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2013 DIGILAW 954 (KER)

Licil Antony v. State of Kerala

2013-11-06

ANTONY DOMINIC, P.D.RAJAN

body2013
Judgment : Antony Dominic, J. 1. The challenge in this writ petition is against Ext.P1, an order of detention issued under the COFEPOSA Act against husband of the petitioner Mr.Antony Morris (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu' for short). 2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that during November 2012, the Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI for short), Regional Unit, Kochi gathered information that a consignment of Red sanders, an item prohibited for export under the EXIM POLICY, was being attempted to be smuggled to Dubai through the International Container Transshipment Terminal (ICTT), Vallarpadam, Cochin. Accordingly, two containers were detained by the DRI resulting in the recovery of a huge quantity of Red sanders. Statements of several persons were recorded by the DRI and from these statements, details of the active role played by the detenu in the smuggling of Red sanders through Cochin Port were disclosed. Accordingly, the detenu was summoned and his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act was recorded. It is stated that in his statement, the detenu is alleged to have admitted his involvement in the smuggling of red sanders. Thereafter, proceedings under the COFEPOSA Act were initiated for the detention of three persons including the detenu and finally, by Ext.P1 order dated 6.5.2013, the detenu was ordered to be detained under Section 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA Act. Pursuant to Ext.P1 order, he was detained on 11.6.2013 and he is undergoing detention. It is in this background, the detenu's wife has filed this writ petition seeking to set aside Ext.P1 order of detention and to set the detenu at liberty by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 3. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. The first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the sponsoring authority suppressed vital documents from the detaining authority. He expatiated this contention by stating that in relation to another consignment, a criminal case was registered against the detenu in the State of Andra Pradesh and in that criminal case, he was enlarged on bail with conditions. Those conditions, according to the counsel, were sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities and if those conditions were placed before him, the detaining authority would have been influenced by those materials. 4. Those conditions, according to the counsel, were sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities and if those conditions were placed before him, the detaining authority would have been influenced by those materials. 4. The second contention urged was that on the allegation of smuggling of Red sanders, departmental proceedings were initiated by the DRI and show cause notice dated 2.5.2013 was issued to all persons including the detenu, and that the show cause notice was neither produced before the detaining authority nor was it considered before issuing Ext.P1 order. He also contended that the show cause notice dated 2.5.2013 was placed before the Advisory Board and that the Advisory Board considered the show cause notice without affording the detenu an opportunity to contradict the same. It was also his complaint that the detenu was not permitted to adduce oral evidence before the Advisory Board. Learned counsel then contended that since the detention order was passed only on 6.5.2013, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay of almost seven months and that even the order passed on 6.5.2013 was executed only on 11.6.2013, after a delay of 36 days. According to the learned counsel, for all the aforesaid reasons, the detention is unconstitutional and the detenu is entitled to be set at liberty. 5. Learned Government Pleader referred to the detailed counter affidavit filed and also made available the files of the Detaining Authority and contradicted each one of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. According to her, there is nothing invalidating the detention order justifying interference by this Court and that therefore according to her, the writ petition merits only dismissal. 6. We have considered the submissions made. 7. The contentions of the petitioner that the bail order in the case against the detenu in Andra Pradesh and the show cause notice dated 2.5.2013 were not considered by the detaining authority, can be considered together. In support of this contention, counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this court in K.V.Ashraf V.State of Kerala (2001(2) KLT SN 47). In this case, this Court dealt with the obligation of the detaining authority to consider a bail order passed in favour of the detenu. 8. In support of this contention, counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this court in K.V.Ashraf V.State of Kerala (2001(2) KLT SN 47). In this case, this Court dealt with the obligation of the detaining authority to consider a bail order passed in favour of the detenu. 8. In this context, there are numerous precedents both of the Apex Court and of various High Courts including this Court, which consistently lay down the principle that while passing an order of preventive detention, which deprives a citizen of his precious fundamental right of liberty, the detaining authority has the duty to consider with due application of mind each of the relevant facts and documents. If it is shown that there was failure on the part of the detaining authority, a constitutional court is duty bound to interfere with the order of detention and uphold the fundamental rights of the detenu. Therefore, the essential question which calls for consideration is whether there has been any failure on the part of the detaining authority in adverting to any relevant factual details or vital documents. 9. In so far as this case is concerned, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding the non consideration of the bail order passed by the Andra Pradesh court in the case against the detenu. That order has been produced along with Ext.P4. It is relying on this order that learned counsel for the petitioner states that this order contains conditions which were sufficient to prevent the detenu from continuing his prejudicial activities and that if those conditions were duly adverted, the detaining authority would have come to a different conclusion. The conditions imposed by Andra Pradesh Court which are relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner read thus:- “Conditions:- 7) The petitioner/accused No.4 shall appear and sign before the concerned Station House Officer in between 10.30 AM to 2.00 PM on the first week Wednesday of every succeeding month for a period till the date of filing of charge sheet or until further orders and cooperate with the Investigating Officer. 8) The petitioner/accused No.4 shall not tamper with the evidence of prosecution witnesses in any way”. 10. Reading of these conditions would show that the court has only called upon the detenu to appear and sign before the concerned Station House Officer and to cooperate with the Investigating Officer. 8) The petitioner/accused No.4 shall not tamper with the evidence of prosecution witnesses in any way”. 10. Reading of these conditions would show that the court has only called upon the detenu to appear and sign before the concerned Station House Officer and to cooperate with the Investigating Officer. He is also directed not to tamper with the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The order does not contain a condition preventing the detenu from engaging in similar illegal activities or that if such activities are continued, that would result in cancellation of the bail. 11. Having considered the conditions in the bail order, we are inclined to take the view that this bail order does not contain anything which could have restrained the detenu from continuing his prejudicial activities, or the consequences of its continuation. Only if such conditions were there, it would have been possible for the petitioner to raise an argument that the conditions were sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities and that if those conditions were considered, the detaining authority would have come to a conclusion different from what is reflected in Ext.P1 order of detention. Therefore the bail order passed by the trial court in Andra Pradesh, in our view, is not a crucial or vital document, having any relevance with decision making process resulting in Ext.P1, the omission of which, can render the order of detention unconstitutional. 12. The second part of his contention was that the show cause notice issued on 2.5.2013 was neither placed before the detaining authority nor considered by him. In support of this contention, learned counsel placed considerable reliance on the Apex Court judgment in M.Ahamed Kutty V. Union of India (1990 (47) ELT 188), Madras High Court judgment in Rehamath Nisha V. State of Tamil Nadu and the judgment of Delhi High Court in Sunny Kannodia V. Uol (WP (Crl) No.1854 of 2010). In the context of this contention also, we re-iterate that if we are satisfied that the show cause notice dated 2.5.2013 was a vital or relevant document, the omission of the sponsoring authority to make available that document to the detaining authority and the failure of the detaining authority in adverting to the same, would render the order of detention unconstitutional. Before dealing with that issue, we shall examine whether the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of any assistance to him. 13. In so far as the judgment in the case of M.Ahamed Kutty (supra) is concerned, what is relied on is paragraph 18 of the judgment. The relevant portion of paragraph 18 of this judgment reads thus:- “18. The Constitutional imperatives in Article 22(5) are two-fold : a) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be, i.e as soon as practicable, after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making the representation against the order of detention. The right is to make an effective representation and when some documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention, without copies of such documents, the grounds of detention would not be complete. The detenu has, therefore, the right to be furnished with the grounds of detention along with the documents so referred to or relied on. If there is failure or even delay in furnishing those documents it would amount to denial of the right to make an effective representation.” 14. Reading of the above principles laid down by the Apex Court would show that what is recognized in this judgment is the right of a detenu to be supplied with documents relied on against him, and it does not lay down any principle either about the obligation of the sponsoring authority to place any document before the detaining authority or the consequence of the detaining authority's failure in considering any vital documents. 15. In so far as the Madras High Court judgment in Rehamath Nisha's case (supra) is concerned, what was relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner was paragraph 9, where referring to the case of the petitioner that the show cause notice, which was a vital document, was not placed before the Advisory Board, the court held that this contention was not countered by the respondents in their counter affidavit filed and that therefore “it is a tacit admission that the documents were relevant and material documents”. On that basis, it was held that though the said show cause notice came into existence subsequent to the passing of the detention order, so long as it is considered to be relevant and material, authorities were duty bound to place those documents before the Advisory Board and that they had not done so. 16. Thus, in this judgment, on admitted facts, the court came to the conclusion that the show cause notice was relevant and material to the case. Consequently, on account of the non-production of such a document before the Advisory Board, the court found that it invalidated the detention order. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether the show cause notice in this case was a relevant document. 17. The third judgment relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is that of Delhi High Court in WP(Crl) No.1854 of 2010. This again is a case where the detention order was challenged on the basis that the sponsoring authority had failed to place on record, vital information/document for the consideration of the detaining authority, which reflected non application of mind by the detaining authority. It was also held that non-supply of such documents to the detenu would infringe his rights guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to make an effective representation against the detention order. Here again, the question which arises to be considered is the relevancy of the documents in question. 18. In the light of the settled legal principles, it can be concluded that the tenability of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner would depend upon the question whether the show cause notice dated 2.5.2013, which was not produced or considered by the detaining authority, was a vital or relevant document. It is the admitted fact that the show cause notice in question came into existence prior to the detention order and that the show cause notice was not placed before the detaining authority. The justification put forward by the respondents for such a course of action is contained in paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit filed by first respondent and according to them, the detaining authority had already made up his mind on 2.5.2013 and it was therefore that the document was not placed before him. 19. The justification put forward by the respondents for such a course of action is contained in paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit filed by first respondent and according to them, the detaining authority had already made up his mind on 2.5.2013 and it was therefore that the document was not placed before him. 19. Irrespective of the justification offered by the respondents, in this case, the detaining authority had the entire files with him before passing Ext.P1 order of detention. Petitioner also did not argue otherwise. It is based on those materials contained in the files that simultaneously DRI initiated departmental proceedings against the detenu and others. It was as part of such proceedings that the show cause notice in question was drafted and issued on 2.5.2013. Therefore, the show cause notice in effect and substance, is a brief narration of the materials available in the files which were produced by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. In this context, we must also take note of the fact that even the detenu did not have a case that anything more than what was known to him or disclosed to him was incorporated in the show cause notice. In other words, even if show cause notice was placed before the detaining authority, through this document, no fresh or additional facts or materials would have been disclosed to the detaining authority. Therefore the failure on the part of sponsoring authority to place the show cause notice before the detaining authority could not have had any impact on the decision making process of the detaining authority. If that be so, the show cause notice dated 2.5.2013, in our view, was not a relevant or vital document, the non-availability of which to the detaining authority, cannot affect the validity of the detention order. 20. We must in this context make reference to the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu and another V. Abdullah Kadher Batcha and another (AIR 2009 SC 507), where the Apex Court has laid down the principle that the non supply of only those documents causing prejudice to the detenu alone would affect the validity of a detention order. We extract paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment, which read thus:- “7. The Court has a duty to see whether the non supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. We extract paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment, which read thus:- “7. The Court has a duty to see whether the non supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court has not examined as to how the non supply of the documents called for had any effect on the detenu and/or whether non supply was prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because copies of some documents have been supplied they cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as relied upon documents. 8. While examining whether non supply of a document would prejudice a detenu the Court has to examine whether the detenu would be deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document. Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non supply thereof would prejudice to the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced”. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the non consideration of the bail order or the show cause notice affected the validity of the detention order. 22. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that show cause notice dated 2.5.2013 was placed before the Advisory Board and that the Advisory Board has considered this document. Learned counsel contended that the statutory duty of the Advisory Board under Section 8 is only to review the materials already relied on by the detaining authority and to decide whether there were grounds justifying detention. According to him, by placing reliance on the show cause notice, a document which was neither placed before the detaining authority nor considered by him, the Advisory Board acted illegally. 23. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act deals with the constitution and powers of the Advisory Board. In the context of the contention now raised before us, Section 8(c) is relevant and the Section is extracted below for reference.:- 8. 23. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act deals with the constitution and powers of the Advisory Board. In the context of the contention now raised before us, Section 8(c) is relevant and the Section is extracted below for reference.:- 8. Advisory Board - For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4), and sub-clause (c) of clause (7) of article 22 of the Constitution, - a) xxxxxx b) xxxxxxx c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under clause (b) shall after considering the reference and the materials placed before it and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government, or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard in person, after hearing him in person, prepare its report specifying in a separate paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned and submit the same within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned;”. 24. Reading of this provision would show that on receipt of a reference made under Section 8(b), the Advisory Board shall, after considering the reference and the materials placed before it, and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned and after hearing the detenu, make its report. From the language of this provision, it is pellucid that it empowers the Advisory Board to call for such further information, either from the appropriate Government or from any person concerned with the proceedings before it. If that be so, it was well within the powers of the Advisory Board to receive any documents in addition to those forwarded by the Government under Section 8(b) of the Act. 25. In so far as this case is concerned, the pleadings contained in paragraph 18 of the writ petition itself show that while submitting the show cause notice to the Advisory Board, copy was served and acknowledgment was obtained both from the detenu and his Advocate. 25. In so far as this case is concerned, the pleadings contained in paragraph 18 of the writ petition itself show that while submitting the show cause notice to the Advisory Board, copy was served and acknowledgment was obtained both from the detenu and his Advocate. Therefore, not only that the Advisory Board was statutorily empowered to receive additional documents, but also such reception of additional material was fully in compliance with the principles of natural justice. Further, there is no case for the petitioner that once the show cause notice was produced before the Board, any request was made either by the detenu or his counsel for time to make submissions based on the notice. In such a situation, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to now contend that the detenu was prejudiced by the production of show cause notice before the Advisory Board. We therefore have no hesitation to reject this contention as well. 26. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was regarding delay. According to him, though the prejudicial activity in this case was detected on 16/11/12, Ext.P1 detention order was passed only on 6/5/13. This according to the learned counsel indicates that there was a delay of almost 7 months. Learned counsel also contended that though Ext.P1 order was issued on 6/5/13, the detenu was detained only on 11/6/13 and that there was delay of 36 days in executing the order. According to him, to validly detain a person in preventive detention, there should be a live link between the prejudicial activity on his part and the necessity to keep him under detention. Therefore, if there is unexplained and inordinate delay in either passing the order or executing the same, the live link is snapped rendering the detention illegal and unconstitutional. In support of the above principle, counsel also placed reliance on the judgment in A.Mohammed Farook v. Joint Secretary to Government of India {(2000) 2 SCC 360)}, in which case, according to the learned counsel, delay of 40 days in executing the order of detention was held to be vitiated on the ground that the delay was not satisfactorily explained. 27. 27. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader relied on the explanation offered in paras 19 and 20 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent and also the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Rajesh R.Khushlani v. Mahendraprasad (1993 Supp (1) SCC 758), Sheetal Manjo Gore v. State of Maharashtra {(2006) 7 SCC 560} and Subhash Popatlal Dave v. Union of India (2013(9) Scale 295). 28. From the above judgments relied on by both sides, the principle seems to be settled that if there is inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the order or in executing the same, it can very well be argued that the live link between the prejudicial activity of the detenu and the purpose for which the order of detention is issued is snapped and being stale, there was no justification either for the belated issuance of the order of detention or the detention of the detenu. However, in Subhash Popatlal Dave's case (supra), the extent to which law breaker can take advantage of his own conduct in evading the process of law has also been considered by the Apex Court and it has been held thus: “98. Therefore, I am of the opinion that those who have evaded the process of law shall not be heard by this Court to say that their fundamental rights are in jeopardy. At least, in all those cases, where proceedings such as the one contemplated under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act were initiated consequent upon absconding of the proposed detenu, the challenge to the detention orders on the live nexus theory is impermissible. Permitting such an argument would amount to enabling the law breaker to take advantage of his own conduct which is contrary to law. 99. Even in those cases where action such as the one contemplated under Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act is not initiated, the same may not be the only consideration for holding the order of preventive detention illegal. This Court in Shafiq Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Meerut (1989) 4 SCC 556: (AIR 1990 SC 220) held so and the principle was followed subsequently in M.Ahamedkutty v. Union of India & Anr. (1990) 2 SCC 1, wherein this Court opined that in such cases, the surrounding circumstances must be examined. 100. In both Shafiq Ahmad and Ahamedkutty's cases, these questions were examined after the execution of the detention order. (1990) 2 SCC 1, wherein this Court opined that in such cases, the surrounding circumstances must be examined. 100. In both Shafiq Ahmad and Ahamedkutty's cases, these questions were examined after the execution of the detention order. Permitting an absconder to raise such questions at the pre-detention stage, I am afraid would render the jurisdiction of this Court a heaven for characters of doubtful respect for law.” 29. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, we have to now examine whether there was delay in passing Ext.P1 order or in its execution and whether such delay has been satisfactorily explained. It is true that though the last prejudicial activity in question was on 16/11/12, the order of detention was issued only on 6/5/13 and the detenu was arrested and detained only on 11/6/13. The above dates though are capable of suggesting that there is delay on both counts, the tenability of the order of detention and the detention of the detenu depends upon whether the explanation offered by the respondents is satisfactory or not. This explanation is contained in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent, which reads thus; “19. The allegation in the Writ Petition that there is a long delay of 7 months in passing detention order after detection of Preventive Act is not correct. As a matter of fact there is no wilful and unexplained delay in passing order of detention. There are three stages for processing order of detention on receipt of a proposal for detention furnished by Director of Revenue Intelligence. The Government after applying their mind has to forward the same to Screening Committee headed by Law Secretary for evaluation. After the report of the Screening Committee the same will have to be sent to the detaining authority (Principal Secretary) for their independent consideration. It is submitted that in the instant case the proposal containing thousand pages was sent to the detaining authority on 17.12.2012. The detaining authority after scrutiny and evaluation of voluminous documents forwarded to the Screening committee. The Screening Committee after meticulous scrutiny of the records and documents running thousand pages arrived at a conclusion that it was a fit case for detention order and forwarded to the detaining authority for taking an independent decision in the matter. The detaining authority after scrutiny and evaluation of voluminous documents forwarded to the Screening committee. The Screening Committee after meticulous scrutiny of the records and documents running thousand pages arrived at a conclusion that it was a fit case for detention order and forwarded to the detaining authority for taking an independent decision in the matter. The detaining authority examined the entire proposal which consists of thousand pages in detail and applied their mind on the records available, statement given by the accused and provisions of law. After arriving at the subjective satisfaction that it was a fit case for detention under section 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of COFEPOSA Act 1974 the detaining authority issued detention order against Shri. Antony Morris vide order No. 7017/ SSA4/ 2013/ Home dated 6.5.2013. Therefore the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority is a valid one and in order. All constitutional safeguards and statutory procedures with regard to preventive detention have been scrupulously complied with in the case of the detenu. It is very pertinent to note that since it is a matter affecting the personal liberty of an individual either the Screening Committee or the detaining authority cannot show any sort of haste in passing order of detention. Any unnecessary haste in passing an order of detention will result deprivation of personal liberty of an individual guaranteed by the constitution. Hence there was no delay in passing the order of detention as alleged by the petitioner. 20. It is further submitted that the detenu was totally emboldened in fleeing from justice as there was no condition for granting bail. Ever since his release on bail and anticipation of order of detention he has been concealing himself from arrest. There was no delay in execution of detention order. The detention order dated 6.5.13 made in respect of Shri.Antony Morris could not be executed immediately after the issuance of the order as he had been intentionally concealing himself. Soon after the issuance of the detention order dated 6.5.13, copies of the same were forwarded to the District Police Chief, Kochi City for immediate execution. The District Police Chief, Kochi City has informed that after receiving the detention order, it has been forwarded to Circle Inspector of Police, Fort Kochi. Soon after the issuance of the detention order dated 6.5.13, copies of the same were forwarded to the District Police Chief, Kochi City for immediate execution. The District Police Chief, Kochi City has informed that after receiving the detention order, it has been forwarded to Circle Inspector of Police, Fort Kochi. Discreet enquiries were made about the detenu at the address of the detenue and it is revealed that he is not residing in the given address at that time. On enquiry the brother of the detenue refused to give the whereabouts of his brother. Hereupon repeated enquiries were made with his neighbours, but no information was received. The photocopy of the report No.D1(b)/22556/2013-EC dated 10.10.2013 furnished by District Police Chief Kochi city is produced herewith and may be marked as Exhibit R1(l). On further enquiry, the Circle Inspector of Police got information on 19.5.13 that the detenue was residing at Kallukulam. Though enquiry was conducted on the same date at Kallukulam the warrantee was not located. On 11.6.13 the Circle Inspector of Police, Fort Kochi received information that he was in his house at Kallukulam. On getting this information, the police party reached at the above place on 11.6.13 at 9.00 am, identified the detenu and the matter of the order of COFEPOSA briefed to him and executed the COFEPOSA warrant on the same date. After completing the formalities, he was sent to the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram and handed over to the prison on 11.6.13. Hence there is no delay in executing the detention order as alleged by the detenu. The detention order has been issued by the detaining authority after considering all the evidences and thereafter order was issued for detention under Section 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, for preventing the detenue from abetting the smuggling of red sanders and preventing him from transportation of smuggled goods.” 30. There is no affidavit in reply filed by the petitioner. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that what is stated in the affidavit is undisputed. Reading of the above portion of the affidavit shows the different procedures and processes that it has undergone including scrutiny of the voluminous records that were placed before the different authorities who have considered the matter prior to the issuance of Ext.P1. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that what is stated in the affidavit is undisputed. Reading of the above portion of the affidavit shows the different procedures and processes that it has undergone including scrutiny of the voluminous records that were placed before the different authorities who have considered the matter prior to the issuance of Ext.P1. Considering the different processes that it has undergone, we are satisfied that the delay, if any, in passing Ext.P1 order stands explained. 31. In so far as the delay in execution of the order is concerned, explanation thereof is contained in para 20 extracted above. Reading of the above paragraph would show that it was only on account of the fact that the detenu had concealed himself from arrest that the respondents had to take several steps thereafter to secure his arrest. As indicted by the Apex court in its judgment in Subhash Popatlal Dave's case (supra), this Court cannot permit those who have evaded the process of law to say that the fundamental rights are in jeopardy on account of the delay, which they themselves have caused. Therefore, we are not prepared to accept the case now canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Ext.P1 order is vitiated on the ground of delay. 32. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Advisory Board did not review the allegations against him by permitting the detenu to adduce evidence. It was contended that one Shaji was willing to adduce oral evidence proving the incorrectness of the conclusions of the detaining authority regarding the ownership of two lorries allegedly owned by the detenu. Learned counsel also placed reliance on a communication issued to one Aneesh, issued by the finance company from which he had availed advance for the vehicles in question. In this context, counsel placed reliance on the judgments in Harbans Lal v. M.L.Wadhawan and others (1987 (27) E.L.T 584), Gursharan Singh v. Union of India and others (1989 41 E.L.T 44) and Abraham C. Joseph v. Union of India (2012(2) KLT 590). In so far as this contention is concerned, it seems to be fairly clear from the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments that if the detenu desires to lead evidence before the Advisory Board, the Advisory Board should allow him to lead such evidence. In so far as this contention is concerned, it seems to be fairly clear from the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments that if the detenu desires to lead evidence before the Advisory Board, the Advisory Board should allow him to lead such evidence. However, when a detenu makes a complaint before this Court that he was denied an opportunity to lead evidence before the Advisory Board, it is also incumbent on the part of the detenu to establish before this Court that a request was made to the Advisory Board and that the Advisory Board has declined him permission. In this behalf, we must say that neither in the pleadings nor in the evidence is there any specific averment that any such request was made to the Advisory Board or that the Advisory Board declined such a request made. Such being the factual situation, we are not prepared to act upon this submission made at the bar, which is not substantiated either by facts or pleadings. Even in Ext.P6, the representation made by the detenu before the Advisory Board, all that is stated is “Sri.Shaji T.S. is available for giving evidence to that effect before this Hon'ble Court” and this, in our view, is totally insufficient to accept the case of the detenu. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we do not find any substance in the contentions raised and in our view, the writ petition deserves only dismissal and we do so.