JUDGMENT Hon’ble Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi, J.—Both these special appeals have been preferred against a common judgment and order dated 30.5.2012 passed by learned Single Judge (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra, J.) of this Court in 18 writ petitions. Since a common question of law was involved in all these writ petitions and the same is involved in these special appeals, hence, we proceed on to decide both these appeals together. 2. Admitted facts of the case are that the appellants were working on Class-IV post as employees of the respondents. The appellants became eligible for promotion to Class-III post (Junior Clerk-cum-Typist) under U.P. Subordinate Offices Ministerial Group “C” Posts of the Lowest Grade (Recruitment by Promotion) Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule of 2001”). The appellants were promoted to the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist in the year 2003 but vide impugned order dated 13.3.2006 appellants were reverted to Class-IV post on the ground that they were not fulfilling the minimum eligibility criteria of clearing typing test i.e. 25 words per minute in typing, nor their interview was conducted, nor their character rolls were scrutinized by the promoting authorities. 3. Aggrieved by the said order of reversion appellants preferred Writ Petition (Service Single) Nos. 8962 of 2006, 2672 of 2006, 2625 of 2006, 2214 of 2006, 2529 of 2006, 2345 of 2006, 4559 of 2006, 5951 of 2006, 2334 of 2006, 7286 of 2006, 2332 of 2006, 3744 of 2006, 2352 of 2006, 2771 of 2006, 2473 of 2006, 2417 of 2006, 2472 of 2006, 2328 of 2006. 4. Learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the writ petitions with observation that the promotion in the year 2003 was not a valid selection and the respondents were directed to take a fresh typing test, evaluate the candidature of each of the candidate as per Rules for Promotion, within a period of 4 months; till final selection the petitioner shall continue on the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist, as per the interim order dated 3.7.2007. It was further directed that if needs be, the petitioners shall be at liberty to approach U.P. State Public Service Tribunal. 5. We have heard both the parties and have gone through the records. 6. Part-II of the Rules of 2001 deal with recruitment and Part-III deals with procedure for recruitment. It was further directed that if needs be, the petitioners shall be at liberty to approach U.P. State Public Service Tribunal. 5. We have heard both the parties and have gone through the records. 6. Part-II of the Rules of 2001 deal with recruitment and Part-III deals with procedure for recruitment. Rule 8 of Part-III of Rules of 2001 prescribes that the appointing authority shall determine number of vacancies to be filled during the course of the year of the recruitment. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 8 provides: “(2) Recruitment by promotion shall be made on the basis of merit as disclosed by marks obtained in the test for selection through the Selection Committee constituted under sub-rule (1). The test for selection shall include a simple written test, interview and evaluation of character roll. The maximum marks to be assigned for written test, interview and evaluation of character roll shall be as given below: (a) Written Test Thirty marks (b) Interview Ten Marks (c) Evaluation of character roll Ten Marks Total Fifty marks Note 1.—The written test shall include a single question paper. The question paper shall contain two questions. Each question shall carry fifteen marks. One question shall be on Hindi Essay writing on a simple topic and the other shall be on General Knowledge. Note 2.—Where recruitment by promotion is being made for the post of Typist or a post for which Hindi Typewriting is essential, there shall be conducted a qualifying test of Hindi Typewriting also, as prescribed by the Government from time to time. To qualify this test a candidate must have a minimum speed of twenty-five words per minute in Hindi Typewriting” 7. In case of the appellants, only written test was conducted though the promotion has been made to the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist, for which Hindi Typewriting is essential with minimum speed of 25 words per minute. 8. No such test was conducted by the respondents before making promotions of the appellants, nor the interview was conducted, nor character role of each of the appellant was evaluated and, as such, the promotion order was obviously made in blatant violation of the Rules. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed: “Needless to mention that an employee of the State has no fundamental right of promotion but has a right to be considered for promotion. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed: “Needless to mention that an employee of the State has no fundamental right of promotion but has a right to be considered for promotion. Therefore, the promotion is a normal incident of service of every employee as per the ratio laid down in the case of Food Corporation of India and others v. Parashotam Das Bansal and others, (2008) 5 SCC 100 . However, it may be mentioned that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ut. Chandigarh and others v. Avtar Singh and others, (2002) 10 SCC 432 , held that “withholding of the promotion amounts to stagnation in service for an unduly long period that may creates the frustration in the mind of employee but the fact remains that the petitioner will become eligible.” Thus, the petitioners should first deserve the post, only then they desire to have the same.” 9. Learned counsel for appellants placed reliance upon the law laid down by this Court in State of U.P. and others v. Umesh Chandra Srivastava, (2001) 1 UPLBEC 384, in which it has been held: “it is, therefore, clear that insofar as the recruitment by promotion from Group ‘D’ post to Group ‘C’ is concerned, once a candidate has the essential qualification and meets the other recruitments as set out in Rule 8 of the Recruitment Rules, such candidate shall be eligible for selection to Group ‘C’ post without appearing or passing the typing test. 10. In the case of the appellants, the reversion order does not speaks about typing alone. But the fact is that a show-cause notice was issued to the appellants on 12.9.2005 to the effect that the appellants were not having qualifications of having attained fluency in typing to 25 words per minute, nor any of the appellant was interviewed, nor the character roll has been evaluated and, as such, the promotion is illegal. Each of the appellant was directed to show cause ‘why he should not be reverted?’. Each of the appellant was required to show cause within 15 days. The appellants have filed their replies. 11. In view of this factual position the law laid down by this Court in Umesh Chandra Srivastava (supra) does not help appellants. The promotion order was obviously bad in law and, as such, the reversion order has rightly been upheld by the learned Single Judge. The appellants have filed their replies. 11. In view of this factual position the law laid down by this Court in Umesh Chandra Srivastava (supra) does not help appellants. The promotion order was obviously bad in law and, as such, the reversion order has rightly been upheld by the learned Single Judge. It was also argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants have been promoted in the year 2003 and the reversion was done in the year 2006, is illegal because of lapse of time. We did not find any force in this plea, which is not tenable by law, particularly in view of the fact that the inception (promotion) was illegal. It cannot be regularised by lapse of time or otherwise. A void order is no order at all form in its inception, it is nullity for the obvious reason that failure to follow procedural requirement, the result is nullity. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has held as under: “Public employment in a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic, has to be as set down by the Constitution and the laws made thereunder. Our constitutional scheme envisages employment by the Government and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf.” It was further held: “The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily (See Basu’s Shorter Constitution of India). Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a model employer.” 12. The full Bench also relied upon the law laid down earlier by a three-Judges Bench in State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma, AIR 1996 SC 1565 , in which it was held: “It is settled law that having made rules of recruitment to various services under the State or to a class of posts under the State, the State is bound to follow the same and to have the selection of the candidates made as per recruitment rules and appointments shall be made accordingly.” 13. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies and others, 2004 (7) SCC 112 , a three Judge Bench made a survey of the authorities and held that when appointments were made in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Act and statutory rules framed thereunder and by ignoring essential qualifications, the appointments would be illegal and cannot be regularized by the State. 14. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh, (2004) 2 SCC 130 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to say: “We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order, which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.” 15. Recently, in State of Orissa and another v. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “It is a settled legal proposition that if an order is bad in its inception, it does not get sanctified at a later stage. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. A subsequent action/development cannot validate an action which was not lawful at its inception, for the reason that the illegality strikes at the root of the order. It would be beyond the competence of any authority to validate such an order. It would be ironic to permit a person to rely upon a law, in violation of which he has obtained the benefits. If an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings consequent thereto will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. A right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin.” 16. On the basis of law, as discussed above, we find that no interference is called for, in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the reversion order is perfectly in accordance with the law as applicable to the appellants. 17. In result, appeals deserve to be dismissed and, are dismissed with Rs. 5,000/- each as costs. ——————