Judgment 1. Heard Mr. C. Pereira, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. M. Pereira, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1 and Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2. 2. Rule. By consent, Rule is made returnable and heard forthwith. 3. By this petition, the petitioners have challenged the show cause notice bearing no. SGPDA/P/5112/2145/12-13, dated 25/01/2013 issued by respondent no. 1 to the petitioners as to why the Development Permission granted to the petitioners vide order No. SGPDA/P/5112/1411/10-11 dated 29/10/2010 should not be revoked and the order dated 26/06/2013 passed by respondent no. 1 thereby revoking the said Development Permission. 4. Case of the petitioners, in short, is as follows: Petitioner no. 1 is a company registered under the Companies Act and petitioner no. 2 is its Shareholder and Director. The petitioner no. 1 is the owner of the property bearing Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of City Survey of Margao in which there existed a residential house of transferors of petitioners. The access to the said property and the house was always through the Public Works Department's tarred road to the road connecting Erasmo Carvalho road of the city of Margao. The said road existed from inception and was located within Chalta Nos. 391 and 413 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of City Survey of Margao. After obtaining Sanad for conversion of the said land for change of user under the provisions of Land Revenue Code on 21/05/2010, the petitioner no.1 applied to the respondent no. 1, by an application dated 04/08/2010, for permission for development of the said property under Section 44 of the Town and Country Planning Act. The said application was accompanied by certified copy of the survey plan of the said property maintained under Land Revenue Code, Form D, the site plan and the plans of the proposed construction. The development of the said property consisted of a building consisting of basement, ground floor and six upper floors. The said application was accompanied by certified copy of the survey plan of the said property maintained under Land Revenue Code, Form D, the site plan and the plans of the proposed construction. The development of the said property consisted of a building consisting of basement, ground floor and six upper floors. Upon obtaining the said order, the petitioners submitted along with the order and the approved plan, an application for grant of construction licence to the Margao Municipal Council under the provisions of Municipalities Act, which authority, upon scrutiny of the said plan submitted along with the application and on inspection of site, granted a licence to the petitioners on 24/02/2011 for construction of the building in terms of the plan approved by the respondent no. 1 on 29/10/2010 and upon payment by the petitioners of the licence fee of Rs. 2,05,200/- for a period of one year from the date of grant of the licence which has been renewed for a period of one year and was valid till the filing of the petition. The petitioner no. 1 also obtained N.O.C.s from the Health Officer of Urban Health Centre, Margao, as also a certificate from the Fire Officer under the provisions of the Fire Act which the petitioners obtained from the Urban Health Centre, Margao and Fire and Emergency Services, Panaji which were granted to the petitioners on 12/11/2010 and 31/01/2011 respectively and also obtained an alignment under the provisions of Municipalities Act and Bye-laws framed thereunder. After obtaining the alignment from the Margao Municipal Council, the petitioners commenced the construction of footings and erection of columns of the proposed building. The petitioners completed the basement on 30/09/2011 and proceeded with the construction stage wise and spent an amount of about Rs. 10.06 Crores (excluding land cost, interest, etc.). On 25/02/2011, the respondent no. 2, who claims to be one of the co-owners of the property bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and otherwise owns a building abutting western side of the tarred road and has an establishment at the ground floor, filed a complaint to the respondent no. 1 and the Chief Officer of Margao Municipal Council. Margao Municipal Council wrote a letter dated 02/05/2011 to the respondent no. 1 enclosing the complaint of respondent no. 2 and requesting the respondent no. 1 and the Chief Officer of Margao Municipal Council. Margao Municipal Council wrote a letter dated 02/05/2011 to the respondent no. 1 enclosing the complaint of respondent no. 2 and requesting the respondent no. 1 to look into the matter and take necessary action under intimation to the petitioners. On 27/10/2011, the respondent no. 1 wrote a letter to the petitioners titled as complaint regarding proposed development in petitioners' property and referring to the letter dated 02/05/2011 of the Margao Municipal Council and the letter dated 28/04/2011 received from the respondent no. 2. In the said letter, the petitioner no. 1 was directed to submit clarifications in writing pertaining to the issues raised by the complainant within 15 days of the receipt of the letter, failing which the respondent no. 1 would be compelled to initiate further necessary action against the petitioners. By a reply dated 12/11/2011 addressed to the respondent no. 1, wrongly mentioned as 12/10/2011 and in-warded in the office of the respondent no. 1 on 14/11/2011, the petitioner no.1, inter alia, stated that the petitioners' property had an access from the property bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 which was mainly a public road; that the main gate of the compound wall was on the western side and leading out to the said Chalta No. 391; that late Mr. A. J. Barreto i.e. the transferor of the petitioners of the said property as well as his legal heirs always used the western side gate for their access; that when Mr. A. J. Barreto built a new compound wall with the permission from the respondent no. 1 under letter referred to in the said reply and construction licence from the Margao Municipal Council, the access on the western side was continued; that while granting the permission, the respondent no. 1 requested the petitioners to rebuild the wall after leaving 10 metres for road; that as a result, the petitioner no. 1 rebuilt its compound wall after leaving some space between the public road and the compound wall and the said space was also being used by the respondent no. 2; that actually, the complainant (respondent no. 2) was parking his old/dirty mixers on the said space left by the petitioners; that after the death of Shri A. J. Barreto, the respondent no. 2; that actually, the complainant (respondent no. 2) was parking his old/dirty mixers on the said space left by the petitioners; that after the death of Shri A. J. Barreto, the respondent no. 2 started parking his cars right in front of the gate blocking the access. The drain passing through the property of the petitioners forms part of their property and therefore it was not shown in the site plan. But along with the site plan, the petitioners had produced the survey plan which clearly showed the said drain. No construction has been proposed on the said drain. After the said reply, there was no action taken by the respondent no. 1 on the complaint against the grant of permission to the petitioners for construction of the said building. The petitioners, thus, proceeded with the construction of the said building. On 25/01/2013, after construction had reached to an advanced stage, the petitioner no.1 was visited with a show cause notice to the effect that the respondent no. 1 had received a complaint from respondent no. 2 regarding misrepresentation of the facts by the petitioners and stating that the said reply was not satisfactory. On 07/03/2013, the petitioner no. 1 showed cause to the said show cause notice. No personal hearing was given to the petitioners though the petitioners sought for it in the reply. There was gross violation of principles of natural justice. By order dated 26/06/2013, served on the petitioners on 01/07/2013, the revocation order was served on the petitioners. Hence, the petition. 5. By way of reply filed on behalf of the respondent no. 1, inter alia, it was alleged as under: It is false that the access to the suit property and the house existing therein was through the PWD tarred road. The complaint by Shri Sunil K. Naik dated 28/04/2011 was filed claiming that the property bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of City Survey of Margao through which the said PWD road was passing, was his own property. The petitioners did not produce any land acquisition proceedings to show that the PWD or Government owned the said property. However, there is an existing tarred road lying to the west of the said property which as per the survey records has varying width dimensions of 5 metres and more. The petitioners did not produce any land acquisition proceedings to show that the PWD or Government owned the said property. However, there is an existing tarred road lying to the west of the said property which as per the survey records has varying width dimensions of 5 metres and more. However, there is no ODP road of 10 metres width, but only the proposed 10 metres wide ODP road towards western side of the petitioners' property from which the petitioners claim access. From the documents produced along with the petition, it is evident that there is only a proposed 10 metres wide road and not an existing 10 metres wide road. The plan shows in yellow colour the existing public road and it can be seen that there are portions between the existing road and the suit property belonging to Chalta No.391 which is not part of the existing tarred road. The drain/public nullah is also visible in the petitioners' property. The width of the existing tarred road varies from 5 metres to 7 metres, if one travels parallel to the western boundary of the petitioners' plot in north to south direction. As per the building rules, there must be at the site 6 metres wide road, if advantage is to be claimed of a proposed ODP road. There is a gap between the petitioners western boundary and edge of the tarred road and this gap has been shown in Exhibit D to the petition. The petitioners cannot claim access to the road and the petitioners also cannot take benefit of the proposed 10 metres wide ODP road to say that the said proposed road touches its western boundary. For the properties zoned as C-1, an advantage can be taken of the proposed 10 metres wide road if there is an existing tarred road having width of not less than 6 metres. The respondent no. 1 had granted development permission vide order dated 29/10/2010 for construction of a building consisting of ground plus 6 stories. In clause 2 of the development permission, it was clearly stipulated that the permission would be revoked if any plans were found incorrect at any stage after the grant of permission and the petitioners would not be entitled for any compensation. In clause 2 of the development permission, it was clearly stipulated that the permission would be revoked if any plans were found incorrect at any stage after the grant of permission and the petitioners would not be entitled for any compensation. After the complaint was lodged by Sunil Naik wherein he pointed out that the property bearing Chalta No. 391 was his personal property and after making investigations, it was found that the petitioners had made misrepresentation to the extent that they showed the suit plot as accessible by a proposed 10 metres wide road, whereas there was a gap between the road and the western boundary of the said property which space in the said gap belonging to the Chalta No.391 claimed to be owned by Sunil Naik. The petitioners misrepresented to the respondent that the provisions regarding a proposed wide road would apply to the petitioners. Even under clause 3 of the order dated 29/10/2010, the respondent was right in revoking the development permission. The same principle will apply to the northern road shown on the plans submitted for approval. There is only a 4 metres wide road existing on this side. Another reason for revoking the development permission was that the petitioners did not disclose or omitted to show that there was drain passing through the suit property. Consequently, the said drain being public nullah needed to be plotted on the plans submitted for approval so that the respondent could determine whether any development/construction was supposed to be carried out over the said drains. The said drains were not plotted on the plans submitted for approval and ramps to the building have been constructed on the said spot. The respondent authority has rightly revoked the development permission in the meeting held on 13/04/2013. 6. Respondent No. 2, Sunil Naik, after having been added as respondent, also filed his affidavit-in-reply. In short, the respondent no. 2 alleged as under:- The petition involves disputed questions of facts which cannot be conveniently gone into in the exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. The petitioners have efficacious alternate remedy. The respondent no. 2 is one of the co-owners of the properties bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and Chalta No. 413 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 of Margao City, which properties have been purchased by his father late krishnanath Baburao Naik vide Sale Deed dated 28/03/2005. The petitioners have efficacious alternate remedy. The respondent no. 2 is one of the co-owners of the properties bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and Chalta No. 413 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 of Margao City, which properties have been purchased by his father late krishnanath Baburao Naik vide Sale Deed dated 28/03/2005. In answer to the public notice published in local daily 'Navhind Times' dated 30/01/2008, by which it was notified that the property under Chalta No. 71 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 was being sold, the father of the respondent no. 2 had conveyed his objection vide letter dated 11/02/2008 pointing out that Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was private property and that Chalta No. 71 had no access from Chalta No. 391 and that access to Chalta No. 71 was from the East of said Chalta No. 71. The petitioners purchased the property bearing Chalta No. 71 of P. T. Sheet No. 238, with full knowledge of the objections dated 11/02/2008 raised by the father of the respondent no. 2. Since development activities were noticed in said Chalta No. 71, in December 2010, the respondent no. 2 obtained copies of permission/plans in respect of the property under Chalta No. 71, from the respondent no. 1 and upon receipt of the same found that the petitioners had misrepresented in the plan that the access was through Chalta No. 391. Neither Chalta No. 391 nor Chalta No. 413 have been acquired. There is no public road through Chalta No. 391. The petitioners also have made misrepresentation with regard to existing nallah in Chalta No. 71 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 falsely claiming that the same was a rain water drain. There is no permission granted by District Magistrate to do any construction work over the nallah such as ramp-cum-pathway/passage for going to the parking slot. Hence, he lodged the complaint dated 25/02/2011. The show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 and revocation order dated 26/06/2013 have been rightly issued by the respondent no. 1. 7. The petitioners then filed affidavits-in-rejoinder to the replies filed by the respondents. Respondent no. 2 filed affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder and in answer to the same, petitioner no.1 filed affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder. 8. Hence, he lodged the complaint dated 25/02/2011. The show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 and revocation order dated 26/06/2013 have been rightly issued by the respondent no. 1. 7. The petitioners then filed affidavits-in-rejoinder to the replies filed by the respondents. Respondent no. 2 filed affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder and in answer to the same, petitioner no.1 filed affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder. 8. Mr C. Pereira, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the revocation order is malafide and arbitrary since the petitioners were not given a personal hearing, though in the reply, the petitioners sought for it. He submitted that the said order was passed without application of mind and on extraneous grounds. He urged that the impugned revocation order has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, since the grounds on which the revocation is sought to be done are not the grounds mentioned in the Show Cause Notice. Learned Counsel further contended that the revocation order is also in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and/or is innocuous as there is no consideration of the facts set out and the points raised by the petitioners in reply to the show cause notice. Learned Counsel pointed out that the resolution taken in the 48th meeting of SGPDA held on 13/04/2013 shows different grounds than mentioned in the show cause notice. He submitted that after the reply, in detail, was filed by the petitioners to the show cause notice, no joint inspection of site was carried out. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that in the reply dated 06/03/2013, to the show cause notice, from paragraphs 8 to 17, the petitioners had explained about the access to the property, but the same was not taken into consideration by the respondent no. 1 while passing the revocation order. He submitted that in the reply from paragraphs 18 to 22, the petitioners had in detail explained as to how and why the said part of the drain in survey Chalta no. 71 of P. T. Sheet no. 238 of Margao city was owned by the petitioners and that no construction was proposed on the drain, but the same was not taken into consideration by the respondent no. 1 whole passing the revocation order. 71 of P. T. Sheet no. 238 of Margao city was owned by the petitioners and that no construction was proposed on the drain, but the same was not taken into consideration by the respondent no. 1 whole passing the revocation order. He urged that though the respondents no 1 and 2, now, in their affidavits, filed in the present petition, have given several reasons as to why the revocation order is good, however, the revocation order which does not consider all those grounds cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavits or otherwise. Learned senior counsel pointed out that at the end in the reply, the petitioners had sought for personal hearing in the matter but no such opportunity was given to the petitioners. 9. According to the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, the land mentioned as intermediate portion/strip of land in between the existing tar road and compound wall on western side as mentioned in the said resolution dated 13/04/2013 was the land left by the petitioners as setback. Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioners had shown from the reply that they had constructed their compound wall by leaving three metres space and had to gift that space to the Municipality. He invited my attention to clause 29 of the Development Permission dated 29/10/2010 which says that the widening area should be gifted to MMC before applying for completion certificate. He submitted that the road on the western side shown under Chalta no. 391 of P.T. Sheet no. 238 is existing since last more than 50 years and the same is being repaired by PWD. In this regard he invited my attention to the letter dated 30/12/2008 addressed by Vinay Mehta, G-28, Phoenix Estate, Gogol, Margao-Goa, the representative of the petitioners, seeking information regarding the existence of the road; information furnished by MMC dated 10/02/2009 under no. 3/(c)/08-09/TECH/2695 that there is tarred road existing which is used by public and maintained by P.W.D.; and the plan(Annexure-D) to the petition. Learned Counsel showed from the said plan, Annexure-D to the petition that there are buildings all along the said road. He submitted that the said road as in shown in the said plan joins Erasmo Carvalho road within Chalta No. 413 and passes further through Chaltas No. 391 and 382 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and again connects the Erasmo Carvalho road. He submitted that the said road as in shown in the said plan joins Erasmo Carvalho road within Chalta No. 413 and passes further through Chaltas No. 391 and 382 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and again connects the Erasmo Carvalho road. He submitted that the plans were approved after carrying out inspection of the site. He invited my attention to the Checklist/Site Inspection report, which speaks about existence of 10.00 metres wide road on the western side. Learned Senior Counsel drew my attention to the photographs produced along with the petition which show the factual situation. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the respondent no. 2 is not the owner of the said road. Counsel invited my attention to the affidavit dated 28/7/2013 sworn by Lilia Maria Do Ceu Silva e Menezes, a co-owner of the property bearing Chalta No 391 of P. T. Sheet No. 238, wherein she has stated that the said Chalta number has been a public road since prior to liberation and has tarred surface and is being used by general public and is being maintained by P.W.D. Learned Counsel submitted that Silva's daughter in this affidavit has explained as to how the respondent no. 2 has no right to Chalta No. 391. He submitted that the respondents have not denied or dealt with this affidavit of Silva's daughter. My attention was drawn to clause (3) of the Sale Deed dated 28/03/2005, by which Krishnanath B. Naik purchased the property bearing Chalta Nos. 391 and 413 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 (Unsold Portion), wherein it is stated that although the Vendors had applied for the requisite permission under Section 49(6) of the Goa Town & Country Planning Act, 1974 for registering the sale deed in respect of Sold Portion as also the Unsold Portion, the requisite permission in respect of Unsold Portion was not forthcoming. He pointed that in this sale deed there is reference to the sale deed dated 08/10/2004 which pertains to the said Sold Portion. That sale deed dated 08/10/2004 has not been produced by the respondent no. 2 but has been produced by the petitioners along with their affidavit-in-rejoinder. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out from the said sale deed dated 08/10/2004 that plots 3, 4, and 7 were to be used as access and clause 4(b) of the said sale deed mentions that the said plots no. 2 but has been produced by the petitioners along with their affidavit-in-rejoinder. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out from the said sale deed dated 08/10/2004 that plots 3, 4, and 7 were to be used as access and clause 4(b) of the said sale deed mentions that the said plots no. 3, 4, and 7 are presently surveyed under chalta Nos. 391 and 413 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of the Margao City Survey. He further pointed out from the schedule of the sale deed that the on the eastern side of that Sold Portion is external and internal private road. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the plan at exhibit-D wherein the location of the properties bearing Chalta Nos. 413 and 391 has been indicated. He submitted that what has been purchased by the respondent no. 2 by sale deed dated 28/03/2005 is the undivided share in plots(Lotes) No. 3, 4 and 7 of the said property, which bear Chalta Nos. 413 and 391, which is nothing but access. According to the learned Counsel, though in the 4th recital, in the sale deed dated 08/10/2004, it is stated that 1/4th undivided share in each plots no 3, 4, and 7 are described under three registration numbers as mentioned therein and Chalta Nos. 413 and 391, actually what was sold was 1/5th share in the said plots no. 3, 4 and 7. He invited my attention to the Deed of Exchange and Agreement dated 17/02/1962 by which the said late Roque Redualdo da Costa, prior to execution of the sale deed dated 28/03/2005, in order to make his plot, had exchanged in favour of other co-owners, the right to 1/5th of plots no. 3, 4 and 7. Learned Counsel therefore, contended that the heirs of said Roque Redualdo da Costa did not have any right to the said plots no. 3, 4 and 7 corresponding to chalta Nos. 413 and 391 of P. T. Sheet No. 238, to transfer the same in favour of krishnanath B. Naik. Learned Counsel submitted that all these facts have been brought on record by the petitioners in the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 15/10/2013 and the said sale deeds have been produced. Learned Counsel, thus, urged that the revocation order deserves to be canceled. 11. 413 and 391 of P. T. Sheet No. 238, to transfer the same in favour of krishnanath B. Naik. Learned Counsel submitted that all these facts have been brought on record by the petitioners in the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 15/10/2013 and the said sale deeds have been produced. Learned Counsel, thus, urged that the revocation order deserves to be canceled. 11. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the part of the drain passing through the property of the petitioners forms part of the property of the petitioners and that over the said drain there is a bridge interlinking parts of their property falling on either side of the said drain. Even other wise according to the learned senior counsel, the said drain/nallah has been closed and no construction has been proposed to be done over the drain and that the building is much beyond that drain. He invited my attention to the minutes of the 45th meeting of the SGPDA held on 06/11/2012 and submitted that the item no. 18 was not included in the agenda dated 06/11/2012 but was taken up as any other item with the permission of Chair. He further submitted that the objection regarding the nallah was just that the same was reflected in the survey plan but was not shown in the site plan submitted for obtaining the development permission. He further submitted that though this item no. 18 was with regard to the complaint received regarding the Development Permission granted to the petitioners, however, in the said complaint of the respondent no. 2 there was no mention of any nallah. He pointed out from the show cause notice dated 25/01/2013, that the same travels beyond the resolution dated 06/11/2012, since it speaks of proposed development over the drain/public nallah. This according to the counsel is colourable exercise. Learned Senior Counsel urged that the petitioners had obtained loan of Rs. 11 Crores and after obtaining all the requisite permissions, the petitioners had commenced the construction work and had completed the basement on 30/09/2011 and by 24/11/2012, the whole 6th floor was complete after which the impugned show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 came to be issued and the revocation order dated 26/06/2013 was also served upon the petitioners. 12. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied upon the following judgments: (a) “Mohinder Singh Gill And Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi And Ors. 12. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied upon the following judgments: (a) “Mohinder Singh Gill And Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi And Ors. “[(1978) 1SCC 405] (b) “Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association Vs. Designated Authority And Ors.” [(2021) 2 SCC 258] (c) “Prakash Ratan Sinha Vs. State of Bihar And Ors. [ (2009) 14 SCC 690 ] 13. On the other hand, Mr. M. Pereira, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 1, submitted that the Development Order dated 29/10/2010 was granted with a condition in clause (2) that the permission shall be revoked, if any information, plans, calculations, documents and any other accompaniments of the application are found incorrect or wrong at any stage after the grant of permission. He further submitted that in terms of clause 14 of the said order dated 29/10/2010, it was made clear that the ownership documents would be verified before issuing the licence. Insofar as the drain is concerned, learned Counsel pointed out from clause 26 of the Development Permission that all drains existing on the site shall be strictly maintained with dimensions of width and depth as per site conditions and as per prevailing storm water flow during monsoons. Learned Counsel further contended that the access is sought to be taken from Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, which does not belong to the petitioners. He pointed out from the plan (Annexure-D) to the petition that the said plan is prepared from the survey plan and the same shows that the drain passes through the other properties also. He therefore contended that the drain cannot be the property of the petitioners. He submitted that the site plan on which Development permission was granted by the respondent no. 1, a ramp is sought to be built on the nallah. According to him even a part of the building comes on the said nallah. According to Mr. Pereira, learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1, the petitioners themselves have shown the space under Chalta no. 391 outside their compound wall and have not produced any document of gift to MMC or of any land acquisition proceedings and hence there cannot be any dispute about the said space. According to Mr. Pereira, learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1, the petitioners themselves have shown the space under Chalta no. 391 outside their compound wall and have not produced any document of gift to MMC or of any land acquisition proceedings and hence there cannot be any dispute about the said space. He showed from the photographs produced by the petitioners themselves that there are garbage cans kept in the said space between the compound wall of the petitioners and the edge of the road. He invited my attention to the affidavit of Aires Justino Joaquim Barreto attached to the letter dated 5th November 1983 regarding the application for N.O.C. for construction of compound wall and pointed out that in this affidavit, said Aires has stated that he wants to construct the compound wall all along the western boundary. Shri Aires has not stated that he is leaving some space belonging to him outside the compound wall. Learned Counsel further pointed out from the letter dated 14/08/2008 bearing no. SGPDA/GEN/1244/08-09 that the application dated 22/07/2008 of the petitioners for Zoning of the property bearing Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, falling in C-1 zone and affected by 10.00mt wide road towards northern and western side as marked on the site plan was subject to final approval by the Government. He, thus, contended that the said road was only a proposed ODP road. However, according to the learned Counsel, when the SGPDA subsequently inspected the site, there was a road which was of the width of less than 6 metres, i.e. between 5 metres to 7 metres. Insofar as the information under Right to Information Act, 2005, date4d 10/02/2009 under no. 3/(c)/08-09/TECH/2695, is concerned, learned Counsel submitted that in the query, the width of the said existing road was not asked for. According to him, the letter dated 23/05/2011 under no. ISLR/MAR/TRI/36/11/56 does not say the nallah belongs to the petitioners. Learned Counsel urged that if the petitioners show something not belonging to them as belonging to them, they get more FAR and hence the nallah has been shown as belonging to the petitioners. In all the above circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, the revocation order has been rightly issued and no interference is called for. 14. Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2, submitted that the respondent no. In all the above circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, the revocation order has been rightly issued and no interference is called for. 14. Mr. Bhobe, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2, submitted that the respondent no. 2 is the owner of the property bearing Chalta no. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and Chalta No. 413 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of Margao City since the said property was purchased by his father by Sale Deed dated 28/03/2005. He submitted that the said sale Deed has not been challenged and cannot be questioned until declared as null and void. He pointed out from the photographs (Annexure-6) to the affidavit-in-reply of the respondent no. 2 that the compound wall of the petitioners is on the side of the property of the respondent no. 2. He further pointed out from the photographs (Annexure-7) that the access to the petitioners is on the eastern side where a gate has been kept. According to the learned Counsel, the entire nallah has been surveyed under Chalta no. 72 of P. T. Sheet No. 238 and that this survey holding belongs to Maria Parras e Cruz. He drew my attention to the copy of the 'Form B' of Chalta no. 72 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, produced by the respondent no 2, which shows the name of said Maria Parras e cruz as holder of the same. He submitted that by letter dated 22/07/2011, the Executive Engineer-VI has informed that no portion of Chaltas No. 413 and 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 has been acquired. He further submitted that by letter dated 03/08/2011, the Additional District Magistrate, South Goa, has informed that no application has been received seeking permission for doing any construction over the nallah in P.T,. Sheet No. 238/Chalta No. 71 of Margao city such as ramp cum pathway/passage for going to parking of vehicles slot shown on the plans which were submitted for approval before the Member Secretary, South Goa Planning and development Authority, Margao-Goa. Learned Counsel urged that in the Sanad dated 02/07/2010, by which conversion was granted for an area of 495 square metres from Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, part of nallah is included but in the approved plan for construction the petitioners have not shown the nallah. He pointed out that the old cadastral plan shows the nallah. Learned Counsel urged that in the Sanad dated 02/07/2010, by which conversion was granted for an area of 495 square metres from Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, part of nallah is included but in the approved plan for construction the petitioners have not shown the nallah. He pointed out that the old cadastral plan shows the nallah. He submitted that no area has been gifted by the petitioners and that the road is shown in the property of the respondent no. 2. According to learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 there are glaring illegalities committed by the petitioners and misrepresentations done by them and hence no interference is called for with the revocation order. 15. In rejoinder, Mr. C. Pereira, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the nallah in Chalta no. 72 does not belong to the petitioners and it belongs to Maria Parras but said Maria Parras has no property in Chalta No. 71, which belongs to the petitioners and in which part of nallah is situated. He showed from the survey plan that Chalta No. 72 is separated from Chalta No. 71. According to the learned Counsel, the permission to construct the compound wall was granted by SGPDA by following the alignment of the proposed road as shown in the plan in green colour. He also drew my attention to the Note which reveals that the construction of the boundary walls had become an urgent necessity as the Municipality had covered with concrete slab the existing gutter all along the western boundary of the petitioners' property. 16. I have carefully perused the material on record and considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 17. The impugned show cause notice dated 25/01/2013, as to why the Development Permission dated 29/10/2010 should not be revoked, was issued to the petitioner no. 1 in view of the following observations:- (i) The property under Chalta no. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was not directly accessible by public road on the western side, as shown by the petitioner no. 1 on the approved site plan, as the same access was sought to be taken from the property under chalta no. 391 of P. T. Sheet no. 238, which did not belong to the petitioner no. 1. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was not directly accessible by public road on the western side, as shown by the petitioner no. 1 on the approved site plan, as the same access was sought to be taken from the property under chalta no. 391 of P. T. Sheet no. 238, which did not belong to the petitioner no. 1. (ii) The drain/public nalla shown on the survey plan which was passing through the property under Chalta no. 71 of P.T. Sheet no. 238 in which the petitioner no. 1 has got the building approved was not reflected on the site plan approved and over which the petitioner no. 1 has proposed the development. 18. The impugned revocation order no SGPDA/P/5112/648/13-14 dated 26/06/2013, inter alia, reads as under: REVOCATION ORDER Ref: Show Cause Notice No.SGPDA/P/5112/2145/12-13 dated 25/01/2013. Whereas development permission was issued to you vide order No. SGPDA/P/5112/1411/10-11 dated 29/10/2010 for proposed construction of building in Chalta no. 71. of P.T. Sheet no. 238 at Margao; Whereas vide Show Cause Notice No. SGPDA/P/5112/2145/12-13 dated 25/01/2013 you were directed to show cause within 15 days from the receipt of the notice as to why action under the provisions of the Town & Country Planning Act should not be initiated for misrepresentation of facts in view of condition no. 2 of the development permission issued vide order No. SGPDA/P/5112/1411/10-11 dated 29/10/2010; And whereas vide your letter dated 6/03/2013 you have replied to the said Show Cause Notice; And whereas your reply was placed before the Authority in its meeting held on 13/04/2013 and the same was not found to be satisfactory as: A) the clarification given about the development proposed over the drain was not in conformity with the plans approved; B) necessary documents to substantiate the claim to have direct access from the 10.00m wide road, were not submitted; In view of the reasons above, it has been resolved to revoke the Development permission issued vide Order No. SGPDA/P/5112/1411/10-11 dated 29/10/2010. Therefore the development permission issued vide Order No. SGPDA/P/5112/141/10-11 dated 29/10/2010 hereby stands revoked with immediate effect. Sd/- MEMBER SECRETARY 19. From the above revocation order, it can be seen that though a finding is given to the effect that the clarification given about the development proposed over the drain was not in conformity with the plans approved, however, no reasons are given as to why it is so. Sd/- MEMBER SECRETARY 19. From the above revocation order, it can be seen that though a finding is given to the effect that the clarification given about the development proposed over the drain was not in conformity with the plans approved, however, no reasons are given as to why it is so. Again, though, a finding is given to the effect that necessary documents to substantiate the claim to have direct access from the 10.00m wide road, were not submitted, however, there is no reason as to why the explanations given by the petitioners in the reply to show cause notice and documents produced along with it were not sufficient to establish the claim of the petitioners. In answer to the above show cause notice, the petitioners had given a reply in detail. In that reply dated 06/03/2013, the petitioners, inter alia submitted as under: (a) that the structure of the proposed building was already complete and the internal finishing was in progress. That the Respondent sought certain clarifications from the Petitioner no.1 on the issues raised by Sunil K. Naik in his letter dated 28-04-2011 and the Petitioner no. 1 by reply dated 12-11-2011 to the letter of the Respondent dated 27-10-2011 dealt with the letter dated 25-02-2011 of Mr. Sunil K. Naik. That the perusal of the Survey Plan of Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 of Margao City, i.e. the Petitioners' property, would indicate that part of the drain passing through the Petitioners' property forms part of the Petitioners' property and over the said drain there was a bridge interlinking parts of the Petitioners' property falling on either side of the drain. That on the site there was a compound wall on the western boundary of the Petitioners' property and in the said western side compound wall there was a gate in alignment with the bridge over the drain in the Petitioners' property. That at site it could be seen that the said gate in the western compound wall opens on the tar road which was situated at the western boundary of the Petitioners' property and passing through Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, i.e. the road indicated in the plan in yellow shading. That at site it could be seen that the said gate in the western compound wall opens on the tar road which was situated at the western boundary of the Petitioners' property and passing through Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, i.e. the road indicated in the plan in yellow shading. (b) That the property of the Petitioners was earlier owned by Aires J. J. Barreto and in the year 1983 he had obtained from the predecessor authority i.e. Southern Planning and Development Authority, as well as from the Margao Municipal Council, approval for construction of the compound wall on the western, northern and southern side of the Petitioners' property and the letters at Annexure–G hereto along with the plan approved by SPDA and Margao Municipal Council, where the proposed road of 10 metres was shown on the western side of the Petitioners' property and passing through the Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was shown. That in the said approved plan the drain and the bridge over it could be clearly seen with provision of a gate. (c) That the Petitioners purchased the said property on obtaining a NOC from the authority so that the Petitioners could get guidelines regarding the planning. That the Petitioners obtained xerox copy of the NOC obtained under Section 49 which was annexed to the said reply and the said NOC when granted mentioned that the Petitioners' property was bounded on the West by Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 belonging to Krishnanath Baburao Naik (Public road). As a fact the Deed of Sale of the Petitioners also states that on the western side of the property bearing Chalta No. 71, there is a property of heirs of Manuel Lourenco, presently by Public Road No. 238/391. (d) That in the month of July, 2008, the Petitioners applied for zoning guidelines in preparation to constructing a building in the said property and the Respondent issued guidelines by letter dated 14/08/2008 along with the plan where the Respondent had clearly shown the existing road lying on the western side of the Petitioners' property with the proposed width of 10 metres and the Respondent had also shown the central line of the said road. A copy of the said letter dated 10-02-2009 was also annexed to the Show Cause Notice stating that the Chief Officer of Margao Municipal Council gave information under Right to Information Act, 2005, wherein it stated that the tarred road which is depicted in the plan at Annexure-D in yellow shading was existing and being used by public, and maintained by P.W.D. That although the letter of the Chief Officer did not contain the survey details of the land, mentioned that it is sent with reference to the letter of Mr. Vinay Mehta dated 30-12-2008, which stated that the land through which the road was passing was identified as Chalta No. 391. The said road was of Erasmo Carvalho Street and passing in front of the establishment of M/s. David & Co. (e) That from the documentary details referred to above, it was clear that the road through Chalta No. 391 P.T. Sheet No. 238 had been in existence much prior to the year 1983 and was maintained by the P.W.D. That it also stood concluded that the said road was shown in the ODP of the Southern Planning & Development Authority in the year 1983 and in the present ODP as well. That the road was public and maintained by the P.W.D., that it did not matter through whose property it passes and the consideration would be whether the members of public have a right of way through the road. (f) That in the site plan and representations to the authority, the Petitioners never claimed that the road was passing through the Petitioners' property but showed that the said road was existing and passing through the Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 and that the site was inspected by the personnel of the Respondent and confirmed the existence of the said road and the public nature of the said road on verification of the same at site. (g) As far as the 2nd claim was concerned, the drain passing through the property of the Petitioners does not belong to any other person or body, but it forms part of the Petitioners' property although the monsoon waters were passing through it. (g) As far as the 2nd claim was concerned, the drain passing through the property of the Petitioners does not belong to any other person or body, but it forms part of the Petitioners' property although the monsoon waters were passing through it. In addition the Petitioners annexed a letter from the Inspector of Surveys & Land Records dated 23-05-2011 addressed to the said Sunil Krishnanath Naik under Right to Information Act wherein it was certified by the Inspector of Surveys & Land Records that the nallah shown through the petitioners' property belonged to the Petitioners. (h) That since the nallah belonged to the Petitioners and formed part of the Petitioners' property, in the Petitioners' site plan there was no need of showing the said drain forming part of the Petitioners' property. That along with the Petitioners' site plan, the Petitioners have produced to SPDA the official Survey Plan which clearly showed the existence of the said drain passing through the Petitioners' property and forming part of the Petitioners' property and therefore there was no misrepresentation intended to be done. That the Petitioners have not proposed any construction over the drain. That on perusal of the approved site plan, it was clear that the building was not proposed to be constructed over the said drain and the same was much beyond the drain. The Petitioners requested for personal hearing in the matter. Reply to the said Show Cause Notice along with the annexure is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-R. 20. The Development Permission was granted to the petitioner no. 1 by order dated 29/10/2010. N.O.C. from Fire & Emergency Services was obtained by the petitioner no. 1 on 31/01/2011. N.O.C. from Urban Health Centre was obtained on 12/11/2010. Construction licence was issued by the Margao Municipal council on 24/02/2011. Alignment of building was obtained on 19/07/2011. The construction consisted of Basement+Ground+upper 6 Floors. The complaint received by the respondent no. 1 from the respondent no. 2 was dated 25/02/2011. The respondent no. 1 did not ask the petitioners to stop the construction activity. Instead by letter dated 27/10/2011, the respondent no. 1 asked the petitioners to submit clarification pertaining to the issues raised by the respondent no. 2. By letter dated 12/11/2011, the petitioners submitted the required clarification to the respondent no. 1. But till 25/01/2013, the respondent no. The respondent no. 1 did not ask the petitioners to stop the construction activity. Instead by letter dated 27/10/2011, the respondent no. 1 asked the petitioners to submit clarification pertaining to the issues raised by the respondent no. 2. By letter dated 12/11/2011, the petitioners submitted the required clarification to the respondent no. 1. But till 25/01/2013, the respondent no. 1 kept quite and allowed the construction activity to be continued by the petitioners. The petitioners completed the construction of 6th floor on or about 28/11/2012, by spending crores of rupees, after availing loan of huge amount. After that, the impugned show cause notice was issued to the petitioners on 25/01/2013 and the impugned revocation order was issued on 26/06/2013. The next step would be requisition to remove the said construction. Because of such delay, since the petitioners had already almost completed the works, it was expected of the respondent no. 1 to have dealt with the matter with more seriousness, by duly considering the submissions of the petitioners and of the respondent no. 2, by giving them personal hearing. In the reply dated 06/03/2013, the petitioners had specifically sought for personal hearing. But the respondent no. 1 just placed the reply before the SGPDA meeting held on 13/04/2013 and relied upon the resolution taken in that meeting. The show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 mentioned that the property under Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was not directly accessible by public road on the western side, as shown on the approved site plan, as the same access is sought to be taken from the property under Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238, which did not belong to the petitioners. But the resolution dated 13/04/2013 says that the 10.00 mt wide road on western side was a proposal as shown on the O.D.P. Margao and that the petitioners had not produced any such records showing that the intermediate portion/strip of land in between the existing tar road and compound wall on western side was acquired by the Government for the construction of road nor any such documents are submitted by the petitioners to substantiate the claim of ownership over the said portion. Consequently, the revocation order dated 26/06/2013 says that necessary documents to substantiate the claim to have direct access from 10.00m wide road, were not submitted. Consequently, the revocation order dated 26/06/2013 says that necessary documents to substantiate the claim to have direct access from 10.00m wide road, were not submitted. The petitioners never claimed that the said strip of land bearing Chalta No. 391 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 was at any time acquired by the Government. A perusal of the reply dated 06/03/2013 sent by the petitioners to the show cause notice, reveals that explanation regarding the access to the property was given in ten paragraphs i.e. paragraphs no. 8 to 17. But none of the said explanations has been considered by the respondent no. 1. Thus, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the ground mentioned in the show cause notice and that mentioned in the revocation order was different from one another and even otherwise the explanations given by the petitioners in their reply dated 06/03/2013 were not at all considered. 21. The second ground for revocation as mentioned in the show cause notice was that the drain/public nallah shown on the survey plan which was passing through the property under Chalta No. 71 of P.T. Sheet No. 238 in which the petitioners have got the building approved was not reflected on the site plan approved and over which the petitioners have proposed the development. In this regard, the petitioners had made it clear that the survey plan was already produced along with the application for permission for development, which showed the nallah and since the same belonged to them the same was not shown on the site plan. In the reply dated 06/03/2013 to the show cause notice, the petitioners had explained in paragraphs no. 18 to 22 as to how the said drain belongs to them and even otherwise no construction was proposed over the same. Said explanations have not been considered by the respondent no. 1 while passing the revocation order. 22. In my view, if personal or oral hearing was given to the petitioners, all the points which have been raised by the learned senior Counsel before this Court, in this petition could have been raised before the respondent no. 1 and duly considered by him. Since no personal hearing was given to the petitioners, there is gross violation of the principles of natural justice and in the present case the same has caused grave prejudice to the petitioners. 1 and duly considered by him. Since no personal hearing was given to the petitioners, there is gross violation of the principles of natural justice and in the present case the same has caused grave prejudice to the petitioners. The revocation order, on the face of it appears to be arbitrary and it has caused miscarriage of justice. 23. In the case of “Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association” (supra), it has been held that it is well settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication, excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. It has been further held that the principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a straitjacket nor is it a general rule of universal application. In paragraphs 78 and 79 of the judgment supra, it is observed as under: “78. In Mohinder Singh Gill, upon consideration of several cases, Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style observed thus: (SCC p.434, para 48) '48. Once we understand the soul of the rule as fair play in action — and it is so — we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one’s bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more — but nothing less. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one’s bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more — but nothing less. The ‘exceptions’ to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. Textbook excerpts and ratios from rulings can be heaped, but they all converge to the same point that audi alteram partem is the justice of the law, without, of course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation.' 79. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of “natural justice”. Referring to several decisions, His Lordship observed thus: (SCC p.666) 'Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle—as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application—seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.” 24. In the case of “Prakash Ratan Sinha” (supra), the Apex Court has observed thus: “11. The decision complained against in the instant case is an administrative decision. The decision is likely to have far reaching civil consequences for the appellant, as it has adversely affected his right to continue in the promotional post. Therefore, in our view, the decision concerning the promotion makes itself available for scrutiny by the Courts on the touchstone of well-established principles of natural justice. The decision that was questioned before the Court was an administrative decision having civil consequences and is alleged to have been taken without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 12. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, basically is that, the administrative decision taken by the respondents is unfair, unreasonable and in breach of principles of natural justice. The administrative decision taken by the respondents is within the realm of public law and therefore, the decision ought to have been taken in a fair and reasonable manner. This was more necessary because the action cancelling the promotion of the appellant had civil consequences in the sense that it not only puts an end to the right of the appellant and also his further career prospectus. This was more necessary because the action cancelling the promotion of the appellant had civil consequences in the sense that it not only puts an end to the right of the appellant and also his further career prospectus. Therefore, the respondents are under an obligation to take all decisions in a fair and lawful manner by adhering to the rules of natural justice. 13. The law in this regard has been settled by several decisions of this Court. The principle that emerges from the decisions of this Court is that, if there is a power to decide and decide detrimentally to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such a power and that the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made. 14. Corollary principles emanating from these cases are as to what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to an extent on the facts and circumstances of that case and that it is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity of being heard and on the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed on the decision maker itself implies an obligation to hear before deciding. These cases have also observed, whenever an action of public body results in civil consequences for the person against whom the action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be presumed and in such a case, the administrative authority must give a proper opportunity of hearing to the affected person.” 25. The show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 and the revocation order dated 26/06/2013 say that development has been proposed over the drain. But in the Affidavit-in-reply, filed on behalf of the respondent no. 1, it is mentioned that ramps have been constructed on the said drains. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 even submitted that the petitioners have done construction of some part of the building on these drains. With such submissions, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 wanted to justify the action of revocation of the Development permission. Besides the above, learned Counsel for the respondent no. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 even submitted that the petitioners have done construction of some part of the building on these drains. With such submissions, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 wanted to justify the action of revocation of the Development permission. Besides the above, learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1, as discussed above, raised various contentions as to why the said revocation order is good, but the said reasons are not found in the impugned revocation order. The validity of the revocation order dated 26/03/2013 cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons. Insofar as the alleged construction done by the petitioners on the nallah, is concerned, the respondent no. 1 may have to give fresh show cause notice to the petitioners. 26. In the case of “Mohinder Singh Gill And Anr.” (supra), the Hon'ble supreme court has held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. It is observed that otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to the Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Reference has been made to the observations in the case of “Commr. Of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji,” ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ), which are as under: “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” 27. In all the circumstances above, though the learned counsel for the parties argued at length on the merits of the matter, however, without going into the merits of the revocation order, I am of the considered view that the impugned revocation order dated 26/03/2013 should be set aside and the matter should be remanded to the respondent no. In all the circumstances above, though the learned counsel for the parties argued at length on the merits of the matter, however, without going into the merits of the revocation order, I am of the considered view that the impugned revocation order dated 26/03/2013 should be set aside and the matter should be remanded to the respondent no. 1 with a direction to give personal hearing to the parties and to dispose of the matter of show cause notice dated 25/01/2013 and reply dated 06/03/2013, given by the petitioners to it by giving appropriate reasons. 28. In the result, the petition stands disposed of by following order: (a) The impugned revocation order dated 26/06/2013 is quashed and set aside. (b) The matter stands remanded to the respondent no.1 for fresh decision on the show cause notice dated 25/01/2013, after giving personal hearing to the parties and after considering the reply dated 06/03/2013 filed by the petitioners, in accordance with law, by giving appropriate reasons. (c) The respondent no. 1 shall dispose of the matter within a period of 30 days from the date of appearance of parties before it. (d) Parties to appear before the respondent no. 1 on 28/04/2014 at 11.00 a.m. 29. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.