Judgment : 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal. It was the case of the plaintiff that she was the absolute owner of the suit property, at No. 27, Muniswamappa Road, Munireddypalya, Bangalore, measuring 82'x18'. She is said to have purchased the same from one Khajabee, under a sale deed, dated 15.11.1961. The suit property consists of two rows of tenements, which were said to be in the occupation of several persons. The entire property was enclosed with a compound wall. And the property bore a single door number. The plaintiff claimed to be in possession continuously from the date of purchase. The vendor, Khajabee, was said to be in occupation of a unit. The portion under her occupation was leased back to her by the plaintiff. 2. In the year 1965 the plaintiff is said to have filed a civil suit in O.S.509 of 1965, claiming arrears of rent from Khajabee. While contesting the suit, Khajabee denied the sale in favour of the plaintiff. However, the suit was decreed. It then transpires, that the husband of Khajabee had filed a suit, in O.S.1160 of 1967, against the plaintiff seeking re-conveyance of the suit property, on the footing that the sale in favour of the plaintiff was nominal. That suit was said to have been dismissed. An appeal was filed against such dismissal, in RA 171 of 1969. The said appeal is said to have been allowed, subject to the appellants therein depositing a sum of Rs.2500/-on or before 9.9.1970 .and to secure a deed of re-conveyance. 3. The plaintiff is said to have challenged the judgment passed in the above appeal by way of a second appeal before this court in, RSA 898 of 1970. During the pendency of the appeal both, the vendor and her husband had died-leaving behind no legal heirs. Consequently, the appeal abated. The condition as to the deposit of the amount of Rs.2500/- imposed by the first appellate court, was not complied with. During the pendency of the above proceedings, Khajabee is said to have executed a sale deed, dated 1.8.1970, in favour of the second defendant, in respect of the suit property. 4. The first defendant, claiming to be a care taker of the suit property subsequent to the sale deed aforesaid, is said to have filed a suit, in O.S.474 of 1978, seeking injunctory reliefs against the plaintiff. 4. The first defendant, claiming to be a care taker of the suit property subsequent to the sale deed aforesaid, is said to have filed a suit, in O.S.474 of 1978, seeking injunctory reliefs against the plaintiff. The same is said to have been dismissed on 22.2.1979. Thereafter, the second defendant had instituted a suit, in OS 797 of 1979, which was renumbered as OS 6163 of 1980, seeking the relief of permanent injunction against the plaintiff. The same was said to have been dismissed on 1.4.1989. No appeals had been filed against the dismissal of the above suits. The first defendant is said to have filed yet another suit in O.S.7574 of 1993, with reference to the sale deed dated 1.8.1970, and seeking injunctory reliefs, questioning the right of the plaintiff to the suit property. 5. It is in this background that the plaintiff had filed the suit seeking a declaration of title to the suit property and for recovery of possession from the defendants. Defendants 1 and 2 had entered appearance through counsel. Defendant no. 1 having died subsequently, his legal heirs had been brought on record. Defendant no.2 in his pleadings had contended that after the disposal of the appeal in RA 171 of 1969, Khajabee had deposited the amount as per the condition imposed by the court, in the Court of Munsiff, in case no.O.S.1160 of 1967, on 31.7.1970. And it remained the duty of the plaintiff to execute the re-conveyance deed. This, however, was not complied with. Hence, Khajabee having proceeded to execute the sale deed in favour of the second defendant, was in order. It was also claimed that the property had been leased back to the vendor herself and that she was regular in payment of rents till her death. Thereafter, the daughter of Khajabee, the wife of the first defendant, was in occupation of the same. It was hence denied that the plaintiff was in possession of the property. It was also contended that the subsequent filing of suits for injunctory reliefs by the defendants and the dismissal of the same did not carry much significance, as by operation of law the second defendant is the absolute owner of the property. It was even contended that the defendant had in any event perfected his title to the property by adverse possession. 6. It was even contended that the defendant had in any event perfected his title to the property by adverse possession. 6. While supporting the pleadings of the second defendant, the legal representatives of the first defendant, that the second defendant had made an oral gift, or a hiba, in favour of one Malika Bi @ Gori bi, who is said to be a legal heir of defendant no.1, the said donee claimed to be in possession of the suit property. It was contended that the suit was barred by limitation. 7. On these pleadings, the court below had framed the following issues : "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is the absolute owner of the suit property? 2. Whether the second defendant proves that he is the absolute owner of the suit property either by virtue of sale deed dated 1.8.1970 or adverse possession over the statutory period? 3. What is the effect of decree in O.S.No.171/1969? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover vacant possession of the premises? 5. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" Additional Issues framed on 27.10.2007: "1. Whether the suit is filed in time? 2. Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to try this suit? 3. Whether the Court Fee paid is sufficient? " The trial court answered Issue no.2 and Additional Issue nos. 2 and 3 in the affirmative and Issue nos. 1 and 4 and Additional Issue no.1, in the negative and dismissed the suit. It is that which is under challenge. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that it is not in dispute that the plaintiff had purchased the property under a sale deed dated 15.11.1961. Khajabee and her husband had sought re-conveyance of the same by filing a suit in O.S.1160 of 1967. That suit having been dismissed, an appeal in R.A.No.171 of 1969 having been filed, the same had been allowed with a condition that the re-conveyance would be subject to deposit of Rs.2500/-. Admittedly, the said deed of re-conveyance was not executed. Therefore the title of the plaintiff had not been divested. It is hence contended that the plaintiff could not have been denied title to the property. It is contended that the sale deed executed by Khajabee, in favour of the second defendant was void, as she had no title to the property as on the said date. Therefore the title of the plaintiff had not been divested. It is hence contended that the plaintiff could not have been denied title to the property. It is contended that the sale deed executed by Khajabee, in favour of the second defendant was void, as she had no title to the property as on the said date. In the absence of a re-conveyance in terms of the judgment and decree of the first appellate court in R.A.no.171 of 1969, there was no title with Khajabee, in the eye of law. It is contended that mere possession of the suit property, for several years would not enable a person to claim adverse possession, unless such possession was hostile possession, denying the title of the true owner. The trial court has overlooked the fact that the second defendant was claiming that he was the absolute owner of the suit property, having purchased the same from Khajabee. Therefore, if title is claimed on the basis a title deed, the plea of adverse possession gets displaced. The trial court's opinion that the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession is hence erroneous. The learned counsel hence seeks that the appeal be allowed and the suit decreed. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents seeks to justify the judgment of the trial court. The learned counsel would further contend that it is not disputed that the decision in R.A.No.171 of 1969 had attained finality. The condition imposed as regards deposit of Rs.2500/-had also been complied with by Khajabee and the execution of the re- conveyance deed was a mere formality -a ministerial act which was to be performed by the defendant therein, and hence was not significant. It is also contended that the suit was hopelessly barred by time, and in the absence of the sale deed in favour of the second defendant, being cancelled, the title conveyed could not be wished away. Conversely, it is contended that if it is to be held that the sale deed in favour of the second defendant was void, the possession of the defendant therefore if was illegal was also adverse to the plaintiff and such adverse possession had certainly perfected his title. The learned counsel hence seeks dismissal of the appeal. 10. Conversely, it is contended that if it is to be held that the sale deed in favour of the second defendant was void, the possession of the defendant therefore if was illegal was also adverse to the plaintiff and such adverse possession had certainly perfected his title. The learned counsel hence seeks dismissal of the appeal. 10. In the above facts and circumstances, the question whether Khajabee could have executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant without the deed of reconveyance being executed in her favour, would have to be answered in the negative. Assuming that the defendant in that suit had failed to comply with the decree, and had failed to execute the re- conveyance even after Khajabee had complied with the condition of deposit of the amount as directed by the decree, the plaintiff ought to have followed the procedure prescribed under Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The same is reproduced hereunder for ready reference. "34. Decree for execution of document, or endorsement of negotiable instrument. – (1) Where a decree is for the execution of a document or for the endorsement of a negotiable instrument and the judgment-debtor neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the decree-holder may prepare a draft of the document or endorsement in accordance with the terms of the decree and deliver the same to the Court. (2) The Court shall thereupon cause the draft to be served on the judgment-debtor together with a notice requiring his objections (if any) to be made within such time as the Court fixes in this behalf. (3) Where the judgment-debtor objects to the draft, his objections shall be stated in writing within such time, and the Court shall make such order approving or altering the draft, as it thinks fit. (4) The decree-holder shall deliver to the Court a copy of the draft with such alternations (if any) as the Court may have directed upon the proper stamp-paper if a stamp is required by the law for the time being in force; and the Judge or such officer as may be appointed in this behalf shall execute the document so delivered. (5) The execution of a document or the endorsement of a negotiable instrument under this rule may be in the following form, namely:- "C.D., Judge of the Court of (or as the case may be), for A.B., in a suit by E.F. against A.B.", and shall have the same effect as the execution of the document or the endorsement of the negotiable instrument by the party ordered to execute or endorse the same. [(6)(a) Where the registration of the document is required under any law for the time being in force, the Court, or such officer of the Court as may be authorised in this behalf by the Court, shall cause the document to be registered in accordance with such law. (b) Where the registration of the document is not so required, but the decree-holder desires it to be registered, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit. (c) Where the Court makes any order for the registration of any document, it may make such order as it thinks fit as to the expenses of registration.] " In the light of the above, the requirement of the execution of the re-conveyance deed cannot be dismissed as an empty formality, and in the absence of the same, Khajabee did not derive any title by virtue of the decree that was not completely complied with. In so far as the plea of limitation is concerned, the relevant provision that would be applicable to compute the period of limitation in respect of suit for possession of immovable property, based on title, is Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The limitation period is twelve years and the time from which the period begins to run is when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. It is evident from the series of suits that were filed by the first and second defendant, in O.S.474 of 1978, O.S.6163 of 1980 and O.S.7574 of 1993, there is no indication that the possession of the defendants was sought to be asserted as owners or of being in lawful possession - therefore it could not be said that time had begin to run against the plaintiff. The suit was not barred by limitation. The suit was not barred by limitation. In so far as the plea of adverse possession set up by the defendants, as an alternative plea, is not available to the defendants by virtue of their categorical stand and their pleadings. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's right but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. It is a matter of fundamental principle of law that where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. In the above view of the matter, the judgment of the court below is set aside and the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff.