JUDGMENT Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. This judgment shall dispose of the above titled petitions arising out of an order dated 9.8.20 1 1, though separately passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, HIMUDA, the second respondent, dismissing thereby the applications filed under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) being time barred, not filed within three months from the date of the award passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan (a Court of original jurisdiction), in a petition under Section 18 of the Act in Land Reference No.1-NL/4 of 1996 and its connected references. 2. Challenge to the impugned orders is on the ground inter alia that the Collector has not taken into consideration the provisions contained under Section 28A of the Act and also the law laid down by the Apex Court. The impugned orders to the extent that word ‘Court’ as used under Section 28A would mean the Principal Court of original jurisdiction, i.e., the Court of District Judge and that the word ‘award’ would mean the award passed by the District Court, are not legally sustainable. It is alleged that the Apex Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that an application under Section 28A of the Act can be filed for re-determination of the amount of compensation even after the judgment rendered in appeal by the High Court and also the Apex Court. Therefore, the applications under Section 28A of the Act preferred by the petitioners in both the cases after the judgment rendered by the High Court in an appeal preferred by the first respondent against the award passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Solan, were well within the period of limitation and hence maintainable. 3.The second respondent has dismissed the applications preferred by the petitioners with the following observations: “From the perusal of Section 28A it is evident that a person would be able to seek re-determination of amount of compensation when a court in an award allows to applicant an amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector. The expression “court” here means the Principal Court of the original jurisdiction, i.e. District Court and the expression “award” means the award of the District Court. The Section 28A no where talks of order of the appellate Court. The expression “court” here means the Principal Court of the original jurisdiction, i.e. District Court and the expression “award” means the award of the District Court. The Section 28A no where talks of order of the appellate Court. Secondly, the application is liable to be dismissed on account of being barred by limitation of time. The limitation under section 28A for filing applications is three month from the date of the award of the court and the section 28A under none of its sub-sections provides for the condonation of delay for filing such application under any circumstances whatsoever. The judgment which the ld. Counsel for applicant relies upon does not strengthen the case of the applicant as it speaks about filing an application under section 28A where more than one award is made by the court. It was held in this case that the limitation would start to run from the date of the last award. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case has no where suggested that the limitation would run from the date of judgment of appellate court. The ld. Counsel for applicant seems to be aware of the fact that the application is barred by limitation of time and therefore filed another application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, seeking relaxation of limitation of time.” 4.On hearing Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Dinesh Thakur on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2, as well as taking into consideration the law cited at the bar, the only inescapable and irresistible conclusion would be that an application under Section 28A of the Act for re­determination of compensation can only be filed within the period of three months which starts running from the date of the award passed under Section 18 of the Act and that too by a person who has not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act. Meaning thereby that Section 28A confers the benefits of enhanced compensation to those owners who could not prefer a reference petition under Section 18 of the Act, however, entitled to enhanced compensation in terms of the award passed by the Reference Court (in the present case the Court of Additional District Judge, Solan) in a reference petition preferred by some other owner(s) at the rates as enhanced by such Reference Court. The law on the issue is no more res integra, as it is held so by the Apex Court in State of Orissa and others v. Chitrasen Bhoi, (2009) 17 SCC 74 . Similar is the ratio of the judgment again that of Apex Court in Union of India v. Munshi Ram (D) by L.Rs. & others, AIR 2006 SC 1716 . 5. The proposition brought to this Court in these petitions, is also squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in D. Venkamma and others v. Special Tehsildar (LA) Unit-IV Janagareddigudem, W.G. District Elugu, A.P., (1996) 1 SCC 85 , which reads as follows:- “3. Section 28-A of the Act speaks of redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the “award of the court” and provides that when the court allows any amount in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the person or persons interested in all other land covered by the notification under Section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that he/they had not made an application, by a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of award of the court, require the Collector to redetermine the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. In other words, the foundation for making an application under Section 28-A is the award of the court. The expression ‘Court’ has been defined under Section 3(d) to mean “a principal civil court of original jurisdiction” and in an appropriate case “a special judicial officer” appointed by the government to perform the functions of the court. In other words, the court of original jurisdiction which receives an order of reference pursuant to an application made under Section 18 is the civil court of original jurisdiction. By necessary implication, judgment of an appellate court made under Section 54 of the Act does not give right or cause of action to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act. 4. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 754 ] a Constitution Bench of this court held that the words “any such award” cannot bear the broad meaning of the appellate orders of the High court or of the Supreme Court. 4. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 754 ] a Constitution Bench of this court held that the words “any such award” cannot bear the broad meaning of the appellate orders of the High court or of the Supreme Court. Having regard to the existing hierarchical structure as contemplated in the parent Act, the appellate orders would only be orders arising in appeals against the award of the Collector or of that court. The words “any such award” are intended to have deeper significance and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or the court between 20.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. In other words, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award of the Collector or of the court is made between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. At p. 340, it was further held that Parliament : (SCC p.781, para 33) “never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute.” If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals coming before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984 they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. 5. In State of Punjab v. Raghbir Singh decided on 28.2.1995 by this court, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 4.2.1981. Award under Section 11 was made on 22.12.1983. No reference under Section 18 was sought. On reference under Section 18, the High Court confirmed the award. On an appeal filed by other claimants, by judgment and decree dated 10.9.1990, the High court enhanced the compensation. Thereupon, the respondents filed an application on 2-1-1991 under Section 28-A(1) seeking reference to the court on the basis of judgment of the High Court. The Collector dismissed the application but the High Court allowed the same on revision, directing reference for redetermination of the compensation on the basis of judgment of the High court. Thereupon, the respondents filed an application on 2-1-1991 under Section 28-A(1) seeking reference to the court on the basis of judgment of the High Court. The Collector dismissed the application but the High Court allowed the same on revision, directing reference for redetermination of the compensation on the basis of judgment of the High court. On appeal, this Court held that reference under Section 28-A could be made only on the basis of the award and decree of the Reference Court under Section 26 on a reference under Section 18 but within limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 28-A(1). It was held that the application was filed neither within limitation nor immediately after the award of the District Court. The application under Section 28-A, therefore, would not lie. 6. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the High Court enhancing the compensation under Section 23(1) does not provide a right or cause of action to make a written application under Section 28-A seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court under reference under Section 18 of the Act. Shri Prakash Reddy, therefore, is right in his fairness to contend that the application made under Section 28-A is not maintainable.” 6.The Apex Court has again held so in Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others (2010) 15 SCC 483. The relevant portion of this judgment reads as follows: “4. Mr. N.N. Golswami, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants while placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Collector (LA), [(1 996) 6 SCC 746] which followed the earlier decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumar, [ (1995) 2 SCC 736 ] urged that the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in the above noted decisions. This and the other matters were placed before the Constitution Bench, and are before us, after the decision of the Constitution Bench was rendered on 12.9.2002. No one present for the private respondents to make any special submission at the time of hearing of this appeal. 5. This and the other matters were placed before the Constitution Bench, and are before us, after the decision of the Constitution Bench was rendered on 12.9.2002. No one present for the private respondents to make any special submission at the time of hearing of this appeal. 5. On a careful consideration of the point raised on behalf of the appellants and in the light of the decision in Jose Antonio it has to be necessarily held against the claimants that the limitation of three months for making an application for re­determination of the compensation as envisaged under Section 28-A of the Act has to be computed from the date of the award of the Reference Court on the basis of which re-determination is sought, and not the order of the appellate court dealing with the appeal against the award of the Reference Court (vide p.3 of the decision at p.749). The question on this issue, in our view, has been finally settled by this Court in the above decision rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court. Applying the said decision, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed before the High Court shall stand dismissed. No costs.” 7. Not only this, but a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Dr. Y.S. Parmar University v. Gram Pancha yat Gadogh, 2009 (3) Shim.LC 65 , after taking into consideration the entire case law has held as under: “8. This submission cannot be accepted. In the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents i.e. Munshi Ram’s case and Ram Karan’s case supra the point for consideration was whether the amount could be recovered in restitution proceedings in case the order/judgment was passed by the High Court. The Supreme Court in Kendriya Karamchari’s case has held in clear and unequivocal terms that once a petition under Section 28-A of the Act is pending before the Collector for re-determination of the compensation, the Collector is required to stay his hands and obey the final decision. It cannot be said that the decision postulates a situation where an application can be made denovo after such decision. The submission made on behalf of the respondent therefore cannot be accepted. It cannot be said that the decision postulates a situation where an application can be made denovo after such decision. The submission made on behalf of the respondent therefore cannot be accepted. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the appellant are clear and unequivocal on the point that once the Reference Court makes an award, the limitation for making an application under Section 28-A of the Act would start from that point. Further course of action for the Collector to follow is that in case any proceedings were instituted against the award of the Reference Court, he has to stay his hands till the final decision in appeal. These appeals are accordingly allowed and the order passed by the Reference Court is quashed and set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs.” 8.It is, therefore, to be seen from the legal position discussed hereinabove that law on the issue involved in these petitions is no more res-integra. It has authoritatively been held at this stage that the application for re­determination of the amount of compensation under Section 28A of the Act can only be filed within three months from the date of award passed by the Reference Court, viz in the present case the Court of Additional District Judge, Solan. The Additional District Judge had answered Land Reference No.1-NL/4 of 1996 on 15.3.2000 and thereby enhanced the amount of compensation. The award so passed was assailed in this Court in appeal. The appeal stands dismissed on 22.4.2010. The present petitioners have preferred the applications before the second respondent thereafter, i.e., on 30.8.2010. In view of the legal position discussed hereinabove, both the applications, therefore, were neither within the period of limitation nor maintainable as an application of this nature can only be filed after the pronouncement of award by the Reference Court within three months and not after the decision of the High Court in appeal. The learned Collector has, therefore, not committed any illegality or irregularity while dismissing the applications vide order impugned in these petitions. The same, therefore, is affirmed and these petitions being without any merits, are dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.