ORDER 1. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission and record of both the Courts below is perused. 2. This second appeal under section 100 of CPC assails concurrent findings arrived at by both the two Courts below while decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff claiming eviction under sections 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant contended that the suit which relates to the shop No. 3 was filed without pleading that alternative accommodation within the municipal limit of the town is not available. It is further contended that the suit was not maintainable for having been filed by the individual partner when the tenancy was created by a firm. It is further contended that despite availability of alternative shop and despite no effort being made to occupy the said vacant alternative shop available, the need shown by the plaintiff / landlord was not real, but was a feigned one. It is further contended that for other two shops situated adjacent to the suit shop, the plaintiff/landlord has already entered into compromise with the tenants of the said other two shops to the extent that the tenants would vacate the two shops by the year 2016 and since the shop in question along with the said two shops are sought for opening of a medical clinic by the son of the plaintiff/landlord, the same arrangement arrived at by compromise in regard to the said two shops be also applied for the suit shop . 4. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord in regard to the issue of compromise has contended that the landlord is unable to concede time till 2016 in regard to the suit shop as the landlord is of the view that his son for whom the shop is required can very well start his medical clinic in the suit shop which can later be extended to the other two shops agreed to be vacated by 2016. 5. In this view of the matter, this Court proceeds to decide the matter on merits. 6. 5. In this view of the matter, this Court proceeds to decide the matter on merits. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has primarily contended that objection of the suit being not maintainable for having been filed by one of the partner, whereas, the tenancy was created by a firm is untenable as the appellant/tenant has always treated the respondent/plaintiff as landlord and has never denied this factum since the very beginning and thus cannot now at this stage contend otherwise. It is further contended that the suit shop being adjacent to the road is most suitable for the bonafide need for starting medical clinic by the son of the respondent/landlord which fact is not denied by the appellant/tenant and since the question of suitability of the bona fide need is best to be left to the discretion of the landlord, the tenant cannot dwell into the matter any further. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff relying upon para 10 of the judgment of the trial Court has contended that the landlord has proved that since his son is a qualified practicing Doctor and is presently running a medical clinic in a tenanted accommodation, the bonafide need of requiring the suit shop for the purpose of medical clinic of his son is established. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has placed reliance on the decision in the case of Uday Shankar Upadhyay and Ors v. Naveen Maheshwari reported in (2010) 1 SCC 503 and in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali reported in 2010(3) JLJ 1 = 2010 (III) MPJR (SC)193. 7. Perusal of the evidence and material available on record and the findings arrived at by both the Courts below, it does not appear that any perversity, illegality or material irregularity can be found in the impugned judgment and decree where the bona fide need of the landlord has been found to be established and direction for payment of arrears of rent has been made. 8. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that neither any proposed substantial questions of law nor any new one arises for consideration and, therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the findings rendered by the first appellate Court. 9. Accordingly, this second appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed, sans cost.