ORDER 1. Heard Mr. S. Subbiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. A.K. Baskara Pandian, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the third respondents. 2. The petitioner, a Hawildar in the Tamil Nadu Special Police Battalion, has filed this writ petition, challenging the order passed by the first respondent in G.O. (2D). No. 189, dated 28.3.2006 and for consequential direction to restore all benefits, which were withheld by the respondents. 3. The petitioner, while working as Hawildar in the Tamil Nadu Special Police Battalion at Rajapalayam, was involved in a criminal case in Crime No. 1492 of 2003, on the file of the Inspector of Police, Thatchanallur Police Station, Tirunelveli for offence under Sections 448, 294(b), 342 and 324 IPC. Along with the petitioner, his father-in-law and brother-in-law were also accused and it was alleged that all three of them attacked one Mr.Rajeshkumar son of Ganapathi. The petitioner was placed under suspension, by order dated 28.10.2003, and a charge memo was issued to the petitioner containing the following charges: (i) I was involved in an offence on 24.10.2003, and as such, I had brought bad name to the Noble Police Department. (ii) I went on casual leave from 23.10.2003 to 26.10.2003 and without reporting duty on 27.10.2003, after the expiry of the leave period, I involved myself in the offence on 26.10.2003, and brought bad name to the Department by conducting myself in such manner. 4. The petitioner submitted his explanation and an enquiry officer was appointed to conduct enquiry into the charges. Five witnesses were examined by the Department and opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross examine those witnesses, however, the petitioner did not examine any witness. In the mean time, a final report was filed by the Inspector of Police, Thatchanallur Police Station and the same was taken on file as C.C. No. 34 of 2004, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate IV, Tirunelveli and the petitioner was arrayed as the third accused in the said criminal case. The Criminal Court by judgment dated 20.10.2004, acquitted the petitioner and other accused by giving benefit of doubt. During the pendency of the criminal case, the enquiry officer proceeded with the departmental enquiry, in which the petitioner participated and the enquiry officer submitted a report on 1.3.2004, holding that the charges were proved. The Criminal Court by judgment dated 20.10.2004, acquitted the petitioner and other accused by giving benefit of doubt. During the pendency of the criminal case, the enquiry officer proceeded with the departmental enquiry, in which the petitioner participated and the enquiry officer submitted a report on 1.3.2004, holding that the charges were proved. The petitioner submitted his further explanation and after considering the same, the fifth respondent by order dated 25.3.2004, imposed a punishment of postponement of next increment for three years with cumulative effect. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the fourth respondent and the appellate authority by order dated 10.1.2005, modified the punishment into postponement of annual increment for two years without cumulative effect. The review petition filed before the third respondent was disposed of, by order dated 22.3.2005, modifying the punishment into postponement of increment for one year without cumulative effect. The petitioner filed a mercy petition to the second respondent, which was rejected by order dated 12.5.2005 and further appeal to the first respondent, was rejected by G.O. (2D). No. 189, dated 28.3.2006. The said Government order is impugned in this writ petition. 5. The only ground on which, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order is by stating that the charges levelled against the petitioner depends upon the findings in the criminal case and the order of punishment was passed even before the commencement of the trial, which is improper and further, the criminal case has ended in acquittal, the first respondent ought to have entertained the appeal and interfered with an order of punishment. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in A. Thangaian and Another v. Superintendent of Police and Others, (2012) 5 MLJ 961 . 6. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents contending that the degree of proof, which is required in a departmental proceedings is only preponderance of probabilities unlike in the criminal proceedings, where an offence has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Further, it is stated that the prosecution witness, who was examined in the departmental enquiry have cogently narrated about the incident and the enquiry officer recorded a clear finding that the charges have been proved. Further, it is stated that the prosecution witness, who was examined in the departmental enquiry have cogently narrated about the incident and the enquiry officer recorded a clear finding that the charges have been proved. Further, the petitioner went on casual leave from 23.10.2003 to 26.10.2003 and during such period, he was arrested and the petitioner did not dispute his arrest and being a member of disciplined force, he ought to have restrained himself from involving in the criminal offence and exercised self control and his involvement in the criminal offence was bona fide until the time when the prosecution witnesses turned hostile during the trial in the criminal case. It is further submitted that the hostility of the crucial prosecution witness during the criminal trial does not disprove the involvement of the petitioner in the criminal offence, although the criminal case ultimately ended in acquittal. Further, prosecution witness No. 2 was examined before the enquiry officer clearly deposed about the petitioner’s involvement and therefore, it cannot be stated that the enquiry officer did not consider the facts. Further, the disciplinary authority while passing the order of punishment, has given detailed reasons about the evidence, which was available and order of punishment is just and proper. 7. The petitioner would rest his case based on the decision of this Court in A. Thangaian and Another v. Superintendent of Police and Others (supra). In the said case, the petitioner was a Grade II Police Constable and was issued a charge memo for approaching a lady standing in a bus stop for sexual intercourse and for gross neglect of duty in not informing his superiors about his involvement in the criminal case. The departmental proceedings as well as the criminal case proceeded simultaneously and the enquiry officer held that the charges were proved. In the criminal case, the petitioner therein was honourably acquitted. Therefore, this Court held that when a witness examined in the criminal Court is not believed by the Judicial Magistrate resulting in honourable acquittal, cannot be relied upon to hold the petitioner guilty, and in such circumstances, this Court was inclined to interfere with the punishment. 8. The facts of the present case has been set out in the preceding paragraphs. 8. The facts of the present case has been set out in the preceding paragraphs. Firstly, it has to be noted that though the petitioner in the writ petition has stated that the departmental proceedings should have been deferred till the conclusion of the criminal trial, no record has been placed before this Court to show that such request was made by the petitioner and if the same was rejected as to what further steps were taken by the petitioner to seek for stay of the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal trial. That apart, the petitioner appears to have participated in the departmental enquiry without any demur and he himself admitted that he cross examined the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the department cannot be held to have committed any error in proceeding with the departmental proceedings, pending criminal trial. 9. It is a settled legal position that there is no absolute bar for conducting simultaneous proceedings and unless the petitioner satisfies the test, which have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 679 . Therefore, the petitioner cannot raise any grievance in that regard. 10. I have perused the findings rendered by the enquiry officer in which the de facto complainant in the criminal case was examined as the first witness. Apart from that the Sub-Inspector of Police, who was examined as P.W.11 in the criminal case was examined in the departmental proceedings. The departmental proceedings were concluded and thereafter, the order of punishment was passed, much prior to the commencement of the trial in the criminal case. Therefore, on the date when the order of punishment was passed, the petitioner was not absolved of his criminal liability. Further, it has to be noted that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted, but he was acquitted on benefit of doubt, since the P.W.1 to P.W.7 turned hostile. 11. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Superintendent of Police v. W.D.Sekaran and Another 2005 (5) CTC 672 has held that it is not axiomatic that in all cases where the criminal proceedings based on the very same set of facts ended in acquittal, the departmental action should not be proceeded with. 11. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Superintendent of Police v. W.D.Sekaran and Another 2005 (5) CTC 672 has held that it is not axiomatic that in all cases where the criminal proceedings based on the very same set of facts ended in acquittal, the departmental action should not be proceeded with. By relying upon an earlier decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench in State of Tamil Nadu v. H.A. Munaf and Another, 2002-III-LLJ-66 , it was held that if the acquittal in the criminal proceeding is not a honourable one, it is always open to proceed with the departmental proceedings. 12. In S. Vadivelu v. The Secretary to Govt., 2009 (1) CTC 589 , this Court after taking note of various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the departmental and criminal proceedings are entirely different in nature and they operate in different fields and they have different objectives. The degree of proof, which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof to record the commission of a delinquency. It was therefore held that merely because a criminal case ended in acquittal, it would not automatically put an end to the departmental enquiry. 13. In yet another decision of this Court in A. Sampathkumar v. Board Members, TNEB, 2009 (6) CTC 566 , the question as regards the effect of acquittal by a Criminal Court on departmental proceedings was considered and elaborate reference has been made to the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the said point and it would be beneficial to quote the relevant portion of the said judgment: “14. The third contention that the criminal Court having acquitted the petitioner in respect of very same allegations for which the respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings and punished the petitioner also cannot be sustained, since the order passed by this Court in C.A. No. 367 of 1990 dated 13.7.1998 it is stated that P.W.10 Investigating Officer has failed in his duty in not marking the document-FIR and there was procedural irregularity and therefore the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner was set aside. The effect of acquittal in the criminal case on technical reasons how far can be relied upon while considering the merits of the disciplinary proceedings has already been considered by the Supreme Court and by this Court in very many decisions.” (a) The scope of interference in the domestic enquiry findings and the effect of acquittal in the criminal case was considerd by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 , wherein in paragraphs 16 to 19 it is held thus: “16. It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (See State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena) In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of “proof beyond doubt” has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. 17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. 18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision-making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. 19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits.” (b) In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 in paragraph 18, it is held as follows: “18. 19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits.” (b) In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 in paragraph 18, it is held as follows: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” (c) In Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 764 in paragraph 11, the Supreme Court held as follows: “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal Court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal Court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a Court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal Court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” (d) The Division Bench of this Court in the decision Management of Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. S. Anthonysamy 2005 (1) CTC 625 . In paragraphs 8 to 13 it is held as follows: “8. It is well settled that on the same charges when there is a criminal proceeding as well as a domestic enquiry, merely because the workman is found innocent in the criminal case, it does not mean that he cannot be found guilty in the departmental/domestic enquiry vide Thenmozhi v. The Chairman & Managing Director, Neyveli Lignite Corporation in W.A. Nos. 202 and 203 of 2005 dated 8.2.2005. 9. In the aforesaid Division Bench decision reliance had been placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Allahabad District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Vidhya Varidh Mishra, (2004) 6 SCC 482 and Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Another v. Tahir Ali Khan Tyagi, JT (2002) Supp.1 SC 520 . 10. In paragraph 12 of the decision in Allahabad District Co-Op. Bank Ltd. v. Vidhya Varidh Mishra (supra) the Supreme Court observed: “Mr. Rao submitted that the respondent had been exonerated by the criminal Court. He submitted that the termination was only on the basis of his conviction. 10. In paragraph 12 of the decision in Allahabad District Co-Op. Bank Ltd. v. Vidhya Varidh Mishra (supra) the Supreme Court observed: “Mr. Rao submitted that the respondent had been exonerated by the criminal Court. He submitted that the termination was only on the basis of his conviction. He submitted that as his conviction is set aside, the Courts below were right in reinstating the respondent. We are unable to accede to this submission. The termination was pursuant to a disciplinary inquiry. It is settled law that in a disciplinary inquiry a conclusion different from that arrived at by a criminal Court, may be arrived at. The strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal Court is not required in disciplinary proceeding. The respondent has not claimed that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted fairly. As the termination was based on findings of the Disciplinary Committee, the fact that the appellate Court exonerated the respondent was no consequence.” 11. Similarly, in Secretary, Ministry of Homes Affairs and Another v. Tahir Ali Khan Tyagi (supra) the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph -6): “Departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding can run simultaneously and departmental proceeding can also be initiated even after acquittal in a criminal proceeding particularly when the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is completely different from the standard of proof that is required to prove the delinquency of a government servant in a departmental proceeding, the former being one of proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the latter being one of preponderance of probability.” 12. In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the Labour Court proceeded on a wrong legal basis and wrongly ordered reinstatement of the workman concerned after finding that he was guilty of negligence. 13. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, JT(2004) 8 SC 103 the Supreme Court observed that “once a domestic Tribunal based on evidence comes to a particular conclusion normally it is not open to the appellate Tribunal or Courts to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of the one arrived at by the domestic Tribunal”.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is also unsustainable. 14. 14. In a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S.Samuthiram, dated 30.11.2012, the question arose that when the departmental enquiry was completed resulting in dismissal of the delinquent from service, what would be effect of a finding recorded by the Criminal Court acquitting the delinquent subsequently. While answering the said question, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to the decisions in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another (supra) ; Southern Railway Officers’ Association v. Union of India (2009) 9 SCC 24 ; State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 ; and Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 , held as follows: “20. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal Court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non examination of two key witnesses before the criminal Court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the Prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning order P.Ws.1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the Prosecution had not examined Head Constables 1368 Adiyodi and 1079 Peter of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws.1 and 2, husband and wife, to the Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal Court has also opined that the signature of P.W.1 (husband – complainant) is found in Exhibit P-1 – Complaint. Further, the Doctor P.W.8 has also clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal Court, but only due to the fact that P.W.1 and P.W.2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined.” 15. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal Court, but only due to the fact that P.W.1 and P.W.2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined.” 15. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision also examined the meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ and its effect on the disciplinary proceedings and held as follows: “21. The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal Court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 16. The aforementioned decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also pertained to a Police Personnel working in the Armed Reserve and the case arose out of a proceeding initiated under the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1958, as in the case on hand. 17. Thus, in view of the above mentioned decisions, the effect of the acquittal on benefit of doubt, which has been granted to the petitioner, much after the punishment was imposed on him, can have no effect on the order of punishment and on that ground, the petitioner cannot seek for being exonerated from the punishment imposed after conduct of a full fledged departmental enquiry, in which the petitioner had participated. Further more, the punishment is also a minor penalty though the charges were proved, the reviewing authority took a lenient view of the matter and imposed a minor penalty. 18. For all the above reasons, the petitioner has not made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order. Further more, the punishment is also a minor penalty though the charges were proved, the reviewing authority took a lenient view of the matter and imposed a minor penalty. 18. For all the above reasons, the petitioner has not made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merits, is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Petition dismissed.