JUDGMENT 1. In this criminal appeal, the appellant assails the judgment dated 03.01.2006 passed by learned Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad whereunder learned Judge convicted the A.O for the offences under Section 7 and 13 (2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “P.C. Act”) and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and pay fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence under Section 7 of P.C. Act and Rigorous Imprisonment for two years and pay fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. 2. The factual matrix of the case which led to file the present appeal by the appellant/A.O is thus:- (a) Prosecution case is that PW.4 and PW.6 who are paternal uncle and mother of PW.1 the de facto complainant owned Ac.3-35gts and Ac.2-28gts respectively totalling Ac.6-28gts in different survey numbers in Dharmasagar village in Warangal District. They proposed to sell their lands to S.C Corporation Warangal and made an application to that effect to M.R.O Dharmasagar who directed the Surveyor to survey the lands. The-then Surveyor D.Satyanarayana partly surveyed them during November, 1999. Later, he was transferred to Mulugu Mandal. In the month of December, 1999, the appellant/A.O joined as Surveyor in Dharmasagar M.R.O’s office. PW.1 met the A.O and requested him to complete the survey which was partly done by his predecessor. The A.O told him that he has to conduct the survey from beginning and it would take sometime. Later, when PW.1 again approached him, A.O used to postpone survey on one or other pretext. Finally, when PW.1 met the A.O at his house on 27.06.2000 and requested him to conduct the survey of their lands, A.O demanded Rs.1,000/- as bribe and instructed PW.1 to be present at M.R.O’s office Dharmasagar on 29.06.2000 (Thursday) and make two coolie persons available to assist him and also meet the other incidental expenditure. When PW.1 expressed his inability to pay such huge amount as bribe, the A.O reduced the bribe amount from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.500/-. When PW.1 expressed his inability to pay such huge amount as bribe, the A.O reduced the bribe amount from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.500/-. (b) Unwilling to pay bribe to A.O, PW.1 lodged Ex.P-1 written complaint with PW.8 – the D.S.P, A.C.B Warangal, who after observing due formalities registered a case in Crime No.9/ACB/Warangal on 29.06.2000 and laid a successful trap on A.O with the aid of mediators i.e., PW.2, LW.3 and some other staff after observing the due pre trap formalities. Subsequently, PW.9 – Inspector of Police, A.C.B conducted investigation and on completion of the same laid charge sheet against the A.O for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) r/w S.13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. (c) On appearance of A.O, the trial Court framed charges under Section 7 and 13(2) r/w S.13 (1) (d) of P.C. Act. (d) During trial, prosecution examined PWs.1 to 9 and exhibited documents Exs.P.1 to P.12 and produced material objects which are M.Os.1 to 7. (e) A.O did not produce any oral or documentary evidence. (f) It may be noted that during evidence PW.1 turned hostile and deposed that A.O did not ask him any money as bribe and he himself paid the amount and in fact he kept the money in his pocket without being asked by the A.O. Basing on it, the A.O argued before trial Court that PW.1’s evidence will not prove demand and acceptance of the bribe by him and on the other hand it proved that the amount was thrusted in his pocket and therefore, prosecution failed to prove the charges levelled against him. The judgment of the trial Court would show that basing on the other evidence available on record, the trial Court held that the prosecution could establish the demand and acceptance of bribe by the A.O and the theory of thrusting of the amount in the pocket put forth by A.O is not believable. Ultimately, the trial Court convicted and sentenced him as stated supra. Hence the appeal. 3. Heard Sri J.Parthasarathy, learned counsel for appellant and Sri R. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor and Standing Counsel for A.C.B. 4. Ultimately, the trial Court convicted and sentenced him as stated supra. Hence the appeal. 3. Heard Sri J.Parthasarathy, learned counsel for appellant and Sri R. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Special Public Prosecutor and Standing Counsel for A.C.B. 4. Vehemently attacking the judgment of the trial court, learned counsel for appellant argued that prosecution in order to succeed in a trap case has to establish the two main ingredients i.e., demand of illegal gratification other than legal remuneration by the A.O and acceptance of the same. In the instant case, he argued, the evidence of PW.1- de facto complainant would show that he categorically admitted that A.O did not demand him any bribe on the date of trap and on the other hand he himself paid the amount to A.O as the M.R.O advised him to somehow get the survey work done. Learned counsel submitted that in the cross-examination made on behalf of A.O, again he stated that he paid the amount to the A.O and kept the money in his pocket without his asking. He confirmed that he did not state to the Inspector that the A.O demanded money and he himself paid to him. When this is the clinching evidence of PW.1 on the aspect of demand and payment of bribe, it is crystal clear that the A.O did not demand the bribe at all. Learned counsel further argued that except the evidence of PW.1 there are no other direct witnesses who had seen A.O making any demand for bribe. So omitting PW.1, there is no other direct evidence to connect the A.O to the offence. In such circumstances, having regard to the evidence on record, the trial court ought to have held that prosecution failed to prove the charges levelled against the A.O. However the trial Court in appreciating the evidence on record tread a wrong path and drew optional presumption under Section 114(a) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “Evidence Act”) to the effect that the A.O demanded and received the gratification from PW.1 and with the aid of said optional presumption which is impermissible, drew a further statutory presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act against the A.O and held that A.O failed to rebut the presumption that he received the amount as a motive or reward for doing an official favour. Ultimately, trial Court committed two grave errors: firstly, drawing optional presumption and a consequent statutory presumption against A.O despite lacking evidence and secondly, holding that A.O did not offer spontaneous explanation for the amount received by him though in fact A.O gave a clear and spontaneous explanation before T.L.O to the effect that he did not demand any bribe from PW.1 and on the other hand he himself paid the amount. (a) Nextly, attacking Ex.P.10- sanction order, learned counsel argued that prosecution did not examine the authority who issued the sanction proceedings to establish that he issued sanction on proper application of mind. In the sanction order the material that was placed before Sanctioning Authority for perusal is not mentioned. Hence the sanction issued is not a valid one. He thus prayed for setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by trial Court by allowing the appeal. 5. Per contra, learned Special Public Prosecutor argued that the trial Court on proper appreciation of evidence only drew the optional presumption under Section 114(a) of Evidence Act and statutory presumption under section 20 of P.C. Act and consequently held that prosecution established the acceptance of gratification by the A.O and he failed to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act. Expatiating it, he argued that though PW.1- de facto complainant turned hostile and stated as if the A.O did not demand bribe and he himself paid the amount to A.O, the trial Court after taking into consideration several pre and post trap incidents and considering the evidence of PWs.2 and 8 and also taking into account the conduct of the A.O in not rejecting the amount, has drawn the optional presumption that he accepted the amount voluntarily but not that it was thrusted into his pocket by PW.1. Since there was no proper explanation as to why he received the amount, the trial Court correctly held that he failed to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act to the effect that he received the amount as a motive or reward for doing an official favour and hence there is no point in carping the judgment of the trial Court. Regarding the sanction proceedings, he argued that the trial Court rightly held that the sanction was a valid one. He thus prayed for dismissal of appeal. 6. Regarding the sanction proceedings, he argued that the trial Court rightly held that the sanction was a valid one. He thus prayed for dismissal of appeal. 6. In the light of above divergent arguments, the points that arise for consideration are:- (1) Whether in drawing optional presumption under Section 114(a) of Evidence Act and statutory presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act against A.O, the trial Court properly appreciated the evidence on record? (2) Whether the sanction order was issued on proper application of mind? (3) Whether the judgment of the trial Court is legally sustainable? 7. POINT No.1: Before deciding this point, it is pertinent to discuss whether any official act was pending to be performed by the A.O towards PW.1 – de facto complainant. As per the allegations in Ex.P.1- complaint, during relevant period PWs.4 and 6 who are the paternal uncle and mother of PW.1 respectively proposed to sell their lands to S.C Corporation, Warangal and for this purpose they required the survey of their lands. Hence PW.1 approached M.R.O. Dharmasagar Mandal and requested to cause survey of their lands. On the instructions of M.R.O, the previous surveyor Satyanarayana partly conducted survey during November, 1999 and later he was transferred to Mulugu Mandal and the A.O joined in his place. PW.1 requested him to complete the survey but he used to postpone the survey on the ground that he need to conduct survey afresh and that he was busy in conducting surveys in other lands. Further there was some doubt regarding the actual extent of the lands consented to be sold by PWs.4 and 6 and so the R.D.O, Warangal in his letter dated 17.01.2000(Page 40 of Ex.P.6) instructed M.R.O. Dharmasagar to rectify the defects and submit the proposals at the earliest. On that the M.R.O issued an urgent memo under Ex.P.6 (a) dated 09.02.2000 to A.O directing him to conduct the survey treating the same as urgent. PW.3 – K. Vasantha Kumari, Deputy Tahsildar in M.R.O’s office, Dharmasagar deposed that she signed on Ex.P.6 (a) memo issued by Tahsildar in the capacity of Superintendent and the A.O has received the memo and acknowledged on the copy of memo. Then, the record shows that though memo was issued on 09.02.2000, the A.O did not conduct survey till the date of complaint. Then, the record shows that though memo was issued on 09.02.2000, the A.O did not conduct survey till the date of complaint. The trial Court on perusal of the contents of Ex.P.6 (Dharmasagar land purchase file) and the evidence of PW.3, rightly came to conclusion that an official favour was pending with A.O during the relevant period. 8. Then coming to the demand and acceptance of bribe, prosecution examined PWs.1 to 9. PW.1 is the de facto complainant, PW.2 is the mediator for trap proceedings, and PW.3 was the Deputy Tahsildar in M.R.O’s office who signed on Ex.P.6 (a) memo issued by M.R.O. PW.4 and PW.6 are the paternal uncle and mother of PW.1 respectively who consented to sell their lands to S.C Corporation. PW.5 runs small hotel in the premises of M.R.O’s office wherein the trap proceedings took place. PW.7 Section Officer in Revenue Department who spoke about Ex.P.10 sanction order issued by K.K. Bangar, the then Principal Secretary. PW.8 is the Trap Laying Officer and PW.9 is the investigating officer. 9. Of the above, the PW.1- de facto complainant made a volte-face during trial and deposed that the A.O did not ask for bribe and he himself paid the amount as advised by M.R.O to get the survey work done. He was declared hostile and cross examined by learned Special Public Prosecutor. In the cross-examination also he stated that A.O did not ask for money. In the cross-examination of the A.O, PW.1 reiterated the same and stated that he paid the amount to the A.O by keeping the money in his pocket without his asking. In view of PW.1 not supporting prosecution case on the main aspect of demand of bribe by the A.O, the trial Court on the submission of learned Special Public Prosecutor to the effect that though PW.1 resiled, still the prosecution with the help of the extent of his evidence deposed in favour of prosecution and also with other evidence available on record could establish its case which may be considered, has embarked upon that task. The trial Court agreed with the submission of learned Special Public Prosecutor that the ingredients to draw presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act can be established not necessarily through direct evidence but also through other circumstances and indirect evidence as held in M. Narsing Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2001 (1) ALD Criminal 407 (SC)). The trial Court agreed with the submission of learned Special Public Prosecutor that the ingredients to draw presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act can be established not necessarily through direct evidence but also through other circumstances and indirect evidence as held in M. Narsing Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2001 (1) ALD Criminal 407 (SC)). The trial Court by sieving the other part of evidence of PW.1 and matching the same with Ex.P.1- complaint and the evidence of PWs.2 and 8 and also by taking into consideration the conduct of the A.O in not refusing amount which was paid by PW.1, has held that the prosecution established that the A.O demanded and accepted the bribe. 10. This Court perused the judgment of the trial court to know whether its appreciation of evidence is bereft of logic and principles of Evidence Act. 11. The facts in M. Narsing Rao’s case (1 Supra) relied on by the trial Court are similar to the present case on hand. In that case, the appellant/A.O who was the Manager of Milk Chilling Centre attached to A.P. Dairy Development Corporation was alleged to have received bribe of Rs.500/- from milk transporting contractor (PW.1) during the trap held on 20.04.1989 by the A.C.B officials. PWs.1 and 2 together went to the house of A.O to pay the bribe amount. During trial, they made a volte-face and did not support the prosecution case. PW.1 said he acted as per the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. The defence of appellant/A.O was that the tainted currency notes were forcibly stuffed into his pocket. The trial Court and High Court did not believe the plea of A.O and convicted and sentenced the A.O. In the light of those facts and evidence, a question arose before Hon’ble Supreme Court as to whether in order to draw a legal presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act against A.O, a factual presumption can be taken aid or not. Precisely can a legal presumption be based on a factual presumption? In order to draw a presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act the prosecution need to prove that the A.O has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Precisely can a legal presumption be based on a factual presumption? In order to draw a presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act the prosecution need to prove that the A.O has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. If such fact is proved, the Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted that gratification or the valuable thing as the case may be, as a motive or reward for doing an official favour. Since in that case PWs.1 and 2 did not state that the A.O accepted the amount and on the other hand it was stuffed into his pocket, there was no direct evidence to establish the factum of acceptance of gratification by A.O. Hence it necessitated Hon’ble Supreme Court to consider whether with the other available evidence on record a factual presumption that the A.O has willingly received the currency notes can be drawn and whether with that factual presumption, a further legal presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act can be drawn. Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately held that such a factual presumption can be drawn to make it a basis for drawing legal presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that in that process illustration (a) of Section 114 of Evidence Act which says that “a man who is in the possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing that to be stolen unless he can account for his possession” can be profitably used, though that by itself may not or need not necessarily lead to a presumption that he accepted that amount from somebody else stuffing those currency notes into his pocket or stealthily inserting the same therein. 12. Elucidating the above principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately held that the other circumstances which have been proved in that case and those, preceding and succeeding the searching out of the tainted currency notes are relevant and useful to help the Court to draw a factual presumption that the A.O has willingly received the currency notes. 13. 12. Elucidating the above principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately held that the other circumstances which have been proved in that case and those, preceding and succeeding the searching out of the tainted currency notes are relevant and useful to help the Court to draw a factual presumption that the A.O has willingly received the currency notes. 13. The trial Court applied the above principle to the facts and evidence in the present case and arrived at the following findings:- (i) Origin and genesis of the case are concerned, the admitted facts would show PW.1’s mother and uncle consented to sell their lands to S.C corporation, Warangal and in that context, part survey was conducted by Satyanarayana, the previous surveyor and on his transfer A.O took charge and M.R.O issued him memo (Ex.P.6 (a)) to conduct survey and so an official work was pending with him on the relevant date of trap. (ii) First demand dated 27.06.2000 is concerned, though PW.1 resiled he admitted in the cross-examination that he himself gave Ex.P.1-complaint with the true facts and he avouched its contents before PWs.2 and 8 who too asserted the same. He also admitted to have attended pre-trap proceedings in the A.C.B office on 29.06.2000 and met the A.O at 10:45am. Further in the cross-examination of A.O, he stated that he wrote complaint by sitting outside the A.C.B office. All those assertions would show that on 27.06.2000 A.O made the demand for bribe. (iii) Further demand of A.O on the date of trap is concerned, the evidence of PWs.4, 5 and 6 is not helpful. However, PWs.2 and 8 avouched pre and post trap proceedings i.e., PW.1 giving complaint, PW.8 conducting pre-trap proceedings and laying trap, PW.1 and A.O together coming out of M.R.O office and going to the thatched hotel of PW.5 and again coming out at 11:00am and PW.1 giving prescheduled signal, PW.8 conducting chemical test on both hands of the A.O and to the inner part of his shirt pocket and they are yielding positive result, seizure of tainted amount from the A.O etc.. Their evidence on the aforesaid crucial facts coupled with the conduct of the A.O in not protesting or rejecting the tainted amount when allegedly stuffed by PW.1, would all cumulatively pave way for drawing optional presumption under Section 114(a) of Evidence Act that the A.O has voluntarily accepted the tainted amount. Their evidence on the aforesaid crucial facts coupled with the conduct of the A.O in not protesting or rejecting the tainted amount when allegedly stuffed by PW.1, would all cumulatively pave way for drawing optional presumption under Section 114(a) of Evidence Act that the A.O has voluntarily accepted the tainted amount. Since prosecution produced material to draw optional presumption, a consequent legal presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act also can be drawn. The defence failed to rebut or dispel the presumption since its stand of thrusting of money is not convincing (Para 22 of the judgment). 14. This Court carefully scanned the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 8 to check whether their evidence will allow to arrive above findings of trial Court. It must be said that the trial Court arrived at those findings basing on the evidence and circumstances. PW.1 though resiled, admitted that he himself has given the Ex.P.1- complaint wherein he made an unequivocal allegation that the A.O demanded bribe for conducting survey. He admitted that he himself attended the pre-trap proceedings in the A.C.B office and nobody forced him. He further admitted that he along with trap party went to M.R.O’s office and there he and A.O went to the thatched hotel of PW.5. It must be noted that though PW.5 turned hostile and did not speak about holding of post-trap proceedings in her hotel, still she stated that A.O and PW.1 came to her hotel before trap. These facts are unerringly avouched by PWs.2 and 8 also. Apart from their evidence, Ex.P.4- first mediator report and Ex.P.5- second mediator report which though not serve as substantial piece of evidence, still help to corroborate the evidence of PWs.2 and 8. Above all, the conduct of the A.O immediately after the trap which was noted in Ex.P.5 post trap proceedings in the form of his spontaneous explanation is also relevant under Section 8 of Evidence Act. His own explanation would show that when the amount was given by PW.1, the A.O took the amount and counted the same and kept in his left side pocket of the shirt. It may be noted that though he gave an explanation to the effect that he did not demand the amount and on the other hand PW.1 himself paid the amount but his immediate reaction on tendering of the amount by PW.1 stultify his defence plea. It may be noted that though he gave an explanation to the effect that he did not demand the amount and on the other hand PW.1 himself paid the amount but his immediate reaction on tendering of the amount by PW.1 stultify his defence plea. The A.O did neither resist PW.1 from giving the amount nor throw it away. On the other hand, he took the amount and counted the same and kept in his left side pocket of the shirt. This conduct on his part coupled with the aforesaid evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 8 cumulatively show that upon demand only he accepted the amount. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly drawn factual presumption under Section 114(a) of Evidence Act and later the legal presumption under Section 20 of P.C. Act. Hence, the arguments of learned counsel for appellant that the trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence cannot be countenanced. 15. POINT No.2: Ex.P.10 is the sanction order issued on behalf of Government of Andhra Pradesh by Sri K.K. Bangar, Principal Secretary to Government under Section 19 of P.C. Act to prosecute the A.O. The PW.7, the-then Section Officer in Revenue Department (Vigilance) who worked under the said K.K. Bangar and processed the file relating to G.O.Ms.No.624 dated 21.09.2001 under which sanction order was issued was examined in the Court. He deposed that the department received F.I.R, pre and post trap proceedings and final report from the D.G, A.C.B., basing on which file was prepared and placed before K. K. Bangar and accordingly, he issued sanction order under Ex.P.10. He identified the signature of K. K. Bangar on Ex.P.10. In the cross-examination it was elicited that the details of the material which he deposed to have been perused by the sanctioning authority were not mentioned in Ex.P.10. It was also suggested to him that he did not place any material before the sanctioning authority for perusal and that Ex.P.1 was issued without application of mind and the same was denied by him. 16. Now the contention on behalf of the appellant/A.O is that the prosecution failed to examine the officer who issued the sanction to know whether he made a proper application of mind before issuing the sanction. 16. Now the contention on behalf of the appellant/A.O is that the prosecution failed to examine the officer who issued the sanction to know whether he made a proper application of mind before issuing the sanction. Similarly, Ex.P.10 is silent as to what material was placed before the sanctioning authority for perusal to arrive at the conclusion and hence it must be held that prosecution failed to establish that Ex.P.10 is a product of proper application of mind. It may be noted that similar contention was raised before the trial Court and the same was negatived by it. 17. The contention that the sanction order is invalid for non-examination of the sanctioning authority cannot be accepted in view of the decision reported in The Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad vs. P. Subhash Chandra Reddy (AIR 2003 Cri.L.J. 4776) wherein it was held that the examination of sanctioning authority is not necessary, but the examination of an officer who is acquainted with the signature of the sanctioning authority is sufficient to prove the sanction. In the instant case, the evidence of PW.7 fits into the slot since he worked under K. K. Bangar and processed the file. Then the contention that particulars of the material perused by the sanctioning authority are not disclosed in Ex.P.10 is concerned, the same has no much force. As observed by the trial Court, the sanctioning authority has vividly mentioned about the particulars of the case such as the facts touching the first demand dated 27.06.2000, main trap events, facts constituting distinct offences committed by the A.O, exercising power under Section 19 of P.C. Act and according sanction etc., It must be said that Ex.P.10 spells out that it was issued on proper application of mind. Mere non-mentioning of the documents referred is not a consequence at all. Hence contention of the appellant in this regard cannot be upheld. 18. POINT No.3: In view of the discussion in points supra, the judgment of the trial Court is held to be legally sustainable. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court.