JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shri Narayan Shukla, J.—Heard Mr Amrendra Nath Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel. Through the instant writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 13.1.1978, passed by the Prescribed Authority, Kunda, Pratpgarh in Ceiling Case No. 99 of 1974 as well as the order dated 5.7.1978, passed by the II Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh in Revenue Ceiling Appeal No. 3 of 1978 and other connected appeals. 2. The petitioners are lease holders of the land declared as surplus land of respondent No. 4. Therefore, after declaration the land as surplus they filed objection before the Prescribed Authority, claiming their right available there on the basis of registered lease executed in their favour. The Prescribed Authority considered their objection and decided the case by judgment and order dated 25.1.1975 and declared total 24 Bigha 7 Biswa 10 biswansi land as surplus. The State Government filed Revenue Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1975 before the District Judge, Pratapgarh against the order of Prescribed Authority which was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 29.4.1976. The order, passed in appeal, attained the finality as it was not challenged in the higher forum. Thus, the things took at rest but the Prescribed Authority again issued a notice under Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (herein after referred to as Ceiling Act) against the opposite party No. 4. 3. The opposite party No. 4 as well as the petitioners filed their objection challenging the maintainability of the proceedings being barred by res judicata. They asserted that the Prescribed Authority had adjudicated upon the issue by means of order dated 25.1.1975 which has been upheld in appeal. They claimed that pursuant to the registered deed dated 13.8.1949 the name of Smt. Shiv Kali was mutated in revenue record by means of order dated 5.2.1955 passed by Tehsildar Kunda but due to inadvertent mistake the petitioners’ names were left from being entered into the revenue record. They further stated that they had filed one case under Section 229 (B) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950 for declaration of their right over the land in dispute which was decreed vide judgment and order dated 30.3.1973. They further stated that they had filed one case under Section 229 (B) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950 for declaration of their right over the land in dispute which was decreed vide judgment and order dated 30.3.1973. These facts were placed before the Prescribed Authority but the Prescribed Authority did not acknowledge it on the basis of statement of Jagan Nath and held that the order passed in the declaratory suit was nullity as it was passed against the dead person. Thus, the Prescribed Authority rejected petitioners’ preliminary objection by means of order dated 13.1.1978 and held that 55 Bigha 13 Biswa and 6 Biswansi irrigated land and 56 Bigha 5 Biswa and 8 Biswansi unirrigated land are surplus. Against which the petitioners filed Ceiling Appeal No. 6 of 1978 before the III Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh, who dismissed the same by means of order dated 5 th July, 1978. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the facts of the case reveal that the dispute was finally adjudicated upon earlier by the Prescribed Authority by means of judgment and order dated 25.1.1975 between the parties. Therefore, it was not permitted for the respondents to re-open the proceedings. Thus, he claims that the proceeding was barred by principle of res judicata. He supports his submission with the decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Devendra Singh v. Civil judge, Basti and others, (1999) 1 SCC 71 . Relevant paragraph 3 of which is extracted below: “3.Having examined the provisions of Section 13-A and Section 38-B of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that under Section 13-A, the prescribed authority has the power to reopen the matter within two years from the date of the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 14 to rectify any apparent mistake which was there on the face of the record. That power will certainly not include the power to entertain fresh evidence and re-examine the question as to whether the two sons, namely, Hamendra and Shailendra were major or not. That power will certainly not include the power to entertain fresh evidence and re-examine the question as to whether the two sons, namely, Hamendra and Shailendra were major or not. The power under Section 38-B merely indicates that if any finding or decision was there by any ancillary forum prior to the commencement of the said section in respect of a matter which is governed by the Ceiling Act then such finding will not operate as res judicata in a proceeding under the Act. That would not cover the case where findings have already reached their finality in the very case under the Act. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to reopen the question of the majority of the two sons in purported exercise of the power under Section 13-A. If the authority had no jurisdiction, question of waiver of jurisdiction does not arise, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent.” 5. In support of his submission he further cited (1) Karan Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (2003)(94) RD 527. Relevant paragraph 8 of which is reproduced hereunder : “8. A reading of the aforesaid, section reveals that the Prescribed Authority may at any time within a period of two years from the date of the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 14, rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record. As stated above in the present case there was no error apparent on the face of the record and what the State Government attempted to do by means of an application under Section 13-A of the Act was to take up a new case, “and that too after the orders passed by the authorities below have become final, which is legally not permissible. The order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 12.1.1977 operates as res judicata between the parties as the provisions of Section 13-A of the Act have got no application in the present case. 6. (ii) State of U.P. through Collector Mirzapur v. Commissioner (J) Varanasi Division, (2009) (27) LCD 71. Paragraph 7 of which is reproduced hereunder; “7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the record. 6. (ii) State of U.P. through Collector Mirzapur v. Commissioner (J) Varanasi Division, (2009) (27) LCD 71. Paragraph 7 of which is reproduced hereunder; “7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the record. Admittedly from the record it clearly appears that the proceedings between the parties have become final by order dated 30.3.1977 in the appeal filed by the State. From the record it is also clear that the State petitioner has not filed any writ petition against that order. In the earlier proceedings it has been decided that the property which was clubbed in the holding of respondent No. 3 is a charitable Trust property in the name of Thakur Laxmia Narain Ji and Mahavir Ji. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority has rightly held that second notice is not maintainable and is barred by re judicata. This Court in judgments mentioned above has also taken the same view.” (iii) State of U.P. v. Dev karan and others, 2002 (20) LCD 1408. 7. He further submitted that the Prescribed Authority has got no power to reappreciate evidence in the successive proceedings when earlier proceeding was finalized by declaring the some land of opposite party No. 4 as surplus. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority was approved by the Court of Appeal filed by the State Government. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on this very ground the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. Upon perusal of the orders impugned in comparison to the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority in the earlier proceeding I find that the same very land was subjected under the proceedings of declaration of surplus land and also find that the order, passed by the Prescribed Authority is based on re appreciation of evidence which is not permissible under the eye of law as has been held in the judgments quoted above. This fact is not disputed that the earlier proceeding was on the same subject in which the issue had already been determined between the parties by the Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, I am of the view that the proceeding in question was barred by principle of res judicata. That being so the orders impugned passed in such proceeding are nullity. Therefore, I am of the view that the proceeding in question was barred by principle of res judicata. That being so the orders impugned passed in such proceeding are nullity. Therefore, the orders impugned dated 13.1.1978 and 5.7.1978 are hereby quashed. In the result the writ petition is allowed. ——————