R.M. DOSHIT, CJ.:–Learned Advocate Mr. Raghav Prasad appears for the petitioner. The impugned order is of premature retirement of a Judicial Officer in public interest. Although one of us, the Chief Justice, was the party to the impugned decision, Mr. Raghav Prasad states that he has no objection if this Bench hears and decides the matter. Interlocutory Application No. 4422 of 2011: 2. This Application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. has been filed by the writ petitioner for permission to amend the writ petition. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Mrigank Mauli appears for the High Court and learned advocate Mr. Arbind Kumar appears for the Government of Bihar. They have no objection, if amendment is granted. 4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proposed amendment is allowed. The amendment will be carried out in the writ petition in red ink within two weeks from today. Interlocutory Application stands disposed of. Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.8275 of 2011: 5. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by one Yogendra Nath Tripathi, a Judicial Officer, the then Sub-ordinate Judge 1-cum 2nd Assistant Sessions Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Siwan to challenge the action of the District & Sessions Judge in relieving him from all judicial works under his order dated 26th March 2011. Pending the writ petition, the petitioner was compulsorily retired in public interest under the Government Notification dated 15th April 2011. The said order was communicated to the petitioner on 30th May 2011. The petitioner was ordered to be paid three months’ salary/pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The petitioner has also challenged the aforesaid government Notification dated 15th April 2011. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Raghav Prasad has appeared for the petitioner. Mr. Raghav Prasad has submitted that the impugned order of retirement under Rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code is made in violation of the principles of natural justice. He has submitted that the impugned Notification is punitive. The petitioner could not have been removed from service without holding inquiry against him as envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution. 7. He has submitted that the impugned Notification is punitive. The petitioner could not have been removed from service without holding inquiry against him as envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution. 7. He has next submitted that although the petitioner has been purportedly retired in public interest, the petitioner was not given due notice of three months as envisaged by Rule 74(ii)(b) of the Bihar Service Code; nor was the petitioner paid pay and allowances in lieu of notice with the service of the Notification. The Notification is, therefore, vitiated. In support of his submission, Mr. Raghav Prasad has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Rana Abhai Singh Vs. Hon’ble High court of Judicature at Patna [ 2006 (3) PLJR 400 ]. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Registrar General High Court of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti [Civil Appeal No. 9346 of 2013; decided on 22nd October 2013]. 8. The Petition is contested by the respondents Patna High Court and the Government of Bihar. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. Mrigank Mauli has appeared for the Patna High Court. Mr. Mrigank Mauli has submitted that the impugned Notification has been issued by the State Government in exercise of power of compulsory retirement in public interest conferred by Rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. The said rule does not envisage the principles of natural justice or opportunity of hearing to the person concerned or a disciplinary proceeding. The order made under Rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code is not a punitive order and does not call for a departmental proceeding as envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution. 10. He has taken us through the counter affidavit and the particulars of the service record of the petitioner. He has submitted that neither the petitioner had an exemplary service record nor his integrity was beyond doubt. In the circumstances, the High Court’s Standing Committee took the decision to retire the petitioner prematurely. The said decision was confirmed by the Full Court of the High Court. Upon recommendation of the High Court, the impugned Notification was issued on 15th April 2011. He has submitted that on issuance of Notification, immediately order was made to pay three months? pay and allowances to the petitioner in lieu of notice. The said decision was confirmed by the Full Court of the High Court. Upon recommendation of the High Court, the impugned Notification was issued on 15th April 2011. He has submitted that on issuance of Notification, immediately order was made to pay three months? pay and allowances to the petitioner in lieu of notice. Until the Notification was issued, such order could not have been made. Since the payment has to be made under the order of the Accountant General, the process did take some time. The payment was made in August 2011. He has submitted that mere delay in payment of pay and allowances in lieu of notice would not vitiate the Notification dated 15th April 2011. In support of his submission, Mr. Mauli has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [ (2010) 10 SCC 693 ] and the judgment in the matter of High Court of Judicature, Patna Vs. Shiveshwar Narayan & Anr [Civil Appeal Nos. 6103-7372 of 2005 decided on 22nd September 2011]. 11. In the matter of Rana Abhai Singh (supra), the petitioner Rana Abhai Singh, an Officer in the State Judiciary had challenged the order of the High Court in retiring him at the age of 58 years and in not enhancing the age of superannuation to 60 years pursuant to the direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of All India Judges’ Association & Ors. { 1993 (4) SCC 288 }. The challenge was also on the ground of mala fide. The Bench elaborately considered the service record of the writ petitioner and noted that the writ petitioner had been graded as “Good” Officer all throughout and at times “Very Good” also. The Bench held that a meritorious Judicial Officer was visited with the order of the compulsory retirement by intercepting his superannuation age of 60 years and was sent home at the age of 58 years on the plea of, and in the name of ‘Public Interest’ was against the public interest. The Bench also held that the decision of the High Court was ‘dubious’. The Bench also held that the decision of the High Court was ‘dubious’. The Bench also found that the order of retirement was vitiated on account of non-application of mind and for non-compliance of the statutory provision of Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service Code inasmuch as neither the writ petitioner was given three months’ notice as envisaged by Rule 74(b)(ii); nor was he paid salary in lieu of three months’ notice at the time of retirement or even till the date of the order of the High Court. 12. We may note here that in the matter before us, we are not considering enhancement of the age of the superannuation pursuant to the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ case (supra). The case before us is simply that of premature retirement in ‘public interest’ under Rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. In the matter of Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat & Anr (supra), the matter was of punitive termination of service of a Civil Judge (Junior Division) without inquiry. In our opinion, the observations made in the said judgment shall not apply to the present case because we are dealing with the matter of compulsory retirement in ‘public interest’ and not with a punitive order. In the matter of Pyare Mohan Lal (supra), once again the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered compulsory retirement of a Judicial Officer under Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Jharkhand Civil Services Code, a provision identical to Rule 74(b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code. The Hon’ble Court has reiterated the salient features as under:– “(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary- in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material: in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference”. 13. In the matter of Shiveshwar Narayan & Anr. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the very issue of enhancement of the age of superannuation of a Judicial Officer from 58 to that of 60 years pursuant to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association Case (supra). The Hon’ble Court held that the repeated complaints of judicial impropriety and questionable integrity against a judicial officer although not proved to the hilt may be sufficient basis to disentitle such judicial officer the benefit of extension of retirement age to 60 years. 14. Thus, whether it is a case of enhancement of age of superannuation from that of 58 to 60 years or of premature retirement in ‘public interest’ under Rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code, the principles are more or less the same. 14. Thus, whether it is a case of enhancement of age of superannuation from that of 58 to 60 years or of premature retirement in ‘public interest’ under Rule 74 (b) (ii) of the Bihar Service Code, the principles are more or less the same. The real test is desirability of the continuation of the Judicial Officer in service. The decision would depend upon the service records; the quality of judgments; the complaints, if any; and the general reputation of the officer concerned. The decision would depend upon the subjective satisfaction on the above-referred and any other relevant materials. Neither a disciplinary enquiry is envisaged; nor the official concerned has a right to hearing or representation. The order of premature retirement in public interest can certainly be a matter of judicial review by the High Court under its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution like any other exercise of judicial review of administrative orders. The High Court will not sit in appeal over the administrative decision of the High Court to make threadbare analysis of the relevant materials and to record its own satisfaction on the judicial side. The High Court will ensure that a fair process had been evolved and followed by the High Court in its decision making process; that the opinion was formed on relevant materials; and that the order is not vitiated by mala fide or such other vices. 15. We have considered the rival contentions raised by the learned advocates, the scope and ambit of Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service Code and the above-referred judgments relied upon by the learned advocates. It is indisputable that the impugned Notification in exercise of power conferred under Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service Code was issued by the State Government on recommendation of the High Court. The High Court had, before making such recommendation, considered the entire service record; the allegation files; and other materials relevant to the subject matter. The matter had been scrutinized at several levels. First, by the learned Inspecting Judge; then by the Chief Justice; then by the Standing Committee; and then by the Full Court. The High Court, having satisfied itself objectively on the materials before it opined that it would be in the ‘public interest’ to retire the petitioner. 16. The matter had been scrutinized at several levels. First, by the learned Inspecting Judge; then by the Chief Justice; then by the Standing Committee; and then by the Full Court. The High Court, having satisfied itself objectively on the materials before it opined that it would be in the ‘public interest’ to retire the petitioner. 16. We see no infirmity in the process adopted by the High Court; nor is there a substantial challenge to the impugned Notification. It is well settled that the order of premature retirement in public interest is not an order of punishment; nor does it cast stigma. Neither the petitioner was entitled to be heard nor was he entitled to a disciplinary proceeding. 17. The payment of notice pay although was not made immediately, it is apparent that the process required to be followed by the public authorities did take some time before the payment was made. The payment cannot be said to have been delayed deliberately or that the impugned Notification was issued without due regard to the State’s liability to pay the pay and allowances in lieu of three months’ notice. The entrapments of Rule 74 (b) (ii) were duly followed. 18. We see no infirmity in the decision to retire the petitioner in public interest or in the impugned Notification issued by the State Government. The Petition is devoid of any merit. The Petition is dismissed.