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2014 DIGILAW 1000 (GUJ)

Rabiyabibi v. Abbasbhai Gulamhussein Shaikh

2014-09-08

G.B.SHAH

body2014
ORDER : G.B. Shah, J. At the request of the learned Advocate Mr. J.T. Trivedi for the petitioner and learned Advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah, for respondent No.1, the matter is taken up for hearing for final disposal. 2. Rule. Mr. Mehul S. Shah, learned Advocate waives service of rule for respondent No.1. The learned advocate Mr. J.T. Trivedi has declared that respondent Nos. 2, 2/1 to 2/4 and 3 to 5 are formal parties against which learned advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah for respondent No.1 has not taken any serious objection. 3. The present petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.02.2013 passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad below Exh. 16 in Misc. Civil Appeal (Appeal from Order) No. 1 of 2013 whereby learned Judge dismissed the Appeal from Order and confirmed the order dated 20.12.2012 passed by the learned Trial Judge below injunction application at Exh. 6 in H.R.P. Suit No. 1215 of 2012. 4. The short facts of the case are that deceased father of the present petitioner-original plaintiff-Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai Chandaljiwala was an original tenant of the suit premises situated in Ahmedabad City, Jamalpur area ward No.3 bearing City Survey No. 4280 ad measuring 111.08 sq. yards at ground floor, M.C.No. 3376 and Tenament No.23370556000101A at a monthly rent of Rs.8/since 1925 and he died on 28.06.1952. The respondent No.1 original defendant No.1 had purchased the said premises from erstwhile owner by registered sale deed in the year 1997. Further case of the present petitioner-original plaintiff is that she was born in 1946 and resided with her father in the suit premises along with her sisters. Her sisters are at present married and residing in matrimonial house. She is the legal heir of deceased Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai and after the death of deceased father and mother Rehmatbibi, being unmarried daughter, she acquired tenancy right under Section 5 (11)(c)(i) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for brevity herein after referred to as "the Rents Act"). It is further case of the petitioner that the petitioner is in possession of the suit premises as an heir of the original tenant. It is further case of the petitioner that the petitioner is in possession of the suit premises as an heir of the original tenant. Since the present respondent No.1 defendant No.1 threatened the petitioner to snatch away the possession of the suit premises, she filed H.R.P. Suit No. 1215 of 2012 against the respondent No.1 the present landlord as well as against all the legal heirs of Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai. Along with the suit, petitioner has also filed an application for temporary injunction. 4.1. It can be noticed from the record of the case that, initially, learned Trial Judge has granted ex parte interim status quo to be maintained by the parties in respect of the suit premises. The present respondent No.1- original defendant No.1 landlord appeared in the said suit and filed his written statement at Exh. 17 against the plaint as well as against injunction application-Exh. 6, inter alia, contending that the suit filed by the petitioner-original plaintiff and the injunction application are untrue, incorrect and void under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity herein after referred "the Code"); that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 defendant Nos. 2 to 6 are relatives of the petitioner-plaintiff; that Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai was not tenant of defendant No.1 but defendant No.1 had admitted that he had purchased the suit property on 14.03.1997 by executing the sale deed from previous landlord and in the said sale deed, it was written that "Fareedbhai Usmanbhai was tenant of the suit premises bearing Municipal Census No.3376 having one room". It was further contended that Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai-father of the petitioner was having his property in City Survey Jamalpur, Taluka City, District Ahmedabad bearing Survey No. 4253/32 and since Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai had passed away on 28.06.1952, his heirs were residing in the said property consisting of three floors and the defendant Nos. 2 and 2/1 to 2/4 were residing in the suit premises. 2 and 2/1 to 2/4 were residing in the suit premises. Therefore, it was the contention of the defendant No.1 that the petitioner-plaintiff of H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 was not residing in the said property when her father was alive and after the death of her father, she was residing in the said property of her father and the petitioner-plaintiff of H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 never resided in the suit premises as a tenant, but only Fareedbhai Usmanbhai resided in the said suit premises as a tenant and hence, the defendant No.1 filed H.R.P. Suit No. 977 of 1998 against Fareedbhai for recovery of possession of the suit premises. During pendency of the said suit, Fareedbhai died and, therefore, his heirs present respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 have been joined in the said suit. It was further contended that petitioner-plaintiff of H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 Rabiyabibi Usmanbhai being a sister of deceased Fareedbhai filed the said Suit claiming her right under the Rents Act. However, as she was not the heir of deceased Fareedbhai, she was not joined as party in H.R.P. Suit No. 977 of 1998 filed by the respondent No.1 and ultimately, the matter reached upto the Apex Court by way of filing Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 19139 of 2012 which came to be dismissed by order dated 20/07/2012 by granting time of six months to the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 herein to vacate the possession of the suit premises. Learned Trial Judge, ultimately, passed the order on 20/12/2012 rejecting the injunction application at Exh. 6. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-original plaintiff preferred Misc. Civil Appeal (Appeal from Order) No. 1 of 2013 before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad. After hearing both the parties, learned Appellate Court rejected the Appeal from Order vide judgment dated 11.02.2013. Hence, the present petition. 5. I have heard learned Advocates appearing for the parties at length and also perused the papers placed on record of this petition. 6. Learned Advocate, Mr. J.T. Trivedi for the petitioner, submitted that learned Judge has not discussed the principles governing grant of injunction in the impugned order and jumped to the conclusion without assigning any reason. 5. I have heard learned Advocates appearing for the parties at length and also perused the papers placed on record of this petition. 6. Learned Advocate, Mr. J.T. Trivedi for the petitioner, submitted that learned Judge has not discussed the principles governing grant of injunction in the impugned order and jumped to the conclusion without assigning any reason. He submitted that respondent No.1-original defendant No.1 cannot take shelter of the plea that he was not aware of the fact that the petitioner-original plaintiff is the daughter of original tenant-Usmanbhai more particularly when he is residing adjacent to the suit property. Moreover, the main suit being H.R.P. Civil Suit No. 1215 of 2012 was filed by the petitioner-original plaintiff seeking prayer for declaration under Section 5 (11)(c)(i) of the Rents Act that the petitioner had inherited the tenancy rights along with the heirs of deceased father. He submitted that respondent No.1 defendant No.1 is pressing into service the sale deed in which the petitioner-original plaintiff-appellant was not a party and hence reasoning of the Appellate Court are fallacious and shoddy and accordingly, the decree in which the petitioner-original plaintiff was not a party is not binding to the petitioner. 6.1. While relying upon the decision in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. And others reported in AIR 1994 SC 853 , more particularly para 6, the learned advocate Mr. Trivedi for the petitioner has submitted that a person approaching the Court should come with clean hands. 6.2. While relying upon another decision in the case of Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 , more particularly, para 8, Mr. Trivedi submitted that the points for determination were not properly formulated. While referring to the pages 25 to 68 and reasoning on page 35 of the impugned judgment and order, Mr. Trivedi submitted that the matter is required to be remanded as there is an error in framing the issues. 6.3. He relied upon another decision in the case of Babubhai and others v. Shah Bharatkumar Ratilal reported in AIR 1980 Gujarat 89, wherein it was held that statutory tenant has also an estate and statutory tenancy is heritable and transferable. Para27 reads as under: "27 There are two subsidiary questions which no remain to be considered, viz. 6.3. He relied upon another decision in the case of Babubhai and others v. Shah Bharatkumar Ratilal reported in AIR 1980 Gujarat 89, wherein it was held that statutory tenant has also an estate and statutory tenancy is heritable and transferable. Para27 reads as under: "27 There are two subsidiary questions which no remain to be considered, viz. if there can be more than one successor tenants, either by agreement or by decision of the Court, what is the nature of such tenancy whether it is joint tenancy or tenancy in common and whether or not the tenancy right can be transmitted on more than one occasion. So far as the nature of tenancy is concerned, we are inclined, having, regard to the object and purpose of the Bombay Rent Act and also on principle and authority, to prefer the view that if there are more than one successor tenant, either by agreement or by decision of the Court, they hold the tenancy rights as tenants in common rather than as joint tenants. It is axiomatic to say that a joint tenancy connotes unity of title, interest and possession and commencement of title, while the tenancy in common, on the other hand, implies only the unity of possession and unity of commencement of title, without any unity of title or interest. It is no doubt true that the rule of English law is to presume that a transfer to more than one person creates a joint tenancy with a right of survivor ship unless there are words of severance. However, this principle of joint tenancy is unknown to India barring under Hindu Law in case of coparcenary between members of undivided Hindu Family (vide: Jogeshwar Narain v. Ram Chund Dutt (1896) 23 Ind App 37 (PC). This position in law is affirmed by the Supreme Court in Venkatakrishna v. Satyavathi AIR 1968 SC 751 . It is also an accepted position in law that even if the transferees are members of a coparcenary, they will take as tenants is common unless a contrary intention appears from the instrument of transfer or the grant (vide: Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas (1902) ILR 26 Bom 445. It is also an accepted position in law that even if the transferees are members of a coparcenary, they will take as tenants is common unless a contrary intention appears from the instrument of transfer or the grant (vide: Bai Diwali v. Patel Bechardas (1902) ILR 26 Bom 445. In Mahomed Jusab Abdulla v. Fatmabai Jusab Abdulla AIR 1948 Bom 53, Chagla, J. held that in India the Court must strongly lean against holding any particular bequest or grant as a joint bequest or a joint grant, and the presumption must always be in favour of a tenancy in common rather, than a joint tenancy. The Court can always come to a different conclusion that if that presumption is displaced by clear and cogent material to the contrary. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a case of more than one successor tenant either by agreement or by decision of the Court the nature of tenancy would to tenancy in common unless contrary intention appears to displace that presumption by clear and regent evidence." 6.4. The learned advocate for the petitioner lastly submitted that if a decree of eviction is passed against Fareedbhai Usmanbhai Chandaljiwala, the same would not be binding to the petitioner. He relied upon the another decision in the case of Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia reported in AIR 2008 SC 2718 , wherein it has been held that as the appellant therein was not a party in such compromise, the appellant was not bound by a consent decree. The validity or otherwise of the consent decree would not be necessary to be considered, as the appellant was not bound thereby. 7. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah for the respondent No.1 defendant No.1, vehemently contended that the petitioner describes herself as daughter of Usmanbhai in the cause title and the alleged possession of the petitioner-original plaintiff as such is not an individual possession. The tenancy right is being claimed as a member of the tenants family. Referring to Attornment Notice at page 69, Mr. Shah submitted that the said letter of attornment was given to Fareedbhai, recognising Fareedbhai only as a tenant and nobody else. The tenancy right is being claimed as a member of the tenants family. Referring to Attornment Notice at page 69, Mr. Shah submitted that the said letter of attornment was given to Fareedbhai, recognising Fareedbhai only as a tenant and nobody else. He, therefore, contended that mere description will not lead the case of the petitioner-original plaintiff any further unless any cogent evidence is provided to the effect that Usmanbhai was the original tenant and, therefore, notice at page 69 is just a description and nothing beyond that otherwise defendant No.1 would have specifically written in the notice that Usamanbahi was the original tenant and upon the death of Usmanbhai, Fareedbhai had acquired the tenancy right. Mr. Shah further submitted that respondent No.2-Fareedbhai was the tenant is the finding recorded by both the Courts below on facts. The plaint is at page 110 and as mentioned therein, the father died in 1952, the present suit is filed in 2012, the petitioner-original plaintiff was born in 1946 and thus it is clear that even after attaining majority, the suit was filed after 48 years. Therefore, if she is claiming her right as a tenant, she would not have waited for such a long period and, therefore, both the Courts below have recorded the finding that this is an attempt to frustrate the original decree. Mr. Shah further submitted that either of two things can occur one, if the petitioner says that she was not aware of such proceedings, natural presumption would be that she was not residing in the suit premises but it has come on record that she was residing in the new premises acquired by her father and second, if she was residing with her brother Fareedbhai as mentioned in para4 of her plaint, she must be knowing about these proceedings but she remained silent for all these years and, therefore, in both the situations, she is not entitled to get any equitable relief of temporary injunction. 7.1. In this connection, the learned advocate Mr. Shah for respondent No.1 relied on a decision in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul reported in AIR 1989 SC 1470 . 7.1. In this connection, the learned advocate Mr. Shah for respondent No.1 relied on a decision in the case of H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul reported in AIR 1989 SC 1470 . Drawing my attention on the same, he submitted that it is observed therein that in succession to tenancy, if notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is served on one of the joint tenants, who acted on behalf of other, then in that case, the heirs of original tenant succeed to tenancy rights as joint tenants and not as tenants in common and therefore, notice to one of joint tenants acting for the other is sufficient. 7.2. He also relied on another decision in the case of Veetarag Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Gujarat State Textile Corporation Limited reported in 1996(1) GLH 179 , more particularly on para8 of the same on the point of conduct of a person and delay while seeking equitable relief of temporary injunction, which reads as under: "8. Even so, in any case, inasmuch as this contract was terminated on 6th December 1993, it was expected of the appellant to move for specific performance at the earliest, if they were serious about the same. The appellants certainly cannot be non-suited on the ground of limitation inasmuch as their suit is within time. However, when it comes to grant of equitable relief when the suit is filed after such a lapse of time, it cannot be said that the remedy of interim injunction was the necessary remedy and there was no other remedy available to the party concerned in this behalf. Shri Gupta relied upon the Apex Court judgment rendered in Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors., reported in, AIR 1993 SCC 276 . In paragraph 5 thereof the Courts are cautioned and required to exercise sound judicial discretion. They are required to find out that no other remedy is available to the party concerned and then as stated by the Honor able Supreme Court (and again relied upon by Shri Gupta) in para 20 of the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 ; for approaching a court of equity, the blameworthy conduct of a person approaching a court of equity, for obtaining discretionary relief disentitles him for grant of such relief. Para 20 of the above judgment reads as under: "Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a court of equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitle him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd thus: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were after wards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defense must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 7.3. The learned advocate for the respondent No.1 heavily relied on the decision in the case of Atma Ram Buildings Pvt. Ltd. v. A.V. Tuli and others reported in (2011) 6 SCC 385 and submitted that observation made in paras 3 to 5 of the same is directly applicable to the case on hand which read as under: "3. From a perusal of the above order, it is evident that the tenant had to vacate the premises in question within six months from the date of dismissal of the special leave petitions and to furnish usual undertaking within six weeks from that date. It is extremely unfortunate that neither an undertaking was furnished nor did the tenant vacate the premises in question on the expiry of six months i.e. 06th April, 2011. It is extremely unfortunate that neither an undertaking was furnished nor did the tenant vacate the premises in question on the expiry of six months i.e. 06th April, 2011. Instead, frivolous objections were filed in the execution proceedings, and our order was flouted. Hence, these contempt petitions have been filed by the landlord. 4. It is deeply regrettable that in our county often litigation between the landlord and the tenant are fought up to the stage of the Supreme Court and when the tenant loses in this Court then he starts a second innings through someone claiming to be a cotenant or as a subtenant or in some other capacity and in the second round of litigation the matter remains pending for years and the landlord cannot get possession despite the order of this Court. The time has come that this malpractice must now be stopped effectively. [Emphasis Supplied] 5. After our order dated 6-10-2010, the counsel for the tenant should have advised the tenant to vacate the premises in question like a gentleman before or on the expiry of six months from 6-10-2010 but unfortunately they advised the tenant to put up some other person claiming independent right against the landlord as a subtenant and start a fresh round of litigation to remain in possession. In this manner, our order dated 06-10-2010 was totally frustrated." 8. The question which is to be decided by this Court in nutshell, is as to whether the tenancy rights of the petitioner-original plaintiff can be done away/snatched away with deviously in malafide manner, at the sweet will of the new landlord- respondent No.1 herein-original defendant No.1 or not. 8.1. I have carefully considered the rival contentions made by the learned advocates for the parties together with the citations referred by them. 8.2. The learned advocate for the petitioner plaintiff vehemently submitted that it is the cardinal principle of law that the tenancy rights are heritable and therefore, Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Rents Act is a salutary and wholesome provision to take care and thus, were it not so, no heir of the tenant would feel safe and may be thrown out unceremoniously from the demised premises. He has submitted that it is true that the challenge is made by the petitioner herein after 60 years of the death of her father, but as such no challenge was ever needed for the purpose until recently and when it was needed, the same is made by the petitioner. During the course of submission, learned advocate for the petitioner plaintiff admitted the fact that a decree of eviction has been passed against her deceased brother Fareedbhai Usmanbhai Chandaljiwala and legal heirs of said Fareedbhai, which has been confirmed upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court and hence the moot question is as to whether the silence over a long period of time would put an end to the tenancy rights of the petitioner with the passage of time, more particularly, when admittedly, she has been residing in the same premises since her birth. In the plaint para 4, it is the case of the petitioner plaintiff that after the death of her father, she had resided with the mother and then her brother Fareedbhai and after the death of her brother Fareedbhai, she is residing with the legal heirs of Fareedbhai i.e. respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 herein. 8.3. Before dealing with the submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties, it is desirable to consider the legal provision on which the petitioner has placed sole reliance. On 1st of May, 1960, the Bombay State was divided into the States of Maharashtra and the Gujarat. Sub Clause (C) of clause (11) of Section 5 of the Rents Act was substituted by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965. If the statement of objects and reasons of the amendment is perused, it would become clear that because of lacuna in the original definition of tenant, a situation has arisen where members of the family of a deceased tenant, who were living with him at the time of his death, were faced with the threat of their eviction and it was intended to avoid such eviction. In other words, it clearly appears that the amendment was introduced only in order to provide shelter or roof to the members of the family of a tenant after tenants death. In other words, it clearly appears that the amendment was introduced only in order to provide shelter or roof to the members of the family of a tenant after tenants death. As referred above, the learned advocate for the petitioner plaintiff submitted that if the salutary and wholesome provisions to take care i.e. Section 5(11)(C)(i) is not amended, no heir of tenant would feel safe and may be thrown out unceremoniously from the demised premises. I find myself in agreement with the same because as such the Rents Act is meant for protecting tenants but at the same time definitely not for penalising landlords. Thus, while dealing with submissions made by learned advocates for the parties, the above referred intention of the legislature is required to be kept in mind for proper adjudication of the issues involved in this matter. 8.4. As per the petitioner, she is having tenancy rights under Section 5 (11) (c)(i) of the Rents Act, as her late father Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai Chandaljiwala was an original tenant of the suit premises. Whereas as per respondent No.1-original defendant No.1, he is the bona-fide purchaser of the suit premises by way of Sale Deed. In sale deed, it is clearly mentioned that Fareedbhai Usmanbhai was the tenant and previous landlord also handed over him rent receipts in favour of Fareedbhai Usmanbhai and, therefore, H.R.P. Suit No. 977 of 1998 was filed for recovery of peaceful possession of the suit premises from Fareedbhai Usmanbhai and his legal heirs and representatives. Attornment letter was issued in the name of Fareedbhai Usmanbhai, as the heir of Usmanbhai Ibrahimbhai Chandaljiwala, by the respondent No.1 because Fareedbhai was the tenant of the suit premises as per sale deed. It is the submission made by the learned advocate for the petitioner plaintiff that the said action of respondent No.1 to issue "notice of attornment" in fact it is "letter of attornment" dated 04.05.1998 to one of the heirs of deceased Usmanbhai is in fact indicative of the fact that it has been intentionally described as the sole heir of deceased Usmanbhai. Non issuance of said notice to the petitioner, though fully aware that the petitioner has been residing in the suit premises all along, and suppression of said vital fact is the most material to the determination of the case which tantamount to commission of fraud upon Court as well as upon the petitioner whose tenancy rights are virtually sought to be jeopardised and jettisoned to her detriment. It is important to note that as per the case of the petitioner, after the death of her father in the year 1952, she was residing with her mother and brother Fareedbhai and after the death of mother and brother Fareedbhai, she is residing with widow of Fareedbhai and heirs of Fareedbhai i.e. respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4. It is the case of the petitioner that notice of attornment dated 04.05.1998 was given to Fareedbhai Usmanbhai and being a coheir, the same was not issued to the petitioner by the new owner of suit premises i.e. respondent No.1. It is also important to note that neither the deceased Fareedbhai nor the heirs of Fareedbhai respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 or present petitioner, at any point of time raised any objections regarding the said letter of attornment that it was not given to coheir i.e. the petitioner, who allegedly resided with them in the suit premises. It is a settled legal position that the obligation to determine the question of successor tenant is not only on the landlord. In a given case like the present one, it may be on a person i.e. petitioner herein to claim tenancy rights as successor under Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Rents Act, and that too well in advance, after having the knowledge related to non issuance of letter of attornment to the petitioner by the respondent No.1. 8.5. As averred on page106 of plaint of H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 filed on 27.09.2012, the father of the petitioner died in 1952 and the present suit was filed in 2012 after order dated 20.07.2012 passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 19139 of 2012 preferred by the petitioner Aemna Faridbhai and others i.e. respondent Nos.2/1 to 2/4 herein, with whom the petitioner is allegedly residing. The said order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court reads as under:. The said order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court reads as under:. "Considering the facts of the case, we are inclined to grant six months time to the petitioners to evict the premises on condition that they will file an undertaking to that effect and will pay up to date arrears of rent and future rent till they vacate the premises. The special leave petition is accordingly disposed of". 8.6. It is further averred in the plaint of H.R.P. Civil Suit No. 1215 of 2012 that petitioner original plaintiff was born in 1946 and thus it is clear that even after attaining majority, the said H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 was filed after 48 years and that too after the above referred undertaking given by the widow and heirs of Fareedbhai i.e. respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 herein before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The learned advocate for respondent No.1 submitted that if the petitioner plaintiff has been claiming her tenancy right seriously, she would not have waited for such a long period of 48 years and therefore, both the Courts below have recorded the finding that this is an attempt to frustrate the original decree obtained by respondent No.1 landlord, after a long legal battle. I find myself in fully agreement with the same. 8.7. The order passed in Civil Revision Application No.166 of 2011 dated 09.03.2012, which was challenged by the respondents Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 herein before the Hon'ble Apex Court is at page Nos. 154 to 165. Relevant paragraph Nos. 13 to 15 read as under. [It is clarified that respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 herein i.e. heirs of Fareedbhai were the respondents defendants therein]:" 13. Another contention raised on behalf of the respondents defendants is that the alternative accommodation had been acquired on 6.11.1931 before the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, the provisions of section 13(1)(l) of the Act would not be attracted is also misconceived inasmuch as section 13(1)(l) of the Act lays down that a landlord is entitled to recover possession where the tenant after coming into operation of the Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence. In the facts of the present case, the defendants witnesses have admitted that ten years prior to the institution of the suit the alternative accommodation had been put up on the premise purchased in the year 1931, and, as such, it is apparent that the tenant had after coming into force of the Act, built a suitable residence. In the aforesaid premises, the present case would squarely fall within the ambit of section 13(1)(l) of the Act. 14. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this court is of the view that the lower appellate court, after recording concurrent findings of fact to the effect that alternative suitable accommodation had been acquired by the defendants, was not justified in holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree of eviction on the ground that no actionable claim had been transferred in favour of the plaintiff under the sale deed. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the revision succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court, dismissing the appeal preferred by the revisionist and confirming the judgment and decree dated 21.4.2004 passed by the trial court, is hereby quashed and set aside. The suit for possession is accordingly decreed, as prayed for. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs." 9. From the above evidence on record, it is clear that alternative accommodation, ten years prior to the institution of the Suit in the year 1978, had been put up on the premises purchased in the year 1931 and this Court has observed that after coming into force of the Act, tenant had built a suitable accommodation. As referred above, the above referred order of this Court was challenged by the heirs of Fareedbhai i.e. respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 by preferring the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.19139 of 2012 which was disposed of as referred above as the undertaking was given by the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 to the effect that they will vacate the suit premises within six months which was granted by the Court as referred above. 10. 2/1 to 2/4 by preferring the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.19139 of 2012 which was disposed of as referred above as the undertaking was given by the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 to the effect that they will vacate the suit premises within six months which was granted by the Court as referred above. 10. The allegations against respondent No.1 for non production of notice of attornment at page 69 and withholding of vital documents in order to gain advantage are nothing but playing fraud on the Court as well on the opposite party and the ratio laid down in this regard in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) (Supra) to the effect that one, who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands are much pressed by the learned advocate for the petitioner. The submission of Mr. Trivedi that respondent No.1 has suppressed vital fact with a view to ensure that the decree of eviction in the suit for eviction against the Fareedbhai Usmanbhai Chandaljiwala since deceased, can be executed by ignoring the petitioner in order to gain advantage, and hence, the petitioner has filed the H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 will be discussed little later. First of all, meaning of attornment and the responsibility regarding the same is required to be considered in light of the decisions rendered by the High Court as well as Hon'ble the Apex Court. 10.1. In Madan Lal v. Manakchand reported in AIR 1971 Raj 55 , it was observed as under: "....The word "Attornment" has not been defined in the Transfer of Property act or in any other law. It has been borrowed from English Law. It simply means an agreement or acknowledgement by a tenant that he holds the tenement of a new person as landlord. Such an agreement or attornment acts as an estoppel to prevent the tenant attorning from denying title of the one to whom he has attorned." 10.2. In case of Mohd, Ilyas v. Mohd. Adil reported in AIR 1994 Del 212 , meaning of attornment rendered by the High Court reads as under:"...... "........................ "Attornment" by the tenant would mean acceptance of the new owner as landlord and estopping the tenant to dispute the landlords title thereafter. Of course, attornment had to be in good faith and not on account of any deception caused on the tenant. "........................ "Attornment" by the tenant would mean acceptance of the new owner as landlord and estopping the tenant to dispute the landlords title thereafter. Of course, attornment had to be in good faith and not on account of any deception caused on the tenant. Payment or nonpayment to a new landlord does not affect the relationship created by attornment. "Attornment" also implies continuity of tenancy, though, landlord might change when title of the property passes by sale of otherwise." 10.3. Meaning of attornment under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju v. Josyula Mahumayamma reported in AIR 1967 SC 174 reads as under: "Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, "attornment" means the act of the tenants putting one person in the place of another as his landlord. In the first instance attornment is made in favour of the person who has derived his title or supposed title from the original landlord. It implies a continuity of the tenancy created by the original landlord in favour of the tenant. It is in these circumstances that the existing tenant for the rest of the period of his tenancy agrees to acknowledge the new landlord as his landlord. Once the tenant has agreed to accept the person claiming title from the previous landlord, that amounts to effective attornment in favour of the landlord and is no more dependent on the future conduct of the tenant by way of payment of rent or otherwise." 10.4. In light of the above, for the sake of argument, if it is considered that the notice/letter of attornment at page69, though served on Fareedbhai Usmanbhai, since deceased, was not issued on the petitioner, then also, as referred here in above, neither Fareedbhai nor the legal heirs of Fareedbhai nor the petitioner herein had raised any objection at any point of time regarding non issuance of the said notice/letter of attornment or claiming the rights under Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Rents Act for which no convincing and satisfactory explanation is forthcoming on the record. Nothing has come on record that after receiving notice/letter of attornment, deceased Fareedbhai had given any reply against the same accepting the respondent No.1 as new landlord, nor raised any issue by him or by petitioner or by respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 for non-issuance of notice/letter of attornment. Nothing has come on record that after receiving notice/letter of attornment, deceased Fareedbhai had given any reply against the same accepting the respondent No.1 as new landlord, nor raised any issue by him or by petitioner or by respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 for non-issuance of notice/letter of attornment. It is also settled legal position that the obligation to determine the question of successor tenant is not only on the landlord, but in a case like the present one is also on the petitioner to claim the tenancy rights as successor under Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Rents Act at least after attaining majority or after having the knowledge of notice/letter of attornment page 69 received by deceased Fareedbhai. However, it is clear that after attaining the majority also, the petitioner has not claimed the said right for a long period upto 48 years and one fine morning, the petitioner plaintiff wake up from slumber and filed H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012, which, in my view, is nothing but a deliberate attempt to delay the execution proceeding filed against respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4, who have not fulfilled the undertaking given before the Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Moreover, said conduct on the part of the petitioner is nothing but a wilful and deliberate attempt to frustrate the decree obtained after a long legal battle by the respondent No.1 and that too with indirect help of respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4, which deserves to be deprecated, as has been done by both the Courts below. 11. Under the circumstances referred here in above, it cannot be said that the tenancy rights of the petitioner original plaintiff are being snatched away with malafide manner and that too at the sweet will of the new landlord respondent No.1 herein because the person, who has slept over her right for 48 years, has no right at all to claim the tenancy rights more particularly, when it was proved in the earlier round of litigation that the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 are having the up to date alternative accommodation with whom the petitioner is claiming to have resided after death of her mother as well as her brother Fareedbhai. 2/1 to 2/4 are having the up to date alternative accommodation with whom the petitioner is claiming to have resided after death of her mother as well as her brother Fareedbhai. Under the above circumstances, I do not find any substance and merit in the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioner plaintiff that the present case is one of injustice to gender and it is crying need of the day that gender justice needs to be meted out and the same would sub-serve the cause of justice, more particularly when the said gender appears to have filed H.R.P. Civil Suit No.1215 of 2012 with ulterior motive and with ulterior design just to help respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 who have given the undertaking before the Hon'ble the Apex Court and thus, it is clear that the petitioner plaintiff herein is not coming with clean hands before the Court, but indirectly wants to help the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 to satisfy their ego for the reasons best known to them. 12. Drawing attention on page35 of the impugned order dated 11.02.2013 passed by the Appellate Bench, the learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the points for determination were not properly formulated and considering the said basic fallacy, the matter is required to be remanded. I have gone through the judgment and order dated 11.02.2013 delivered by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad. In my opinion, it can be said that points for determination have not been happily worded but the same is not ground for remand of the case as submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner, more particularly when the rest of the observations and findings are just and proper. It appears to me that the intention of the petitioner is only to delay the proceedings further and deprive the respondent No.1 judgment creditor from reaping the fruits of the decree that too, indirectly joining hands with the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4 who had given undertaking before the Hon'ble the Apex Court as referred above and as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Builders Pvt.Ltd. (Supra), time has come to stop such malpractice in an effective manner, so that genuine tenant can get the dwelling house to meet with their genuine need. 2/1 to 2/4 who had given undertaking before the Hon'ble the Apex Court as referred above and as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Builders Pvt.Ltd. (Supra), time has come to stop such malpractice in an effective manner, so that genuine tenant can get the dwelling house to meet with their genuine need. On careful consideration of the entire case discussed here in above, I am of the opinion that the judgment and order dated 11.02.2013 passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad below Exh. 16 in Misc. Civil Appeal (Appeal from Order) No. 1 of 2013 confirming the order dated 20.12.2012 passed by the learned Trial Judge below injunction application at Exh. 6 in H.R.P. Civil Suit No. 1215 of 2012, is just and proper and there are no reasons to interfere with the same by invoking powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 13. In the above backdrop, the petitioner has miserably failed to make out a prima-facie case or any case against the respondent No.1 original defendant land lord judgment creditor and hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. Considering the deliberate attempt to initiate second round of litigation, only with a motive to indirectly help the respondent Nos. 2/1 to 2/4, who had given undertaking before the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred above, for which the respondent No.1 was forced to take part in the said litigation, he is required to be compensated in terms of money. Hence, this petition is hereby dismissed with costs and the petitioner is directed to pay Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only) towards costs of the litigation for which he was forced to fight the said battle as referred above. Petition Dismissed.