JUDGEMENT SANJAY KAROL, J.- 1. PETITIONER Mukesh Malhotra stands charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, District Solan, H.P. It is this order dated 23.8.2012 which is assailed in the present petition filed under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. ON a complaint (Annexure P-1) received by the Superintendent of Police Solan, Distt. Solan, H.P., F.I.R. No. 33/2010, dated 23.2.2010 (Annexure P-2), was registered at Police Station Sadar, Distt. Solan, H.P., under the provisions of Sections 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code (referred to as IPC). According to the complainants Sh. Devinder Singh Bajwa, Sh. Rajesh Malik and Ms. Poonam Verma, petitioner Mukesh Malhotra by forging their signatures on certain documents, diverted business of the partnership firm by changing its name, of which he is the beneficiary. This was so done only with an intent of cheating and using the documents to his personal use, advantage and gain. Petitioner misrepresented, wrote a letter to M/s Star Den Media Services Private Ltd. and got the contract changed in the name of M/s Solan Set T.V. in place of M/s Solan Communication. Petitioner who was working as a partner with the complainants got the business of the partnership diverted to a new concern with which they have no concern. Attacking the order, Mr. G. C. Gupta, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has argued that since the State Forensic Science Laboratory in its report could not conclusively establish the alleged forgery, as such, Court below erred in framing charges against the petitioner; even otherwise, prima facie, no offence can be said to have been committed by the petitioner warranting continuance of trial; document(s) in question cannot be said to be a valuable security falling within the explanation of Section 30 of IPC and as such applicability of Section 467 of IPC is totally misconceivable, hence inapplicable. Continuance of trial would result into miscarriage of justice, seriously prejudicing the petitioner. Continuance of trial would result into miscarriage of justice, seriously prejudicing the petitioner. He has referred to and relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court reported in Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujarat & others, (2011) 7 SCC 59 ; Asmathunnisa vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & another, (2011) 11 SCC 259 ; and Padal Venkata Rama Reddy @ Ramu vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy & others, (2011) 12 SCC 437 . 3. SECTION 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (referred to as the Code), mandates that if a Judge is of the "opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence" he shall frame, in writing, a charge against the said accused. The gravamen of the section is thus the "opinion" of the Judge concerned. It is also a settled position of law that at the beginning of trial, truth, its veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under S. 227 or S. 228 of the Code. At that stage, Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then only there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. [State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 : (1977) 4 SCC 39 ] At the stage of framing charge all that is required to be established is that a prima facie case is made out by the prosecution. Sufficiency of evidence resulting into conviction is not to be seen, which is to be done only after trial, based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Charges can be framed if there is some material showing possibility of commission of crime as against certainty [State of A.P. vs. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 ]. Possibility of involvement of the accused in the crime is also a reason good enough to frame charge against the accused. [See: Keshub Mahindra vs. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 129 and State of M.P. vs. S. B. Johari & others, (2000) 2 SCC 57 ] 4. THE apex Court in State of Delhi vs. Gyan Devi and others, (2000) 8 SCC 239 has held that:. "7....... It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them, the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases." This Court in Criminal Revision No. 183 of 2012, titled as H.S. Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 17.9.2012 has held that at the time of framing of charge, Court is not required to minutely examine the evidence or apply the standard as to whether prosecution would ultimately be able to prove/establish its case against the accused during trial. The purpose of framing of charge is to tell an accused, precisely and concisely, the matter with which he is charged. It must be conveyed to him with sufficient clarity and certainty what prosecution intends to establish during trial. 5. IN a case of quashing of an F.I.R, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prokash Chandra Bose @ Chabi Bose & another, AIR 1963 SC 1430 has held that the test to be applied is as to whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction. If there was prima facie evidence, though the person charged of an offence in the complainant might have a defence, the matter has to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and the issue of process could not be refused unless it is found that the evidence led is self contradictory and intrinsically untrustworthy. [Also Nirmaljit Singh Hoon vs. The State of W.B & others, AIR 1972 SC 2639 ] 6. FURTHER in a case where challenge is to the order of framing of charges, the apex Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander & another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 clarified that framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case", documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and the judgment of the Court, while Section 228 is tentative. To say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of having committed an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. It further culled out the following principles required to be exercised by the High Court, while exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC:- "27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11 Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. [Ref. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. [Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 ; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 ; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 ; Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194 ; G. Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 ; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. (2003) 3 SCC 11 ; Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma (1996) 7 SCC 705 ; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa (1995) 4 SCC 41 ; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122 ; Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. (2000) 3 SCC 269 ; Shakson Belthissor vs. State of Kerala (2009) 14 SCC 466 ; V.V.S. Rama Sharma vs. State of U.P. (2009) 7 SCC 234 ; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu (2009) 11 SCC 203 ; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar (2001) 2 SCC 17 ; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh (2001) 8 SCC 645 ; Savita v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 338 and S.M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659 .] 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence." [Emphasis supplied] Also at the time of framing of charges, probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted at that stage. 7. 7. NOW, in the instant case, simply because there is no conclusive determination by the Forensic Science Laboratory with regard to alleged forgery with regard to the signatures of the complainants, this fact itself cannot be a ground sufficient enough to discharge the accused/petitioner. There is no finding, in the affirmative that signatures are not forged. The trial Court sieved through other material on record, including the complainant, to prima facie form an opinion with regard to complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. Significantly charge is not with regard to forgery but also cheating. Allegedly, petitioner who was working as a partner with the complainants got the business of the partnership diverted to a new concern with which they have no concern. 8. FRAMING of a charge is not an empty formality. Court has to examine the matter in totality and only thereafter form its opinion based on the material placed on record by the prosecution. Prima facie, the Court was satisfied with regard to the existence of such material and only after evaluating the same proceeded to frame the charge. In Asmathunnisa (supra), Court was dealing with a case of quashing of an F.I.R. The Court quashed the F.I.R. on the basis of admitted facts that at the time of alleged crime, in relation to which F.I.R. stood registered, accused were not even present. This is evident from para-5 of the report. 9. DECISION referred to in Joseph Salvaraj (supra) also does not advance the case of the petitioner. Their the Court was dealing with a case where a complaint was lodged by the Mediator, who had no cause of action to file the same and most significant, in relation to the amount claimed to have been misappropriated and cheated, a Civil Suit for recovery stood filed by the claimants. 10. IN Padal Venkata Rama Reddy (supra) the Court, in fact, frowned upon the High Court in quashing the order framing the charges against the accused. Prima facie trial Court, based on the material so placed on record by the prosecution, arrived at the conclusion that the present accused who was running the business of partnership with the complainants, in the name and style of M/s Solan Communication, forged letters and got the contract changed in the name of a new concern i.e. M/s Solan Set T.V., with which complainants had no concern. Whether accused forged this document(s) or not is to be examined during trial. If this document(s) is forged then it cannot be said that accused would not be guilty of having committed crime punishable under the provisions of Sections 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. Whether the document(s) was forged with an intent to cheat or whether the complainants were cheated are all questions to be examined by the trial Court. 11. IN my considered view, at this stage, it cannot be said that the conclusion with regard to the framing of charges for offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code is unreasonable, unjustifiable, erroneous or illegal, warranting interference by this Court. The case does not fall under the exceptional Rule. 12. FOR all the aforesaid reasons, present petition devoid of any merit, is dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. Record be immediately sent back. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 20.12.2013. Any observation made herein above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the trial Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced on the same.