Judgment : K.C. Bhanu, J. This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), is directed against the judgment, dated 22.09.2008, in Sessions Case No.89 of 2007 on the file of II Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad, whereunder and whereby, the appellants/A.1 and A.2 were found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34 and 307 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘I.P.C’) and accordingly convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life each and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months each for the charge under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years each and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each for the charge under Section 307 read with 34 IPC, and both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the present appeal may be stated as follows: A.1, A.2 and Bhukya Bansi (hereinafter referred to, as ‘the deceased’) are brothers. A.1 borrowed an amount of Rs.5,500/- cash and Rs.1,500/- worth rice from P.W.2 with written agreement (Rokha) to do service for a period of 6 months and the deceased stood as surety, but A.1 worked for a period of two months only. Then P.W.2 demanded the deceased to return the said amount on the ground that A.1 was not working with him. Out of Rs.5,000/-, the deceased deducted Rs.1,600/- for the work done by A.1. Deceased assured that he would pay the debt by selling paddy and assured him to pay Rs.3,400/-. As the deceased insisted A.1 to pay the amount, he bore grudge. On 13.05.2006 at about 9.00 PM, a quarrel ensued between the deceased, A.1 and A.2 and thereafter P.W.5 and the deceased went to the fields to watch paddy crop. At about 10.30 PM, both the accused came to the fields of the deceased, abused and beat him with cart-pegs on his head. P.W.5, who was present at the time of incident rushed to the house from the fields and informed about the incident to P.W.4. Then P.Ws.4 to 6 and others rushed to the scene of occurrence. When P.W.4 questioned A.1, A.1 also beat her and beat P.W.5. P.W.5, who was present at the time of incident rushed to the house from the fields and informed about the incident to P.W.4. Then P.Ws.4 to 6 and others rushed to the scene of occurrence. When P.W.4 questioned A.1, A.1 also beat her and beat P.W.5. Thereafter, P.W.3 and others took double bullock cart and shifted the deceased to Kondapur and from there they had taken the deceased in an auto to Armoor and while reaching the Government Hospital, Armoor, the deceased was succumbed to injuries. Thereafter, L.W.1-Battu Laxman lodged a report to police. On the next day morning at about 8.00 AM, P.W.11 registered a case and informed about registration of case to Inspector of Police-P.W.12. P.W.12 took up investigation, proceeded to scene of occurrence and prepared rough sketch of the scene. He held inquest over the dead body of the deceased, and thereafter, the dead body was subjected to post-mortem examination. P.W.10- Doctor, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased opined that the deceased died as a result of shock and haemorrhage due to fracture of skull. Accused were arrested and in pursuance of their confessional statements M.O.1 was seized. After receipt of wound certificate and after receipt of report from Forensic Science Laboratory, P.W.12 filed charge sheet. 3. The trial Court framed the following charges against the appellants /A.1 and A.2: “That both of you on 13.05.2006 at about 10.30 pm with a common intention to kill your elder brothers viz. Bhukya Bansi, went to his agricultural field and beat him with cart pegs on head and caused death of your elder brother Bhukya Bansi and thereby both of you have intentionally committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and within my cognizance. That both of you on the aforesaid date and time beat Bhukya Sona Bai wife of the deceased Bhukya Bansi with cart pegs while she was obstructing your beating to the deceased Bhukya Bansi and under such circumstances by that act you had caused hurt to said Bhukya Sona Bai thereby both of you have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 read with 34 IPC and within my cognizance.” 4. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. To substantiate the charges, prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 12 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.9 besides case properties M.Os.1 to 5. 6. After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., for which they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of accused. 7. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record, particularly relying upon the evidence of P.Ws.4 to 6 coupled with medical evidence and seizure of M.O.1, found appellants/A.1 and A.2 guilty and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as stated above. Challenging the same, the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/A.1 and A.2. 8. The points for determination are: “Whether the prosecution proved its case against the appellants /A.1 and A.2 beyond all reasonable doubt and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct and proper?” 9. Challenging the same, the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/A.1 and A.2. 8. The points for determination are: “Whether the prosecution proved its case against the appellants /A.1 and A.2 beyond all reasonable doubt and whether the judgment of the trial Court is correct and proper?” 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/A.1 and A.2 contended that P.W.5 is a student and he is a planted witness; that there is no need for P.W.5 to accompany the deceased to go to the fields on the date of incident; that though the alleged incident took place at about 9.00 PM, no independent witnesses were examined; that absolutely there is no evidence to show that the appellants committed the murder of the deceased; that promissory notes said to have been executed by the deceased were kept with P.W.1 agreeing to repay a sum of Rs.3,400/- but, the same have not been seized; that Ex.P.7 was brought into existence during the course of investigation and so, no reliance can be placed on it; that P.W.3 specifically admitted that wife of the deceased gave complaint to police on the date of incident before the injured was taken to Government Hospital; that P.W.5 did not sustain any injury at all; that the evidence of P.W.5 is full of improvements, contradictions and different versions were given with regard to actual amount due by A.1 to P.W.2; that with regard to source of light, three versions were given i.e., P.W.4 stated that it was dark night, P.W.5 stated that it is a moon light and P.W.6 stated that electric light was burning, and in view of these contradictions, it is not safe to place an implicit reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.4 to 6, who are interested witnesses in success of case of the prosecution and hence, he prays to set aside the convictions and sentences recorded by the trial Court. He relied upon number of decisions, which would be referred at appropriate time. 10. He relied upon number of decisions, which would be referred at appropriate time. 10. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State contended that P.W.5 is an eyewitness to the incident and his presence at the time of incident is quite natural and probable; that as a matter of fact after sustaining injuries by the deceased, P.W.5 returned to the Village and informed the same to his mother and sister; that thereafter, all of them went to the scene of occurrence and at that time when wife of the deceased questioned A.1, A.1 beat her with cart-pegs with an intention to kill her; that if really some unknown assailants attacked the deceased, P.W.5, who is the brother’s son of A.1 and A.2, would not have implicated his own paternal uncles falsely; that death of the deceased was due to head injury and medical evidence is completely in corroboration with ocular testimony; that in view of the fact that the incident had taken place in the fields, it is not expected from prosecution to examine any independent witnesses; that the trial Court after an elaborate consideration of evidence on record, found the accused guilty and that order needs no interference by this Court. 11. According to P.W.4, who is wife of the deceased, there were no disputes between the accused and the deceased. A.1, A.2 and the deceased are brothers. P.Ws.5 and 6 are children of the deceased and P.W.4. P.W.2 is owner of land to an extent of Ac.8.00. A.1 worked as farm servant under PW.2 for about two months. A.1 said to have borrowed an amount of Rs.5,000/- on one occasion and Rs1,500/- on another occasion and two quintals of rice. Originally, P.W.2 paid Rs.5,000/- to A.1 and the deceased stood as surety on behalf of A.1. As A.1 did not repay the said amount, P.W.2 demanded the deceased to repay the said amount on the ground that A.1 was not working under him. Out of Rs.5,000/-, the deceased deducted to Rs.1,600/- for the work done by A.1. Then the deceased brought him to the house of P.W.1 to settle the issue and executed a bond for the remaining amount. There is no evidence to show that in that connection a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased. Out of Rs.5,000/-, the deceased deducted to Rs.1,600/- for the work done by A.1. Then the deceased brought him to the house of P.W.1 to settle the issue and executed a bond for the remaining amount. There is no evidence to show that in that connection a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased. Even P.W.4, who is wife of the deceased, simply stated that on the night at about 10.00 PM, a quarrel ensued between the deceased, A.1 and A.2. There is no evidence to show that the deceased insisted A.1 to pay the said amount to him so that he would return the amount to P.W.2. There is no need for the deceased to pay the amount to P.W.2 on behalf of A.1. Admittedly, A.1 worked as a farm servant for some time. The motive aspect as projected by the prosecution cannot be the immediate cause for the accused in causing the death of the deceased. 12. No doubt, motive in a criminal case, especially in murder case, assumes importance and it can be taken as one circumstance to assess criminality. But, at the same time, it is not an integral part or one of the essential ingredients of the crime. Absence or non-proof of motive by itself is not a ground to discard the testimony of an eyewitness provided his evidence is true, trustworthy and reliable. The incident had taken place at about 10.00 or 10.30 PM on 13.05.2006 in the fields of the deceased. Though P.W.5 was a child witness, his evidence has to be evaluated like that of the evidence of any other witness. Though P.W.5 was student at the relevant point of time of incident, still he has given a specific reason for going to the fields along with his father. As the incident had happened on Sunday, there is nothing unusual to P.W.5 to go the fields to watch paddy along with the deceased. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in RATANSINH DALSUKHBHAI NAYAK V. STATE OF GUJARAT ( AIR 2004 SC 23 ), wherein it was held thus (para Nos.7 and 8): IN Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341 ) it was held as follows: "A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and is reliable one, such evidence could be the basis of conviction. IN other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored". The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shook and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness. The learned trial judge has elaborately analysed the evidence of eyewitness. There is no reason as to why she would falsely implicate the accused. Nothing has been brought on record to show that she or her father had any animosity so far as the accused is concerned. The prosecution has been able to bring home its accusations beyond shadow of doubt. Further, the trial court on careful examination was satisfied about child's capacity to understand and to give rational answers. That being the position, it cannot be said that the witness (PW-11) had no maturity to understand the import of the questions put or to give rational answers. Further, the trial court on careful examination was satisfied about child's capacity to understand and to give rational answers. That being the position, it cannot be said that the witness (PW-11) had no maturity to understand the import of the questions put or to give rational answers. This witness was cross-examined at length and in spite thereof she had described in detail the scenario implicating the accused to be author of the crime. The answers given by the child witness would go to show that she was only repeating what somebody else asked her to say. The mere fact that the child was asked to say about the occurrence and as to what she saw, is no reason to jump to a conclusion that it amounted to tutoring and that she was deposing only as per tutoring what was not otherwise what she actually saw. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant has taken pains to point out certain discrepancies which are of very minor and trifle nature and in no way affect the credibility of the prosecution version. 13. Insofar as the incident proper is concerned, P.W.5 is the sole eyewitness. According to him, both the accused came and woke up the deceased and beat him with cart-pegs on his head and thereafter, he returned to the house, which is situated at a distance of one furlong from the scene of occurrence and informed the same to P.Ws.4 and 6. Thereafter, they went to scene of occurrence and P.W.4 questioned A.1 as to why they beat the deceased, for which A.1 beat P.W.4. Insofar as first charge is concerned, evidence of P.W.5 is relevant. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a decision reported in SURESH CHAUDHARY V STATE OF BIHAR (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 128), wherein it was held thus (paras 8 and 9): “we have perused the judgments of the two courts below as also the evidence on which the courts below have relied to base a conviction. It is an admitted fact that the sole eyewitness who has supported the case of the prosecution is P.W.8 who is the brother of deceased Rajendra Chaudhary and the cousin brother of Chamru Chaudhary. It is an admitted fact that the sole eyewitness who has supported the case of the prosecution is P.W.8 who is the brother of deceased Rajendra Chaudhary and the cousin brother of Chamru Chaudhary. The other person who was sleeping with the deceased on that day was P.W.10 Baleshwar Chaudhary who has not supported the prosecution case, therefore, it has become incumbent on us to consider and assess the evidence of P.W.8 rather cautiously to come to the conclusion whether the courts below were justified in relying on this evidence of P.W.8 either with corroboration or even without the same, as observed by the High Court. P.W.8 who is the complainant in the case, in his evidence has stated that he had taken the pond belonging to the village on lease for the purpose of cultivating singharacrop. For that purpose, about 4 to 5 days before the date of the incident, he had been collecting water in a tank by using a pump belonging to Sheo Mahto. For that purpose, on the night of the incident, he along with his brother Rajendra Chaudhary, cousin Chamru Chaudhary, PW 10 Baleshwar Chaudhary, deceased Sheo Mahto, the owner of the pump, were sleeping on the roof of the cabin while water was being accumulated in the tank by the motor. He further stated that at about 12 o’clock in the night, five persons variously armed with country-made pistol and rifles came to the roof of the cabin and threatened to kill them. On hearing the voices of the assailants, he woke up and identified the assailants in the background of the moonlight. He further stated that the assailants started firing due to which Sheo Mahto and Chamru Chaudhary died on the spot while Rajendra Chaudhary was critically wounded. At that point of time, according to this witness, one of the accused, namely, absconding accused stated that three had been eliminated, therefore, they can go away. After hearing the said accused, all the accused persons ran towards the south of the village. At one stage of evidence, he also states that there were about eight to nine accused while the prosecution case has been otherwise that there were only five accused persons. After hearing the said accused, all the accused persons ran towards the south of the village. At one stage of evidence, he also states that there were about eight to nine accused while the prosecution case has been otherwise that there were only five accused persons. This witness then states that he and other surviving witness PW 10 came down from the cabin after the assailants made good their escape and came to the village and informed about the incident to their family members and neighbours following which many people of the village came to the cabin. Even at that point of time, according to this witness, injured Rajendra Chaudhary was still alive and with the help of villagers, Rajendra was taken to one Dr Birendra Babu to Islampur for treatment who declared him as dead. Thereafter, these people carried the body of Rajendra Chaudhary to the police station where PW 8 gave his statement which was recorded as an FIR by PW 13. From this evidence of PW 8, it is clear that the animosity between the assailants and the two groups was because of the fact that he had taken the village pond on lease for growing singhara crop which was not liked by the assailants. If that be so, it is rather intriguing as to why the assailants did not attack this witness and that too when he was awake, rather than attack other victims who were fast asleep and against whom the accused had no direct grievance.Then it is to be noted that immediately after the assailants went away, this witness along with PW 10 went to the village and informed the relatives and neighbours of the incident in question. In this process, they also informed PW 12, son of Rajendra Chaudhary, one of the deceased. The said PW 12 in his evidence states that while he was told about the incident in question, PW 8 did not tell him that Suresh Chaudhary, one of the appellants herein, was also an assailant who attacked the deceased. This omission on the part of PW 8 to mention the name of one of the assailants Suresh Chaudhary immediately after the attack in question also creates a doubt as to the presence of this witness at the time of the incident. This omission on the part of PW 8 to mention the name of one of the assailants Suresh Chaudhary immediately after the attack in question also creates a doubt as to the presence of this witness at the time of the incident. It is then to be noticed that this witness in the complaint states that injured Rajendra Chaudhary was taken to a doctor in Islampur even though there was a government hospital within accessible limits in which, at that time, there were doctors and nurses. This witness states that instead of taking Rajendra Chaudhary to a hospital, he was taken to a private doctor Dr Birendra Babu who has not been interrogated by the police nor has been examined before the court. PW 8 in his complaint has stated that Rajendra Chaudhary died at the dispensary of Dr Birendra Babu and was taken directly to the police station while in his evidence before the court he has stated that the said Rajendra Chaudhary died at the police station and thereafter he gave an FIR, Ext. P-3, at about 1 a.m. on 11-10-1992 based on which PW 13 registered an FIR. In the said complaint, it is mentioned that Rajendra Chaudhary had died by then. But evidence of PW 12 shows that Rajendra Chaudhary was taken to a government hospital and he died there while being treated by the doctors at 5 a.m. on 11-10-1992. This piece of evidence tendered by PW 12 is neither clarified nor challenged by the prosecution, hence, will have to be accepted as correct. If that be so, the entire prosecution case as to its genesis as also the time of the incident, time of death of deceased Rajendra Chaudhary and time of registration of complaint and subsequent investigation would also become highly doubtful. It is to be noted that PW 13 has stated in his evidence that the complaint was given to him by PW 8 at the police station at 1 a.m. at which time Rajendra Chaudhary had died and after recording and registering the said complaint, he started inquest on the bodies of the two victims at the pump house by 5 a.m. and thereafter he recorded the statement of certain witnesses and came back to the police station to conduct the inquest on the dead body of Rajendra Chaudhary which was lying outside the police station. There are certain suspicious circumstances surrounding the investigation made by this IO. We find no reason whatsoever why he chose not to conduct inquest on the body of Rajendra Chaudhary which was lying outside the police station and chose to go to the village and conduct inquest on the other two dead bodies at the pump house. This conduct of the IO also creates some doubt in our minds as to the time of the incident in question. That apart, the express message which PW 13 sent to the Jurisdictional Magistrate reached the said Magistrate at his place only on 12-10-1992 nearly 1 ½ days after the said complaint was registered and we find no explanation from PW 13 as to this inordinate delay which only adds to the doubtful circumstances surrounding the prosecution case. 15. He also relied on a decision reported in HASAN MURTZA V. STATE OF HARYANA (2002) 3 Supreme Court Cases 1), wherein it was held thus (paras 8 to 10): 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. While it is true that there is material to show that the relationship between the appellant and his deceased wife was not cordial and their marital life was marred by frequent quarrels, we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant by the courts below, based on the fact that there was marital discord between the couple and also based on the evidence of PW 4 which, according to us, does not inspire confidence to base a conviction. As noticed by us hereinabove, PW 4 has made material improvements in her evidence to prove her presence in the house where the incident in question took place. Admittedly, PW 4 is not a permanent resident of Panchkula. She is a resident of State of Uttar Pradesh and, according to her, she frequently visited her daughter only because there were quarrels between the husband and wife. She had stated in her evidence that at the time of the incident, she was residing with her daughter in the house where the appellant was also residing, for about one month prior to the date of the incident. She had stated in her evidence that at the time of the incident, she was residing with her daughter in the house where the appellant was also residing, for about one month prior to the date of the incident. At the same time, it has come in evidence that her son Babban who was once residing with the appellant in his house, was thrown out of the house by the appellant for his interference in the dispute between the appellant and his wife. Therefore, it is highly improbable that the appellant would have permitted PW 4 to reside in his house while he was not willing to keep PW 4’s son in his house. It is also highly improbable that PW 4 would have stayed with the appellant and the deceased for about one month when her son who was working independently was residing at a nearby place in Panchkula itself. The conclusion of ours is further strengthened by the fact that the incident in question is supposed to have taken place at about 7 p.m. but according to evidence on record her statement was recorded only at 10 p.m. after her son had informed the police and this delay also contributes to our doubt as to the presence of PW 4 at the time of incident. 9. Our doubt as to PW 4’s presence is further compounded by the fact that the incident in question took place in a house where a tenant was living in one portion of the house and there were other houses nearby which were all occupied. Still the prosecution has not been able to cite any one of these persons to support its case or at least to show that the incident in question took place at a time when PW 4 was present at the scene of occurrence. The fact that PW 4 suffered no injury in the process of protecting her daughter from burning to death, further enhances the suspicion as to her presence at the time of the incident. In such a situation, in our considered view, it is not safe to rely upon the sole testimony of PW 4 to base a conviction on the appellant. 10. It is true from the evidence brought on record by the prosecution that the appellant was not a person with whom the finances of the family could be trusted. In such a situation, in our considered view, it is not safe to rely upon the sole testimony of PW 4 to base a conviction on the appellant. 10. It is true from the evidence brought on record by the prosecution that the appellant was not a person with whom the finances of the family could be trusted. We say this from the material on record which shows that the appellant’s own father when he purchased the house, purchased the same in the name of the deceased and not in the name of the appellant. Even the FDs made for the benefit of the children were made in the name of the deceased and not in the name of the appellant. This itself goes to show that even the father of the appellant did not trust the appellant with the monies which he wanted to contribute for the benefit of the family, more particularly for that of the children, unfit as he is to look after his family. Even then the mere fact that the appellant is proved not to be a good husband or father would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that he would commit the murder in question. No person other than PW 4 claims to have seen the appellant at the scene of occurrence. No incriminating evidence e.g. any material like burns or even soot from the burning of the body to which the appellant must have suffered standing close, was noticed on the person or the clothes of the appellant. In the absence of any such material which would corroborate the evidence of PW 4, we think it highly unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of PW 4 to convict the appellant, as has been done by the two courts below. The courts below totally lost sight of these vitally material aspects which completely undermine the credibility of the prosecution case in its entirety. 16. He also relied on a decision reported in TORAN SINGH V STATE OF M.P. (2202) 6 Supreme Court Cases 494), wherein it was held thus: (para 6 to 8): 6. A part from material contradictions and omissions in the statements of witnesses, these factors clearly indicate the serious infirmities and improbabilities of the prosecution case giving rise to grave doubts as to the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. 7. A part from material contradictions and omissions in the statements of witnesses, these factors clearly indicate the serious infirmities and improbabilities of the prosecution case giving rise to grave doubts as to the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence. 7. The substantial portion of the judgment of the trial Court is contained in the narration of the prosecution story and referring to the prosecution witnesses. We hardly find evaluation, analysis or scrutiny of evidence in a proper perspective objectively. With regard to serious infirmities pointed out by the defence raising doubt about the prosecution case, the learned Sessions judge had simply stated that he did not agree with such contentions. The trial Court, in our view, was not right and justified in lightly brushing aside the infirmities and improbabilities brought out from the prosecution case, that too when the entire prosecution case rested on the sole eyewitness, who was interested being the son of the deceased; more so in the absence of any corroboration of his evidence by other independent evidence on material aspects of the prosecution case. It is unfortunate that the High Court has simply endorsed the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court without objectively and satisfactorily scrutinizing and examining the evidence as a first court of appeal except narrating the prosecution case and referring briefly to the evidence of a few prosecution witnesses. The reason recorded by the High Court is to be seen in parra 10 of the judgment which reads: Thus in the absence of plausible defence by the appellant and the fact that the deceased had stayed in the house of the appellant and in the absence of the explanation as to the cause of death, the appellant is liable to be convicted. Deposition of P.W.1 Puran inspires confidence and finds support from the medical evidence. 8. In the light of what we have stated above, we find it difficult to agree with the High Court as to how deposition of PW 1 Puran Singh inspires confidence. As is evident from the above para, the High Court instead of giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, placed the burden on the defence and found that there was absence of plausible defence and explanation by the appellant. The case of the prosecution should rest on its strength, not on the absence of explanation or plausible defence by the accused. The case of the prosecution should rest on its strength, not on the absence of explanation or plausible defence by the accused. 17. His contention is that the uncorroborated testimony of P.W.5 cannot be accepted. Law is well settled that if evidence of solitary evidence is found to be true, trustworthy and reliable, then it can be acted upon. When evidence of a sole witness is put in the category of wholly reliable, the question of corroboration does not arise. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in GOVINDA RAJU @ GOVINDA V. STATE OF STATE (2012) 4 SCC 722 ), wherein it was held thus (para no.25): Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness, then such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the Court has stated consistently and with certainty. 18. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact. Law does not insist on plurality of evidence. There is no rule of law that uncorroborated testimony of a witness cannot be accepted. It is not the quantity, but the quality matters. When presence of P.W.5 is found to be acceptable, then he can be in a position to witness the incident. As preceding the incident of attack, the appellants woke up the deceased and attacked him resulting in his death, there was every possibility for P.W.5 to woke up and witness the incident. No doubt, three versions were in the evidence with regard to illumination of lights. As preceding the incident of attack, the appellants woke up the deceased and attacked him resulting in his death, there was every possibility for P.W.5 to woke up and witness the incident. No doubt, three versions were in the evidence with regard to illumination of lights. P.W.4 stated that it was dark night, whereas P.W.5 stated that it was moonlight, whereas P.W.6 stated that there were no electric lights burning at the time of incident. When police observed scene of offence under Ex.P.2, they did not find any electric poles or lights near the scene of occurrence. Even assuming for a moment that it was dark night, since both the accused are related to the deceased, even in slightest illumination of light, they can identify the known persons. Furthermore, preceding the incident, the accused woke up the deceased. Even from the voice of the accused, known persons can be identified. Therefore, there is nothing unusual for a boy like P.W.5 to identify his own paternal uncles even in the darkness and as the villagers are accustomed to the darkness, they can be in a position to identify the known persons, even in slightest illumination of lights. Therefore, identity of accused by P.W.5 is not shown to be highly improbable and unbelievable. 19. Further, evidence of P.W.5 is corroborated by the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 6. On coming to know about the incident from P.W.5, both P.Ws.4 and 6 rushed to the scene of occurrence and when P.W.4 questioned A.1, A.1 beat her with cart-pegs, as a result, she sustained injuries. P.W.10, Doctor, who examined P.W.4, found the following injuries: 1. contusion on the right hand 2. laceration on middle of the frontal region 3. contusion on right hip region 4. contusion on back of the chest Ex.P.5 is the wound certificate of P.W.4. The fact that P.W.4 sustained injuries is not disputed by the accused. It is not the case of the accused that those injuries were sustained by her at different place in a different manner at the hands of different persons. So the presence of A.1 and A.2 preceding the incident is established beyond doubt. There is every reason for P.Ws.4 and 6 to rush to the scene of occurrence. Scene of occurrence is situated at a distance of one furlong from the house of P.W.4. So the presence of A.1 and A.2 preceding the incident is established beyond doubt. There is every reason for P.Ws.4 and 6 to rush to the scene of occurrence. Scene of occurrence is situated at a distance of one furlong from the house of P.W.4. Therefore, from the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 6, it is clear that the accused were seen by them immediately after the incident and their evidence is also clear that A.1 beat P.W.4 and caused injuries. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that there were contradictions in the evidence of these witnesses and on suspicion alone, the accused were implicated. On this aspect, he also relied upon a decision reported in ASHISH BATHAM V STATE OF M.P (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 317), wherein it was held thus( para 8): 8. Realities or truth apart, the fundamental and basic presumption in the administration of criminal law and justice delivery system is the innocence of the alleged accused and till the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing an accused does not arise, merely carried away by the heinous nature of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to have been committed. Mere suspicion, however strong or probable it may be is no effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge of commission of a crime and graver the charge is, greater should be the standard of proof required. Courts dealing with criminal cases at least should constantly remember that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and this basic and golden rule only helps to maintain the vital distinction between “conjectures” and “sure conclusions” to be arrived at on the touchstone of a dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case as well as quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. 21. He also relied on a decision reported in CHANDEL PAL V STATE OF HARYANA (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 755), wherein it was held thus (para 13): 13. 21. He also relied on a decision reported in CHANDEL PAL V STATE OF HARYANA (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 755), wherein it was held thus (para 13): 13. With all these contradictions and strong doubts created in our mind with reference to certain facts which are referred by us hereinabove, we think it rather difficult to place reliance on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in the background of the fact of the suggestion made by the defence that the murder in question was a blind one without any witness and only because the deceased was the son of a former police official, the investigating officer has implicated these accused persons with extraordinary zeal of obtaining a conviction. In this regard, we will have to refer to certain peculiar facts which are found on record. As per the evidence of PW 1, the accused persons were arrested on 14-8-1992. This is spoken to by PW 11, the investigating officer. Though according to the prosecution the accused persons were all known to them and knew their places of residence and work, no explanation is given why they could not be arrested earlier. The IO in his examination before the court has not given any explanation as to what efforts he made to trace out these accused persons. Nowhere in his evidence he states whether these accused persons were absconding. He merely states that the accused persons were arrested by him on 14-8-1992. He of course denies the suggestion that the first appellant was nabbed on 2-8-1992 itself but then there is sufficient material on record to show that the arrest of this accused person, as stated by PW 11 cannot be believed. There is a series of telegrams which were sent by the brother-in-law of the first appellant to the Chief Minister of Haryana, Deputy Commissioner of Faridabad, Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court, Inspector General of Haryana as also an application to the CJM, Faridabad, which were made on various dates before this accused was supposed to have been arrested by the police i.e. on 14-8-1992. In these communications, it was specifically averred that appellant Chander Pal was arrested by the police on 2-8-1992 and had been kept in illegal detention. The prosecution pleads that these telegrams were sent deliberately to create evidence to malign the prosecution. In these communications, it was specifically averred that appellant Chander Pal was arrested by the police on 2-8-1992 and had been kept in illegal detention. The prosecution pleads that these telegrams were sent deliberately to create evidence to malign the prosecution. Assuming that this explanation of the prosecution is plausible, but then we cannot brush aside a positive statement made by PW 2 to which a brief reference has already been made by us earlier in this judgment. As stated above, this witness PW 2 Ashok Kumar, has stated in his cross-examination thus: “I had seen Chander Pal, accused in the custody of police at the premises of the police station. He was seen in the custody of the police by me on 2-8-1992. His photographs were not taken by the police in my presence.” This evidence of PW 2 is neither clarified in the re-examination nor has any explanation been given by PW 11 or any other prosecution witness. That being so, we will have to accept that it is a fact and that this accused was as a matter of fact arrested by the police on 2-8-1992 itself. This is somewhat corroborated by the defence evidence wherein the timesheet of Kelvinator factory reflecting the entry and exit of the first accused to the said factory in the course of his work was produced through DW 1 and the said timesheets are kept on record by the Sessions Court. A perusal of this timesheet shows that this accused had marked his presence in the factory in the forenoon of 31-7-1992. DW 1 has stated in his evidence that the accused was to have joined duty again on 1-8-1992 in the afternoon but since then he was marked absent because he had not reported for duty. This fits in with the theory of the defence that this accused person was arrested by the police on 1-8-1992, and was seen by PW 2 in their custody. In our opinion if as a matter of fact the first accused was arrested and was kept in custody from 2-8-1992, it becomes abundantly clear how PWs 1 and 2 so easily identified the first appellant with whom they were not familiar till then. 22. It is not in dispute before this Court that the incident had taken place on 13.05.2006, whereas the witnesses were examined after lapse of two years. 22. It is not in dispute before this Court that the incident had taken place on 13.05.2006, whereas the witnesses were examined after lapse of two years. Therefore, Some minor discrepancies are bound to occur even in case of a truthful witness. So undue importance cannot be given to the minor discrepancies. If the discrepancies seriously affect the main fabric of the prosecution case, then those contradictions shall be given importance. Those discrepancies are trivial in nature. Therefore, from the evidence of these witnesses, it is clear that it is the accused, who caused injuries. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that Ex.P.7 was hit by Section162 Cr.P.C., as it was brought into existence during the course of investigation. The basis for this contention is admission made by P.W.3, who is the wife of the deceased gave a complaint to police when he accompanied her. On this aspect, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon a decision reported in BALAKA SINGH AND OTHERS V. STATE OF PUNJAB (AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1962), wherein it was held thus (para 7): ANOTHER finding which demolishes the entire edifice and fabric of the prosecution case is that the F. I. R. itself was not written at 10 P. M. as alleged by the informant Banta Singh but it was written out after the inquest report was prepared by the A. S. I. and after the names of the four accused acquitted by the High Court were inserted in the inquest report. If this is true then the entire case of the prosecution becomes extremely doubtful. The High Court has also derived support from another important circumstance to come to the conclusion that the F.I.R. was not written at 10 P. M. as alleged by the prosecution but after the preparation of the inquest report at about 2-30 A.M. The High Court points out that according to the prosecution the special report reached the Ilaqa Magistrate at 11 A. M. on 2/09/1966 i. e. more than 12 hours after the F. I. R. was lodged at the police station whereas it should have been delivered to the Ilaqa Magistrate during the night or at least in the early morning. Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that under the High Court Circulars and the Police Rules it was incumbent upon the Inspector who recorded the F. I. R. to send a copy of the F. I. B. to the Ilaqa Magistrate immediately without any loss of time and the delay in sending the F. I. R. has not been properly explained by the prosecution as rightly held by the High Court. It is, therefore, clear that the F. I. R. itself was a belated document and came into existence during the small hours of 2/09/1966. Indeed if this was so, then there was sufficient time for the prosecution party who are undoubtedly inimical to the accused to deliberate and prepare a false case not only against the four accused who have been acquitted, but against the other five appellants also. The High Court also found that the best person to explain the delay in sending the special report to the Ilaqa Magistrate was the Police Constable who had carried the F. I. R. to the Ilaqa Magistrate but the Constable has not been examined ,by the prosecution. On this point the High Court observed as follows : "The delay with which the special report was made available to the Ilaqa Magistrate is indicative of the fact that the first information report did not come into existence probably till about sunrise by when the dead body had already been dispatched for the purpose of post-mortem examination to Patiala along with the inquest report, so that the Investigating Officer was no longer in a position to make alterations in the body of that report and all that he could do was to add later on the names of the said four appellants to its heading." This finding of the High Court is based on cogent materials and convincing reasons, but unfortunately the High Court has not considered the effect of this finding on the truth of the prosecution case with regard to the participation of the appellants. In our opinion, in view of the finding given by the High Court it has been dearly established that the F. I. R. was lodged not at 10 P. M. as alleged by the prosecution but some time in the early morning of 2/09/1966. If this was so, then the F. I. R. lost its authenticity. In our opinion, in view of the finding given by the High Court it has been dearly established that the F. I. R. was lodged not at 10 P. M. as alleged by the prosecution but some time in the early morning of 2/09/1966. If this was so, then the F. I. R. lost its authenticity. If the prosecution could go to the extent of implicating four innocent persons by inserting their names in the inquest report and in the F. I. R. which was written subsequent to the inquest report they could very well have put in the names of the other five appellants also because they were equally inimical to the prosecution party, and there could be no difficulty in doing so because it is found by the High Court that all the prosecution witnesses belonged to one party who are on inimical terms with the accused. 24. He also relied on a decision reported inRAVINDRA ALLAS RAVI BANSI GOHAR V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (1998) 6 Supreme Court Cases 609), wherein it was held thus: (para 7): WE have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance gone through the evidence relevant to the question which we have to now answer. On going through the record we have found certain disturbing features in the prosecution case which remain unexplained and go a long way to discredit it. In his statement, which was recorded as the F.I.R. (Ext. 24) P.W.2 stated, that 'Vijaya' and 'Keshya' were among the miscreants. He, however, did not disclose therein their surnames nor did he name any other miscreant. Curiously, however, we find that in the formal F.I.R. prepared on the basis of the statement of P.W.2 the following names have been shown in the column meant for recording the names of the accused : "1. Vijay alias Vijay Utkar 2. Keshya alias Kishore Marrya, Laxa and other 9/10 persons." When cross-examined on this point, P.W.2 admitted that at the time he lodged the F.I.R. he did not know that the surname of Vijay was 'Utkar' and he came to know about his surname from the papers. Vijay alias Vijay Utkar 2. Keshya alias Kishore Marrya, Laxa and other 9/10 persons." When cross-examined on this point, P.W.2 admitted that at the time he lodged the F.I.R. he did not know that the surname of Vijay was 'Utkar' and he came to know about his surname from the papers. So far as Keshya is concerned he stated that he knew that he was residing in Kanjarwada and was gunda of the locality and that he had told the police at the time of lodging of the F.I.R. about those facts. He, however, admitted that in his statement he did not give the detailed particulars of whom he knew and saw among the miscreants and that there may be a number of persons by the name Keshya. In view of the above admissions of P.W.2 we are at loss to understand how the surnames of Vijay and Keshya and the name of Laxa could find place in the formal F.I.R. recorded on the statement of P.W.2. Equally surprising is that though P.W.2 named Keshya, his name was also given as alias Kishore Marrya. While on this point it is also pertinent to mention that the full name of the appellant Kishore who, according to P.W.2, was named as Keshya in his statement, is admittedly 'Kishore Kaheshkar'. From all these peculiar facts and circumstances, which remain unexplained, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the F.I.R. was not at all prepared at the time alleged by the prosecution (4.15 a.m.). Indeed, in the instant case the F.I.R. was not the basis of the investigation - as it should be - but was the outcome of investigation. 25. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision reported in STATE OF RAJASTHAN V. HANUMAN (AIR 2001 Supreme Court 282), wherein it was held thus (para 8): “We have carefully perused the judgments passed by the learned Sessions Judge and by the High Court. We are of the view that both the reasons stated by the High Court in the impugned judgment are unsustainable. The position is well settled that evidence of eyewitnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they are relatives of the deceased. We are of the view that both the reasons stated by the High Court in the impugned judgment are unsustainable. The position is well settled that evidence of eyewitnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they are relatives of the deceased. Normally close relations of the deceased are not likely to falsely implicate a person in the incident leading to the death of the relation unless there are very strong and cogent reasons to accept such criticism. Further, from the testimony of the two laldies Smt. Badam and Chhoti whose presence at the spot was not disputed by the defence it is clear that they have described the incident in a clear and graphic manner. They have categorically asserted that respondent-Hanuman gave three blows with his axe on the head of Panchu. Though thte witnesses were subject to searching cross-examination nothing material could be elicited from them which may cast a doubt on their credibility. The learned trial Judge who had the opportunity of marking their demeanor in the Court assessed their evidence and did not find any good reason to discard their testimony. In the circumstance the High Court committed an error in discarding their testimony on this ground”. 26. There cannot be any dispute that if First Information Report is brought into existence during the course of investigation, it cannot be looked into for any purpose except for contradicting the maker. In this case, the First Information Report was lodged by one Laxman, but he was not examined. P.W.11, who is Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, specifically stated that at about 8.00 PM on 14.05.2006 while he was present in police station, one Laxman gave Ex.P.7 and he registered a case and thereafter, intimated registration of case to Circle Inspector of Police, who took up investigation. Further, it is the specific case of P.Ws.4 to 6 that from the place of the incident, they proceeded to Kondapur on a Double bullock cart and from there they took the deceased to Government Hospital, Armoor. It is not suggested to them in the first instance that they went to police station and lodged report. Even it is also not suggested to P.W.1 that prior to 8.00 AM on 14.05.2006, P.W.4 lodged complaint to police. It is not suggested to them in the first instance that they went to police station and lodged report. Even it is also not suggested to P.W.1 that prior to 8.00 AM on 14.05.2006, P.W.4 lodged complaint to police. Therefore, an inadvertent admission made by P.W.3, cannot be taken as a sole basis to arrive at a conclusion that P.W.4 lodged report to police prior to Ex.P.7. 27. The death of the deceased was due to head injury. P.W.10, Doctor, who conducted post-mortem examination found the following external injuries: 1. Laceration on left side of the frontal region 2. Contusion on middle of front parietal region 3. Contusion on right middle 1/3rd of right hand 4. Contusion on left hand wrist 5. Abrasion on left side of the lambar region on dissection of the head. According to him, the death of the deceased was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury to skull. Practically the evidence of P.W.10 and recitals in Ex.P.6 remained unchallenged. From the medical evidence, it is established beyond doubt that the death of the deceased was due to head injury and it is a homicidal nature. 28. In pursuance of confessional statement made by A.1, P.W.12 arrested the accused in the presence of P.W.8, thereafter police and mediators recovered M.O.1 from the scene of occurrence. When M.O.1 was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, it was found containing human blood. Therefore, there is every possibility for using M.O.1 by A.1 in commission of the offence. In view of the fact that the accused are close relatives to the deceased, P.W.5 would not have implicated his own paternal uncles as assailants of the deceased. So considering these aspects, the trial Court rightly found the appellants guilty and the said judgment needs no interference by this Court. 29. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming judgment, dated 22.09.2008, in Sessions Case No.89 of 2007 on the file of II Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed.