanent nature. A compassionate appointment is made to alleviate the distress of the family of the deceased employee. The purpose is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of the deceased employee. Therefore, if temporary appointment is made on compassionate ground for a short duration, the purpose of compassionate appointment itself will be defeated. A Division Bench of this Court has taken a view that appointment on compassionate ground is a regular appointment. Reference may be made to judgments of this Court in the case of Ravi Karan Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 1999 ( 2) AWC 976 : 1999 ( 1) LBESR 946 : 1999 ( 3) UPLBEC 2263 ; and Km. Himani Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and others), reported in 2011 ( 2) ADJ 120 : 2011 ( 3) AWC 2818 : 2010 Legal Eagle( ALD) 1068. In Ravi Karan Singh ( supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held as under: "This petition has come up before us on a reference made by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 19.12.1997. In Ravi Karan Singh ( supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held as under: "This petition has come up before us on a reference made by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 19.12.1997. The point involved is very simple, that is, whether an appointment under the Dying-in-Harness Rules is a permanent appointment or a temporary appointment. According to the learned Single Judge, this Court had earlier held that an appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules is a permanent appointment vide Budhi Sugar Dubey v. D.I.O.S., 1993 ESC 21; Gulab Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 ( 2) UPLBEC 995 and Dhirendra Pratap Singh v. D.I.O.S. and others, 1991 ( 1) UPLBEC 427. The learned Single Judge who passed the referring order dated 19.12.1997 disagreed with the abovementioned decisions and hence has referred the matter to a larger Bench. 2. In our opinion, an appointment under the Dying-in-Harness Rules has to be treated as a permanent appointment otherwise if such appointment is treated to be a temporary appointment, then it will follow that soon after the appointment, the service can be terminated and this will nullify the very purpose of the Dying-in-Harness Rules because such appointment is intended to provide immediate relief to the family on the sudden death of the bread earner. We, therefore, hold that the appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules is a permanent appointment and not a temporary appointment, and hence the provisions of U.P. Temporary Government Servant ( Termination of Services) Rules, 1975 will not apply to such appointments." 9. In Km. Himani Saxena ( supra), this Court has held as follows: "5. .......In view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ravi Karan Singh ( supra), an appointment offered under the Rules of 1974 is permanent in nature. In such view of the matter, I am of the opinion that once an appointment letter is issued, without attaching any condition, the service of such person cannot be terminated without any notice and opportunity. 6. It is well settled that an order which involves civil consequences must be just, fair, reasonable, unarbitrary and impartial with the principles of natural justice. 6. It is well settled that an order which involves civil consequences must be just, fair, reasonable, unarbitrary and impartial with the principles of natural justice. The main aim of the principle of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of the justice vide State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( 1978) 1 SCC 248 ; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, ( 1978) 1 SCC 405 and D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 SCC 259 ." 10. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the submission of Sri V.K. Singh that appointment of the petitioner was temporary in nature, has hardly merit acceptance. The University in the counter affidavit has admitted that the petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground and he was paid salary also. However, his services have been terminated on the ground that he remained absent from his duty in an unauthorized way. In the counter affidavit it is mentioned that a number of letters were sent to the petitioner to report for his duties, but I find that neither the dates of those letters have been mentioned in the counter affidavit nor any such letter has been brought on record. The consistent stand of the petitioner is that he was not communicated any such letter or even his termination order. In paragraph-9 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that the University sent a letter dated 23rd July, 1993 to the petitioner at his postal address, which letter was returned undelivered and thereafter it was placed on the notice board of the Hostel and Central Office. Paragraph-9 of the counter affidavits reads as under: "9. That the letter dated 23.7.1993 sent to the petitioner at his postal address was returned undelivered. The said memo was placed on the notice board of the Hostel and the Central Office and then ultimately the services of the petitioner was terminated and communicated to him vide office order dated 12.8.1994. The copies of the final order were also displayed on the notice Board of the Hostel as also of Central Registry. True copies of the letter dated 23.7.1993 and the order dated 12.8.1994 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexures-CA-6 and 7 respectively." 11. Concededly, the letter dated 23rd July, 1993 was not served on the petitioner. The copies of the final order were also displayed on the notice Board of the Hostel as also of Central Registry. True copies of the letter dated 23.7.1993 and the order dated 12.8.1994 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexures-CA-6 and 7 respectively." 11. Concededly, the letter dated 23rd July, 1993 was not served on the petitioner. It is not mentioned in the counter affidavit that it was sent under the registered cover. Therefore, no presumption can be drawn that said letter, which was sent at a correct address, shall be deemed to have been served. Ordinance 3( J) of the Ordinance of the University enjoins that services of an employee will be liable to be terminated after giving him opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. Ordinance 3( J) is reproduced hereunder: "The services of an employee will be liable to be terminated if he continues to be absent from duty for a period of three months without leave. Provided that no action will be taken unless he has been given an opportunity to show-cause against the action proposed to be taken." 12. From a plain reading of the aforesaid ordinance it brings out that before terminating services of an employee it is obligatory on the part of the University to afford him opportunity to show cause. Indisputably, in the present case, provisions of Ordinance 3( J) have not been complied with as the letter/show cause was not sent to the petitioner under the registered cover and no further effort has been made by the University to send the said notice or to publish it in the newspaper. As regards meaning of service by post, it would be useful to go through Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 27 reads as under: "27. As regards meaning of service by post, it would be useful to go through Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 27 reads as under: "27. Meaning of service by post.--Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ''serve' or either of the expression ''give' or ''send' or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post." In Black's Law Dictionary "giving of notice" is distinguished from receiving of the notice, as follows: "A person notifies or gives notice to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or not such other actually comes to know of it." A person "receives" a notice when it is duly delivered to him or at the place of his business." 13. In the case Harcharan Singh v. Shivrani, ( 1981) 2 SCC 535 , the Supreme Court has considered the issue when a presumption can be drawn with regard to service of notice by post and has observed as under: "7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-- "Meaning of service by post" and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under illustration ( f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by prepaying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant, he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice." 14. In the case of Dalmia Cement ( Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., ( 2001) 6 SCC 463 , the Supreme Court has held as under: "7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act deals with the presumption of service of a letter sent by post. The despatcher of a notice has, therefore, a right to insist upon and claim the benefit of such a presumption. But as the presumption is a rebuttable one, he has two options before him. One is to concede to the stand of the sendee that as a matter of fact he did not receive the notice, and the other is to contest the sendee's stand and take the risk for proving that he, in fact, received the notice. It is open to the despatcher to adopt either of the options. If he opts for the former, he can afford to take appropriate steps for the effective service of notice upon the addressee. Such a course appears to have been adopted by the appellant Company in this case and the complaint filed, admittedly, within limitation from the date of the notice of service conceded to have been served upon the respondents." 15. Terminating the services of an employee visits serious civil consequences. In the case of V.C., Banaras Hindu University and others Vs. Shrikant, 2006 ( 11) SCC 42 , the Supreme Court has aptly observed as under: "52. The question came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [ ( 1993) 3 SCC 259 ] wherein emphasising the requirements to comply with the principles of natural justice while terminating the services of the employees on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India; it was held that not only the procedure prescribed for depriving a person of his livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 but also the law which will be liable to be decided on the anvil thereof. 53. Here again, this Court opined that Article 14 requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. It was furthermore held: "Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. 53. Here again, this Court opined that Article 14 requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. It was furthermore held: "Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness." 54. This Court opined that right to life enshrined under Article 21 would include the right to livelihood and thus before any action putting an end to the tenure of an employee is taken, fair play requires that reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic enquiry conducted complying with the principles of natural justice." 16. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Scooters India Ltd. v. M. Mohammad Yaqub and another, AIR 2001 SC 227 ; Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan and another, AIR 1998 SC 1681 ; Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India and others, ( 2010) 13 SCC 427 ; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, ( 1969) 2 SCC 262 ; State of Orissa v. Dr. ( Miss.) Binapani Dei and others, ( 1967) 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269 . 17. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1313 , has held that mere passing of an order of dismissal is not effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned and an order of dismissal without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it does not take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. 18. However, in the case in hand, from the pleadings it is demonstrably established that the order of termination was not communicated to the petitioner. 19. 18. However, in the case in hand, from the pleadings it is demonstrably established that the order of termination was not communicated to the petitioner. 19. Suffice, would it be to mention that the University after sending the letter dated 23rd July, 1993, which admittedly remained undelivered upon the petitioner, did not take any step to serve the copy of the show cause notice or termination order on the petitioner. Along with the counter affidavit no letter or communication sent to the petitioner has been brought on record. 20. After careful consideration of the matter, I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, termination of services of the petitioner is violative of principles of natural justice and the University has also not followed the provisions of Ordinance 3( J) of the Ordinance of the University. 21. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, at this distance of time, the end of justice will be subserved if a direction is issued upon the University to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity to the petitioner. Therefore, a direction is issued upon the Registrar of the University to pass a fresh, speaking order after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner is at liberty to file a representation within eight weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order before the Registrar of the University. The Registrar shall complete the exercise and take decision as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. However, the order of termination, which is impugned in this writ petition, shall abide by the result of the fresh decision to be taken by the Registrar of the University. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.