JUDGMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Present petition has been filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for brevity sake). Petitioner has prayed for restraining respondent No.1 from transferring/removing assets from the site of petitioner- company and giving effect to notices dated 3.5.20 13 and 10.6.20 13 till the commencement and pendency of arbitration proceedings. Petitioner has also sought direction to respondents No.2 and 3 to maintain status quo in respect of the continuation of the toothbrush agreement and giving effect to order dated 14.6.2013 till the commencement and pendency of arbitration proceedings. Petitioner has also prayed to restrain respondents from transferring the rights and interest accruing under the detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and toothbrush agreement dated 26.3.2010 to any third party or creating any third party interest. 2. Petitioner-company is incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner-company has been manufacturing products and also undertakes contract manufacturing for various well known national and global brands. Petitioner is ISO 9001 certified. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are also companies incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. 3. Detergent agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009. It has come to an end on 30.6.2013. Prayer of the petitioner to extend the same was rejected on 10.6.2013. Toothpaste agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2 on 8.3.2010. The contract is valid upto 31.12.2014. Toothbrush agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.3 on 26.3.2010. It has come to an end on 30.6.2013. 4.Petitioner has also entered into asset management agreement on 31.3.2009 with respondent No.1 qua detergent. It has also entered into asset management agreement with respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013 qua toothbrush. 5.Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that it was mutually agreed by the petitioner and respondents to extend the detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement at least upto 5-6 years. He has also argued that petitioner has made huge investment as per detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement. He lastly contended that till the arbitration award is made by the Arbitrator, respondents may be restrained from transferring/moving assets from the petitioner-company. 6. Mr. He has also argued that petitioner has made huge investment as per detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement. He lastly contended that till the arbitration award is made by the Arbitrator, respondents may be restrained from transferring/moving assets from the petitioner-company. 6. Mr. Mustafa Safiyuddin has vehemently argued that in view of specific clauses contained in detergent agreement and asset management agreement dated 31.3.2009, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement dated 8.3.2010 and 26.3.2010, asset management agreement dated 2.5.2013 qua toothbrush and additional amendment agreement dated 20.12.2012 qua toothpaste, courts at Mumbai alone have the jurisdiction. He has also argued that toothpaste agreement is valid upto 31.12.2014 and no relief has been sought qua respondent No.2. He has also contended that there is misjoinder of cause of action and misjoinder of parties. According to him, all the respondents- companies are separate companies and have been registered separately under the Companies Act, 1956. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings carefully. 8. Detergent agreement, which was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009 was initially valid upto 31.3.2013. It was extended upto 30.6.20 13. There is no valid detergent agreement between petitioner and respondent No.1 after 30.6.20 13. Clause 10.13 of detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 reads as under: “10.13. GOVERNING LAW CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. If the matter is not resolved by amicable negotiations within 30 business days or such date as may be agreed upon, then the dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the laws of arbitration. The dispute shall be referred for arbitration to a single arbitrator who shall be a retired judge of the Bombay High Court who shall be appointed by the BUYER .The decision of the BYER on the appointment of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the SELLER. The arbitration proceedings shall be held in Mumbai and shall be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) and any amendment hereof. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The provisions of this section shall survive the termination of this agreement.” 9.Petitioner has also entered into asset management agreement with respondent No.1 dated 3 1.3.2009 qua detergent. It is at page 470 of the paper book. 10. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the copy of asset management agreement has not been supplied to his client. This is not believable. Clause 15 of the asset management agreement reads as under: “15. Only the competent courts in Mumbai shall have the jurisdiction as regards any matter arising out of, or in any way connected to this agreement.” 11.Toothpaste agreement has been entered on 8.3.20 10. Amendment agreement has been entered into between the parties on 20.12.2012. Clauses 8.1 and 8.2 read as under: “8.1 The Parties agree that any dispute arising between the parties in relation to the Manufacturing Agreement or any Addendum/ Amendments thereto (including the Supplementary Agreement, the Idling Cost, Letter, the Advance Agreements or this Agreement or any other writing between the parties) shall (notwithstanding anything to the contrary under the Supplementary Agreement, the stipulated in Clause 10.13 of the Manufacturing Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that the reference to the term “Buyer” used in the Manufacturing Agreement, including the said Clause 10.13 shall refer to the Company and the term “Seller” used in the Manufacturing Agreement, including the said Clause 10.13 shall refer to the Manufacturer. 8.2. Subject to the arbitration provisions contained in Clause 10.13 of the Manufacturing Agreement the parties submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent courts in Mumbai in relation to any proceedings arising out or in relation to the Manufacturing Agreement or any Addendum/ Amendments thereto (including the Supplementary Agreement the Idling Cost Letter, the Advance Agreements this Agreement or any other writing between the Parties).” 12. Manufacturing agreement has been entered into between the parties qua toothbrush on 26.3.20 10. It was valid upto 30.6.2013. Arbitration agreement, i.e. clause 10.13 reads: “10.13 GOVERNING LAW, CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. Manufacturing agreement has been entered into between the parties qua toothbrush on 26.3.20 10. It was valid upto 30.6.2013. Arbitration agreement, i.e. clause 10.13 reads: “10.13 GOVERNING LAW, CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. If the matter is not resolved by amicable negotiations within 30 business days, or such date as may be agreed upon, then the dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the laws of Arbitration. The dispute, shall be referred for arbitration to a single arbitrator who shall be a retired judge of the Bombay High Court who shall be appointed by the BUYER. The decision of the BUYER on the appointment of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the SELLER. The Arbitration proceedings shall be held in Mumbai and shall be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “ACA”), and any amendments thereof. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The provisions of this section shall survive the termination of this agreement. The PARTIES understand the English language and are fully aware of all terms and conditions contained herein. If any translation of this AGREEMENT is made, the English language version shall always continue to govern. The PARTIES agree that (i) the United Nations Convention on International Sale of Goods and/or the Sales of Goods Act (Ontario, Canada) shall have no force or effect on transactions under or relating to this AGREEMENT ; (ii) no trade usage shall be used to explain or supplement this AGREEEMENT even if either or both PARTIES were aware or should have been aware of such trade usage; and (iii) this AGREEMENT prevails over any general terms and conditions of trade.” 13. Asset management agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013. It is at page 579 of the paper book. Detergent agreement, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement are distinct and separate. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are separate entities. The Court is of the considered view that the petition in the present form is not maintainable under section 9 of the Act. It is at page 579 of the paper book. Detergent agreement, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement are distinct and separate. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are separate entities. The Court is of the considered view that the petition in the present form is not maintainable under section 9 of the Act. There is mis-joinder of parties. There is also mis-joinder of cause of action. The cause of action on the basis of detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and toothbrush agreement dated 26.3.2010 are distinct and separate. Mr. J.S. Bhogal has also argued that the three companies are under the same management. Three companies may be under the same management but the same have separately been registered under the Companies Act, 1956. 14.Now, as far as toothpaste agreement is concerned, it is valid upto 31.12.2014. In fact, petition filed against toothpaste agreement is misconceived. Petitioner has not even pleaded any dispute qua toothpaste agreement. Even there is no prayer sought against respondent No.2 on the basis of tooth paste agreement. 15. As far as renewal of detergent agreement and toothbrush agreement is concerned, the Court cannot extend the same. It is a bilateral act. 16. Mr. Mustafa Safiyuddin has also brought to the notice of the Court that in fact Arbitrator, as per clause 10.13 of the manufacturing agreement, i.e. detergent agreement dated 3 1.3.2009 and tooth brush agreement dated 26.3.2010, has been appointed. The Arbitrator has already entered into reference. Petitioner has sought time to file reply to the same. 17. The documents pertaining to the arbitration for the Bombay Court have been placed on record by the petitioner by way of OMP No. 4211/2013. Petitioner ought to have placed on record copies of the asset management agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009 and 3.5.2012 with respondent No.2 and asset management agreement dated 2.5.20 13 with respondent No.3. According to clause 15 of the asset management agreement, the only competent courts at Mumbai have the jurisdiction as regards any matter arising out of, or in any way connected to this agreement. Clause 10.13 also talks of the venue at Mumbai. The Court has already noticed that as per amendment agreement and asset agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2, the Courts at Mumbai have the exclusive jurisdiction. Clause 10.13 also talks of the venue at Mumbai. The Court has already noticed that as per amendment agreement and asset agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2, the Courts at Mumbai have the exclusive jurisdiction. There is no separate clause as far as determination of dispute is concerned as per asset management agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013 but as per arbitration clause i.e. 10.13, arbitration venue is at Mumbai. In the agreements, i.e. detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and amendment agreement dated 20.12.2012, the venue for determination of dispute is at Mumbai. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hakam Singh vs. M/s Gammon (India) Limited, 1971 (1) SCC 286 have held that where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. The Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety applies to proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The jurisdiction of the Courts under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By Cl. 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the City of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act.” 19. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act.” 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Globe Transport Corporation vs. Triveni Engineering Works and another, (1983) 4 SCC 707 have held that the parties can by agreement opt for jurisdiction of courts at one particular place of suing excluding other places which are otherwise open to them for suing. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. It is now settled law that it is not competent to the parties by agreement to invest a court with jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess but if there are more than one forums where a suit can be filed, it is open to the parties to select a particular forum and exclude the other forums in regard to claims which one party may have against the other under a contract. Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage could therefore, validly confer exclusive jurisdiction -on the court in Jaipur City only if it could be shown that the court in Jaipur City would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed byi the respondents against the appellant. It is true and there we agree with the respondents that no part of the cause of action in the present case arose in the City of Jaipur, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the court .in Jaipur City could not be invoked on the ground that the cause of action or a part thereof has arisen in Jaipur. But the jurisdiction of a court whether under Section 19 or Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code can also be invoked. on the ground that the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the court and here it could not be disputed that the appellant does carry on business in the City of Jaipur and if that be so, there can be no doubt that the court in Jaipur City would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondents against the appellant. In that event. In that event. Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the court in Jaipur City and excluding the jurisdiction of other courts would be valid and effective. 4. We are therefore, of the view that the High court was in error in taking the view that the jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad was not excluded by Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage and that court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High court as also the order passer by the Civil Judge, Allahabad and taking the view that the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, we direct that the plaint may be returned to the respondents for presentation to the appropriate court in Jaipur City. We may make it clear that since the respondents have in good faith pursued their claim before the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad which was found to have no jurisdiction by reason of Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage the period during which they prosecuted their suit before the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad, would beliable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in the appropriate court in Jaipur City. There will be no order as to costs.” 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt Ltd. and another vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 have explained the principles of jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of contract as under: “11. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend on the suits of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. 12. A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the conttract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to the invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jursidiction of all the Courts which would otherwise have jursidiction to decide the cause of action under the law it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it cannot be said, that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void being against public policy. Would this be the position in the instant case? 18. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCR 314 : ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) the appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent who had its principal place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration in case of dispute. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCR 314 : ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) the appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent who had its principal place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration in case of dispute. Clause 13 provided that notwithstanding the place where the work under the contract was to be executed the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties at Bombay, and the Court in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. On dispute arising between the patties the appellant submitted a petition to the Court at Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the agreement be filed and an order of reference be made to an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the Court. The respondent contended that in view of the Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement only the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction. The Trial Court also held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdiction on the Courts at Bombay which they did not. otherwise possess. The High Court in revision held that the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law and hence could entertain the petition and that in view of Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement the petition could not be entertained at Varanasi and directed the petition to be retruned for presentation to the proper Court. On appeal therefrom one of the questions that fell for consideration of ‘this Court was whether the Courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction over the dispute. It was held that the Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety. applied to’ proceedings under the Arbitration Act by virtue of Section 41 of that Act. The jurisdiction of the Court under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award was accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the terms of Section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent company which had its principal place of business at Bombay was liable to be sued at Bombay. By the terms of Section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent company which had its principal place of business at Bombay was liable to be sued at Bombay. It was held that it Was not open to the parties to agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it did not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts was not contrary to public policy and such an agreement did not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. Though this case arose out of an arbitration agreement there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to other agreements in so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Without referring to this decision a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nanak Chand v. T. T. Electric Supply Co., AIR 1975 Mad 103 observed that competency of a Court to try an action goes to the root of the matter and when such comptency is not found, it has no jurisdiction at all to try the case. But objection based on jurisdiction is a matter which parties could waive and it is in this sense if such jurisdiction is exercised by Courts it does not go to the core of it so as to make the resultant judgment a nullity. Thus it is now a settled principle that where there may be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile Law and practice permit such agreements. 20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile Law and practice permit such agreements. 20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract, It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird & Co., AIR 1979 Mad 16 where the terms and conditions attached to the quotation contained an arbitration clause provided that : any order placed against this quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcutta and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us”, it was held that it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it did not mean to confer an exclusive jursidiction on the Court at Calcutta, and when a part of the cause of action had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdiction to entertain. The suit under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably deduced that where such an, ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’, and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exlusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exlusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angile Insulations vs. Davy Ashmore India Limited and another, (1995) 4 SCC 153 have held that normally territorial jurisdiction of court lies where cause of action arises, but it will be subject to terms of a valid contract between the parties and where two courts having jurisdiction consequent upon a part of the cause of action arising therewith, if parties stipulate in the contract to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the disputes arising between themselves and if the contract is unambiguous, explicit and clear and is not pleaded to be void and opposed to section 23 of the Contract Act, then suit would lie in the court agreed to by the parties and the other court will have no jurisdiction even though cause of action arose partly within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. The principal contention raised by the appellant is that S.20,of C.P.C.provides that where cause of action had arisen partly within territorial jurisdiction of one court or partly in another Court it would be open to the parties to avail of the remedy at the Court where part of the cause of action had arisen. In support thereof, he contended that the contract was entered into and executed within the jurisdiction of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. Therefore, by operation of the Explanation to S.20, it must be deemed that the cause of action had arisen within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. 4. Normally, the plea of jurisdiction of the Court is to be considered in accordance with Ss. 16 to 20 of CPC. Section 20 provides that subject to some limitations, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-(a)the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business. 16 to 20 of CPC. Section 20 provides that subject to some limitations, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-(a)the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business. or personally works for gain or any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain. 5. So, normally that court also would have jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. But it will be subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. In this case, Clause (21) reads thus : “This work order is issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the above court only.” A reading of this clause would clearly indicate that the work order issued by the appellant will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, be instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction within the jurisdiction of High Court of Bangalore only. The controversy has been considered by this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A. P. Agencies, Salem. (1989) 2 SCC 163 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ). Considering the entire case law on the topic, this Court held that the citizen has the right to have his legal position determined by the ordinary Tribunal except, of course, subject to contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which dispute in respect of the contract shall be subject. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of Clauses (21) of the Contract pleaded in this case. On the other hand, this Court laid that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewith, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited vs. Rama Mishra, (2002) 9 SCC 613 have reiterated that where two or more courts have jurisdiction to try a suit, parties can by an agreement choose one of such courts for adjudication of their dispute. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. In the present case the impugned order of the High Court and the order passed by the appellate Court arises out of the order passed by the Civil Judge, Bhubaneshwar. We have to keep in mind there is difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction of any Court on account of some statute and the other where parties through agreement bind themselves to have their dispute decided by any one of the Court having jurisdiction. Thus the question is not whether the Orissa Courts have the jurisdiction to decide respondent’s suit but whether the respondent could have invoked the jurisdiction of that Court in view of the aforesaid Cl. 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has the jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. In case parties under their own agreement expressly agrees that their dispute shall be tried by only one of them then the party can only file the suit in that Court alone to which they have so agreed. In the present case as we have said through Cl. 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the Courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneshwar. Such a suit would be in violation of the said agreement. 10. For the said reasons we have no hesitation to hold that the suit filed by respondent in the Civil Court at Bhubaneshwar would not be valid, in view of the said agreement.” 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hanil Era Textiles Limited vs. Puro matic Filters (P) Limited, (2004) 4 SCC 671 have held that restriction with regard to place of suing is permissible where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. Their Lordships have further held that when words “alone”, “only” and “exclusive” are written unambiguous and specific, accepted notions of contract would bind parties, and unless absence of ad idem can be shown courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction.Their Lordships have held as under: “6. There is no dispute that the appellant placed the order for supply of 136 coarse filters and 136 fine filters with the respondent (Plaintiff) vide Purchase Order No. CA/ 32 /95 at Bombay on 31-5-1995 and that an advance payment of Rs. 1,16,353.44 was also made at Bombay. There is no dispute that the appellant placed the order for supply of 136 coarse filters and 136 fine filters with the respondent (Plaintiff) vide Purchase Order No. CA/ 32 /95 at Bombay on 31-5-1995 and that an advance payment of Rs. 1,16,353.44 was also made at Bombay. According to the aver­ments made in the plaint, the appellant (defendant) sent Form CT-3 and thereafter the plaintiff dispatched the goods from their factory in Delhi through M/s. Transport Corporation of India, as per the directions of the defendant. Original documents were sent to the branch office of the plaintiff at 25/ 100, Yashwant Nagar, Goregaon (W), Bombay but the defendant did not retire the documents from the branch office of the plaintiff and illegally and unauthorisedly took the delivery of the goods from Transport Corporation of India. These averments show that the offer to purchase the goods was made by the defendant at Bombay and the same was accepted by the plaintiffs branch office at Bombay. The advance payment was also made by the defendant at Bombay. Thus, a part of cause of action accrued at Bombay. According to the plaintiff, the goods were dispatched from Delhi through M/s. Transport Corporation of India Ltd. after receipt of Form CT-3. which was sent by the defendant. In this manner, the plaintiff claims that a part of cause of action accrued in Delhi. 7. The effect of Clause 17 of the Purchase Order which mentions any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, has to be examined in the aforesaid background. Under sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20, the place of residence of the defendant or where he carries on business or works for gain is determinative of the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is to be instituted. Subsection (c) of Section 20 provides that the suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, accrues. As shown above, in the present case, a part of cause of action had accrued in both the places, viz., Delhi and Bombay. Subsection (c) of Section 20 provides that the suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, accrues. As shown above, in the present case, a part of cause of action had accrued in both the places, viz., Delhi and Bombay. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. 1971 (1) SCC 286 , it was held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. It was also held that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. 8. The same question was examined in considerable detail in A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A. P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 (Headnote D) and it was held as under : “When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another - may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another - may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all other from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” This view has been reiterated in Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., 1995 (4) SCC 153 . 9. Clause 17 says - any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, The clause is no doubt not qualified by the words like “alone”, “only” or “exclusively”. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other Courts except Courts in Mumbai is excluded. Having regard to the fact that the order was placed by the defendant at Bombay,; the said order was accepted by the branch office of the plaintiff at Bombay; the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay; and as per the plaintiffs case the final payment was to be made at Bombay; there was a clear intention to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. The Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.” 24.In the instant case, ouster clause stating “any legal proceedings shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Mumbai”. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor Krishanlal Jhanwar vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 have again held that it is permissible to the parties in a case where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. The agreement is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 have again held that it is permissible to the parties in a case where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. The agreement is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Normally, under Clauses (a) to (c) plaintiff had a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the defendant and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If the defendant desires to be pro­tected from being dragged into a litigation at some place merely because the cause of action arises there it can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause. The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that where the Corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter alia “carries on business”. Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. 14. By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two Courts or more have under the CPC jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one Court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two Courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction to a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) and M/ s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, 2002 SC 2402)). 16. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction to a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) and M/ s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, 2002 SC 2402)). 16. Had it only been indicated in the consignment note the Court at Head Office city had jurisdiction then in the absence of a precise indication of the place what would have the consequence, we are not presently concerned, more particularly, when the consignment note itself had indicated that Court at Udaipur alone had jurisdiction. 18. Above being the factual and legal position, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in upsetting the order of First Appellate Court. It is not a case where the chosen Court did not have jurisdiction. The only question, therefore, related to exclusion of the other Courts. 19. The intention of the parties can be culled out from use of the expressions “only”, “alone”, “exclusive” and the like with reference to a particular Court. But the intention to exclude a Court’s jurisdiction should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms. In such case only the accepted notions of contract would bind the parties. The first appellate Court was justified in holding that it is only the Court at Udaipur which had jurisdiction to try the suit. The High Court did not keep the relevant aspects in view while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the first appellate Court. The Court at Barnala shall return the plaint to the plaintiff No. 1 (respondent No. 1) with appropriate endorsement under its seal which shall present it within a period of four weeks from the date of such endorsement of return before the proper Court at Udaipur. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No costs.” 26. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No costs.” 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd. vs. Chand Mal Baradia and others, (2005) 10 SCC 704 have held that plea of jurisdiction goes to very root of matter and has to be determined first, before any relief can be granted. Their Lordships have further held that place of suing can be restricted as per agreement. Their Lordships have held as under: “16. The plaintiff wants that the Hindustan Chamber of Commerce (defendant No. 2) may be restrained from proceeding with arbitration of the dispute, which has been raised by the appellant Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. (defendant No. 1). Both defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 have their offices at Bombay. Insofar as commencement of proceedings before defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1 is concerned, no part of cause of action has accrued in Calcutta. 17. In Hakam Singh vs. Gammon (India) Ltd. ( 1971 (1) SCC 286 ,) it has been held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. In A.B.C. Laminart(P) Ltd. vs. A.P. Agencies ( 1989 (2) SCC 163 ,) it was held as under: - “When the court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other courts. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusion alterius’ expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” This view has been reiterated in Angile Insulation vs. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. ( 1995 (4) SCC 153 .) 18. In the case on hand the clause in the indent is very clear, viz., “court of Bombay and no other court”. The trial court on consideration of material on record held that the court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 19. The High Court in the earlier part of the judgment noted that the invoice contained clause like “under jurisdiction of the court from where the goods have been dispatched” and in the indent (contract) a clause like “dispute under this contract shall be decided by the courts of Bombay and by no other courts”. Further, while recording its findings on the plea raised by the appellant regarding jurisdiction it held as under: - “In the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff has no doubt an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of its business. Further, while recording its findings on the plea raised by the appellant regarding jurisdiction it held as under: - “In the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff has no doubt an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of its business. Its case that “from where the goods has been dispatched”, is not sufficiently specific as to exclude a court’s jurisdiction, is no doubt an arguable case.” 20. In our opinion the approach of the High Court is not correct. The plea of the jurisdiction goes to the very root of the matter. The trial court having held that it had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, the High Court should have gone deeper into the matter and until a clear finding was recorded that the court had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, no injunction could have been granted in favour of the plaintiff by making rather a general remark that the plaintiff has an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the court.” 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs. Universal Petrol Chemicals Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 107 have held that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute, such agreement is valid and binding. Their Lordships have held as under: “20. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the parties entered into various agreements which are referred to above. The said agreements admittedly also contained forum selection clauses between the parties whereby and whereunder the parties agreed that the said contracts and agreements, in relation to any dispute or difference would be subject to the jurisdiction of courts at Jaipur in Rajasthan. Therefore, the issues which we are required to address here is whether the ouster clause in the agreement between the parties will also be applicable in ascertaining the competent court for making an application for reference under section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the issues which we are required to address here is whether the ouster clause in the agreement between the parties will also be applicable in ascertaining the competent court for making an application for reference under section 20 of the Act. As per Section 41 (1) of the act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short “the Code”) shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under the Act. 22. There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it was held that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, such agreement would be valid and binding. 27. The aforesaid legal proposition settled by this Court in respect of territorial jurisdiction and applicability of Section 20 of the Code to Arbitration Act is clear, unambiguous and explicit. The said position is binding on both the parties who were contesting the present proceeding. Both the parties with their open eyes entered into the aforesaid purchase order and agreements thereon which categorically provide that all disputes arising between the parties out of the agreements would be adjudicated upon and decided through the process of arbitration and that no court other than the court at Jaipur shall have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. In both the agreements in clause 30 of General Conditions of the Contract it was specifically mentioned that the contract shall for all purposes be construed according to the laws of India and subject to jurisdiction of only at Jaipur in Rajasthan Courts only and in addition in one of the purchase order the expression used was that the Court at Jaipur only would have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. 28. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions which are referred to hereinbefore would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. 28. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions which are referred to hereinbefore would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. There is indeed an ouster clause used in the aforesaid stipulations stating that the courts at Jaipur alone would have jurisdiction to try and decide the said proceedings which could be initiated for adjudication and deciding the disputes arising between the parties with or in relation to the aforesaid agreements through the process of arbitration. In other words, even though otherwise the Courts at Calcutta would have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes, but in view of the ouster clause it is only the courts at Jaipur which would have jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding.” 28. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balaji Coke Industry Private Limited vs. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Limited, (2009) 9 SCC 403 have held that where two or more competent courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, parties to contract can agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute and such agreement is valid. In this case, parties voluntarily agreed to jurisdiction of courts at Kolkata even though courts in Gujarat also had jurisdiction. Respondent filed application under section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for interim order before court of Bhavnagar. Their Lordships have further held that respondents have violated agreement entered into between them and wrongly chosen to file application under the 1996 Act before Bhavnagar. Their Lordships have transferred the case to Kolkata. (emphasis supplied) Their Lordships have held as under: “28. This Court in A.B.C. Laminart case went on to observe that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewithin, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise between them, the agreement would be valid. 30. 30. In the instant case, the parties had knowingly and voluntarily agreed that the contract arising out of the High Seas Sale Agreement would be subject to Kolkata jurisdiction and even if the courts in Gujarat also had jurisdiction to entertain any action arising out of the agreement, it has to be held that the agreement to have the disputes decided in Kolkata by an Arbitrator in Kolkata, West Bengal, was valid and the Respondent- Company had wrongly chosen to file its application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bhavnagar Court (Gujarat) in violation of such agreement. The decisions of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. (supra) as also Hakam Singh (supra) are very clear on the point.” 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment, in M/s Swastik Gases P. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd; JT 2013 (10) SC 35 have held that where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. Their Lordships have further held that such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute that part of cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What appellant says is that part of cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to consider the application made by the appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The question is, whether parties by virtue of clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded. The question is, whether parties by virtue of clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties - by having clause 18 in the agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.” JUDGMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. Present petition has been filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for brevity sake). Petitioner has prayed for restraining respondent No.1 from transferring/removing assets from the site of petitioner- company and giving effect to notices dated 3.5.20 13 and 10.6.20 13 till the commencement and pendency of arbitration proceedings. Present petition has been filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for brevity sake). Petitioner has prayed for restraining respondent No.1 from transferring/removing assets from the site of petitioner- company and giving effect to notices dated 3.5.20 13 and 10.6.20 13 till the commencement and pendency of arbitration proceedings. Petitioner has also sought direction to respondents No.2 and 3 to maintain status quo in respect of the continuation of the toothbrush agreement and giving effect to order dated 14.6.2013 till the commencement and pendency of arbitration proceedings. Petitioner has also prayed to restrain respondents from transferring the rights and interest accruing under the detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and toothbrush agreement dated 26.3.2010 to any third party or creating any third party interest. 2. Petitioner-company is incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner-company has been manufacturing products and also undertakes contract manufacturing for various well known national and global brands. Petitioner is ISO 9001 certified. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are also companies incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. 3. Detergent agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009. It has come to an end on 30.6.2013. Prayer of the petitioner to extend the same was rejected on 10.6.2013. Toothpaste agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2 on 8.3.2010. The contract is valid upto 31.12.2014. Toothbrush agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.3 on 26.3.2010. It has come to an end on 30.6.2013. 4.Petitioner has also entered into asset management agreement on 31.3.2009 with respondent No.1 qua detergent. It has also entered into asset management agreement with respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013 qua toothbrush. 5.Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that it was mutually agreed by the petitioner and respondents to extend the detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement at least upto 5-6 years. He has also argued that petitioner has made huge investment as per detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement. He lastly contended that till the arbitration award is made by the Arbitrator, respondents may be restrained from transferring/moving assets from the petitioner-company. 6. Mr. He has also argued that petitioner has made huge investment as per detergent agreement, toothpaste and toothbrush agreement. He lastly contended that till the arbitration award is made by the Arbitrator, respondents may be restrained from transferring/moving assets from the petitioner-company. 6. Mr. Mustafa Safiyuddin has vehemently argued that in view of specific clauses contained in detergent agreement and asset management agreement dated 31.3.2009, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement dated 8.3.2010 and 26.3.2010, asset management agreement dated 2.5.2013 qua toothbrush and additional amendment agreement dated 20.12.2012 qua toothpaste, courts at Mumbai alone have the jurisdiction. He has also argued that toothpaste agreement is valid upto 31.12.2014 and no relief has been sought qua respondent No.2. He has also contended that there is misjoinder of cause of action and misjoinder of parties. According to him, all the respondents- companies are separate companies and have been registered separately under the Companies Act, 1956. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings carefully. 8. Detergent agreement, which was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009 was initially valid upto 31.3.2013. It was extended upto 30.6.20 13. There is no valid detergent agreement between petitioner and respondent No.1 after 30.6.20 13. Clause 10.13 of detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 reads as under: “10.13. GOVERNING LAW CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. If the matter is not resolved by amicable negotiations within 30 business days or such date as may be agreed upon, then the dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the laws of arbitration. The dispute shall be referred for arbitration to a single arbitrator who shall be a retired judge of the Bombay High Court who shall be appointed by the BUYER .The decision of the BYER on the appointment of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the SELLER. The arbitration proceedings shall be held in Mumbai and shall be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) and any amendment hereof. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The provisions of this section shall survive the termination of this agreement.” 9.Petitioner has also entered into asset management agreement with respondent No.1 dated 3 1.3.2009 qua detergent. It is at page 470 of the paper book. 10. Mr. J.S. Bhogal, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that the copy of asset management agreement has not been supplied to his client. This is not believable. Clause 15 of the asset management agreement reads as under: “15. Only the competent courts in Mumbai shall have the jurisdiction as regards any matter arising out of, or in any way connected to this agreement.” 11.Toothpaste agreement has been entered on 8.3.20 10. Amendment agreement has been entered into between the parties on 20.12.2012. Clauses 8.1 and 8.2 read as under: “8.1 The Parties agree that any dispute arising between the parties in relation to the Manufacturing Agreement or any Addendum/ Amendments thereto (including the Supplementary Agreement, the Idling Cost, Letter, the Advance Agreements or this Agreement or any other writing between the parties) shall (notwithstanding anything to the contrary under the Supplementary Agreement, the stipulated in Clause 10.13 of the Manufacturing Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that the reference to the term “Buyer” used in the Manufacturing Agreement, including the said Clause 10.13 shall refer to the Company and the term “Seller” used in the Manufacturing Agreement, including the said Clause 10.13 shall refer to the Manufacturer. 8.2. Subject to the arbitration provisions contained in Clause 10.13 of the Manufacturing Agreement the parties submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent courts in Mumbai in relation to any proceedings arising out or in relation to the Manufacturing Agreement or any Addendum/ Amendments thereto (including the Supplementary Agreement the Idling Cost Letter, the Advance Agreements this Agreement or any other writing between the Parties).” 12. Manufacturing agreement has been entered into between the parties qua toothbrush on 26.3.20 10. It was valid upto 30.6.2013. Arbitration agreement, i.e. clause 10.13 reads: “10.13 GOVERNING LAW, CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. Manufacturing agreement has been entered into between the parties qua toothbrush on 26.3.20 10. It was valid upto 30.6.2013. Arbitration agreement, i.e. clause 10.13 reads: “10.13 GOVERNING LAW, CONSTRUCTION AND LANGUAGE All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation of the parties. If the matter is not resolved by amicable negotiations within 30 business days, or such date as may be agreed upon, then the dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the laws of Arbitration. The dispute, shall be referred for arbitration to a single arbitrator who shall be a retired judge of the Bombay High Court who shall be appointed by the BUYER. The decision of the BUYER on the appointment of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the SELLER. The Arbitration proceedings shall be held in Mumbai and shall be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “ACA”), and any amendments thereof. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on BUYER and SELLER. The decision of the arbitrator shall constitute an award within the meaning of the ACA and shall be enforceable in any competent court of law. The provisions of this section shall survive the termination of this agreement. The PARTIES understand the English language and are fully aware of all terms and conditions contained herein. If any translation of this AGREEMENT is made, the English language version shall always continue to govern. The PARTIES agree that (i) the United Nations Convention on International Sale of Goods and/or the Sales of Goods Act (Ontario, Canada) shall have no force or effect on transactions under or relating to this AGREEMENT ; (ii) no trade usage shall be used to explain or supplement this AGREEEMENT even if either or both PARTIES were aware or should have been aware of such trade usage; and (iii) this AGREEMENT prevails over any general terms and conditions of trade.” 13. Asset management agreement was entered into between petitioner and respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013. It is at page 579 of the paper book. Detergent agreement, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement are distinct and separate. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are separate entities. The Court is of the considered view that the petition in the present form is not maintainable under section 9 of the Act. It is at page 579 of the paper book. Detergent agreement, toothpaste agreement and toothbrush agreement are distinct and separate. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 are separate entities. The Court is of the considered view that the petition in the present form is not maintainable under section 9 of the Act. There is mis-joinder of parties. There is also mis-joinder of cause of action. The cause of action on the basis of detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and toothbrush agreement dated 26.3.2010 are distinct and separate. Mr. J.S. Bhogal has also argued that the three companies are under the same management. Three companies may be under the same management but the same have separately been registered under the Companies Act, 1956. 14.Now, as far as toothpaste agreement is concerned, it is valid upto 31.12.2014. In fact, petition filed against toothpaste agreement is misconceived. Petitioner has not even pleaded any dispute qua toothpaste agreement. Even there is no prayer sought against respondent No.2 on the basis of tooth paste agreement. 15. As far as renewal of detergent agreement and toothbrush agreement is concerned, the Court cannot extend the same. It is a bilateral act. 16. Mr. Mustafa Safiyuddin has also brought to the notice of the Court that in fact Arbitrator, as per clause 10.13 of the manufacturing agreement, i.e. detergent agreement dated 3 1.3.2009 and tooth brush agreement dated 26.3.2010, has been appointed. The Arbitrator has already entered into reference. Petitioner has sought time to file reply to the same. 17. The documents pertaining to the arbitration for the Bombay Court have been placed on record by the petitioner by way of OMP No. 4211/2013. Petitioner ought to have placed on record copies of the asset management agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.1 on 31.3.2009 and 3.5.2012 with respondent No.2 and asset management agreement dated 2.5.20 13 with respondent No.3. According to clause 15 of the asset management agreement, the only competent courts at Mumbai have the jurisdiction as regards any matter arising out of, or in any way connected to this agreement. Clause 10.13 also talks of the venue at Mumbai. The Court has already noticed that as per amendment agreement and asset agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2, the Courts at Mumbai have the exclusive jurisdiction. Clause 10.13 also talks of the venue at Mumbai. The Court has already noticed that as per amendment agreement and asset agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent No.2, the Courts at Mumbai have the exclusive jurisdiction. There is no separate clause as far as determination of dispute is concerned as per asset management agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent No.3 on 2.5.2013 but as per arbitration clause i.e. 10.13, arbitration venue is at Mumbai. In the agreements, i.e. detergent agreement dated 31.3.2009 and amendment agreement dated 20.12.2012, the venue for determination of dispute is at Mumbai. 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hakam Singh vs. M/s Gammon (India) Limited, 1971 (1) SCC 286 have held that where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. The Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety applies to proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The jurisdiction of the Courts under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By Cl. 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the City of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act.” 19. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene S. 28 of the Contract Act.” 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Globe Transport Corporation vs. Triveni Engineering Works and another, (1983) 4 SCC 707 have held that the parties can by agreement opt for jurisdiction of courts at one particular place of suing excluding other places which are otherwise open to them for suing. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. It is now settled law that it is not competent to the parties by agreement to invest a court with jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess but if there are more than one forums where a suit can be filed, it is open to the parties to select a particular forum and exclude the other forums in regard to claims which one party may have against the other under a contract. Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage could therefore, validly confer exclusive jurisdiction -on the court in Jaipur City only if it could be shown that the court in Jaipur City would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed byi the respondents against the appellant. It is true and there we agree with the respondents that no part of the cause of action in the present case arose in the City of Jaipur, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the court .in Jaipur City could not be invoked on the ground that the cause of action or a part thereof has arisen in Jaipur. But the jurisdiction of a court whether under Section 19 or Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code can also be invoked. on the ground that the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the court and here it could not be disputed that the appellant does carry on business in the City of Jaipur and if that be so, there can be no doubt that the court in Jaipur City would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the respondents against the appellant. In that event. In that event. Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the court in Jaipur City and excluding the jurisdiction of other courts would be valid and effective. 4. We are therefore, of the view that the High court was in error in taking the view that the jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad was not excluded by Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage and that court had jurisdiction to entertain that suit. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High court as also the order passer by the Civil Judge, Allahabad and taking the view that the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, we direct that the plaint may be returned to the respondents for presentation to the appropriate court in Jaipur City. We may make it clear that since the respondents have in good faith pursued their claim before the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad which was found to have no jurisdiction by reason of Clause 17 of the Contract of Carriage the period during which they prosecuted their suit before the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad, would beliable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filing the suit in the appropriate court in Jaipur City. There will be no order as to costs.” 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt Ltd. and another vs. A.P. Agencies, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 have explained the principles of jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of contract as under: “11. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend on the suits of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. 12. A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the conttract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to the invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jursidiction of all the Courts which would otherwise have jursidiction to decide the cause of action under the law it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it cannot be said, that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void being against public policy. Would this be the position in the instant case? 18. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCR 314 : ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) the appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent who had its principal place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration in case of dispute. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCR 314 : ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) the appellant agreed to do certain construction work for the respondent who had its principal place of business at Bombay on the terms and conditions of a written tender. Clause 12 of the tender provided for arbitration in case of dispute. Clause 13 provided that notwithstanding the place where the work under the contract was to be executed the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties at Bombay, and the Court in Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. On dispute arising between the patties the appellant submitted a petition to the Court at Varanasi for an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the agreement be filed and an order of reference be made to an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the Court. The respondent contended that in view of the Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement only the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction. The Trial Court also held that the entire cause of action had arisen at Varanasi and the parties could not by agreement confer jurisdiction on the Courts at Bombay which they did not. otherwise possess. The High Court in revision held that the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction under the general law and hence could entertain the petition and that in view of Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement the petition could not be entertained at Varanasi and directed the petition to be retruned for presentation to the proper Court. On appeal therefrom one of the questions that fell for consideration of ‘this Court was whether the Courts at Bombay alone had jurisdiction over the dispute. It was held that the Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety. applied to’ proceedings under the Arbitration Act by virtue of Section 41 of that Act. The jurisdiction of the Court under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award was accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the terms of Section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent company which had its principal place of business at Bombay was liable to be sued at Bombay. By the terms of Section 20(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with explanation 11 thereto the respondent company which had its principal place of business at Bombay was liable to be sued at Bombay. It was held that it Was not open to the parties to agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it did not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts was not contrary to public policy and such an agreement did not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. Though this case arose out of an arbitration agreement there is no reason why the same rule should not apply to other agreements in so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Without referring to this decision a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nanak Chand v. T. T. Electric Supply Co., AIR 1975 Mad 103 observed that competency of a Court to try an action goes to the root of the matter and when such comptency is not found, it has no jurisdiction at all to try the case. But objection based on jurisdiction is a matter which parties could waive and it is in this sense if such jurisdiction is exercised by Courts it does not go to the core of it so as to make the resultant judgment a nullity. Thus it is now a settled principle that where there may be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen there within, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile Law and practice permit such agreements. 20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the Statute. Mercantile Law and practice permit such agreements. 20. When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract, It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird & Co., AIR 1979 Mad 16 where the terms and conditions attached to the quotation contained an arbitration clause provided that : any order placed against this quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcutta and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us”, it was held that it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it did not mean to confer an exclusive jursidiction on the Court at Calcutta, and when a part of the cause of action had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdiction to entertain. The suit under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably deduced that where such an, ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’, and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exlusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exlusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angile Insulations vs. Davy Ashmore India Limited and another, (1995) 4 SCC 153 have held that normally territorial jurisdiction of court lies where cause of action arises, but it will be subject to terms of a valid contract between the parties and where two courts having jurisdiction consequent upon a part of the cause of action arising therewith, if parties stipulate in the contract to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the disputes arising between themselves and if the contract is unambiguous, explicit and clear and is not pleaded to be void and opposed to section 23 of the Contract Act, then suit would lie in the court agreed to by the parties and the other court will have no jurisdiction even though cause of action arose partly within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. Their Lordships have held as under: “3. The principal contention raised by the appellant is that S.20,of C.P.C.provides that where cause of action had arisen partly within territorial jurisdiction of one court or partly in another Court it would be open to the parties to avail of the remedy at the Court where part of the cause of action had arisen. In support thereof, he contended that the contract was entered into and executed within the jurisdiction of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. Therefore, by operation of the Explanation to S.20, it must be deemed that the cause of action had arisen within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. 4. Normally, the plea of jurisdiction of the Court is to be considered in accordance with Ss. 16 to 20 of CPC. Section 20 provides that subject to some limitations, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-(a)the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business. 16 to 20 of CPC. Section 20 provides that subject to some limitations, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-(a)the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business. or personally works for gain or any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carried on business or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain. 5. So, normally that court also would have jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. But it will be subject to the terms of the contract between the parties. In this case, Clause (21) reads thus : “This work order is issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the above court only.” A reading of this clause would clearly indicate that the work order issued by the appellant will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore in the State of Karnataka. Any legal proceeding will, therefore, be instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction within the jurisdiction of High Court of Bangalore only. The controversy has been considered by this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A. P. Agencies, Salem. (1989) 2 SCC 163 : ( AIR 1989 SC 1239 ). Considering the entire case law on the topic, this Court held that the citizen has the right to have his legal position determined by the ordinary Tribunal except, of course, subject to contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which dispute in respect of the contract shall be subject. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. This is clear from S. 28 of the Contract Act. But an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of Clauses (21) of the Contract pleaded in this case. On the other hand, this Court laid that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewith, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be valid. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Ss. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements.” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited vs. Rama Mishra, (2002) 9 SCC 613 have reiterated that where two or more courts have jurisdiction to try a suit, parties can by an agreement choose one of such courts for adjudication of their dispute. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. In the present case the impugned order of the High Court and the order passed by the appellate Court arises out of the order passed by the Civil Judge, Bhubaneshwar. We have to keep in mind there is difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction of any Court on account of some statute and the other where parties through agreement bind themselves to have their dispute decided by any one of the Court having jurisdiction. Thus the question is not whether the Orissa Courts have the jurisdiction to decide respondent’s suit but whether the respondent could have invoked the jurisdiction of that Court in view of the aforesaid Cl. 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. 34. A party is bound either by provision of the Constitution, statutory provisions or any rule or under terms of any contract which is not against the public policy. It is open for a party for his convenience to fix the jurisdiction of any competent Court to have their dispute adjudicated by that Court alone. In other words if one or more Court has the jurisdiction to try any suit, it is open for the parties to choose any one of the two competent Courts to decide their disputes. In case parties under their own agreement expressly agrees that their dispute shall be tried by only one of them then the party can only file the suit in that Court alone to which they have so agreed. In the present case as we have said through Cl. 34 of the agreement, the parties have bound themselves that any matter arising between them under the said contract, it is the Courts in Calcutta alone which will have jurisdiction. Once parties bound themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction as in the present case by filing the suit at Bhubaneshwar. Such a suit would be in violation of the said agreement. 10. For the said reasons we have no hesitation to hold that the suit filed by respondent in the Civil Court at Bhubaneshwar would not be valid, in view of the said agreement.” 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hanil Era Textiles Limited vs. Puro matic Filters (P) Limited, (2004) 4 SCC 671 have held that restriction with regard to place of suing is permissible where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. Their Lordships have further held that when words “alone”, “only” and “exclusive” are written unambiguous and specific, accepted notions of contract would bind parties, and unless absence of ad idem can be shown courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction.Their Lordships have held as under: “6. There is no dispute that the appellant placed the order for supply of 136 coarse filters and 136 fine filters with the respondent (Plaintiff) vide Purchase Order No. CA/ 32 /95 at Bombay on 31-5-1995 and that an advance payment of Rs. 1,16,353.44 was also made at Bombay. There is no dispute that the appellant placed the order for supply of 136 coarse filters and 136 fine filters with the respondent (Plaintiff) vide Purchase Order No. CA/ 32 /95 at Bombay on 31-5-1995 and that an advance payment of Rs. 1,16,353.44 was also made at Bombay. According to the aver­ments made in the plaint, the appellant (defendant) sent Form CT-3 and thereafter the plaintiff dispatched the goods from their factory in Delhi through M/s. Transport Corporation of India, as per the directions of the defendant. Original documents were sent to the branch office of the plaintiff at 25/ 100, Yashwant Nagar, Goregaon (W), Bombay but the defendant did not retire the documents from the branch office of the plaintiff and illegally and unauthorisedly took the delivery of the goods from Transport Corporation of India. These averments show that the offer to purchase the goods was made by the defendant at Bombay and the same was accepted by the plaintiffs branch office at Bombay. The advance payment was also made by the defendant at Bombay. Thus, a part of cause of action accrued at Bombay. According to the plaintiff, the goods were dispatched from Delhi through M/s. Transport Corporation of India Ltd. after receipt of Form CT-3. which was sent by the defendant. In this manner, the plaintiff claims that a part of cause of action accrued in Delhi. 7. The effect of Clause 17 of the Purchase Order which mentions any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, has to be examined in the aforesaid background. Under sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20, the place of residence of the defendant or where he carries on business or works for gain is determinative of the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is to be instituted. Subsection (c) of Section 20 provides that the suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, accrues. As shown above, in the present case, a part of cause of action had accrued in both the places, viz., Delhi and Bombay. Subsection (c) of Section 20 provides that the suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, accrues. As shown above, in the present case, a part of cause of action had accrued in both the places, viz., Delhi and Bombay. In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. 1971 (1) SCC 286 , it was held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. It was also held that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. 8. The same question was examined in considerable detail in A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A. P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 (Headnote D) and it was held as under : “When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of the ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another - may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ - expression of one is the exclusion of another - may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all other from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” This view has been reiterated in Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., 1995 (4) SCC 153 . 9. Clause 17 says - any legal proceedings arising out of the order shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in Mumbai, The clause is no doubt not qualified by the words like “alone”, “only” or “exclusively”. Therefore, what is to be seen is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of all other Courts except Courts in Mumbai is excluded. Having regard to the fact that the order was placed by the defendant at Bombay,; the said order was accepted by the branch office of the plaintiff at Bombay; the advance payment was made by the defendant at Bombay; and as per the plaintiffs case the final payment was to be made at Bombay; there was a clear intention to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts in Bombay to the exclusion of all other Courts. The Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.” 24.In the instant case, ouster clause stating “any legal proceedings shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Mumbai”. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Moga Transport Co., through its Proprietor Krishanlal Jhanwar vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 have again held that it is permissible to the parties in a case where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. The agreement is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 have again held that it is permissible to the parties in a case where two or more courts have jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure and agreement restricts place of suing to any one of them. The agreement is not contrary to public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Normally, under Clauses (a) to (c) plaintiff had a choice of forum and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business of the defendant and can file a suit at a place where the cause of action arises. If the defendant desires to be pro­tected from being dragged into a litigation at some place merely because the cause of action arises there it can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion clause. The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that where the Corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 inter alia refer to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant inter alia “carries on business”. Clause (c) on the other hand refers to a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. 14. By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two Courts or more have under the CPC jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one Court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two Courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction to a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) and M/ s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, 2002 SC 2402)). 16. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction to a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. (See Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon (India) Ltd., ( AIR 1971 SC 740 ) and M/ s. Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, 2002 SC 2402)). 16. Had it only been indicated in the consignment note the Court at Head Office city had jurisdiction then in the absence of a precise indication of the place what would have the consequence, we are not presently concerned, more particularly, when the consignment note itself had indicated that Court at Udaipur alone had jurisdiction. 18. Above being the factual and legal position, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in upsetting the order of First Appellate Court. It is not a case where the chosen Court did not have jurisdiction. The only question, therefore, related to exclusion of the other Courts. 19. The intention of the parties can be culled out from use of the expressions “only”, “alone”, “exclusive” and the like with reference to a particular Court. But the intention to exclude a Court’s jurisdiction should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms. In such case only the accepted notions of contract would bind the parties. The first appellate Court was justified in holding that it is only the Court at Udaipur which had jurisdiction to try the suit. The High Court did not keep the relevant aspects in view while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the first appellate Court. The Court at Barnala shall return the plaint to the plaintiff No. 1 (respondent No. 1) with appropriate endorsement under its seal which shall present it within a period of four weeks from the date of such endorsement of return before the proper Court at Udaipur. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No costs.” 26. If it is so done, the question of limitation shall not be raised and the suit shall be decided on its own merits in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. No costs.” 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd. vs. Chand Mal Baradia and others, (2005) 10 SCC 704 have held that plea of jurisdiction goes to very root of matter and has to be determined first, before any relief can be granted. Their Lordships have further held that place of suing can be restricted as per agreement. Their Lordships have held as under: “16. The plaintiff wants that the Hindustan Chamber of Commerce (defendant No. 2) may be restrained from proceeding with arbitration of the dispute, which has been raised by the appellant Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. (defendant No. 1). Both defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 have their offices at Bombay. Insofar as commencement of proceedings before defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1 is concerned, no part of cause of action has accrued in Calcutta. 17. In Hakam Singh vs. Gammon (India) Ltd. ( 1971 (1) SCC 286 ,) it has been held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act. In A.B.C. Laminart(P) Ltd. vs. A.P. Agencies ( 1989 (2) SCC 163 ,) it was held as under: - “When the court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other courts. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other courts. Where an ouster clause occurs, it is pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of other courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and specific accepted notions of contract would bind the parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown, the other courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction. As regards construction of ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ and the like have been used there may be no difficulty. Even without such words in appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusion alterius’ expression of one is the exclusion of another may be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has therefore to be properly construed.” This view has been reiterated in Angile Insulation vs. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. ( 1995 (4) SCC 153 .) 18. In the case on hand the clause in the indent is very clear, viz., “court of Bombay and no other court”. The trial court on consideration of material on record held that the court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 19. The High Court in the earlier part of the judgment noted that the invoice contained clause like “under jurisdiction of the court from where the goods have been dispatched” and in the indent (contract) a clause like “dispute under this contract shall be decided by the courts of Bombay and by no other courts”. Further, while recording its findings on the plea raised by the appellant regarding jurisdiction it held as under: - “In the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff has no doubt an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of its business. Further, while recording its findings on the plea raised by the appellant regarding jurisdiction it held as under: - “In the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff has no doubt an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of its business. Its case that “from where the goods has been dispatched”, is not sufficiently specific as to exclude a court’s jurisdiction, is no doubt an arguable case.” 20. In our opinion the approach of the High Court is not correct. The plea of the jurisdiction goes to the very root of the matter. The trial court having held that it had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, the High Court should have gone deeper into the matter and until a clear finding was recorded that the court had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, no injunction could have been granted in favour of the plaintiff by making rather a general remark that the plaintiff has an arguable case that he did not consciously agree to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the court.” 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs. Universal Petrol Chemicals Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 107 have held that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute, such agreement is valid and binding. Their Lordships have held as under: “20. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the parties entered into various agreements which are referred to above. The said agreements admittedly also contained forum selection clauses between the parties whereby and whereunder the parties agreed that the said contracts and agreements, in relation to any dispute or difference would be subject to the jurisdiction of courts at Jaipur in Rajasthan. Therefore, the issues which we are required to address here is whether the ouster clause in the agreement between the parties will also be applicable in ascertaining the competent court for making an application for reference under section 20 of the Act. Therefore, the issues which we are required to address here is whether the ouster clause in the agreement between the parties will also be applicable in ascertaining the competent court for making an application for reference under section 20 of the Act. As per Section 41 (1) of the act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short “the Code”) shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under the Act. 22. There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it was held that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, such agreement would be valid and binding. 27. The aforesaid legal proposition settled by this Court in respect of territorial jurisdiction and applicability of Section 20 of the Code to Arbitration Act is clear, unambiguous and explicit. The said position is binding on both the parties who were contesting the present proceeding. Both the parties with their open eyes entered into the aforesaid purchase order and agreements thereon which categorically provide that all disputes arising between the parties out of the agreements would be adjudicated upon and decided through the process of arbitration and that no court other than the court at Jaipur shall have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. In both the agreements in clause 30 of General Conditions of the Contract it was specifically mentioned that the contract shall for all purposes be construed according to the laws of India and subject to jurisdiction of only at Jaipur in Rajasthan Courts only and in addition in one of the purchase order the expression used was that the Court at Jaipur only would have jurisdiction to entertain or try the same. 28. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions which are referred to hereinbefore would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. 28. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the present case, the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions which are referred to hereinbefore would squarely govern and apply to the present case also. There is indeed an ouster clause used in the aforesaid stipulations stating that the courts at Jaipur alone would have jurisdiction to try and decide the said proceedings which could be initiated for adjudication and deciding the disputes arising between the parties with or in relation to the aforesaid agreements through the process of arbitration. In other words, even though otherwise the Courts at Calcutta would have territorial jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes, but in view of the ouster clause it is only the courts at Jaipur which would have jurisdiction to entertain such proceeding.” 28. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balaji Coke Industry Private Limited vs. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat Private Limited, (2009) 9 SCC 403 have held that where two or more competent courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, parties to contract can agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute and such agreement is valid. In this case, parties voluntarily agreed to jurisdiction of courts at Kolkata even though courts in Gujarat also had jurisdiction. Respondent filed application under section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for interim order before court of Bhavnagar. Their Lordships have further held that respondents have violated agreement entered into between them and wrongly chosen to file application under the 1996 Act before Bhavnagar. Their Lordships have transferred the case to Kolkata. (emphasis supplied) Their Lordships have held as under: “28. This Court in A.B.C. Laminart case went on to observe that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewithin, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise between them, the agreement would be valid. 30. 30. In the instant case, the parties had knowingly and voluntarily agreed that the contract arising out of the High Seas Sale Agreement would be subject to Kolkata jurisdiction and even if the courts in Gujarat also had jurisdiction to entertain any action arising out of the agreement, it has to be held that the agreement to have the disputes decided in Kolkata by an Arbitrator in Kolkata, West Bengal, was valid and the Respondent- Company had wrongly chosen to file its application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Bhavnagar Court (Gujarat) in violation of such agreement. The decisions of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. (supra) as also Hakam Singh (supra) are very clear on the point.” 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment, in M/s Swastik Gases P. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd; JT 2013 (10) SC 35 have held that where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. Their Lordships have further held that such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. Their Lordships have held as under: “31. In the instant case, the appellant does not dispute that part of cause of action has arisen in Kolkata. What appellant says is that part of cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and, therefore, Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to consider the application made by the appellant for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code, there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has jurisdiction in the matter. The question is, whether parties by virtue of clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded. The question is, whether parties by virtue of clause 18 of the agreement have agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of clause 18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been excluded. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties - by having clause 18 in the agreement – is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.”