JUDGMENT : Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is at the instance of Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service, the owner of the offending vehicle, and is directed against an award dated 3rd August 2005 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ahmedabad City, in MACP No. 711 of 2002 thereby awarding a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- as compensation for the injuries suffered by the claimant. Although according to the Tribunal itself, the total amount of compensation worked out to Rs.2,40,080/-, as the claimant had restricted its claim petition only to Rs.2,00,000/-, the learned Tribunal awarded only Rs.2,00,000/- with 9% interest per annum from the date of filing of the claim-petition till realization. 2. Being dissatisfied, the owner of the vehicle has come up with the present appeal. 3. It appears from the records that the claimant was an auto rickshaw driver, and on 2nd January 2002, while the claimant was crossing the road, the bus owned by the appellant knocked him down and the rear wheels of the bus ran over both his legs as a result he suffered fractures on both his legs. It further appears from the record that the claimant was operated thrice on his legs, and for this reason, for the next 13 months, he could not drive his rickshaw. In the claim-petition, it was specifically asserted that the monthly income of the victim was Rs.4000/- as such auto rickshaw driver. 4. In spite of service of summons, the appellants did not contest the proceedings by filing Written Statement nor did it give any evidence controverting any of the allegations made by the claimant, yet participated in the trial by only cross-examining the witness for the claimant. 5. At the time of trial, the claimant examined himself and another eyewitness was also examined in support of the case made out in the claim-petition for compensation. 6. As indicated earlier, the learned Tribunal below has awarded Rs.2,00,000/- as compensation. 7. Mr. Munshaw, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has laboriously contended before this Court that the bus in question was not at all involved in the accident as it appears that the registration number of the bus was not given in the claim application. 7.1 Mr. Munshaw also disputed the quantum awarded by the Tribunal. 8. Mr. Mr. Munshaw, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has laboriously contended before this Court that the bus in question was not at all involved in the accident as it appears that the registration number of the bus was not given in the claim application. 7.1 Mr. Munshaw also disputed the quantum awarded by the Tribunal. 8. Mr. Shah, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the claimant has drawn my attention to the fact that in a proceedings under section 140 of the M.V. Act arising out of the selfsame accident, a sum of Rs.25,000/- has already been awarded by the Tribunal in favour of the claimant and that amount has also been paid by the appellant. Such being the position, the question of involvement of the vehicle is no longer available to the appellant in the proceedings under section 166 of the MV Act and is hit by doctrine of res judicata. 9. As regards the quantum, according to the learned advocate for the respondent-claimant, there is no cross-examination at the instance of the appellant at the time of trial regarding the income of the victim and also as regards the hospitalisation and expenditure incurred by his client. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the aforesaid material, I am of the view that the question of involvement of the vehicle in the accident is not legally open for further adjudication once in the earlier proceedings under section 140 of the Act, the Tribunal passed an award against the appellant. It is now settled by the Apex Court that an award under section 140 of the Act is an appealable one (See Yallawwa v. National Insurance Company reported in AIR 2007 SC 2582 ) and therefore, the parties, by not preferring any appeal, has accepted the position that the vehicle was involved in the accident. This question, therefore, cannot be reopened in the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act either at the instance of the owner of the vehicle. At this stage it will be profitable to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others v. Smt. Deorjin Debi And Another reported in AIR. This question, therefore, cannot be reopened in the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act either at the instance of the owner of the vehicle. At this stage it will be profitable to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others v. Smt. Deorjin Debi And Another reported in AIR. 1960 SC 941 where a Bench consisting of three Judges specifically held that even if Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in a judicial proceeding, the principles of res judicata is nevertheless applicable: "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct." (Emphasis supplied). 11. I, thus, find that the question of involvement of the vehicle is not legally available to Mr. Munshaw. 12. As regards the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, it appears that the accident occurred in the year 2002, and the claimant has asserted in the claim-petition that as an auto rickshaw driver, he used to earn Rs.4000/- a month, and the same appears to be reasonable. It further appears that the parties jointly agreed that the disability should be treated to be 17% for body as a whole, even though the Orthopaedic Surgeon assessed 25% for body as a whole. It further appears that the parties jointly agreed that the disability should be treated to be 17% for body as a whole, even though the Orthopaedic Surgeon assessed 25% for body as a whole. Such being the position, it appears that the amount assessed by the Tribunal below as regards future loss of income is quite reasonable. Over and above, there were three different operations on both the legs and the award of Rs.30,000/- towards pain, shock and suffering at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per operation is quite reasonable. Similarly, in spite of the specific finding that there were three operations, the award of Rs.25,000/- towards medical expenses is on the lower side. The award of Rs.25,000/- towards transportation charges is also just and reasonable having regard to the fact that the follow up treatment continued for about a period of one year. Moreover, I have already pointed out above that even though the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the total amount awardable to the claimant comes to Rs.2,40,080/-, since the claim was restricted to only Rs.2,00,000/-, the Tribunal has reduced the amount to Rs.2,00,000/-. In such circumstances, in this appeal at the instance of the owner of the vehicle, I do not find any reasons to further reduce the amount. 13. The appeal is, thus, devoid of any merit, and is consequently dismissed. No order as to costs. 13.1 It appears that by order dated 9th October 2006 passed in Civil Application No. 1714 of 2006 and 11602 of 2006, 80% was ordered to be invested in Fixed Deposits and the remaining amount was permitted to be withdrawn by the claimant. Now that the appeal is dismissed, the Tribunal is directed to forthwith pay the balance amount to the claimant with interest accrued thereon, upon proper verification, by accounts payee cheque. 13.2 Registry is directed to forthwith return the Record and Proceedings to the Tribunal. Appeal dismissed.