JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge . The appellant, who was defendant No.2, before the learned District Judge, Shimla, H.P., has preferred the present first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.7.2012, passed in Civil Suit No. 18-S/1 of 2009/05, whereby the suit of the plaintiffs has been decreed. The facts, in brief, may be noticed. 2. The respondents herein - Shiv Dutt and Surat Ram (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent and mandatory injunction against the defendants stating therein that they had been in possession of land described in Kh. No. 189/3/1 and 262/1, measuring 17 Bigha 18 Biswas in revenue estate Sabhar (Jubbal). The plaintiffs claimed to have developed the aforesaid land by planting apple orchard. The defendant No. 2 is said to be owner in possession of Kh. No. 28 measuring 9 biswas in revenue estate Jhalri Kanot, Kh. No. 100/1, 101 and 108/1 measuring 8 bigha in revenue estate Sabhar and Kh. No. 485/2, 485/2/1, measuring 10 bighas 6 biswas in revenue estate Malog. The defendant No. 2 had applied for exchange of his aforesaid land with the land in suit to the authorities claiming that the said land of defendant No. 2 had washed away in floods in 1978 and not fit for cultivation. On 30.12.1982, District Collector/Deputy Commissioner allotted the land in question to defendant No. 2, which order was challenged in review by the plaintiffs on the ground of illegality. The District Collector vide order dated 31.3.1983, cancelled the exchange, which order was also upheld in appeal by the Commissioner on 21.8.1985. On this, defendant No. 2 filed a Civil Writ Petition before the High Court being CWP No. 989 of 1985 which came to be disposed of on 24.4.1990, directing the Commissioner to reconsider the question of exchange in favour of defendant No. 2. In pursuance to the direction given in the Writ Petition, the Commissioner vide order dated 14.11.1991, proceeded to uphold the exchange, which according to the plaintiffs was without conducting the proper inquiry, wrong, illegal and also fraud and by misrepresentation of proper facts. In pursuance to the direction given in the Writ Petition, the Commissioner vide order dated 14.11.1991, proceeded to uphold the exchange, which according to the plaintiffs was without conducting the proper inquiry, wrong, illegal and also fraud and by misrepresentation of proper facts. It is further averred in the suit by the plaintiffs that the land of defendant No. 2 never washed away in floods at any point of time and said defendant continued to usufruct that land and the possession of the said land was stated to have been delivered to the State in papers only. It is further averred that the plaintiffs had been unauthorizedly and illegally, dispossessed of the suit land. Alternatively, the defendant No. 2 was sought to be dispossed of his land stated to have been given in exchange to defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs had also stated that defendant No. 2 was liable to pay use and occupation charges of the land in suit/his land to the State and permanent and mandatory injunction had been claimed against the defendants. 3. The State/respondent No. 1 therein had resisted the suit on the ground of limitation and valuation stating that the plaintiffs had instituted suit for declaration of their ownership and possession of the suit land against the by adverse possession. Not only this, it is averred that the suit is hit by resjudicata, as the Civil Suit No. 28/1 of 1992 of plaintiff No. 1 Shiv Dutt had been dismissed by learned Sub Judge First Class, Rohru on 31.10.1994 and Civil Suit No. 48/1 of 1999/98 of plaintiff No. 2 had been dismissed on 29.4.2000 by Sub Judge First Class, Jubbal. Further the defendant No. 1 claimed its ownership and possession over the land in suit and alleged that plaintiffs had unauthorizedly and illegally encroached upon the same and they have been ejected in accordance with law. The suit land had been rightly given in exchange to defendant No. 2, possession whereof was delivered to him and mutation No. 71 had been sanctioned on 28.9.1998. Defendant No. 1 denied any fraud or mis representation on the part of defendant No. 2 and admitted him to be owner in possession of the land in suit and denied the liability of paying the use and occupation charges thereof from him and also challenged the locus standi of the plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1 denied any fraud or mis representation on the part of defendant No. 2 and admitted him to be owner in possession of the land in suit and denied the liability of paying the use and occupation charges thereof from him and also challenged the locus standi of the plaintiffs. Defendant No. 2 also adopted the stand taken by defendant No. 1. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues for determination: “1. Whether the defendant No. 2 has illegally and wrongly been allotted Government land, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the defendant No. 2 obtained Government land in exchange by misrepresentation and fraud? OPP. 3. Whether the defendant No. 2 is in illegal possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the suit is beyond the period of limitation? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction, if so, what would be the proper valuation? OPD. 6(a). Whether the plaintiffs had become owners by adverse possession of suit property prior to the date of their alleged illegal dispossession by defendant No. 1? OPP. 6(b). If (sic.) Issue No. 6(a) is proved, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover back the possession of the suit property? OPP. 7. Relief” 5. At the outset, it may be noticed that the parties are in litigation since decades. The grant of nautor in favour of the appellant and allotment of some portion of land in favour of the plaintiff ultimately reached this Court and was the subject matter of CWP No. 989 of 1985. Vide order dated 24.4.1990, the Writ petition filed by the petitioner came to be disposed of with the direction to the Commissioner to re-examine the grant in the light of the provisions of the Scheme dated 9.1.1979. The Commissioner was also given liberty to make an inquiry if found necessary for the purpose of exchange under the Scheme and then decide whether the appellant is entitled to the custody of land applied for. It was further held that in case it is found that the appellant is entitled to such an exchange than the Commissioner will also consider the appellant’s case for shifting of the plaintiff to some other place. It was further held that in case it is found that the appellant is entitled to such an exchange than the Commissioner will also consider the appellant’s case for shifting of the plaintiff to some other place. Lastly, it was held that in case it is found that the plaintiff had made improvements than he need not be shifted. Subsequently, application was filed by the appellant for clarification of judgment dated 25.4.1990, which application was allowed by this Court and the following orders came to be passed: “ Second respondent need not be disturbed if it is found that he has improved the land by planting fruit bearing trees, applies only to one bigha of land covered by the nautor granted to him. I make it further clear that this observation does not preclude the Commissioner from ordering the shifting of second respondent to another area of one bigha of land out of 17 bighas 18 biswas covered by the exchange in case it is found that the location of one bigha of land allotted to the second respondent as for the enjoyment of the rest of land. In the event of an order for shifting it is also open to the Commissioner to decide whether the second respondent is entitled to any compensation for the improvement effected by him.” 6. In compliance to the directions, the matter was examined in detail by the Commissioner by reference to the Scheme and it was held as under: “ Under this Scheme, there exists a provision for those whose rains and land-slides. In deserving cases, alternative land was to be allotted to those who suffered. In the said Scheme, it is also made clear that where land is not available for agricultural purposes in the same Mohal, such grants/allotments could be given in other Mohals. Since the consolidation of land at one place is no bar and there are no restrictions under the Scheme to give land in adjoining Mohals, Shri Amar Singh is entitled to grant of land in exchange in Village Sabhar. I have also perused the reports of revenue field agencies, forests and the consent given by the estate right-holders. In fact, the reports show that Sh. Amar Singh has actually suffered loss due to heavy rains. The Deputy Commissioner, Shimla in his order dated 30.12.1982 has stated that the market price of private land comes to Rs. I have also perused the reports of revenue field agencies, forests and the consent given by the estate right-holders. In fact, the reports show that Sh. Amar Singh has actually suffered loss due to heavy rains. The Deputy Commissioner, Shimla in his order dated 30.12.1982 has stated that the market price of private land comes to Rs. 23076.02 paise and that of Government land comes to Rs. 14241.24 paise. The market price and the area of private land is higher than that of Government land and there is an advantage to the Government in terms of money and area in this exchange. Therefore, I hold that the exchange of land sanctioned in favour of Sh. Amar Singh on 30.12.1982 was in order and inconformity with the Scheme.” 7. In so far as subsequent direction passed by this Court is concerned, the Commissioner concluded as follows: “In compliance to above directions of Hon’ble High Court, alternative land of 1 bigha outside the land which was granted to Sh. Amar Singh has to be given to Sh. Shiv Datt. It is also relevant to state that my learned predecessor also visited this area on 22.7.1990, it is found that Sh. Surat Ram father of Sh. Shiv Datt has raised an orchard on this piece of land. Considering this report, it is established that Sh. Surat Ram has made plantations in the land in question. The nautor land granted to Sh. Shiv Datt is stated to be in the middle of the area applied for by Sh. Amar Singh and the same is likely to cause inconvenience in the enjoyment of land to Amar Singh. It is considered appropriate that 1 bigha of land be allotted to Sh. Shiv Datt outside the area of 1718 bighas which is now sanctioned in favour of Sh. Amar Singh. Accordingly, Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru is directed to visit the spot and allot 1 bigha of land to Sh. Shiv Datt outside the area of 17-18 bighas. The Sub Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-improvement of land made by Sh. Shiv Datt and the amount of compensation so worked out shall be paid to Sh. Shiv Datt by Sh. Amar Singh.” 8. The revision preferred by the plaintiff against the order of the Commissioner dated 14.11.1991 came to be dismissed by the Financial Commissioner vide order dated 25.8.1994, passed in Revenue Revision No. 150 of 1992. Shiv Datt and the amount of compensation so worked out shall be paid to Sh. Shiv Datt by Sh. Amar Singh.” 8. The revision preferred by the plaintiff against the order of the Commissioner dated 14.11.1991 came to be dismissed by the Financial Commissioner vide order dated 25.8.1994, passed in Revenue Revision No. 150 of 1992. It appears that in the meantime when the matter had been decided by the Commissioner on 14.11.1991, plaintiff-Shiv Dutt filed a suit in the Court of Sub Judge First Class, Rohru wherein he claimed ownership of the land by way of adverse possession and further claimed that the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner was null and void. In those proceedings, the following issues fame to be framed: “1. Whether the plaintiff has become the owner of land comprising Kh. No. 538 and 541 by way of adverse possession, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the order passed by ld. Commissioner, Shimla on 14.11.1991 is null and void? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the matter has already been adjudicated upon by Hon’ble High Court and thus the suit is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is stopped from filing the present suit by his acts, conduct etc? OPD. 6. Relief.” These issues were answered in the following manner: Issue No. 1. No. Issue No. 2. No. Issue No. 3. Not pressed. Issue No. 4. Not pressed. Issue No. 5. Not pressed. Issue No. 6 (Relief) Suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs as per operative part of the judgment. 9. The matter did not end here because on 29.8.1998, the father of the plaintiff then filed a suit for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction comprised in Kh. No. 537/1, the suit land and from restraining the State from allotting or handing over the possession of the same or any part thereof to the appellant. This suit came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 29.4.2000. Undeterred, the plaintiff thereafter has instituted the present suit on 24.6.2005. Therefore, the question at this stage, would than arise as to whether a party can be permitted to indulge in filing frivolous and vexatious proceedings and whether the same amount to abuse of process of Court. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.K.Modi vrs. Undeterred, the plaintiff thereafter has instituted the present suit on 24.6.2005. Therefore, the question at this stage, would than arise as to whether a party can be permitted to indulge in filing frivolous and vexatious proceedings and whether the same amount to abuse of process of Court. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.K.Modi vrs. K.N.Modi and others, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 573 has dealt in detail with the proposition as to what would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court, one of which pertains to re-litigation. It has been held at paragraphs 43 to 46 as follows: 43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase "abuse of the process of the Court" thus : "This terms connotes that the process of the Court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The Court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. . . . . . . . . The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material." 44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of Court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the Court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of Courts' discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped not; and thi discretion has to be exercised with exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding. 45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard (1947) 2 All ER 255, the Court had to consider different proceedings on the same cause of action for conspiracy, but supported by different averments. The Court held that if the plaintiff has chosen to put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction before the Court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with the plea of res judicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out on the ground that the action is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. 46. In Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force (1980) 2 All ER 227, the Court of Appeal in England struck out the pleading on the ground that the action was an abuse of the process of the Court since it raised an issue identical to that which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs' earlier criminal trial. The Court said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint on the ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of the process of the Court because it is an abuse for a party to re-litigate a question or issue which has already been decided against him even though the other party cannot satisfy the strict rule of res judicata or the requirement of issue estoppels. 11. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in ( 2013(2) SCC 398 , has dealt in detail with “ abuse of process of Court” in the following terms: Abuse of the process of Court : “31. 11. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in ( 2013(2) SCC 398 , has dealt in detail with “ abuse of process of Court” in the following terms: Abuse of the process of Court : “31. Now, we shall deal with the question whether both or any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 111/2011 and 125/2011 are guilty of suppression of material facts, not approaching the Court with clean hands, and thereby abusing the process of the Court. Before we dwell upon the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case laws which would help us in dealing with the present situation with greater precision. 32. The cases of abuse of the process of court and such allied matters have been arising before the Courts consistently. This Court has had many occasions where it dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated the principles that would govern the obligations of a litigant while approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that would uniformly apply to a variety of cases. These are: 32.1. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the Courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts and came to the courts with 'unclean hands'. Courts have held that such litigants are neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the case nor entitled to any relief. 32.2. The people, who approach the Court for relief on an ex parte statement, are under a contract with the court that they would state the whole case fully and fairly to the court and where the litigant has broken such faith, the discretion of the court cannot be exercised in favour of such a litigant. 32.3. The obligation to approach the Court with clean hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly been reiterated by this Court. 32.4. Quests for personal gains have become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts in the court proceedings. Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have over-shadowed the old ethos of litigative values for small gains. 32.5. 32.4. Quests for personal gains have become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and suppress facts in the court proceedings. Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have over-shadowed the old ethos of litigative values for small gains. 32.5. A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 32.6. The Court must ensure that its process is not abused and in order to prevent abuse of the process the court, it would be justified even in insisting on furnishing of security and in cases of serious abuse, the Court would be duty bound to impose heavy costs. 32.7. Wherever a public interest is invoked, the Court must examine the petition carefully to ensure that there is genuine public interest involved. The stream of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants. 32.8. The Court, especially the Supreme Court, has to maintain strictest vigilance over the abuse of the process of court and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be granted “visa”. Many societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed grievances and the Court should endure to take cases where the justice of the lis well-justifies it. [Refer : Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 114 ; Amar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC 69 and State of Uttaranchal v Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 402 ]. 33. Access jurisprudence requires Courts to deal with the legitimate litigation whatever be its form but decline to exercise jurisdiction, if such litigation is an abuse of the process of the Court. In P.S.R. Sadhanantham Arunachalam & Anr (1980) 3 SCC 141 the Court “15. The crucial significance of access jurisprudence has been best expressed by Cappelletti: “The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured be a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured be a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement the most basic 'humanright' of a system which purports to guarantee legal rights.” 16. We are thus satisfied that the bogey of busybodies blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Article 136 is chimerical. Access to justice to every bona fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action, pro bono proceedings, are. We cannot dwell in the home of processual obsolescence when our Constitution highlights social justice as a goal. We hold that there is no merit in the contentions of the writ petitioner and dismiss the petition.” 34. It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties, as truth is the basis of the Justice Delivery System. 35. With the passage of time, it has been realised that people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the Courts, irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in all cases. The Court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is the foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. The parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant st approach the Court with clean hands It is the bounden the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the Court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs. 36. The party not approaching the Court with clean hands would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is bound to make “full and true disclosure of facts”. (Refer : Tilokchand H.B. Motichand & Ors. v. Munshi & Anr. [ 1969 (1) SCC 110 ]; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam & Anr. [ (2012) 6 SCC 430 ]; Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma [(1995) SCC 1 421]; Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India & Ors. [ (2011) 6 SCC 145 ]; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. [ (2011) 7 SCC 639 ]; Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India & Anr. [ (2011) 3 SCC 287 )]. 37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. [ (2011) 7 SCC 639 ]; Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India & Anr. [ (2011) 3 SCC 287 )]. 37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal maxim jurenaturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not become a source of abuse of the process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands. 38. No litigant can play 'hide and seek' with the courts or adopt 'pick and choose'. True facts ought to be disclosed as the Court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even as a technique of advocacy In such the Court is duty bound to contempt of court for abusing the process of the court. [K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 12 SCC 481]. 39. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) v. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 ).” 12. Now, it is to be seen as to whether the conduct of the respondents was infact in abuse of the process of the Court. What is “abuse of process of Court” of course has not been defined or given any meaning in the Code of Civil Procedure. (Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) v. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 ).” 12. Now, it is to be seen as to whether the conduct of the respondents was infact in abuse of the process of the Court. What is “abuse of process of Court” of course has not been defined or given any meaning in the Code of Civil Procedure. However, a party to a litigation can be said to be guilty of abuse of process of the Court in any of the following cases as held by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in Ranipet Municipality Rep. by its…. Vs. M. Shamsheerkhan, reported in 1998 (1) CTC 66 at paragraph 9. To quote: “9. It is this conduct of the respondent that is attacked by the petitioner as abuse of process of Court. What is 'abuse of the process of the Court'? Of course, for the term 'abuse of the process of the Court' the Code of Civil Procedure has not given any definition. A party to a litigation is said to be guilty of abuse of process of the Court, in any of the following cases:- (1) Gaining an unfair advantage by the use of a rule of procedure. (2) Contempt of the authority of the Court by a party or stranger. (3) Fraud or collusion in Court proceedings as between parties. (4) Retention of a benefit wrongly received. (5) Resorting to and encouraging multiplicity of proceedings. (6) Circumventing of the law by indirect means. (7) Presence of witness during examination of previous witness. (8) Institution vexatious, obstructive or dilatory actions. (9) Introduction of Scandalous or objectionable matter in (10) Executing a decree manifestly at variance with its purpose and intent. (11) Institution of a suit by a puppet plaintiff. (12) Institution of a suit in the name of the firm by one partner against the majority opinion of other partners etc.” The above are only some of the instances where a party may be said to be guilty of committing of “ abuse of process of the Court”. 13. An important provision contained in Order 2 Rule 2 appears to have been totally ignored by the learned Court below. The object behind the enactment was this provision is to prevent multiplicity of litigation on the same cause of action. 13. An important provision contained in Order 2 Rule 2 appears to have been totally ignored by the learned Court below. The object behind the enactment was this provision is to prevent multiplicity of litigation on the same cause of action. Undisputedly, the plaintiff had filed a suit earlier and the plea which has now been raised in the present suit was definitely available to him when he filed the previous suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 28/1 of 1992 in the Court of Sub Judge First Class, Court No. 1, Rohru. In terms of Order 2 Rule 2 in case the plaintiff omits to sue or knowingly relinquishes any portion of the claim which he is entitled to make, he thereafter is precluded from making such claim afterwards unless of course the leave of the Court as contemplated under Order 2 Rule 2(3) is sought. The rule engrafts a laudable principle that discourages/prohibits vexing the defendant again and again by multiple suits except in situation where one of the several reliefs though available to a plaintiff may not have been claimed for a good reason. Even in such case, which relief will be granted only with the leave of the Court which of course would be on due satisfaction and after recording sufficient reason. 14. This aspect of the matter has been considered in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited vs. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, reported in 2013 (1) SCC 625 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at paragraphs 9 to 12 and 17 as follows: “9. Order II Rule 1 requires every suit to include the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of any particular situation where a plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of the claim which he is entitled to make. If the plaintiff so acts, Order II Rule 2 of CPC makes it clear that he shall not, afterwards, sue for the part or portion of the claim that has been omitted or relinquished. It must be noticed that Order II Rule 2 (2) does not contemplate omission or relinquishment of any portion of the plaintiff's claim with the leave of the court so as to entitle him to come back later to seek what has been omitted or relinquished. It must be noticed that Order II Rule 2 (2) does not contemplate omission or relinquishment of any portion of the plaintiff's claim with the leave of the court so as to entitle him to come back later to seek what has been omitted or relinquished. Such leave of the Court is contemplated by Order II Rule 2(3) in situations where a plaintiff being entitled to more than one relief on a particular cause of action, omits to sue for all such reliefs. In such a situation, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a subsequent suit to claim the relief earlier omitted except in a situation where leave of the Court had been obtained. It is, therefore, clear from a conjoint reading of the provisions of Order II Rule 2 (2) and (3) of the CPC that the aforesaid two sub-rules of Order II Rule 2 contemplate two different situations, namely, where a plaintiff omits or relinquishes a part of a claim which he is entitled to make and, secondly, where the plaintiff omits or relinquishes one out of the several reliefs that he could have claimed in the suit. It is only in the latter situations where the plaintiff can file a subsequent suit seeking the relief omitted in the earlier suit proved that at the time of omission to claim the particular relief he had obtained leave of the Court in the first suit. 10. The object behind enactment of Order II Rule 2 (2) and (3) of the CPC is not far to seek. The Rule engrafts a laudable principle that discourages/prohibits vexing the defendant again and again by multiple suits except in a situation where one of the several reliefs, though available to a plaintiff, may not have been claimed for a good reason. A later suit for such relief is contemplated only with the leave of the Court which leave, naturally, will be granted upon due satisfaction and for good and sufficient reasons. The situations where the bar under Order II Rule 2 (2) and (3) will be attracted have been enumerated in a long line of decisions spread over a century now. A later suit for such relief is contemplated only with the leave of the Court which leave, naturally, will be granted upon due satisfaction and for good and sufficient reasons. The situations where the bar under Order II Rule 2 (2) and (3) will be attracted have been enumerated in a long line of decisions spread over a century now. Though each of the aforesaid decisions contain a clear and precise narration of the principles of law arrived at after a detailed analysis, the principles laid down in the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [ AIR 1964 SC 1810 ] may be usefully recalled below: “In order that a plea of a bar under O. 2. r. 2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (1) that the second suit was in respect of the of action that hich the previous suit plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief, (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar.” The above principles have been reiterated in several later judgments of this Court. Reference by way of illustration may be made to the judgments Deva Ram & Anr. v. Ishwar Chand & Anr. [ 1995 (6) SCC 733 ] and M/s. Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. M/s Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co.& Anr. [ AIR 1997 SC 1398 ] 11. The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order II Rule 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit. [ AIR 1997 SC 1398 ] 11. The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order II Rule 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit. It will be wholly unnecessary to enter into any discourse on the true meaning of the said expression, i.e. cause of action, particularly, in view of the clear enunciation in a recent judgment of this Court in the Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee [JT 2012 (6) SC 149]. The huge number of opinions rendered on the issue including the judicial pronouncements available does not fundamentally detract from what is stated in Halsbury's Law of England, (4th Edition). The following reference from the above work would, therefore, be apt for being extracted herein-below: “Cause of Action” has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that particular action the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." 12. In the instant case though leave to sue for the relief of specific performance at later stage was claimed by the plaintiff in C. S. Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005, admittedly, no such leave was granted by the Court. The question, therefore, that the Court will have to address, in the present case, is whether the cause of action for the first and second set of suits is one and the same. Depending on such answer as the Court may offer the rights of the parties will follow. 17. The question, therefore, that the Court will have to address, in the present case, is whether the cause of action for the first and second set of suits is one and the same. Depending on such answer as the Court may offer the rights of the parties will follow. 17. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier Division Bench order in the case of R.Vimalchand and M.Ratanchand v. Ramalingam, T.Srinivasalu & T. Venkatesaperumal (supra) holding that the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC would be applicable only when the first suit is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits, it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of Order II, Rule 2(3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline required the learned Single Judge of the High Court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable to agree with the same in view of the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC as already discussed by us, namely, that Order II Rule 2 of the CPC seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on same cause of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand fully sub-served by holding that the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the second suit has been filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order II, Rule 2 of the CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations. Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti v. Bhola Ram [(1894) ILR 16 All 165] and by the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji v. Raghunath [ AIR 1954 BOM 125 ].” 15. Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti v. Bhola Ram [(1894) ILR 16 All 165] and by the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji v. Raghunath [ AIR 1954 BOM 125 ].” 15. Admittedly, in this case, the plaintiff has not sought any permission from the Court to file the suit and earlier to that the proceedings conducted under the nautor Scheme have concluded against the plaintiff which were the subject matter in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff and at the time of filing of said suit, the grounds taken and relief prayed for by the plaintiff in the present suit were also available to him. Instead of availing these grounds, the plaintiff intelligently got instituted a suit on behalf of his father which too unfortunately to the luck of the appellant came to be dismissed. 16. Now, in such a situation, can these present proceedings be termed as bonafide or are they frivolous, vexatious or oppressive? There can be no manner of doubt that the present proceedings are vexatious, obstructive apart from being a dilatory action in the Court of law whereby the plaintiff has abused the process of the Court by instituting multiplicity of proceedings for ones own aggrendisement. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and ors., reported in 2011 (3) SCC 408 , reiterating the principles of res judicata and abuse of process of Court observed as follows: “12. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely, `interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is `nemo debet his ve ari, si constet curiae quod sit pro un aet eademn cause' meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest. 13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colourand pretence of law in as much as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing Court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.” 17. Thus, what clearly emerges from the aforesaid is that no litigant can be permitted to indulge in re-litigation and file successive suits or petitions because the general principles underline the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately policy is that the decision pronounced by the Court of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless modified or reversed by the appellate authorities and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice, because such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice. The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but it also covers issues of facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be a abuse of process of Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect thereof. This was so observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 683 , at paragraphs 32 to 40: “32. This was so observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka and another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 683 , at paragraphs 32 to 40: “32. Res judicata is a doctrine based on the larger public interest and is founded on two grounds: one being the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa ("No one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause" ) and second, public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation . It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter "the CPC") is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof and hence, the Section is not to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law. The main purpose of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to re-agitate the matter again and again. Section 11 of the CPC recognises this principle and forbids a court from trying any suit or issue, which is res judicata, recognising both 'cause of action estoppel' and 'issue estoppel'. There are two issues that we need to consider, one, whether the doctrine of res judicata, as a matter of principle, can be applied to Public Interest Litigations and second, whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy (supra) constitute res judicata for the present litigation. 33. Explanation VI to Section 11 states:"Explanation VI.-Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating." 34. Explanation VI came up for consideration before this Court in Forward Construction Co and Ors Prabhat Mandal d Ors of Explanation VI, it could not be disputed that Section 11 applies to Public Interest Litigation, as long as it is shown that the previous litigation was in public interest and not by way of private grievance. Further, the previous litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. 35. Further, the previous litigation has to be a bona fide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others. 35. As a matter of fact, in a Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner is not agitating his individual rights but represents the public at large. As long as the litigation is bona fide, a judgment in a previous Public Interest Litigation would be a judgment in rem. It binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming forward before the court and raising any connected issue or an issue, which had been raised/should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of a Public Interest Litigation. It cannot be doubted that the petitioner in Somashekar Reddy (supra) was acting bona fide. Further, we may note that, as a retired Chief Engineer, Somashekar Reddy had the special technical expertise to impugn the Project on the grounds that he did and so, he cannot be dismissed as a busybody. Thus, we are satisfied in principle that Somashekar Reddy (supra), as a Public Interest Litigation, could bar the present litigation. 36. We will presently consider whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy (supra) actually constitute res judicata for the present litigation. Section 11 of the CPC undoubtedly provides that only those matters that were "directly and substantially in issue" in the previous proceeding will constitute res judicata in the subsequent proceeding. Explanation III to Section 11 provides that for an issue to be res judicata it should have been raised by one party and expressly denied by the other: "Explanation III. -The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other." 37. Further, Explanation IV to Section 11, states: "Explanation IV. -Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." 38. Further, Explanation IV to Section 11, states: "Explanation IV. -Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." 38. The spirit behind Explanation IV is brought out in the pithy words of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson as follows: "The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to point which properl belonged to th subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." 39. In Greenhalgh v. Mallard (hereinafter "Greenhalgh"), Somervell L.J. observed thus:"I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them." 40. The judgment in Greenhalgh (supra) was approvingly referred to by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain . Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit, Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. (supra) by holding that: "An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had (sic) decided as incidental to or essentially connected with (sic) subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.” 18. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.” 18. Thus, it can be safely concluded that if adjudication is conclusive and final, not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and not to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially conducted with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of matters of claim and defences. The filing of the present suit is a classical example of abuse of the process of Court by re-litigating and is, therefore, contrary to justice and public policy for a party cannot be permitted to against him. The aforesaid discussion leaves no manner of doubt that the Court infact should have invoked the provisions of Order 6 Rule 16 and nipped the litigation at the very initial stage. 19. Coming to the facts of the case, issue No. 5 dealt with the applicability of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure i.e. plea of res judicata, which has been dealt with and answered in the following manner: “Issue No. (v). 29. The plaintiffs earlier had claimed ownership of the suit land by adverse possession. In suit under consideration, the plaintiffs say that allotment of the suit land in favour of the defendant No. 2 was wrong, illegal, void and of no consequence. Cause of action for institution of the suit under consideration was separate from cause of action of earlier suits. In view of this position and my answer to issues No. (i) to (iii), suit is not barred by the principle of resjudicata under Section 11 of CPC. Issue No. (v) is answered against the defendants.” 20. It is shocking to note the manner in which the issue has been dealt with especially when a reference to the previous proceedings interse parties have not even been made and the provisions of explanation IV and VIII of Section 11 have been given complete go by. Issue No. (v) is answered against the defendants.” 20. It is shocking to note the manner in which the issue has been dealt with especially when a reference to the previous proceedings interse parties have not even been made and the provisions of explanation IV and VIII of Section 11 have been given complete go by. Explanation IV and VIII of Section 11, read as follows: “Explanation IV: Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation VIII: An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” 21. This Court in Krishan Gopal and others vrs. Mehar Singh and others, decided on 15.7.2014, has dealt with the aforesaid provisions in the “12. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with res judicata as under: “11. Res judicata. – No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I to III: xxx xxx xxx Explanation-IV.-Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.” Therefore, in terms of the aforesaid provision, as a general rule, every ground of attack with reference to the title sued on must be pleaded and the plaintiffs will not be allowed to make out a fresh case afterwards. Conversely, if the decree passed in the previous suit is inconsistent with a defence which ought to have been raised, that defence must be deemed to have been raised and finally decided, and is barred by principle of res judicata. 13. Conversely, if the decree passed in the previous suit is inconsistent with a defence which ought to have been raised, that defence must be deemed to have been raised and finally decided, and is barred by principle of res judicata. 13. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. No doubt, where a matter has been constructive in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. and others vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) “20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to S. 11, C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.” 14. The law on the subject has been dealt with in detail in three Judges Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane (dead) by LRs and others vs. Vithu Hira Mahar (dead) by LRs and others (2009) 10 SCC 273 wherein it has been held as under: “Res judicata and the Code of Civil Procedure 42. It is well known that the doctrine of res- judicata is civil suits. But apart from the codified law, the doctrine of res-judicata or the principle of the res-judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by courts in England, India and other countries. The rule of constructive res-judicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other situations also Principles not only of direct res-judicata but of constructive res-judicata are also applied, if by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicitly decided, the decision operates as res-judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties. 43. The principle of res- judicata comes into play when by judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implications even then the Principle of res- judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided. [See Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1978 SC 1283 ]. 44. In Swamy Atmandanda vs. Sri Ramakrishna, Tapovanam [ (2005) 10 SCC 51 ], it was held by this court : (SCC p.61 paras 26-27) "26. [See Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1978 SC 1283 ]. 44. In Swamy Atmandanda vs. Sri Ramakrishna, Tapovanam [ (2005) 10 SCC 51 ], it was held by this court : (SCC p.61 paras 26-27) "26. The object and purport of the principle of res judicata as contended in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute book with view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other side may not be put to harassment. 27. The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter in another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point that was determined in the earlier judgment." 45. When the material issue has been tried and determined between the same parties in a proper suit by a competent court as to the status of one of them in relation to the other, it cannot be again tried in another suit between them as laid down in Krishna Behari Roy vs. Bunwari Lal Roy reported in [1875 ILR (IC144)], which is followed by this Court in the 28 case of Ishwar Dutt Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. [ (2005) 7 SCC 190 ], wherein the doctrine of `cause of action estoppel' and `issue estoppel' has been discussed. It is laid down by this Court, that if there is an issue between the parties that is decided, the same would operate as a res-judicata between the same parties in the subsequent proceedings. This court in the case of Isher Singh vs. Sarwan Singh, [ AIR 1965 SC 948 ] has observed : (AIR p.951, para 11) "11. It is laid down by this Court, that if there is an issue between the parties that is decided, the same would operate as a res-judicata between the same parties in the subsequent proceedings. This court in the case of Isher Singh vs. Sarwan Singh, [ AIR 1965 SC 948 ] has observed : (AIR p.951, para 11) "11. We thus reach the position that in the former suit the heirship of the respondents to Jati deceased (a) was in terms raised by the pleadings, (b) that an issue was framed in regard to it by the trial Judge, (c) that evidence was led by the parties on that point directed towards this issue, (d) a finding was recorded on it by the appellate court, and (e) that on the proper construction of the pleadings it would have been necessary to decide the issue in order to properly and completely decide all the conditions necessary to satisfy the test as to the applicability of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is satisfied." 46. So far as the finding drawn in the suit for injunction in O.S. No.104 of 1953, regarding adoption would also operate as a res-judicata in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair [ (1994) 2 SCC 14 ]. It is observed: "The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, it operates as a res-judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res-judicata. “9….It is a settled law that in a Suit for injunction when title is in issue, for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties when the same is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, the decree in injunction suit equally operates as a res-judicata." (SCC p.20,para 9) 47. The same view is reiterated in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 3272 ]. The same view is reiterated in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 3272 ]. This Court has stated, that, even in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in the later suit or proceedings, where title is directly in question, unless it is established, that it was "necessary" in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was found or based on the bindings of title Even the framing of issue may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case.” 15. The principle of res judicata comes into play when by judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implications not only this, when any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eyes of the law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, it is taken as decided. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 . 16. The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, operates as a res judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res judicata. (See: Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994) 2 SCC 14 and Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh (2000) 7 SCC 543 : AIR 2000 SC 3272 . 17. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not contest the suit of Mathi. Not only this, they were even satisfied with the awards made by the Land Acquisition Collector/ Courts. Undisputedly, the basis of such awards in so far as it relates to the apportionment of shares was determined entirely on the basis of the judgment and decree in Mathi’s case. 17. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not contest the suit of Mathi. Not only this, they were even satisfied with the awards made by the Land Acquisition Collector/ Courts. Undisputedly, the basis of such awards in so far as it relates to the apportionment of shares was determined entirely on the basis of the judgment and decree in Mathi’s case. Thus, the learned Courts below have rightly concluded that the appellants having accepted the judgment and decree in Mathi’s case to attain finality and thereafter having withdrawn the amount of compensation are clearly estopped from filing the present suit. 18. Mr. G.C.Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellants would contend that the determination of the question of title under Land Acquisition Act would parties and has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar and another (2003) 3 SCC 128 more particularly the following observations: “34. The award made by the Collector is final and conclusive as between the Collector and the 'persons interested', whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area, i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) as to value of the land, i.e. the amount of compensation, and (iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the 'persons interested' - again, between the Collector and the 'persons interested' and not as amongst the 'persons interested' inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for u/S. 18, the Collector's award on these issues; if varied by Civil Court, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation is payable; in spite of the award by Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.” 19. Mr. The scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation is payable; in spite of the award by Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.” 19. Mr. G.C.Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants would also contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly stated that the scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom the compensation is payable; inspite of the award by the Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum. 20. I am afraid that I cannot agree with these submissions. Firstly, it is not on the basis of the award of the Collector that plea of res judicata is being raised by the other side. This plea is being raised on the basis of the award passed by the learned District Judge Shimla in Acquisition Act. It was not only the adequacy of the compensation but even the apportionment which had been questioned and thereafter determined by the competent court of jurisdiction which determination has attained finality. 21. The plea of res judicata being applicable on question of title determined by the Land Acquisition Collector and thereafter by the competent court in reference is no longer res-integra. Reference can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon’ble in T.B.Ramchandra Rao and another vs. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao and others AIR 1922 Privy Council, 80. The position of law reiterated and followed in Mt. Bhagwati vs. Mt. Ram Kali AIR 1939 Privy Council 133 in the following terms: “In order successfully to establish a plea of res judicata or estoppel by record it is necessary to show that in a previous case a Court having jurisdiction to try the question came to a decision necessarily and substantially involving the determination of the matter in issue in the later case. It was at one time a matter of doubt in India whether the determination of a Court to which a matter has been referred by the Collector Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was such a decision. It was at one time a matter of doubt in India whether the determination of a Court to which a matter has been referred by the Collector Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was such a decision. That doubt was resolved, by the judgment of this Board in Raniachmdra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (1922) L.R. 49 I.A. 129 : S.C. 24 Bom. L.R. 963, which decided that, where a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation has been referred to the Court, a decree thereon not appealed from renders the question of title res judicata in a suit between the parties to the dispute. In that case some question arose as to whether any appeal lay to His Majesty in Council in a case where the determination of the Judge ended in an award and not in a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the persons claiming compensation, involving, it might be, judgment has, however, become academic, since an appeal to His Majesty in Council is now given by Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which was added by amendment in 1921 and enacts : Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2), and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. If, then, in a matter referred to him by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, a Judge to whom it is referred has in a dispute as to their title to the land between two of the parties claiming compensation, determined that dispute, the matter is res judicata and binds the parties in any later suit involving that issue……...” 22. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the question of title determined under the Land Acquisition Act would operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings relating to title. The decision of the Hon’ble Privy Council aforesaid was followed and statement of law made therein was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shrimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others vs. Banamali Sen and others AIR 1953 SC 33 in the following manner: “20. It was then argued by Mr. The decision of the Hon’ble Privy Council aforesaid was followed and statement of law made therein was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shrimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others vs. Banamali Sen and others AIR 1953 SC 33 in the following manner: “20. It was then argued by Mr. Ghose that the Judge who decided the apportionment issue in the land acquisition proceedings of 1928 was a special Judge appointed under the land Acquisition Act and not being a District Judge, the two decisions of the Privy Council, i.e., Ramachandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, 49 I. A. 129 and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali, 66 I.A. 145 had no application, as the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the present suit, while the District Judge in those cases would have jurisdiction to hear the regular suits. It was urged that to substantiate the plea of res-judicata even on general principles of law it was necessary that the Court that heard and decided the former case should be a Court competent to hear the subsequent case. This contention was based on the language of S. 11. “The condition regarding the competency of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitations engrafted on the general rule of res judicata by s.11of the Code and has application to suits alone. When a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the Court that heard and decided the former case was a Court of competent jurisdiction. It does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction like revenue Courts, land acquisition Courts, administration Courts, etc. It is obvious that these Courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute.” We have not been able to appreciate the distinction sought to be made out by Mr. Ghose that had this matter been decided by a District Judge, then the decision of the Privy Council would have been res judicata but as it was by a special Judge the effect was different. Ghose that had this matter been decided by a District Judge, then the decision of the Privy Council would have been res judicata but as it was by a special Judge the effect was different. The District Judge when exercising powers of a Court under the Land Acquisition Act, in that capacity is not entitled to try a regular suit and his jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act is quite different from the jurisdiction he exercises on the regular civil side.” 23. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by courts that are competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of the judgments is an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country and the law on this subject has been summed up by the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Unnikrishnan and another vs. V.K.Mahanudevan and others (2014) 4 SCC 434 wherein it has been held as under: “19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by Courts that are competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457 where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words: (AIR p. 1462, paras 9 & 11) “9. ….It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. 11.…The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.” 20. 11.…The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.” 20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res- judicata is also fairly well settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 65 , this Court observed: (AIR p.72, para-23) “23.There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as ‘res judicata’ between the parties to it. The correctness or upon the question whether or not it operates as ‘res judicata’.” 21. Similarly in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee AIR 1966 SC 1061 , this Court reiterated the above principles in the following words : (AIR p.1066, para 14) “14.…..A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides.” 22. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (2013) 5 SCC 252 is a timely reminder of the very same principle. The following passage in this regard is apposite: (SCC pp.267-68, para44) “44.…..In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate issues which have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, every time either a statute or a provision thereof is declared ultra vires, it would have the result of reopening of the decided matters within the period of limitation following the date of such decision.” 24. The law on the subject has been reiterated in another recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2014) 5 SCC 75 in the following terms: “39.The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question. The law on the subject has been reiterated in another recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2014) 5 SCC 75 in the following terms: “39.The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question. The literal meaning of “ res ” is “everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status” and “ res judicata ” literally means “a matter adjudged a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgments”. “ Res judicata pro judicata ”, which means that res judicata is accepted for truth. The doctrine contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment which is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence “ interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim “ nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa ” (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). 40. Even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. (Vide: Shah Shivraj Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi & Ors. , AIR 1949 PC 302; and Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors. , AIR 1953 SC 65 ). 41. In Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v. Banamali Sen & Ors. , AIR 1953 SC 33 , this Court while dealing with the doctrine of res judicata referred to and relied upon the judgment in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh , AIR 1916 PC 78 wherein it had been observed as under: (Raj Lakshmi Dasi AIR p.38 para 15) “15......... the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient precedents, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time..... Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source, it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators. the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient precedents, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time..... Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source, it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators. Vijnanesvara and Nilakantha include the plea of a former judgment among those allowed by law, each citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana, who describes the plea thus: 'If a person though defeated at law again he should be formerly". This is called the plea of former judgment.’... And so the application of the rule by the courts in India should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law’ (Sheoparsan Singh case, IA pp.98-99).” 42. This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr. , AIR 1960 SC 941 explained the scope of principle of res-judicata observing as under: (AIR p.943 para 7) “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.” A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao & Ors. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.” A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457 ; Greater Cochin Development Authority v. Leelamma Valson & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 952 ; and Bhanu Kumar Jain Archana Kumar & Anr (2005) 1 SCC 43. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1013 , considered the issue of res judicata applicable in writ jurisdiction and held as under: (AIR p. 1018, para 17) “17....Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed under Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the petitions filed under Art. 32 does not in any way impair or affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It only seeks to regulate the manner in which the said rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in courts of law.” 44. In Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & Anr., (1999) 5 SCC 590 , this Court has explained the scope of finality of the judgment of this Court observing as under: (SCC pp.604 & 607, paras 17 & 26) “17…..One important consideration of public policy is that the decision pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by the appellate authority and other principle that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice ever because such a procedure should be contrary to consideration of fair play and justice. 26.……Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it.” (See also: Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees , AIR 1957 SC 38 ; G.K. Dudani & Ors. v. S.D. Sharma Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. , (1998) 4 SCC 361 .) 45. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it.” (See also: Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees , AIR 1957 SC 38 ; G.K. Dudani & Ors. v. S.D. Sharma Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. , (1998) 4 SCC 361 .) 45. A three-Judge Bench of this court in The State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal, AIR 1971 SC 1676 considered the issue and came to the conclusion that if necessary facts were present in the mind of the parties and had gone into by the court, in such a fact-situation, absence of specific plea in written statement and framing of specific issue of res judicata by the court is immaterial. 46. A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Union of India v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1370 observing as under: (AIR p.1372, para 5) “5.This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v. State of Gujarat , AIR 1965 SC 1153 observed that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to all earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata , any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. There is no good reason to preclude, such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest.” 47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of decision must b understood in the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of decision must b understood in the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 22. It cannot be disputed that at the time of filing of Civil Suit No. 28/1 of 1992, these pleas, as raised in the present suit were available to the plaintiff and undisputedly no liberty whatsoever had been sought by the plaintiff under Order 2 Rule 2(3) CPC so as to enable him to file the present suit and thus the suit was clearly not maintainable and barred under the provisions of Section 11 Explanation IV. Not only this, the orders passed by the limited Court of jurisdiction i.e. the Commissioner and thereafter affirmed by the Financial Commissioner in respect of the land in question had already attained finality and, therefore, the effect of these judgments could not have even been challenged what to talk of being reversed in the present proceedings in view of the clear cut bar imposed by Explanation VIII to Section 11. 23. Clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue has to be shown in a plaint as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Arivandam vrs. T.V. Satyapal and another, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 467 . 24. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it can conveniently be concluded that the suit as instituted was not maintainable and barred by the principles of not only constructive res judicata but also res judicata. 25. Since, I have held the suit itself to be not maintainable, therefore, the other questions as raised in this appeal are not required to be gone into and the same have only been rendered academic. 25. Since, I have held the suit itself to be not maintainable, therefore, the other questions as raised in this appeal are not required to be gone into and the same have only been rendered academic. In normal circumstances, this would have been a fit case where heavy costs should have been imposed upon the plaintiffs’ but taking into consideration that there has been a decree passed in his Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 30.7.2012 passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, in Civil Suit No. 18-S/1 of 2009/05 is set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed.