JUDGMENT SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. The petitioner seeks to assail provisions of Sections 2 (g) and 2 (m) of The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994. 2. Learned counsel for respondents points out, as has been done earlier, that the issue is no more res-integra in view of the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 6139 of 2011 titled as Dr. Pardeep Mahendru v. State of Haryana and others and other connected matters, decided on 28.8.2012. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners seeks to contend that the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment really did not examine the plea and the only issue which was considered was whether the mandamus could be issued or not i.e. the aspect of vires was not examined. 4. We are afraid that this argument is only stated to be rejected if one peruses what has been observed in paras 4 to 9 of the judgment, which is reproduced as under : “(4) The petitioner, however, draws the distinction and urges that there was no challenge to the provisions of the PNDT Act or Rules in the above stated writ petition hence, the additional issue, namely, vires of Section 2 (m) of the PNDT Act, which defines “registered medical practitioner”, deserves independent consideration by us. However, he does not dispute that the other related issues have been gone into by the learned single Judge in Dr. Devender Bohra case cited (supra). (5) It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce Section 2(m) of the PNDT Act which defines “registered medical practitioner” and reads as follows: “registered medical practitioner” means a medical practitioner who possesses any recognized medical qualification as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and whose name has been entered in a State Medical Register. (6) The petitioner contention is that only those medical practitioners who possess recognized medical qualification as defined in Clause (h) of Section 2 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and whose names are entered in a State Medical Register, have been recognized as “registered medical practitioner” under the PNDT Act, which amounts to hostile discrimination with BAMS Degree holders, hence the above-reproduced definition does not stand to the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (7) We have given our thoughtful consideration to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. (8) The petitioner does not plead or allege fault with the inclusion of medical practitioners who are qualified under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, amongst those who are recognized by PNDT Act. He, while questioning the definition of “registered medical practitioner” under the PNDT Act, in a way, seeks a mandamus to rewrite the said definition so as to include “medical practitioners” recognized/registered under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 also. No such writ, in our considered view, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can be issued. (9) The MBBS or any other similar qualification based upon modern medical science is totally distinct and different from the Ayurvedic system of medicines as is imparted in the BAMS degree course. Whether BAMS degree-holders are professionally capable to use Ultra-sound Machines or not is essentially a question which falls within the domain of the subject-experts. The fact that the legislature in its wisdom did not include in the registered medical practitioners under PNDT Act except those who are possessing recognized medical qualifications under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, is a decision based upon intelligible criteria and satisfies the test of reasonable classification.” 5. It is abundantly clear that the only aspect which was really urged and examined by the Division Bench was qua the definition of a registered medical practitioner and exclusion of the ayurvedic doctors from the ambit of the Act. The Division Bench has clearly opined that to include doctors like the petitioners herein would amount to re-writing the definition of “registered medical practitioners” under the PNDT Act. This issue, as observed, is best left to the experts and the legislative in its wisdom. 6. In our view, the matter is thus, no more res-integra and we are also in complete agreement with the views expressed in the judgment. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners despite the aforesaid position persists in his argument to contend that there is another aspect of the plea which has not been examined by the earlier Bench. Learned counsel draws our attention to the provisions of Section 17(3)(d) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 which reads as under : “17. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners despite the aforesaid position persists in his argument to contend that there is another aspect of the plea which has not been examined by the earlier Bench. Learned counsel draws our attention to the provisions of Section 17(3)(d) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 which reads as under : “17. Rights of persons possessing qualifications included in Second, Third and Fourth Schedules to be enrolled - (1) and (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) (a) to (c) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (d) the rights conferred by or under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956) [including the right to practice medicine as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the said Act], on persons possessing any qualifications included in the Schedules to the said Act.” 8. It is thus, his submission that in view of the aforesaid position, all rights conferred by or under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 stand conferred even on the petitioners and thus, the petitioners cannot be excluded from the ambit of the provisions of Sections 2 (g) and 2 (m) of the PNDT Act. These provisions read as under : “2. Definitions. (a) to (f) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (g) “medical geneticist” includes a person who possesses a degree or diploma in genetic science in the fields of sex selection and pre-natal diagnostic techniques or has experience of not less than two years in any of these fields after obtaining. (i) any one of the medical qualifications recognized under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956); or (ii) a post-graduate degree in biological sciences;] (h) to (l) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (m) “registered medical practitioner” means a medical practitioner who possesses any recognized medical qualification as defined in clause (h) of section 2 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956), and whose name has been entered in a State Medical Register.” 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners in fact contends that what he seeks to assail is requirement of medical qualifications recognized under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 being stipulated in Clauses (g) and (m) of Section 2 of the PNDT Act aforesaid and seeks support from the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Learned counsel for the petitioners in fact contends that what he seeks to assail is requirement of medical qualifications recognized under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 being stipulated in Clauses (g) and (m) of Section 2 of the PNDT Act aforesaid and seeks support from the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Mukhtiar Chand v. State of Punjab, 1998 (7) SCC 579 : ( AIR 1999 SC 468 ) and Subhashis Bakshi v. West Bengal Medical Council, 2003 (9) SCC 269 : ( AIR 2003 SC 1563 ). 10. On reference to the aforesaid judgments, we find nothing contained in the same which can be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioners to advance his submission. We may notice that the PNDT Act is a Special Act dealing with the particular aspect enacted with the object of prohibiting pre-natal diagnostic techniques for determination of sex of the foetus leading to female foeticide. What is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that he can own a machine but not operate it, which is liable to be struck down as ultra vires the right under Constitution of India to carry on his business, profession and trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. His contention is that so long as those aids can be used for purposes of practising in their own system of medicine, there can be no prohibition. 11. In our view, the very objective with which the PNDT Act has been enacted would show that the aim is to be sub-served by putting restrictions on the category of persons who can operate the machine in question. This is done by the definition clauses (g) and (m) of Section 2 of the PNDT Act. 12. We thus, find the plea misplaced and thus, dismiss the petition with cost quantified at Rs.5,000/-. Petition dismissed.