Judgment : 1. This is a common order on the above two petitions between the same parties which petitions have been, by the order dated 7 th March, 2013, directed to be disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 2. Writ Petition No.76/2013 is directed against the award dated 1st April, 2011 passed by the Industrial Tribunal directing reinstatement of respondent no.1 with full backwages and continuity of service. Writ Petition No.114/2013 is directed against the award dated 11th December, 1998 of the Industrial Tribunal declaring that respondent no.1 along with eight others was a permanent workman of the petitioner with effect from 24 th February, 1995. The petitioner is a Mapusa Municipal Council. 3. The factual matrix of the two petitions is as under: Respondent no.1 was engaged as a daily wage labourer with effect from 20th May, 1985. Since respondent no.1 and eight others similarly employed had been continued in service as daily wage workers for more than four years and were being deprived of proper wages, along with other service benefits, the Goa Municipal Workers Union of which respondent no.1 and the others were members, raised a dispute regarding their regularization. By the order dated 15th September, 1989, the dispute came to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal being reference no.67/1989. The petitioner through its Chief Officer and Director of Municipal Administration, Panaji-Goa were the respondents to the reference as employers. The petitioner filed its written statement in the reference on 26th March, 1990. During the pendency of the reference on 24th February, 1993, the petitioner appointed respondent no.1, and others, as sweeper/labourer on temporary basis with a probation period of two years. But her period of probation was neither extended on expiry of two years nor was her appointment confirmed. 4. In the reference the petitioner failed and neglected to appear before the Industrial Tribunal after filing its reply. Consequently, by the order dated 15th April, 1996 the Industrial Court directed for the reference to proceed for ex-parte hearing. Then by the order dated 11th December, 1998, the reference was answered in favour of the workers declaring the petitioner and seven others as permanent workmen from 24th February, 1995. The eighth workman was declared as permanent workman from 2nd April, 1995 and the ninth workman was held not entitled to be declared as a permanent workman. Then by the order dated 11th December, 1998, the reference was answered in favour of the workers declaring the petitioner and seven others as permanent workmen from 24th February, 1995. The eighth workman was declared as permanent workman from 2nd April, 1995 and the ninth workman was held not entitled to be declared as a permanent workman. This order is sought to be challenged by the petitioners by Writ Petition No.114/2013 filed on 13 th February, 2013 i.e. 15 years after the same was passed. The petition has been filed despite the fact that the award has already been given effect to by absorbing the concerned workers as permanent workers, some of whom today stand retired on attaining the age of superannuation and some are still in service of the petitioner as permanent workmen. The prayers in the petition does not restrict the challenge to regularization of respondent no.1. 5. On 31st January, 1996, the petitioner issued a direction to respondent no.1 to join for special cleaning drive on 3rd February, 1996 in ward no.2 of Mapusa area. Respondent no.1 did not report to work from 1st February, 1996 until 16th February, 1996. According to respondent no.1 her absence was on account of illness whereas the petitioner alleges that respondent no.1 had feigned illness in order to avoid joining in the special cleaning drive. The petitioner alleged that respondent no.1 obtained a false medical certificate and abstained from work on the ground of sickness. She was therefore issued a memo dated 14th February, 1996 calling upon her to report to Goa Medical College on 20 th February, 1996 for her medical examination in order to countercheck and confirm the sickness claimed by her. On 16th February, 1996 when respondent no.1 sought to resume duty she was not permitted to do so. According to the petitioner the conduct on the part of respondent no.1 amounted to indiscipline. The other instances of indiscipline alleged against respondent no.1 are insistence upon working only in the garden and at no other place. The Union representing respondent no.1 also raised a grievance against the direction issued to respondent no.1 to do the work of sweeping of public streets when she was engaged to work only at the garden and not at any place other than the garden. The Union representing respondent no.1 also raised a grievance against the direction issued to respondent no.1 to do the work of sweeping of public streets when she was engaged to work only at the garden and not at any place other than the garden. The petitioner then by its order dated 8th March, 1996 suspended respondent no.1 from service, only to later revoke the suspension at the demand of the Union. 6. The petitioner thereafter conducted enquiry against respondent no.1 and dismissed her from service by the order dated 21st August, 1997 with immediate effect. Respondent no.1 therefore raised a dispute before the Labour Commissioner which was taken up for conciliation. On failure of the conciliation the State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal vide order of reference dated 24th March, 2000. The said reference came to be registered as I.T. No.37/2000. One of the grounds of challenge by respondent no.1 to her dismissal was that it was in violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). This reference also after initial appearance was neglected by the petitioner. The Industrial Court therefore proceeded ex-parte and by order dated 1st April, 2011, allowed the reference holding that the action of the petitioner in terminating services of respondent no.1 was in contravention of mandatory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and hence the order of termination was illegal, inoperative and nonest. It further declared that respondent no.1 was entitled to reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. This award has been impugned by the petitioner by filing Writ Petition No.76/2013 on 7th February, 2013. 7. Before referring to the grounds of challenge by the petitioner to the impugned awards and the merits of the rival contentions thereon it would be necessary to refer to some more facts which are not disputed. On passing of the award of reinstatement in service respondent no.1 had approached the petitioner on 6 th June, 2011 for resuming on duty with a request for payment of backwages along with the benefits applicable to her post. The petitioner neither reinstated her in service nor paid the backwages. On passing of the award of reinstatement in service respondent no.1 had approached the petitioner on 6 th June, 2011 for resuming on duty with a request for payment of backwages along with the benefits applicable to her post. The petitioner neither reinstated her in service nor paid the backwages. After pursuing the matter for some time respondent no.1 filed application dated 7th December, 2011 under Section 33(c)(1) of the Act to the Labour Commissioner, Panaji for recovery of backwages pursuant to the award together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. As per form K1 submitted along with the application the total dues payable to respondent no.1 by way of backwages were of Rs.15,68,806/-. The Commissioner Labour and Employment of Goa issued notice dated 2nd January, 2012 to the petitioner for non-implementation of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and called upon the petitioner to make payment of Rs.15,68,806/- to her on or before 13th January, 2012 with a warning that on failure, recovery proceedings would be effected. The petitioner ignored the notice as also the reminder dated 17th January, 2012. The Commissioner Labour and Employment therefore issued recovery notice dated 16th April, 2012 along with the recovery certificate to the Collector, North Goa for recovery of the amount as per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Collector was asked to recover and deposit the amount in treasury under the Head of account “8443-Civil Deposit, 00116-deposit under Various Central States Act 01-Recovery of Dues” under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Mamlatdar of Bardez took his own time of more than two months in issuing a notice of demand to the petitioner. The notice of demand was issued by him on 29th June, 2012. But thereafter he failed to take any steps in pursuing the recovery. After making several representations to pursue the recovery the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by way of Writ Petition No.820/2012. That petition was disposed off by the order dated 3rd January, 2013 directing the recovery authority to complete recovery process within a period of three months i.e. on or before 3rd April, 2013. In compliance of that order the recovery officer issued further notices dated 14th January, 2013, 17th January, 2013 and 4th February, 2012 calling upon the petitioner to make the payment and also furnish the list of bank accounts of the petitioner. In compliance of that order the recovery officer issued further notices dated 14th January, 2013, 17th January, 2013 and 4th February, 2012 calling upon the petitioner to make the payment and also furnish the list of bank accounts of the petitioner. It is only thereafter that the first petition i.e. Writ Petition No.76 of 2013 came to be filed on 7th February, 2013. 8. Although there are a number of grounds stated in both the petitions to challenge the two awards passed by the Industrial Court, it is clear from the submissions advanced before the Court that all that the petitioner is interested in is to wriggle out of execution of the award for payment of full backwages. As has been pointed out by the Counsel for both the sides respondent no.1 has already reached the age of superannuation. Therefore there is no scope for her reinstatement. What remains by way of implementation of the award is compliance with the monetary direction. The arguments in the petitions were essentially focused on this aspect. 9. Reference at this stage can be conveniently made to the order of the Industrial Court directing reinstatement of respondent no.1 together with the full backwages and continuity in service. The learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Ltd. V/s. Shri Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. reported in (2002) I CLR 789 to hold that the provision of Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory and the employer cannot disobey the mandatory provision. He cannot be permitted to say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative and he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Consequently, the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workmen to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of the industrial dispute when the relationship between them was already strained. Consequently, the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workmen to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of the industrial dispute when the relationship between them was already strained. The Industrial Court on the undisputed evidence produced before it held that the petitioner had not complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act which provides that no workmen who is a party to a pending industrial dispute shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and application has been made by the employer to the authority before whom the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. The petitioner had admittedly not made any application to the Industrial Court, where the industrial dispute was pending, for approval of the action of dismissal from service taken against respondent no.1. The Industrial Court therefore held that the order of termination of respondent no.1 was not operative and a natural corollary would be that respondent no.1 is deemed to be in service during the period of alleged termination. As such, she would be entitled for continuity in service with full backwages. 10. Mr. Sardessai, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that reliance of the Industrial Tribunal on the decision of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila case (supra) was not correct. According to him at the relevant time i.e. at the time of passing of the order of termination of respondent no.1 the law was nebulous as regards the impact of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The law relating thereto came to be settled with the decision of five Judges Bench in Jaipur Zila case (supra). Since the decision in Jaipur Zila case (supra) was not available at the time of termination of respondent no.1 in the year 1997, while dealing with the industrial dispute relating to the termination from service of respondent no.1 during the pendency of the industrial dispute, the Industrial Court ought to have decided it in accordance with the law as settled by that date. According to him the law as applicable in the year 1997 was the decision of three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Suresh Chand and another reported in (1978) 2 SCC 144 , by which the Apex Court had held that dismissal of the workman in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the orders of dismissal void and inoperative. It only rendered the employer liable to punishment under Section 31 of the Act. The remedy for such dismissed employee was then either by way of a complaint under Section 33(a) or by way of a reference under Section 10(1) (d) of the Act. Mr. Sardessai submits that in the circumstance of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila's case (supra) not being available to the petitioner at the time of terminating services of respondent no.1, it cannot be expected to meet with the consequence of that law. Relying upon another decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India V/s. N. Sundaramoney reported in (1976) I LLJ 478 he argues that had the petitioner known the law, it would have acted on it. But that did not happen. Now after passage of many years the petitioner should not be made to pay respondent no.1 for the services not rendered by her. 11. The first question thrown up by the above argument is whether in the year 1997 i.e. at the time of termination of respondent no.1 the law as regards application of Section 33(2) (b) was nebulous as suggested. The second question would be whether it is open for the petitioner to say that it did not know the law. 12. Mr. Agni, the learned Counsel for respondent no.1 submits that on careful reading of the decision in Jaipur Zila's case (supra) and the other decisions referred to therein it cannot be said that the law on the question was nebulous or not yet settled by authoritative pronouncement. 13. The five learned Judges bench of the Apex court in Jaipur Zila's case (supra) was called upon to decide the reference arising on account of conflict of views expressed by the benches of three learned Judges of the Apex Court. The conflict found was between the views taken by two benches consisting of three learned Judges in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. The conflict found was between the views taken by two benches consisting of three learned Judges in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. V/s. Gobind reported in (1962 SUPP. (3) SCR 618 and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. V/s. S.N. Modak reported in ( 1965 (3) SCR 411 ) on the one hand and the view taken by bench of three learned Judges in Punjab Beverages case that if the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed and therefore the employee becomes entitled to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of disapproval of the application. 14. The reference court framed the following question for it’s consideration. “If the approval is not granted under section 33(2)(b)of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whether the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed or from the date of non-approval of the order of dismissal and whether failure to make application under section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative?” For answering the above question, the Apex Court considered in detail the provision of Section 33(2) of the Act and the decisions in Straw Board case, Tata Iron case and Punjab Beverages case. While approving the decisions in Straw Board case and Tata Iron case, the Apex Court noted that it’s Constitution Bench in the case of P.H. Kalyani vs. M/s Air France, Calcutta, reported in 1964 (2) S.C.R. page 104 had reaffirmed the decision in Straw Board case. It also noted that unfortunately in Punjab Beverages case, the earlier two decisions of Straw Board and Tata Iron , touching the question, were not noticed. The Reference Bench then agreed and endorsed the view taken in the cases of Straw Board and Tata Iron to hold at para. 14 of the judgment as follows: “...If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement.” 15. Mr. Agni has cited the decision in Tata Iron case for understanding the full details. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement.” 15. Mr. Agni has cited the decision in Tata Iron case for understanding the full details. By this decision, the Apex Court has specifically held that in the absence of approval under Section 33(2)(b), order of dismissal passed by the employer is wholly invalid or inoperative and the employee can legitimately claim to be continued to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order of dismissal from service. The Apex Court had also rejected the contention of the employer that on final determination of the main dispute between the parties, the employer’s right to terminate the services of the employee revives and the ban imposed under Section 33(2) on the exercise of that power would get lifted. The reasons stated in the order for rejecting the contention read as follows: “This argument, in our opinion is misconceived. It cannot be denied that with the final determination of the main dispute between the parties, the employer’s right to terminate the services of the respondent according to the terms of service revives and the ban imposed on the exercise of the said power is lifted. But it cannot be overlooked that for the period between the date on which the appellant passed it’s order in question against the respondent and the date when the ban was lifted by the final determination of the main dispute, the order cannot be said to be valid unless it receives the approval of the Tribunal. In other words, the order being incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained, cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and the employee between the appellant and the respondent; and so, even if the main industrial dispute is finally decided, the question about the validity of the order would still have to be tried and if the approval is not accorded by the Tribunal, the employer would be bound to treat the respondent as its employee and pay his full wages for the period even though the appellant may subsequently proceed to terminate the respondent’s services. Therefore, the argument that the proceedings if continued beyond the date of the final decision of the main industrial dispute would become futile and meaningless, cannot be accepted” Thus every aspect of the provision of Section 33(2)(b) was considered in Tata Iron case. Further by this decision, the Apex Court had set at rest the conflict of opinion on the question amongst different High Courts. It overruled the decisions of Calcutta, Madras and Mysore High Courts and confirmed the decisions of Kerala, Punjab and Allahabad High Court. 16. Since the decision in Straw Board case which is same as the decision in Tata Iron case had been approved by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in P.H. Kalyani’s case (supra), there is no scope for the argument that the law on the question was nebulous. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be permitted to contend that at the time of passing the order of termination of respondent no.1, the law on interpretation of Section 33(2) was nebulous. 17. Irrespective of the above judicial pronouncements, the petitioner cannot be allowed to plead that it did not know the above law as prevailing on the date of dismissal of respondent no.1. Firstly, nobody can plead ignorance of law. Secondly, the specific provision of Section 33(2)(b) has always been there in the Act for compliance. From it’s very language, it is seen to be a mandatory provision about which there can be no confusion. The decisions cited above had only considered the consequence of noncompliance of the mandatory provision. Certainly observance of law cannot be dependent upon severity of consequences of noncompliance. Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever for the petitioner terminating employer of respondent no.1 during the pendency of the main industrial dispute, without applying for approval of the Court where the main dispute was pending. 18. The next argument of Mr. Sardesai is that the Industrial Tribunal could not have awarded backwages to respondent no.1 in the absence of pleadings that she was not gainfully employed during the relevant period and the evidence produced in support of the pleading. He submits that there has been a significant change in the view held by the courts as regards award of backwages. The award of backwages is no longer considered to be on automatic consequence of reinstatement. He submits that there has been a significant change in the view held by the courts as regards award of backwages. The award of backwages is no longer considered to be on automatic consequence of reinstatement. In this connection, he relies upon decisions of the Apex Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan vs. S.C. Sharma, reported in (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases, page 363 and J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. K.P. Agarwal and another , reported in (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases, page 433 . Mr. Agni, on the other hand relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd ., reported in 1979 (2) AIR Supreme Court, Page 75 , in addition to the decision in JK. Synthetics to submit otherwise. According to him, the Apex Court has distinguished between backwages payable on illegal retrenchment or termination and on termination by way of punishment for misconduct in a departmental enquiry where the Court confirms the finding regarding misconduct but interferes with the punishment on the ground of it being excessive resulting into reinstatement of the employee. The other decisions relied upon by him are the decision of Division Bench of our High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Taranjitsingh I. Bagga vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Amravati, in [2008 (118) FLR 119] and of Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Management of Batra Hospital & Medical Research Centre v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr., in (2013) 1 CLR page 228 . 19. In Kendriya Vidyalaya (supra), the Apex Court dealt with the question of award of backwages to an employee who had been dismissed from service, on the ground of misconduct of willful absence from duty for a period of more than two years. The order of dismissal had been passed without holding regular enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the rules; on the ground that the employee had not responded to the notices issued to him and had not offered any explanation for his willful absence from duty for a long period of more than two years. The Courts held that the reason given by the employer for not holding disciplinary enquiry proceedings was not justified and reinstated the employee in service. The courts, however granted liberty to employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee. The Courts held that the reason given by the employer for not holding disciplinary enquiry proceedings was not justified and reinstated the employee in service. The courts, however granted liberty to employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee. On this background, the Apex Court was to consider the question relating to direction for backwages. It referred to it’s earlier decision in P.G.I. of Medical Education and Research vs. Raj Kumar , wherein the Apex Court had justified the order of the Labour Court of restricting the backwages to 60%. The Apex Court quoted para 12 of that decision, which reads as follows: “12. Payment of backwages having a discretionary element involved in it has to be dealt with, in the facts and circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be evolved, though, however, there is statutory sanction to direct payment of back wages in its entirety.” After quoting para. 12, from the earlier decision, the Apex Court held as follows: “15. The position was reiterated in Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya, Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar and M.P. SEB v. Jarina Bee. 16. Applying the above principle, the inevitable conclusion is that the respondent was not entitled to full back wages which according to the High Court was a natural consequence. That part of the High Court order is set aside. When the question of determining the entitlement of a person to back wages is concerned, the employee has to show that he was not gainfully employed. The initial burden is on him. After and if he places materials in that regard, the employer can bring on record materials to rebut the claim. In the instant case, the respondent had neither pleaded nor placed any material in that regard.” 20. Mr. Agni points out that the facts in cases of Kendriya Vidyalaya, Hindustan Motors, Indian Railway Construction and M.P. SEB are distinctively different from the facts of the present case. In all those cases, the employee had been dismissed on account of misconduct after holding departmental enquiry. As already seen above in Kendriya Vidyalaya case, the misconduct was unauthorised absence from duty for more than two years. In Hindustan Motor’s case and in the case of Indian Railway Construction, the misconduct had been of using abusive language and assaulting senior officers. As already seen above in Kendriya Vidyalaya case, the misconduct was unauthorised absence from duty for more than two years. In Hindustan Motor’s case and in the case of Indian Railway Construction, the misconduct had been of using abusive language and assaulting senior officers. In the case of M.P. SEB , the misconduct was of committing theft of the company property. In all these cases, departmental enquiry had been held and the employees were found guilty of the misconduct alleged against them, which had resulted into their dismissal from service. The challenge to their termination was on merits of the case. None of those cases involved illegal termination or retrenchment by noncompliance with the statutory provision of Section 33(2) of the Act or any other similar provision. These decisions therefore can be distinguished on facts. 21. The above distinguishing factor is seen to be recognised and accepted by the Apex Court in it's decision in J.K. Synthetics case. The award under challenge in J.K. Synthetics case was of setting aside punishment of termination of service for the proved misconduct and imposition of punishment of stoppage of increments of two years of the workman. While considering the challenge to the award, the Apex Court had to consider the question of backwages from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement. For the purpose, it looked into it's decisions not only in the above mentioned cases, but also into the decisions in Hindustan Tin Works (supra), Surendra Kumar Verma vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court , New Delhi , reported in (1981) 1 S.C.R. Page, 789 and Mohan Lal vs. Bharat Electronics Limited , reported in [1981 (3) SCC, page 225 . 22. While acknowledging the change in the manner, in which backwages are viewed i.e. the backwages no longer being an automatic or natural consequences of reinstatement, the Apex Court held that the award of backwages depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Any income received by the employee during the relevant period, on account of alternate employment or business is a relevant factor to be taken note of while awarding backwages. Therefore, it is necessary for the employee to plead that he was not gainfully employed from the date of his termination. Any income received by the employee during the relevant period, on account of alternate employment or business is a relevant factor to be taken note of while awarding backwages. Therefore, it is necessary for the employee to plead that he was not gainfully employed from the date of his termination. It further held that while an employee cannot be asked to prove the negative, he has to at least assert on oath that he was neither employed nor engaged in any gainful business or venture and that he did not have any income. Then the burden will shift to the employer. 23. The Apex Court then noted it's decisions in the cases of Hindustan Tin Works , Surendra Kumar and Mohanlal (supra) to observe : 19. ........“W here the power under Article 226 or section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act (or any other similar provision) is exercised by any Court to interfere with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and the employee deserves a lesser punishment, and a consequential direction is issued for reinstatement, the court is not holding that the employer was in the wrong or that the dismissal was illegal and invalid. The court is merely exercising its discretion to award a lesser punishment. Till such power is exercised, the dismissal is valid and in force. When the punishment is reduced by a court as being excessive, there can be either a direction for reinstatement or a direction for a nominal lump sum compensation. And if reinstatement is directed, it can be effective either prospectively from the date of such substitution of punishment (in which event, there is no continuity of service) or retrospectively, from the date on which the penalty of termination was imposed (in which event, there can be a consequential direction relating to continuity of service). What requires to be noted in cases where finding of misconduct is affirmed and only the punishment is interfered with (as contrasted from cases where termination is held to be illegal or void) is that there is no automatic reinstatement; and if reinstatement is directed, it is not automatically with retrospective effect from the date of termination. Therefore, where reinstatement is a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment, neither backwages nor continuity of service nor consequential benefits, follow as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. Therefore, where reinstatement is a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment, neither backwages nor continuity of service nor consequential benefits, follow as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. In cases where the misconduct is held to be proved, and reinstatement is itself a consequential benefit arising from imposition of a lesser punishment, award of back wages for the period when the employee has not worked, may amount to rewarding the delinquent employee and punishing the employer for taking action for the misconduct committed by the employee. That should be avoided. Similarly, in such cases, even where continuity of service is directed, it should only be for purposes of pensionary/retirement benefits, and not for other benefits like increments, promotions etc. 20. But there are two exceptions. The first is where the court sets aside the termination as a consequence of employee being exonerated or being found not guilty of the misconduct. Second is where the court reaches a conclusion that the inquiry was held in respect of a frivolous issue or petty misconduct, as a camouflage to get rid of the employee or victimize him, and the disproportionately excessive punishment is a result of such scheme or intention. In such cases, the principles relating to backwages etc. will be the same as those applied in the cases of an illegal termination.” In Hindustan Tin Works case, the employer was found to have terminated service of employee illegally and the termination was motivated, to resist the workman's demand for revision of wages. The Court found that such termination amounted to unfair labour practice and therefore in such circumstances, reinstatement being a normal rule, it should be followed with full backwages. In the case of Surendra Kumar and Mohan Lal , the retrenchment had been in violation of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was held in the decisions in these cases that where the termination is illegal, it would amount to neither termination nor cessation of service and therefore a declaration follows that the workman concerned continued to be in service with all consequential reliefs. 24. The termination of respondent No.1 herein was illegal, it being in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 24. The termination of respondent No.1 herein was illegal, it being in contravention of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Therefore, applying the decision in J.K. Synthetics case, which approves and confirms it's decisions in Hindustan Tin, Surendra Kumar and Mohan Lal , it must be held that the Industrial Court was correct in awarding full badkwages as the backwages were an automatic, consequence of reinstatement. Therefore, the decision of the Industrial Court dated 1st April, 2011 impugned in Writ Petition No. 76 of 2013 must be held to be correct order in the facts of the case. 25. As regards Writ Petition No.114 of 2013, Mr. Agni, apart from pointing out that the order impugned therein has already been executed and hence no longer survives for challenge, submits that the petition suffers from gross latches. He also submits that the statement made in the petition for the purpose of explaining the extensive delay in approaching the Court are patently false. 26. These petitions by the Mapusa Municipal Council, have been filed through it's Chief Officer and as such been signed by the Chief Officer. The petitioner has sought to give explanation in paragraphs 59, 65 and 71 to 75, for the delay in challenging the impugned order. At paragraph 59, he impugns negligence and failure on the part of it's Chief Officer to take appropriate action against the award and further at paragraph 65 states as follows: “65. The Petitioner states that whilst this being the case, apparently no steps were taken at the instance of the petitioner and it appears that the concerned officers of the petitioner were unaware of what was happening in the said case or chose to remain silent intentionally to facilitate an undue advantage to the Respondent No.1. The case was allowed to be proceeded exparte by the concerned officers in their design to assist Respondent No.1 in succeeding her case at the cost of public funds.” These allegations of a deliberate and malicious action on the part of officers of the petitioner have been repeated at paragraphs 71 to 75. The Chief Officer does not name the delinquent officers. He also does not mention as to when did he first learnt about the impugned award. The Chief Officer does not name the delinquent officers. He also does not mention as to when did he first learnt about the impugned award. It is to be noted here that all the notices issued for implementation of the second award had been directed to the Chief Officer himself, the first of it being dated 6th June, 2011. There is no dispute about the receipt of these notices. The Chief Officer himself must, therefore, be imputed with the knowledge of both the awards for a period of almost two years. 27. Respondent No.1, after receipt of the notices in the present petitions, had applied under the Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking information about the status of the other seven workmen concerned under the 1st award, and the disciplinary action taken against the concerned officers by the petitioner for the failure on their part in attending to the proceedings in the Industrial Court. The information received was that no disciplinary action has been taken against any of the officers till date. As regards the status of the seven other workmen covered by the 1st award, they have been absorbed in service in implementation of the award. In view of these facts, the stand taken by the petitioner of it's officers being deliberately negligent in attending to the Court proceedings cannot be believed. 28. The Writ Petition No. 114 of 2013, therefore, fails on both the counts i.e. on the count of the Award being satisfied and on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay. 29. In view of the above, both the petitions are dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.15,000/- to be paid in one set to respondent No.1. 30. At the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the interim order dated 8th February, 2013 passed in Writ Petition No.76 of 2013 is extended for a period of eight weeks from today. The amount of Rs.5,00,000/- deposited in the Court pursuant to the interim order shall be available to respondent no.1 for appropriation towards execution of the award dated 1st April, 2011 in Reference No. IT 32/2000.