ORDER Being aggrieved by order dated 20.05.2014, a copy of which was supplied allegedly subsequently to the petitioner, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 2. The writ petitioner has stated thus: The petitioner has been running a business in the name and style as “M/s Niranjan Nandkishore” in the premises bearing Municipal holding No.928 in Ranchi Municipal Ward No.3 (now 22) in the district of Ranchi on a month to month tenancy under Respondent No.4. The premises in question has been occupied for more than 50 years by the family of the petitioner in which the wholesale business of shocks, innerwear and other garments is being carried out by the family of the petitioner. The premises consists of two rooms adjacent to each other and two separate rent receipts are issued with respect to both the properties by Respondent No.4. The monthly rent of the shop is Rs.2000/-per month and two separate receipts of Rs.1500/-per month and Rs.500/-per month are issued by the Respondent No.4. After the death of the father of the petitioner on 16.11.2012, the Respondent No.4 started pressurizing the petitioner to evict the suit premises which is the only source of livelihood of the petitioner’s family. The petitioner was forced to pay a sum of Rs.2,01,000/- (Rs. Two lacs one thousand) in cash to Respondent No.4 for purchase of the entire suit premises for which the total consideration was decided as Rs.50,00,000/- however, no formal agreement for sale was executed by Respondent No.4 on the pretext that unless and until a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-is paid by the petitioner the formal agreement for sale would not be executed in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner was compelled to file a suit in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ranchi vide Title Suit No.67 of 2014, seeking grant of perpetual injunction restraining the Respondent No.4 from interfering with the legal possession of the petitioner in the suit premises. Even though the Title Suit No.67 of 2014 remained pending, the Respondent No.4 with an ulterior motive to evict the petitioner from the suit premises, filed an application before the Ranchi Municipal Corporation under Section 387 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 seeking an appropriate order for demolition of the suit premises. Even though the Title Suit No.67 of 2014 remained pending, the Respondent No.4 with an ulterior motive to evict the petitioner from the suit premises, filed an application before the Ranchi Municipal Corporation under Section 387 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 seeking an appropriate order for demolition of the suit premises. The Respondent No.2 on the application filed by the Respondent No.4, in a most arbitrary manner and without complying with the provisions of Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 passed an order for demolition of the building, though the petitioner is the tenant in the suit premises for more than 50 years. No notice was served upon the petitioner and even the copy of order dated 20.05.2014 was not served upon the petitioner. In these facts the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the writ petition. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 supporting and justifying order dated 20.05.2014. A copy of the report dated 24.04.2014 prepared by the officers of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation has been brought on record. 4. By filing counter affidavit, the Respondent No.4 has also supported order dated 20.05.2014, whereby Respondent No.2 has passed an order for demolition of the suit premises. 5. A rejoinder affidavit to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No.1 to 3 and Respondent No.4 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner disputing the statements made in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the Respondents. A copy of the JBC Case No.31 of 2014 has been brought on record by the petitioner. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the provision under Section 387 of Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, a notice was required to be given not only to the owner of the building but also to any other person having an interest in the building. It is further submitted that before an order under Section 387 of Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, is passed, a finding has to be recorded that the building in question has been rendered unfit for human habitation and thereafter only an order for demolition of building can be passed. It is further submitted that before an order under Section 387 of Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, is passed, a finding has to be recorded that the building in question has been rendered unfit for human habitation and thereafter only an order for demolition of building can be passed. He further refers to Section 387 (7) of the Act and submits that sub section 7 to Section 387 specifically provides that an order for demolition can be passed having regard to the factors which includes repair of the building in question and since in the present case the petitioner has specifically denied that the building is in dilapidated condition and it could be repaired by expense of a meager sum of Rs.86,000/-, the impugned order dated 20.05.2014 could not have been passed. It is further submitted that in view of the provision under Section 449 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 unless there is a report from the Municipal Architect and the Town Planner certifying that it is necessary for the safety of the public or inmates of the building that action as contemplated is required to be taken, no order under Section 449 can be passed. It is further submitted that even if the report dated 24.04.2014 is considered to be a report, it nonetheless can not be considered a report of the Municipal Architect or the Town Planner and since in the present case there is no such report, the impugned order dated 20.05.2014 is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that no notice under Section 449 of the Act was given to the petitioner though the petitioner is admittedly a tenant in the suit premises for more than last 50 years. It is submitted that the entire proceeding initiated by the Respondent No.4 is actuated with malice in law only with a view to evict the petitioner from the suit premises. In support of his case learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment rendered in the case of “Lata Soni Etc. Vs. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee” reported in 2002 (3) JLJR 285 and in the case of “Sitaram Khandelwal and another Vs. In support of his case learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment rendered in the case of “Lata Soni Etc. Vs. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee” reported in 2002 (3) JLJR 285 and in the case of “Sitaram Khandelwal and another Vs. Ranchi Municipal Corporation and Ors.” reported in 2013 (3) JLJR 308 and urged that the order dated 20.05.2014 is without jurisdiction and the age of the building cannot be the sole criteria for passing an order under Section 387 (7) of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. 8. Per-contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent nos. 1 to 3 has submitted that in view of the report dated 24.04.2014 which was prepared on the basis of inspection carried out by a team of engineers including the Executive Engineer, Respondent No.2 has passed the impugned order dated 20.05.2014. The report prepared by engineers of the municipal corporation cannot be assailed by the petitioner in a writ proceeding because it involves questions of fact which on a visual assessment the engineers and the technical experts have reported to the Respondent No.2. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 has also supported the impugned order dated 20.05.2014 and submitted that the building which is occupied by the petitioner is more than 90 years old in which the petitioner’s family is a tenant. He draws distinction between the provisions under Sections 387 and Section 449 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 and urges that the provisions under Section 387 of the Act is attracted in a case where the building is found unfit for human habitation whereas, the petitioner moved an application dated 25.03.2014 on the ground that the building in question has become dangerous and therefore, it needed to be demolished. It is further submitted that in provision under Section 449 notice to the landlord only is required to be issued and since in the present case order dated 20.05.2014 was passed on an application of the landlord himself, the contention with respect to notice to the petitioner is of no significance. He draws distinction on facts in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 11. He draws distinction on facts in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 11. Before referring to the factual background of the case, it would be relevant to notice provisions contained under Section 387 and 449 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. The provision under Section 387 deals with a situation in which the building in question has become unfit for human habitation. It provides that before passing an order of demolition of the building in question, several factors enumerated under sub-section 7 to Section 387 should be taken note of by the authority concerned and one of the factors relates to repair of the building in question. The learned counsel for the petitioner has asserted that the building in question is not in dilapidated condition and on expense of a meager sum of Rs.86,000/-it can be made habitable. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner itself goes to show that building in question is not habitable. In the application dated 25.03.2014 made by the Respondent No.4, it is asserted that the building in question is more than 90 years old. The report dated 24.04.2014 prepared by the engineers of the Municipal Corporation discloses that there are several vertical and horizontal cracks in the building. The petitioner himself in his representation dated 02.05.2014 has claimed that he is occupant of the premises for more than 70 years. In the entire writ petition, I do not find any averment in so far as, the regular and proper maintenance of the building being carried out by the petitioner or with the permission of the Respondent No.4, is concerned. Mere assertion by the petitioner that the building is not in dilapidated condition is not sufficient. Moreover, the provision under Section 387 of the Act is not attracted in the present case. In view of the specific assertion of the Respondent No.4 in his application dated 25.03.2014 wherein he has stated that the building in question has become dangerous for habitation, the provision under Section 449 is attracted. No doubt there is no report of Municipal Architect and Town Planner on record and no notice has been issued to the petitioner who claims himself to be a tenant of the premises. No doubt there is no report of Municipal Architect and Town Planner on record and no notice has been issued to the petitioner who claims himself to be a tenant of the premises. In my opinion, it would not have changed the decision taken by Respondent No.2 vide order dated 20.05.2014. The facts brought on record would unerringly disclose that the building is more than 70 years old, which the petitioner himself has claimed in his representation dated 02.05.2014. Notice to the petitioner in such a situation would not have changed the factual matrix of the case. The order dated 20.05.2014 is passed on a report prepared by the engineers of the Municipal Corporation who visited the site and physically examined the same and submitted the report dated 24.04.2014. The report prepared by the expert i.e. the engineers can not be doubted by the Court in a casual manner. The petitioner himself has not disputed the report nor brought on record any material to establish otherwise. The reliance of the counsel for the petitioner in the case of “Lata Soni Etc. Vs. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee” (supra) is misplaced. In so far as the Lata Soni case is concerned, I do not find from the facts of the said case that the building in question in those cases were more than 70 years old. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner, on the judgment in case of “Sitaram Khandelwal and another Vs. Ranchi Municipal Corporation and Ors.” (supra) is also misplaced for the reason that in the said case an order was passed under Section 387 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011 which was challenged whereas, in the present case the order has been passed under Section 449 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.4 has rightly relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Jacky Vs. Tiny alias Antony and Ors.” reported in (2014) 6 SCC 508 to contend that the writ Court cannot go into the question whether the proceeding was initiated to victimize the petitioner. 12. I do not find any merit in the writ petition and, accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order is vacated.