Judgment L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This writ appeal is filed against the order dated 30.09.2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in Review W.P.M.P.No.16732 of 2003 in W.P.No.29125 of 1998. The case has a bit of complexity of facts. The 5th respondent is a Girls High School at Vikarabad, which is admitted to grant-in-aid. The post of Telugu Pandit Grade II, which is also admitted to grant-in-aid, fell vacant. The competent authority had accorded permission on 02.05.1990 to the institution to fill the vacancy. Based on that, not only a letter was addressed to the local Employment Exchange to sponsor eligible candidates, but also notification was issued inviting applications from eligible candidates. The appellant submitted an application in response to the notification. The Selection Committee, constituted in accordance with the relevant Rules, selected him and he was appointed through order, dated 27.06.1990. He joined the duty and started working. On 26.08.1990, the 5th respondent submitted proposals to the respondents 3 and 4 for approval of the appointment. However, on 15.04.1991, the 3rd respondent rejected the proposal on the ground that the name of the appellant was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 1. The appellant and two other Teachers, who were similarly placed, filed W.P.No.6662 of 1991, with a prayer to direct the respondents to regularize their services. The writ petition was disposed of on 22.09.1994 directing the respondents to consider the cases of the appellant and two other candidates, in accordance with law. In compliance with the same, the 1st respondent issued G.O.Rt.No.1226, dated 14.08.1997, refusing to accord approval for the appointment of the appellant on the ground that his case was not sponsored through Employment Exchange. Another observation was made to the effect that the Rule of Reservation was not followed. Challenging the same, the appellant filed W.P.No.29125 of 1998. The writ petition was allowed on 30.06.1999, by taking note of the fact that the sponsoring through Employment Exchange is not the only source for an employer and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Excise Superintendent vs. K.B.N.Visweswara Rao ( 1996 (6) SCALE 676 ) was taken note of. The judgment rendered in the writ petition was implemented and the appellant was extended all the benefits. 2. The judgment rendered in the writ petition was implemented and the appellant was extended all the benefits. 2. The Review Petition was filed in the writ petition by the respondents stating that the appellant suppressed the fact that the request made by the institution for regularization of approval of the appointment of the appellant was rejected on 15.04.1991 and that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in K.C.High School, Guntur vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh ( 1997 (6) ALD 331 (DB)) was not taken note of. The Review Petition was allowed and the order in the writ petition was set aside and the writ petition was restored to file. Hence, this writ appeal. Heard Sri V.Jagapathi, learned counsel for the appellant, and learned Government Pleader for School Education appearing for the respondents. It is too well established that a Court can review its own order on very limited grounds and the fact that a different view was possible on the same set of facts, does not constitute a ground, for such an exercise. It cannot be treated as a forum of appeal. Even where a case is made out for review, the ultimate result must be to ‘recall’ the order or to ‘modify’ it, but not to ‘set aside’ the order under review. It is only prerogative of the appellate authority to set aside the order passed by any inferior forum. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge, who heard the Review Petition, however, has ‘set aside’ the order passed in the writ petition, may be inadvertently. One of the important grounds for allowing the review petition was that the appellant suppressed the fact that the request made by the institution for approval of the appointment of the appellant was rejected on 15.04.1991 and the said fact was suppressed in the writ petition. There is nothing on record to show that the order, dated 15.04.1991, was communicated to the appellant and, at the most, it was a correspondence between the institution, on the one hand, and the Government, on the other hand. Be that as it may, this Court in W.P.No.6662 of 1991 did take note of the fact that the approval was not accorded by citing certain reasons. The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to take all the relevant aspects into account and pass orders on the representations made by the appellant. Be that as it may, this Court in W.P.No.6662 of 1991 did take note of the fact that the approval was not accorded by citing certain reasons. The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to take all the relevant aspects into account and pass orders on the representations made by the appellant. A comprehensive order in G.O.Rt.No.1226, dated 14.08.1997, was passed. Once the entire gamut of the case was taken into account and the order was passed, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondents 1 to 3, to state that the appellant did not bring to the notice of this Court, the order dated 15.04.1991. Even if there was any lapse on the part of the appellant, it was open to the respondents to plead that fact not only in W.P.No.6662 of 1991, but also in W.P.No.29125 of 1998. A party to the proceedings, who has knowledge of a fact from the commencement of the proceedings cannot plead the ground of suppression of such fact by opposite party, in a review. It would be rather a case of that party failing to plead its case properly. Therefore, the observation of the learned Single Judge that there was suppression of fact by the appellant is totally without any basis. It appears that an official in the office of the 3rd respondent was hell-bent upon to create trouble for the 5th respondent and, in particular, the appellant in one forum or the other and he was pursuing the proceedings with utmost bitterness. We strongly deprecate the steps taken by respondents 1 to 3 in this behalf, resulting in undue harassment to Teacher in local language. The second ground, on which the learned Single Judge allowed the Review Petition, was that the judgment of this Court in K.C.High School’s case (2 supra) was not taken note of when the writ petition was allowed. When that was not even pleaded by the respondents at any stage of the proceedings and when they did not feel the principle mentioned therein as a hurdle for the grant of the relief to the appellant, there was no basis to treat it as a ground to set at naught the relief granted to the appellant in the writ petition. All through, the only ground on which the respondents refused to accord approval for the appointment of the appellant was that his name was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. It is a matter of record that apart from addressing a letter to the Employment Exchange, the institution has issued advertisement in accordance with law. It is fundamental and axiomatic that once an advertisement is issued, the consideration is not confined to the candidates, who are sponsored by the Employment Exchange alone. At any rate, the Supreme Court has put at rest the controversy in this behalf, through its judgment in K.C.High School’s case (2 supra). Accordingly, we allow the Writ Appeal and set aside the order under appeal. We direct that the respondents shall not be entitled to recover anything from the appellant and he shall be continued as Teacher by extending all benefits in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. The miscellaneous petition filed in the Writ Appeal shall stand disposed of.