ORDER Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. 1. The present writ petition is filed seeking to declare as illegal and arbitrary the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 04.04.2008, through which approval of the absorption of the petitioner into Aided Secondary Grade Teacher post is rejected. The facts in brief are that the petitioner being a Science Graduate with B.Ed. (Maths) was appointed B.Ed. Assistant in the year 1995 in the 3rd respondent B.V.R. Aided High School, Koppolu, Prakasam District. The said appointment was approved in the same year. Both B.V.R. Aided High School and B.S. Aided High School, Koppolu, are under the same management, having 15 Secondary Grade Teacher posts approved by the competent authority. Out of the said 15 posts, 12 posts have been admitted into grant in aid. Insofar as B.V.R. Aided High School is concerned, there are in total eight teachers working, out of whom five have been admitted into grant-in-aid. On 29.09.2004 the petitioner made a representation to the 3rd respondent to consider his case for absorption into Aided Secondary Grade Teacher post, which was to fall vacant on the superannuation of a the incumbent teacher, who had to retire on 30.09.2004. The petitioner, while making his. representation, has underlined the fact to the management that there are no other Unaided Secondary Grade Teachers working in the 3rd respondent school. 2. The 3rd respondent management, considering the request of the petitioner, as he is suitable with the requisite qualification, absorbed the petitioner as a Secondary Grade Teacher through proceedings dated 01.10.2004. Since it is a statutory mandate, on such absorption, the 3rd respondent submitted a proposal to the 2nd respondent for approval. The Mandal Education Officer, Ongole Rural Mandal, has in turn submitted a proposal to the District Education Officer for the approval of the absorption of the petitioner, through his proceedings dated 06.10.2004. 3. Though as per the Rules the approval of the absorption is formal in nature, albeit subject to the conditions laid in the applicable rules, the 2nd respondent has not passed any orders either approving or rejecting the proposal, which in fact, should have taken place in a time bound manner. 3. Though as per the Rules the approval of the absorption is formal in nature, albeit subject to the conditions laid in the applicable rules, the 2nd respondent has not passed any orders either approving or rejecting the proposal, which in fact, should have taken place in a time bound manner. Thus, questioning the said-inaction of the 2nd respondent, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 15927 of 2005, which was allowed by this Court on 04.12.2007, with the following directions to the respondent authorities: "Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the 2nd respondent is directed to consider the proposal sent by the 3rd respondent-management for absorbing the petitioner in to aided vacancy, without reference to the memo, dated 20.10.2004, issued by the Government imposing general ban on recruitment, and pass appropriate orders, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and communicate the same to the petitioner." 4. Despite the orders passed by this Court, when the 2nd respondent did not pass any order on the proposal sent by the 3rd respondent, the petitioner, invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, filed C.C. No. 493 of 2008. Under those circumstances, the 2nd respondent passed the present impugned orders dated 04.04.2008 refusing to give approval, inter alia, on the ground that the absorption of the petitioner as a Secondary Grade Teacher was in violation of G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 5. On the part of the respondents a counter affidavit was filed. Apart from traversing the allegations that had been levelled by the petitioner, the respondents contended that initially the proposal could not be considered since the Government imposed a ban on recruitment through memo No. 12080/CO/A2/2004 dated 20.10.2004. It is further contended that the absorption has been rejected also on another ground that the management has not obtained prior permission from the competent authority. Thus, what emerges from the pleadings of the respondent is that the Government has taken its objection on two folds, viz., that there was a ban and that there was no prior permission obtained from the Government by the 3rd respondent management. 6. Sri. Thus, what emerges from the pleadings of the respondent is that the Government has taken its objection on two folds, viz., that there was a ban and that there was no prior permission obtained from the Government by the 3rd respondent management. 6. Sri. D. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that insofar as the objection as to the ban is concerned, this Court while disposing of W.P. No. 15927 of 2005, through its order dated 04.12.2007, has categorically observed that the proposal sent by the 3rd respondent management for absorption of the petitioner into the aided vacancy shall be considered without reference to Memo dated 20.10.2004, through which the general ban on recruitment was imposed. Since no further challenge has been laid against the order of this Court, the same operates as res judicata, and as such, the respondents are estopped from raising the same or similar plea once again. 7. The learned counsel has further contended that though much stress has been laid on the third respondent management not obtaining prior permission, apparently the said plea was taken based on G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006. Succinctly stated, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged this Court to take judicial note of the fact that the very G.O., incorporating the said condition into Rule 12 of G.O. Ms. No. 1 Education dated 01.01.1994 came into force only on 13.07.2006. Since the absorption of the petitioner took place on 01.10.2004, the present condition of obtaining prior permission, as was incorporated in G.O. Ms. No. 56 dated 13.07.2006, has no application. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed on record various proceedings of the Government showing that other similarly placed employees were absorbed and their services were regularized. A perusal of those proceedings, (four in number), amply illustrates that in all those cases the employees whose absorption was approved by the Government are similarly situated as the petitioner has been. Even on this count, it is contended by the learned counsel, the petitioner cannot be discriminated against. 9. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader has strenuously contended that the action of the Government is totally justified on both the counts. He has further submitted that since there is an incorporation of the amendment through G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006 into the existing rules which were framed through G.O. Ms. 9. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader has strenuously contended that the action of the Government is totally justified on both the counts. He has further submitted that since there is an incorporation of the amendment through G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006 into the existing rules which were framed through G.O. Ms. No. 1 Edn., dated 01.01.1994, it is deemed that the rule so incorporated by way of amendment has been in existence since beginning. In other words, the amended rule is retroactive in operation. It is further contended that the petitioner ought not to have been allowed to be absorbed into the Secondary Grade Teacher post from that of B.Ed. Assistant. On the other hand, given the existing of a vacancy, the petitioner could have been absorbed, if it is permissible, in the same post in which he had been working. The learned Government Pleader, in this regard, has placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kolawana Gram Vikas Kendra v. State of Gujarat and others (2010) 1 SCC 133 : 2009 (8) SCJ 992. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for School Education, apart from perusing the record. 11. As could be seen from the respective pleadings and rival submissions made across the bar, it is clear that the entire dispute centres on the issue of the absorption and the consequential approval by the Government. In the usual course, there could not have been much hassle with regard to the routine process of granting absorption given the fact that the petitioner is qualified to hold the said post. But, in view of the fact that the petitioner initially was appointed in an unaided post, albeit after following the due procedure, and further in view of the prior litigation leading up to initiation of contempt proceedings, the Government has insisted that the petitioner has no entitlement to claim absorption. 12. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, first objection as to the so-called ban does not stand the legal scrutiny on the simple premise that this Court earlier through its order dated 04.12.2007 in W.P. No. 15927 of 2005 has directed the respondents to consider the proposal for absorption without reference to the said ban, which came to be issued through Memo dated 20.10.2004. Accordingly, the very plea of ban on recruitment falls prey to the principle of res judicata, constructive or otherwise. 13. On the second limb, the fulcrum of the learned Government Pleader's argument is G.O. Ms. No. 56 dated 13.07.2006. Without further ado, it can be stated that the said G.O. does impose a limitation on the freedom of the management of the private school that they need to take approval before recruiting any teaching staff into either aided or unaided posts. The fact however remains that the said G.O. was brought into existence on 13.07.2006. It is axiomatic to state that any subordinate legislation will have only prospective application, unless the parent legislation empowers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the authority, in the first place, to make any rule or regulation with retrospective effect. 14. In Kusumam Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Kerala SEB (2008) 13 SCC 213 : 2009 (4) ALT 22.1 (DN SC) : 2008 (8) SCJ 119, the Supreme Court has held that a presumption, rebuttable though, can be raised that a statutory rule has prospective operation only. Further, in Mahabir Vegetable Oils (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Haryana and others 2006 (4) SCJ 104 : 2006 AIR SCW 1500 : 2006 (4) ALT 27 .2 (DN SC) the Supreme Court has held: "41. We may at this stage consider the effect of omission of the said note. It is beyond any cavil that a subordinate legislation can be given a retrospective effect and retroactive operation, if any power in this behalf is contained in the main Act. The rule-making power is a species of delegated legislation. A delegatee therefore can make rules only within the four corners thereof. 42. It is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. (See West v. Gwynne)" 15. It is noteworthy that in the same judgment, their Lordships have further observed that although there lies a distinction between vested rights and accrued rights as by reason of a delegated legislation, a right cannot be taken away. A fortiori, such taking away with retrospective effect, unless backed up by parent legislation, is an administrative anathema. 16. As quoted in H.C. Suman v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees' Co-op. A fortiori, such taking away with retrospective effect, unless backed up by parent legislation, is an administrative anathema. 16. As quoted in H.C. Suman v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees' Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 485 , the celebrated authority on Adminsitrativ Law, H.W.R. Wade in his well known treatise (5th Edn., pp. 748, 751-52) has admirably enunciated the limitations of delegated legislation in the following words: "It follows likewise that the courts must determine the validity of delegated legislation by applying the test of ultra vires, just as they do in other contexts. Delegated legislation in no way partakes of the immunity which Acts of Parliament enjoy from challenge in the courts, for there is a fundamental difference between a sovereign and a subordinate lawmaking power. Acts of Parliament have sovereign force, but legislation made under delegated power can be valid only if it conforms exactly to the power granted." *** "Whether delegated legislation can have retrospective operation without express parliamentary sanction is a question upon which there is scant authority. It is natural to presume that Parliament is unlikely to confer a power which it uses only most sparingly itself." *** "Just as with other kinds of administrative action, the courts must sometimes condemn rules or regulations for unreasonableness. In interpreting statutes it is natural to make the assumption that Parliament could not have intended powers of delegated legislation to be exercised unreasonably, so that the legality of the regulations becomes dependent upon their content." 17. In the present instance, a perusal of G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006 does not indicate in any manner that it has got any retrospective application. As such, obtaining of prior permission by the 3rd respondent as a precondition does not arise. It is further a settled principle of law that any right that has accrued in favour of any person shall be reckoned and determined based on the statutory or legal position obtaining as on that particular day. In other words, pending consideration of any application involving the right of a particular person, be it a right to the post, shall not be considered, much less defeated, based on subsequent developments either of statutory or administrative nature. Thus, it is quite evident that the approval cannot be held back either on the ground of the ban, which came to be relaxed subsequently or on the basis of G.O. Ms. Thus, it is quite evident that the approval cannot be held back either on the ground of the ban, which came to be relaxed subsequently or on the basis of G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn., dated 13.07.2006, which has no retrospective effect. 18. As far as the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kolawana Gram Vikas Kendra case (supra) is concerned, a perusal of the same would indicate that prior approval of State Government or competent authority is required only in terms of the recruitment provisions that are in force, but not otherwise. In this case, had it been a case of absorption subsequent to 13.07.2006, when G.O. Ms. No. 56 Edn. was introduced, the ratio laid down by their Lordships would have had application. In this case, however, as the entire process of absorption took place prior to the introduction of the said G.O., the ratio laid down in the above referred case has no application. 19. The issue may have to, be viewed from the point of equity and parity of treatment. In other words, from the stand point of discrimination. Thus, Keeping aside all other contentions raised by either party, the previous instances of the very Government extending its approval to all other absorptions of similarly placed persons, as is evident from the material produced by the petitioner, belie the contention of the Government that prior permission is required or that the lack of prior permission vitiates the absorption. 20. In the above facts and circumstances, the proceedings of the 2nd respondent in RC. No. 9285/(D4) C1/2007, dated 04.04.2008 are declared as illegal and arbitrary, apart from being discriminatory. Accordingly, they are set aside. Consequently, the respondent is directed to consider the proposal sent by the 3rd respondent in the light of the observations made herein above and pass appropriate orders as expeditiously as possible, in any event, not being two months' time. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel to it, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. Case Closed.