JUDGMENT V.K. Sharma, J. (Oral). Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Records including that of the writ petition perused. 2. The petitioner herein (respondent No. 3 in the writ petition) is seeking review of the judgment dated 1.1.2013 passed by this Court in CWP No. 2794 of 2010-C, Smt. Nirmala Devi Vs. State of H.P. and others, wherein the following directions were issued to respondents No. 2 and 3 in the writ petition (HRTC and the petitioner herein):- “In view of the admitted facts, the petition is allowed with a direction to respondent No. 2-HRTC to remit the said sum of `1348 (one thousand three hundred forty eight) along with interest @ 9% per annum, with effect from 1970-7 1 onwards till the amount is remitted to respondent No. 3, within two months from today, failing which higher interest @ 12% per annum shall be payable from the due date, as above and the date of payment. On receipt of the said sum of `1348 (one thousand three hundred forty eight) along with interest as above, respondent No. 3 shall take further action in the matter with regard to payment of CPF component and family pension to the petitioner, within further two months”. 3. Mainly three grounds have been set up in the review petition. Firstly that at the time of passing the aforesaid judgment dated 1.1.2013 it escaped from the notice of this Court that “nor any amount of contribution either under the Employees Provident fund and Misc. Provision (sic provisions) Act, 1952 or under the Employees Family Pension Scheme, 1971 was ever remitted by the Mandi Kullu Road Transport Corporation”, which averment on the face of it is not borne out of the record, as it is specifically mentioned in para 2 of the judgment dated 1.1.2013 that “However, unfortunately the employer did not remit the amount contributed by the deceased employee along with equivalent employer’s share and interest to respondent No. 3- Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and as a consequence on the death of the deceased employee, the petitioner did not get either any amount on account of CPF or family pension.” 4. The second ground for review is that the deceased employee had not exercised the option in terms of sub para (3) of para 4 of Employees’ Family Pension Scheme, 1971 (1971 Scheme) (Annexure RS- 1 of the writ file), which is to the following effect:- “(3) It shall be the duty of every employer to get the option referred to in sub-paragraph (1) exercised by every member to whom the option is given within the time specified in sub­paragraph (2)”. 5.The plain reading of the above provision would go to show that it was the duty of the employer (MKRTC succeeded by HRTC) to get the option referred to under sub-para (1) of para (3) of 1971 Scheme exercised by every member, including the deceased employee, to whom the option was given within the time specified in sub-para (2) thereof, meaning thereby, that it was incumbent upon the employer to get such option from the employee and in case it was not done, the employee cannot be held responsible for the detrimental consequences. It being so, the second contention raised on behalf of the review petitioner would also not serve its purpose. 6. The third ground that the deceased employee had not completed the requisite service of two years as required under para 28 of 1971 Scheme at the time of his death which occurred on 29.11.1971 and the Scheme having come into force on 1st day of March, 1971. True it is that the requisite period of two years was not complete when the death of the employee had occurred during harness. However, the fact remains that this embargo was later on substituted by three months instead of two years by G.S.R. 608, dated the 27th April, 1988 (deemed to have come into force from 1st April, 1988). Though the substitution was prospective in its effect, yet the fact remains that the Statute and Scheme with which we are concerned at the moment are welfare legislations which aspect is itself manifest and borne out from the amendment as carried out by bringing down the qualifying period from two years to three months. It being so, the provision can safely be read to cover the case of the present nature by giving it retrospective effect by seeking strength from the ratio of an authoritative pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in B. Prabhakar Rao and others, etc. It being so, the provision can safely be read to cover the case of the present nature by giving it retrospective effect by seeking strength from the ratio of an authoritative pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in B. Prabhakar Rao and others, etc. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc. AIR 1986 Supreme Court 210, wherein vide para 22 it has been laid down as under:- “22. An argument which requires to be dealt with is that it is not open to the Court to give retrospectivity to a legislation to which the legislature plainly and expressly refused to give retrospectivity. As pointed out in Nakara’s case ( AIR 1983 SC 130 ), the question is not one of retrospectivity at all. The circumstance that the relief given by Ordinance No. 24 of 84 and Act No. 3 of 1985 is not entended to those who had attained the age of 55 years by February 28, 1983 or between 28-2-83 and 23-9-84, has the effect of limiting the field of operation of the Ordinance and the Act and introducing a classification which in order to be sustained must be shown to be reasonable and to have a nexus to the object to be achieved besides not being arbitrary. While it is a general rule of law that statutes are not to operate retrospectively, they may so operate by express enactment, by necessary implication from the language implied or where the statute is explanatory or declaratory or where the statute is passed for the purpose of protecting the public against some evil or abuse or where the statute engrafts itself upon existing situations etc. etc. But it would be incorrect to call a statute ‘retrospective’, “because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing”. (Vide R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants) (1848) 12 QB 120). etc. But it would be incorrect to call a statute ‘retrospective’, “because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing”. (Vide R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants) (1848) 12 QB 120). We must further remember, quite apart from any question of retrospectivity, that, unlike in the United Kingdom here in India we have a written Constitution which confers justiciable fundamental rights and so the very refusal to make an Act retrospective or the non-application of the Act with reference to a date or to an event that took place before the enactment may, by itself, create an impermissible classification justifying the striking down of the non- retroactivity or non-application clause, as offending the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. That is the situation that we have here”.The above dictum of law in B. Prabhakar Rao and others, supra, is in turn based on a leading case on the subject reported as D.S. Nakara and others Vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 Supreme Court, 130. 7. Though, per contra, reliance has been placed on behalf of the review petitioner as also HRTC on Union of India and others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, particularly paras 9 and 17 thereof, yet the facts of the case relied upon being clearly distinguishable and as such not applicable to the controversy in hand would not go to advance their case any further. 8. In view of the above, no ground is made out for review of the judgment dated 1.1.2013. The review petition is accordingly dismissed.