JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. Appellant-convict Des Raj, hereinafter referred to as the accused, has assailed the judgment dated 30.9.2008, passed by Sessions Judge, Chamba Division, Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.62 of 2007, titled as State of H.P. v. Des Raj, whereby he stands convicted of the offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, and in default thereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 24.3.2007 at about 8.30 a.m., when Smt. Bimla Devi (PW-2) went to her fields, she noticed Smt. Guddo Devi (deceased) lying with injury on her head. She immediately rushed back and informed the villagers, including Chino Devi (PW-3), daughter of the deceased and Shri Ramesh Kumar (PW-1), Up-Pradhan of the area. Thereafter, all of them went to the spot and enquired from Guddo Devi about the cause of injury. She disclosed that her husband Des Raj (accused) had given a blow on her head with an iron rod. Guddo Devi was brought home and immediately taken to Banikhet for medical treatment. Dr. Vinay Patyal (PW-20), posted at Primary Health Centre, Banikhet, informed the police. ASI Naresh Kumar (PW-18) rushed to the hospital and got statement (Ex. PW-2/A) of Bimla Devi (PW-2) recorded, on the basis of which FIR No.26/07, dated 24.3.2007 (Ex. PW- 15/A), under the provisions of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered at Police Station, Dalhousie, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh against the accused. Dr. Patyal (PW-20) referred the patient for further treatment to the Regional Hospital, Chamba, vide MLC (Ex. PW-20/A), where she was further referred to the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences and Research (PGI), Chandigarh, where Dr. Dinesh Patel (PW-19) treated her. Unfortunately Guddo Devi succumbed to her injuries and died on 30.3.2007. Dr. Krishna Dutt Chabli (PW-26) conducted postmortem and issued report (Ex. PW-26/A). 3. Simultaneously, ASI Naresh Kumar conducted the investigation. He took into possession blood stained soil from the spot vide recovery Memo (Ex. PW-1/A). Same day, i.e. 24.3.2007, accused was arrested, who, on 26.3.2007, in the presence of independent witnesses, namely Ashwani Kumar (PW-5) and Pritam Chand (PW-6), made a disclosure statement (Ex. PW-5/A) and got recovered weapon of offence, i.e. iron rod (Ex. P-1) from his house. He took into possession blood stained soil from the spot vide recovery Memo (Ex. PW-1/A). Same day, i.e. 24.3.2007, accused was arrested, who, on 26.3.2007, in the presence of independent witnesses, namely Ashwani Kumar (PW-5) and Pritam Chand (PW-6), made a disclosure statement (Ex. PW-5/A) and got recovered weapon of offence, i.e. iron rod (Ex. P-1) from his house. Police also took into possession blood stained clothes of the deceased. The same were sent for chemical analysis and report (Ex.PZ) obtained by the police. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused in the crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 4. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 26 witnesses and statement of accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up defence of prosecution witnesses being inimical, hence having falsely deposed against him. To prove his plea of alibi, he examined his sister Smt. Kali Devi (DW-1) to prima facie establish that in the night intervening 22-23.3.2007, he had stayed with her in her house. 6. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court convicted the accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal by the accused. 7. Prosecution case is based on dying declaration, oral in nature, made by deceased Guddo Devi, in the presence of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1), Bimla Devi (PW-2), Chino Devi (PW-3), Babu Ram (PW-7) and Bikku (PW-12). 8. While contending that the alleged dying declaration is nothing but a concoction of prosecution story, Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the accused has invited our attention to the testimonies of aforesaid witnesses as also testimonies of the doctors. According to the learned counsel, medical evidence is conclusive of the fact that Goddo Devi, after sustaining injuries on her head, could not have remained conscious at all. Hence, there was no question of her having narrated the incident to any one. According to the learned counsel, medical evidence is conclusive of the fact that Goddo Devi, after sustaining injuries on her head, could not have remained conscious at all. Hence, there was no question of her having narrated the incident to any one. It is also contended that there is material contradiction in the testimony of spot witnesses, with regard to the person who changed the position of body of Guddo Devi, who was lying in the fields. Also, prosecution witnesses, Chino Devi (PW-3) and Bikku (PW-12), have proved that the acused was not at home in the night intervening 22.3.2007 and 23.3.2007. Witnesses, who harboured animosity, with an intent to falsely implicate the accused, have falsely deposed in Court. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 10. Identity of the deceased is not in dispute, so also that of the accused. That deceased died on 30.3.2007 at Chandigarh, is also not in dispute. From the testimony of Dr. Krishna Dutt Chabli (PW-26), who proved the postmortem report (Ex. PW-26/A), it stands clearly established that cause of death was “complications of cranio cerebral damage consequent upon blunt trauma to the head”. 11. Dr. Vinay Patyal (PW-20), who first attended, found following injuries on the body of deceased: 1. Lacerated would on the scalp, extending from frontal to occipital region dimension – 8 Cms. X 1 Cm. X 1½ Cms. 2. Swelling of nose with clotted blood in both nostrils. 3. Swelling in right hand extensor aspect. 12. As per MLC (Ex. PW-20/A), deceased was examined at 12.30 p.m. on 24.3.2007. Dr. Kulbinder Pal Singh (PW-11), who referred the deceased for further treatment to PGI, has proved the treatment chart (Ex. PW 11/B). 13. Conjoint reading of testimonies of the doctors would only establish that deceased remained unconscious throughout her treatment at all places. 14. Dr. Kulbinder (PW-11), in his testimony, simply states that “it is possible for the patient to become unconscious, some time after the injury was sustained” and that “it is correct that if a patient receives head injury and brain is damaged, he will go in comma immediately”. However, through medical evidence, it is not established that in the instant case, deceased had immediately become unconscious upon receiving a blow of iron rod on her head. In fact Dr. However, through medical evidence, it is not established that in the instant case, deceased had immediately become unconscious upon receiving a blow of iron rod on her head. In fact Dr. Kulbinder has clarified that “it is possible for the patient to become unconscious some time after receiving injury”. Thus, the contention that from medical evidence, it stands proved that upon receiving injury on her head, Guddo Devi immediately went into comma only needs rejection. 15. It is in this backdrop that we need to appreciate the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with whom Guddo Devi disclosed the incident. It is in a form of dying declaration. 16. It is a settled position of law that if there are more then one dying declarations then the Court has to scrutinize all of them to find out if each one of them pass the test of trustworthiness. The Court must further find whether different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. 17. There can be more than one dying declarations and if there is no inconsistency between them, all can be used against the accused for proving the guilt. [State of Karnataka vs. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 and (1982) 1 SCC 700 , Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani vs. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 ]. 18. This view further stands reiterated in Jaishree Anant Khandekar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647 , where the Apex Court was dealing with five dying declarations, which were found not to be in variation with each other. 19. Where there is variation in the dying declaration (two in question), the Apex Court has held that there cannot be conviction based on them [Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 69 and Sanjay vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148 ]. 20. Further in (2010) 6 SCC 516, Apex Court has again summarized its view in the following terms:- “The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in replying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. A mechanical approach in replying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. When there are more than one dying declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. Such a trend will be extremely dangerous. However, the courts below are fully entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass all the above tests. The court has to weigh all the attendant circumstances and come to the independent finding whether the dying declaration was properly recorded and whether it was voluntary and truthful. The courts must bear in mind that each criminal trial is an individual aspect. If after careful scrutiny the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it a basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Emphasis supplied)” 21. In Jaishree Anant Khandekar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647 , a comparative study of laws of various countries on the point of dying declaration was done by the Apex Court. It was held that: “17. The law relating to dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule. The rationale behind admissibility of a dying declaration was best expressed, not in any judgment, but in one of the soliloquies in Shakespeare's King John, when fatally wounded Melun wails: ‘Have I met hideous death within my view, Retaining but a quantity of life, Which bleeds away even as a form of wax, Resolveth from his figure 'gainst the fire? What in the world should make me now deceive, since I must lose the use of all deceit? What in the world should make me now deceive, since I must lose the use of all deceit? Why should I then be false since it is true that I must die here and live hence by truth?' (See King John, Act V, Scene IV.) 18. Both Taylor and Wigmore in their treatise on Evidence took refuge to the magic of Shakespeare to illustrate the principles behind admissibility of dying declaration by quoting the above passage. 19. Among the judicial fraternity this has been best expressed, possibly by Lord Chief Justice Baron Eyre (See. R. Vs. Woodcock, (1789) 1 Lea.502, and which I quote (ER p.353):- "...That such declarations are made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation, equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice." 20. The test of admissibility of dying declaration is stricter in English Law than in Indian Law. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1876 brought out a ‘Digest of the Law of Evidence' and its introduction is of considerable interest even today. The author wrote that English Code of Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. In the words of the author: "In the autumn of 1872 Lord Coleridge (then Attorney General) employed me to draw a similar code for England. I did so in the course of the winter, and we settled it in frequent consultations. It was ready to be introduced early in the Session of 1873. Lord Coleridge made various attempts to bring it forward, but he could not succeed till the very last day of the Session. He said a few words on the subject on the 5th August, 1873, just before Parliament was prorogued. The Bill was thus never made public, though I believe it was ordered to be printed. It was drawn on the model of the Indian Evidence Act and contained a complete system of law upon the subject of evidence." 21. In that book, Article 26 sums up the English law relating to dying declaration as under:- "Article 26. Dying Declaration as to Cause of Death. It was drawn on the model of the Indian Evidence Act and contained a complete system of law upon the subject of evidence." 21. In that book, Article 26 sums up the English law relating to dying declaration as under:- "Article 26. Dying Declaration as to Cause of Death. - A declaration made by the declarant as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is deemed to be relevant only in trials for the murder or manslaughter of the declarant; and only when the declarant is shown, to the satisfaction of the judge, to have been in actual danger of death, and to have given up all hope of recovery at the time when his declaration was made. Such a declaration is not irrelevant merely because it was intended to be made as a deposition before a magistrate, but is irregular." (emphasis supplied) 22. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act the underlined portion is not there. Instead Section 32 (1) is worded differently and which is set out: "32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant - Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) When it relates to cause of death - When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be he nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." (emphasis supplied) 23. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard Vs. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be he nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." (emphasis supplied) 23. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard Vs. The Queen, 1982 (1) The All England Law Reports 183 (Privy Council), while hearing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, made a comparison of the English Law and Indian Law by referring to the underlined portions of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act at page 187 of the report. Sir Owen Woodhouse, speaking for the Privy Council, pointed out the different statutory dispensation in Indian Law prescribing a test of admissibility of dying declaration which is distinct from a common law test in English Law. 24. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic truthfulness of human character at the dying moments of one's life, admissibility of dying declaration is also based on the doctrine of necessity. In many cases victim is the only eye witness to a crime on him/her and in such situations exclusion of the dying declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends of justice. American Law on dying declaration also proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty of death leading to an intrinsic faith in truthfulness of human character and the necessity principle. 25. On certainty of death, the same strict test of English Law has been applied in American Jurisprudence. The test has been variously expressed as ‘no hope of recovery', ‘a settled expectation of death'. The core concept is that the expectation of death must be absolute and not susceptible to doubts and there should be no chance of operation of worldly motives. (See Wigmore on Evidence page 233-234). 26. This Court in Kishan Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 3062 , held that under English Law the credence and the relevance of the dying declaration is admissible only when the person making such statement is in hopeless condition and expecting imminent death. Justice Willes coined it as a "settled hopeless expectation of death" (R Vs. Peel, (1860) 2 F. & F. 21, which was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R Vs. Perry, (1909) 2 KB 697). Justice Willes coined it as a "settled hopeless expectation of death" (R Vs. Peel, (1860) 2 F. & F. 21, which was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R Vs. Perry, (1909) 2 KB 697). Under our Law, the declaration is relevant even if it is made by a person, who may or may not be under expectation of death, at the time of declaration. (See para 18, page 3066). However, the declaration must relate to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.” 22. In Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 , the Apex Court has further held that:- “Sometimes, attempts have been made to equate a dying declaration with the evidence of an accomplice or the evidence furnished by a confession as against the maker, if it is retracted, and as against others, even though not retracted. But in our opinion, it is not right in principle to do so. Though under S. 133 of the Evidence Act, it is not illegal to convict a person on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Act, lays down as a rule of produce based on experience, that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless his evidence is corroborated in material particulars and this has now been accepted as a rule of law. The same cannot be said of a dying declaration because a dying declaration may not, unlike a confession, or the testimony of an approver, come from a tainted source. The same cannot be said of a dying declaration because a dying declaration may not, unlike a confession, or the testimony of an approver, come from a tainted source. If a dying declaration has been made by a person whose antecedents are as doubtful as in the other cases that may be a ground for looking upon it with suspicion, but generally speaking, the maker of a dying declaration cannot be tarnished with the same brush as the maker of a confession or an approver.” “It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence that other pieces of evidence; a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as for as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the lying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” “In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. The aforesaid decision came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Harbans Singh and another vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 and after taking into account its earlier decision in Ram Nath vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420 , affirmed the aforesaid view. 24. In Paniben (Smt.) vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 , the Court has further reiterated and laid down the following principles:- “A dying declaration is entitled to great weight. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring-corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” “However, since the accused has no power of cross-examination, which is essential for eliciting the truth, the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail”. “Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to occurrence, it is not to be rejected. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. But a dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.” “(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Mannu Raja v. State of U.P. (1976) 2 SCR 764 ) ( AIR 1976 SC 2199 ). (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 ; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 ). (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 ). (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1974 SC 332 ). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1982 SC 1021 ). (Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1974 SC 332 ). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1982 SC 1021 ). (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., 1981 SCC (Crl) 581). (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 ). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505 ). (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912 ). (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519 ). 19. In the light of the above principles, we will consider the three dying declarations in the instant case and we will ascertain the truth with reference to all dying declarations made by the deceased Bai Kanta. This Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839 held: "where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred." Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, they have to be accepted.” 25. However, where the prosecution version differs from the statement of deceased, dying declaration cannot be used for convicting the accused [Paniben (supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another, (2013) 12 SCC 255]. 26. However, where the prosecution version differs from the statement of deceased, dying declaration cannot be used for convicting the accused [Paniben (supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another, (2013) 12 SCC 255]. 26. The aforesaid view has been reiterated in Jai Karan vs. State of Delhi (MCT), (1999) 8 SCC 161 , Sham Shankar Kankaria vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165 and Mohammed Asif vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 11 SCC 497 . 27. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , while considering the conflict in Paparambaka Rosamma vs. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 69 5 and Koli Chunilal Savji vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562 , came to the conclusion that law laid down in the latter was the correct law and simply because the Doctor has not recorded/made endorsement that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement in question, other material on record to indicate that the deceased was fully conscious and capable of making statement cannot be ignored. This view has been reiterated in Ravi and another vs. State of T.N. (2004) 10 SCC 776 ; and Kamalavva and another vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 614 . 28. The apex Court in Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 310 , has held as under: “18. Now we proceed to examine the principle of evaluation of any dying declaration. There is distinction between the evaluation of dying declaration under the English law and that under the Indian law. Under the English law, credence and the relevancy of a dying declaration is only when person making such statement is in hopeless condition and expecting an imminent death. So under the English law for its admissibility, the declarant should have been in actual danger of death at the time when they are made, and that he should have had a full apprehension of his danger and the death should have ensued. Under the Indian law the dying declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. Under the Indian law the dying declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. Under the English law, the admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The general principle on which this species of evidence are admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak only the truth. If evidence in a case reveals that declarant has reached this state while making declaration then within the sphere of the Indian law, while testing the credibility of such dying declaration weightage can be given. Of course depending on other relevant facts and circumstances of case.” 29. It is a settled position of law that conviction can be founded solely on the basis of dying declaration, if the same fully inspires confidence. [See: Parbin Ali and another v. State of Assam, (2013) 2 SCC 81 and Krishan vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 3 SCC 280 ]. 30. In Shaik Nagoor vs. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2008) 15 SCC 471 , the Apex Court held that where the Judicial Magistrate and the Police officer had given detailed description and witnesses were not cross-examined on the point of fitness of the deceased to give dying declaration plea taken by the accused that the deceased was not fit to make the statement, under the circumstances of that case, was untenable. 31. In Maiben D/o Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria vs. State of Gujarat, (2007) 10 SCC 362 , the Court was dealing with a case where death had taken place 25 days after recording of the statement of the deceased and the same was taken to be a dying declaration. 32. 31. In Maiben D/o Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria vs. State of Gujarat, (2007) 10 SCC 362 , the Court was dealing with a case where death had taken place 25 days after recording of the statement of the deceased and the same was taken to be a dying declaration. 32. Further in Sohan Lal alias Sohan Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 534 , State of Karnataka vs. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , Dayal Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 452 and Kanti Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 498 , it has been held that it is not necessary that dying declaration is to be recorded before the Magistrate. The same can be recorded even before or by the police official. This view stands reiterated in Gulam Hussain and another vs. State of Delhi, (2000) 7 SCC 254 . 33. In Mohan Lal and others vs. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC 151 , the Court disbelieved the statement made by the wife of the accused on the ground that not only it was vague but also there was no contemporaneous documentary or other material to prove dowry demands prior to the incident. 34. In Jayabalan vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199 , the Apex Court was dealing with the case of an accused who was charged of having poured kerosene oil on his wife and then set her on fire. The accused husband was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. The accused assailed the findings of conviction on the ground that prosecution had examined only interested witnesses and also dying declaration was tutored, promoted and product of the imagination of deceased. In the proven facts of that case repelling the contention, it was held as under:- “We are of the considered view that in case where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. In Sukanti Moharana vs. State of Orissa, (2009) 9 SCC 163 , the Court was dealing with a case where the dying declaration was challenged on the ground that it did not contain thumb impression or signatures of the deceased. The challenge was repelled on the ground that medical evidence proved that the deceased was having 90% burn injuries on the thumb and therefore was in no position to sign the dying declaration. The Apex Court further reiterated its decision in Nallapati Sivaiah vs. SDO, (2007) 15 SCC 465 , in the following terms:- "18. …This Court in more than one decision cautioned that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion." 36. This view stands reiterated in Ongole Ravikanth vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 647 . 37. In Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur, (2011) 13 SCC 125 , the Court has held as under: “20. There can be no dispute that the dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, however, such a dying declaration has to be roved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and truthful and further that the maker thereof must be in a fit medical condition to make it. The oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence, where the exact words uttered by the deceased are not available, particularly because of the failure of memory of the witnesses who are said to have heard it…………….” [See also: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master and others, (2010) 12 SCC 324 ]. 38. The oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence, where the exact words uttered by the deceased are not available, particularly because of the failure of memory of the witnesses who are said to have heard it…………….” [See also: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master and others, (2010) 12 SCC 324 ]. 38. Dying declaration need not be in the form of question and answer. Principles required to be adopted for recording the statement of deceased stand reiterated in Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1998) 4 SCC 517 , State of Karnataka vs. Shariff (2003) 2 SCC 473 and K.Ramachandra Reddy and another vs. The Public prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 . 39. In Ashabai & another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 224 , apex Court while dealing with a case of dying declarations, four in number, observed as under: “15. About the evidentiary value of the dying declaration of the deceased, it is relevant to refer to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc. is relevant. – Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1) When it relates to cause of death. – When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. (2) - (8) * * *” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. (2) - (8) * * *” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that her statement relates to the cause of her death. In that event, it qualifies the criteria mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor is it required to be recorded only by a Magistrate. As a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assessed independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variations in the other.” 40. The apex Court in Muthu Kutty & another vs. State by Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 has discussed the exceptions so contained in Section 32 to the general rule against hearsay evidence elaborated in Section 60 of the evidence Act, 1872. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in the legal mazim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire – a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. 41. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in the legal mazim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire – a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. 41. In view of the above statement of law, we now proceed to analyze the testimonies of the witnesses. 42. Now, Bimla Devi (PW-2) was the first one to have spotted the deceased lying in an injured condition in the fields. We do not find her statement to be at variance or in contradiction with her initial version so disclosed to the police in her statement (Ex. PW-2/A), recorded under the provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Court, she states that on 24.3.2007 at about 8.40 a.m., when she went to her fields, she noticed Guddo Devi lying with blood all around. Immediately she informed Chino Devi (PW-3), daughter of the accused. Also, Pradhan of the Panchayat was called. On enquiry, Guddo Devi informed that her husband, i.e. the accused, had hit her with an iron rod. Relatives of Guddo Devi were also informed and she was taken for treatment to a doctor. Though, in cross-examination, this witness admits her husband to have filed a criminal case against the accused and her family and having quarreled with the accused on an earlier occasion, but however, we do not find this fact to be a reason enough to discard her otherwise inspiring testimony. It is a settled proposition of law that animosity is a double edged sword. Crucially, from her unrebutted testimony, unequivocally and unambiguously, it is clear that on earlier occasion, she had saved the deceased from the clutches of the accused, who would oftenly beat his wife. 43. We find her version to be corroborated by Ramesh Kumar (PW-1), Up Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat and a local resident. He states that on 24.3.2007 at about 8.30 – 8.45 a.m., Bimla Devi and Chino Devi informed him that Guddi Devi was lying in the fields in a critical condition. He went to the spot. Guddo Devi was lying facing the ground. He changed her posture and saw blood oozing out from her head. She was conscious. On enquiry, she informed that her husband had hit her with an iron rod. Guddo Devi had asked for water. She was taken to her house. Her relatives were also informed. He went to the spot. Guddo Devi was lying facing the ground. He changed her posture and saw blood oozing out from her head. She was conscious. On enquiry, she informed that her husband had hit her with an iron rod. Guddo Devi had asked for water. She was taken to her house. Her relatives were also informed. She was taken to Banikhet for treatment and matter was reported to the police. He further states that police conducted the investigation in his presence. On the asking of accused, in his presence, police recovered weapon of offence (Ex. P-1). Crucially, witness clarifies that he instantly reached the spot. It was within two minutes. Also, this witness, in his unrebutted testimony, has deposed that accused used to take liquor and beat his wife. Only improvement, which we find in his testimony from his previous statement (Ex. DA), with which he was confronted, is that Guddo Devi had demanded water. But this fact would not render the veracity of his statement to be in doubt at all. His unrebutted testimony clearly establishes that Guddo Devi was found lying in the fields at about 8.30 – 8.45 a.m. First, she was taken home and then to the hospital, where she was attended to by the Doctor at 12.30 p.m. 44. Significantly, none of the witnesses has deposed that Guddo Devi never regained consciousness, after becoming unconscious. That accused had been beating his wife in the past stands established on record. Significantly, PW-1 is relative of the accused. He is Mama (uncle) by relation. He had no reason to falsely implicate the accused. In his capacity as Up Pradhan, he was informed about the incident and promptly he took action. He visited the spot and made enquiries from the deceased, who disclosed involvement of her husband in the crime. 45. We find that on the issue of dying declaration even daughter Chino Devi (PW-3) and son Bikku (PW-12) of the accused have corroborated the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2. Since much stress has been laid on their testimonies to discredit the prosecution case, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the same in toto: Chino Devi (PW-3) “Stated that Guddo Devi was my mother. Accused present in the court is my father. We are two sisters and two brothers. My elder brother Prithi Singh used to work as Coolie at Delhi. Accused present in the court is my father. We are two sisters and two brothers. My elder brother Prithi Singh used to work as Coolie at Delhi. On the intervening night of 23/24th March, 2007, I alongwith my mother Guddo Devi and brother and sister was sleeping in a Hall whereas my father was sleeping in a separate room. In the morning at about 8.40 AM Smt. Bimla Devi told me that my mother was lying in the fields of Pritam Singh in an injured condition. I went to the fields and enquired from my mother who told that she was given beatings by her husband, accused, during the night with an iron rod. My younger brother Bikku had gone to watch a match on a T.V. in neighbourhood and he came back at about 3 AM. I noticed blood oozing out from her head. I called Ramesh, Roshan Lal and Babu Ram at the spot and then my Mamas Joginder and Vias Dev were informed telephonically. My mother was taken to Banikhet for her treatment. Where my mother was lying, wheat crop was sown in it. My father used to quarrel with my mother earlier. My father also used to take liquor. XXX XXX By ld. defence counsel. My father, accused, had not given beatings to my mother Guddo Devi in my presence. We reached at the spot after 10-15 minutes when I was informed by Bimla Devi where my mother was lying in injured condition, it is two minutes to walk from my house. The field where my mother was lhying injured is adjoining to the houses of Ravinder, Madan Lal and Diwan Chand. It is correct that all the above persons were present in their houses during that night. It is also correct that if some one screams off or shouts the same is audible in the above houses. Only Babu Ram, Roshan Lal and Ramesh Kumar and Bimla Devi had visited the spot. It is correct that my mother was conscious at that time. She was removed from the spot by the above persons to the hospital. It is correct that my father is a labourer and used to remain outside the house for number of days in connection with his labour work. It is correct that my mother was conscious at that time. She was removed from the spot by the above persons to the hospital. It is correct that my father is a labourer and used to remain outside the house for number of days in connection with his labour work. It is correct that on that day my father was not present in the house.” (Emphasis supplied) Bikku (PW-12) “Accused Des Raj, present in the court is my father and Guddo Devi deceased was my mother. On 24.3.2007 I had gone to the house of Gian Chand to watch Television to view the match between India and Sri Lanka. On the intervening night of 23/24.3.2007 I came at 3 AM to my house. At that time, my father, mother, two sisters were present in the house. When I returned, my father asked as to where I had gone and I replied that I had gone to watch a match on the television in the house of Gian Chand. I went to sleep in the hall where my mother and sisters were sleeping. In the morning I went to deliver the milk at Baghdhar and my sister had gone to fetch buffaloe milk. I returned at 8.45 AM. When I left to deliver the milk, my mother was not in the house. On my return, I was told by the villagers that my mother was lying in the fields of Pritam Singh where Ramesh, Roshan, Chino, Fannu were also present. When I enquired from my mother, she told me that she had been beaten by my father, accused Des Raj with an iron rod. My Mamas Joginder and Vias Dev were also informed telephonically and they reached our house. Then my mother was taken to Banikhet and thereafter to Chamba and PGI Chandigarh. My mother had sustained injuries on her head. XXXX XXXX By the ld. defence counsel. I do not know about the landed property of my father. There are about 17 families living in village Badoh. It is incorrect that my maternal uncles are looking after us after the incident. I have five Buas. I woke up at 7 AM on 24.3.2007. I and my mother were sleeping on one bed. I had not heard any cries of my mother during the night. I went to Baghdhar at 7.40 AM. It is incorrect that my maternal uncles are looking after us after the incident. I have five Buas. I woke up at 7 AM on 24.3.2007. I and my mother were sleeping on one bed. I had not heard any cries of my mother during the night. I went to Baghdhar at 7.40 AM. It is correct that when I saw my mother, she was lying unconscious. It is incorrect that my mother did not tell me about the cause of injury. It is correct that my father was staying with my Bua namely Kali Devi at village Bassa on the intervening night of 23/24.3.2007. Village Bassa is about 2 Kms. from my house. It is correct that my father was not present in the house on that night.” (Emphasis supplied) 46. The apex Court in C. Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 , has held as under: “85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (vide Sohrab & Anr. v. The State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 2020 ; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 ; Bharwada Bhogini Bhai Hirji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 ; State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash AIR 2007 SC 2257 ; Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 588 ; State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 626 ; and State v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151).” 47. Further, in Thoti Manohar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 7 SCC 723 , the apex Court held as under: “38. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 588 ; State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 626 ; and State v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151).” 47. Further, in Thoti Manohar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 7 SCC 723 , the apex Court held as under: “38. The learned counsel for the appellant has endeavoured hard to highlight certain discrepancies pertaining to time, situation of the land, number of persons, etc., but in our considered opinion, they are absolutely minor in nature. The minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the matter cannot bring discredit to the story of the prosecution. Giving undue importance to them would amount to adopting a hyper-technical approach. The Court, while appreciating the evidence, should not attach much significance to minor discrepancies, for the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case are to be ignored. This has been so held in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [ AIR 1985 SC 48 ]; Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat [ AIR 1988 SC 696 ]; Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1999 SC 3544 ]; State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj and another [ (2000) 1 SCC 247 ]; Laxman Singh v. Poonam Singh [ (2004) 10 SCC 94 ] and Dashrath Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2004) 7 SCC 408 ]” 48. The aforesaid law stands reiterated in Kuriya and another v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 . 49. Now significantly, in examination-in-chief, these witnesses have clearly deposed complicity of the accused in the crime. Independently, they confirm their mother having told them of their father having given a blow of iron rod. 50. On first brush, with regard to presence of the accused in his house in the night intervening 23.3.2007 and 24.3.2007, we find these witnesses to have contradicted themselves, but close scrutiny of their testimony, would only reveal that house of Kali Devi (DW-1), where accused allegedly spent the night, is just at a distance of 1½-2 kms away from the village of accused. The distance is walkable. It is connected by road. The distance is walkable. It is connected by road. No doubt, PW-3 states that deceased was assaulted during night, but then this statement has to be read in the context that possibility of accused having come back in the early hours and then assaulted his wife is not ruled out. Meticulous examination of their testimonies only establishes presence of the accused at home on the date of occurrence of crime. Court is duty bound to extract the grain from the chaff for ascertaining the truth from the testimonies of these witnesses. Why would children falsely implicate their father? Except for minor discrepancy or contradiction on fact, which is not material, they have supported the prosecution. Basic version of the prosecution remains unshattered. 51. We further find that another son of the accused, namely Prithi Chand (PW-10) has deposed against the accused. 52. We find testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 also to be fully corroborated by yet another witness, namely Babu Ram (PW-7), who in his unrebutted testimony has deposed that in his presence Guddo Devi had told “Chuni Devi that she had been beaten by her father, accused Des Raj, with an iron rod”. We find that the witness not to be cross-examined on this point at all. 53. Testimony of aforesaid witnesses would only establish that at the time of making dying declaration, Guddo Devi was conscious, fully oriented and aware of what all was happening around her. She had no reason to falsely implicate the accused. Her testimony is free from tutoring, influence, fear or malice. There is no contradiction. It is trustworthy and inspires confidence. Uniformity in the manner and form of such dying declaration is clear from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. 54. Our specific attention is invited to that part of testimony of the witnesses that in the fields, deceased had become unconscious. It be only observed that none of the witnesses has deposed that thereafter, deceased never regained consciousness. Deceased had suffered an injury on her head and blood was oozing out. All of the witnesses, in whose presence incident was narrated, have, in one voice, deposed that deceased had clearly revealed complicity of the accused in the crime. On this point there is neither any contradiction nor any variation. 55. Deceased had suffered an injury on her head and blood was oozing out. All of the witnesses, in whose presence incident was narrated, have, in one voice, deposed that deceased had clearly revealed complicity of the accused in the crime. On this point there is neither any contradiction nor any variation. 55. Hence, from the conjoint reading of testimonies of all the aforesaid witnesses, we find the prosecution to have clearly established and proved the dying declaration. Accused gave a blow with an iron rod on the head of the deceased, as a result of which she sustained severe and serious injuries, resulting into her death. 56. We find the witnesses to be reliable and trustworthy and their testimonies to be fully inspiring in confidence. There are neither any material contradictions nor any exaggerations, improvements or embellishments, casting any doubt about the truthfulness of their deposition. 57. We find that even by link evidence, prosecution has been able to establish its case. In the presence of Ashwani Kumar (PW-5) and Pritam Chand (PW-6), accused made disclosure statement (Ex. PW-5/A), which led to recovery of weapon of offence (Ex. P-1), in the presence of Ramesh Kumar (PW-1) and Gandhi Ram (PW-9), both independent witnesses. PW-9 does state that he signed the papers of recovery at about 4 p.m., when he returned from school, but then we find that there is no cross-examination to his earlier part of the testimony to the effect that recovery was effected by the police, on the asking of accused, in his presence. As such, we do not find any fault with the investigating agencies, in effecting recovery of incriminating article. 58. Our attention is also invited to the fact that report of FSL (Ex. P-2) is inconclusive with regard to the blood group found on the clothes of deceased. We do not find this fact to be fatal at all, in view of the otherwise inspiring testimonies of independent witnesses, as discussed herein earlier. 59. We do not find version of DW-1 to be inspiring in confidence or to have probablized the defence of the accused in any manner. The witness denies having any knowledge of her sister-in-law, i.e. the deceased, being murdered. 60. In the instant case, conduct of the accused also acquires significance. What steps he took to take his wife to the hospital, he has not disclosed. The witness denies having any knowledge of her sister-in-law, i.e. the deceased, being murdered. 60. In the instant case, conduct of the accused also acquires significance. What steps he took to take his wife to the hospital, he has not disclosed. It is not his case that he was aware of his wife having suffered injury. What steps did he take to ensure immediate medical attendance, has not been explained by him. Also, he did not lodge any complaint with any person, much less police authorities. After all his wife had suffered a serious injury. Police had to arrest him, as he was missing from home. 61. Considering the fact that accused assaulted his wife with an iron rod on a vital part of her body, it cannot be said that he did not have any knowledge or intent of not murdering her. 62. Thus, in our considered view, prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the accused, so held by the trial Court, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, not only ocular but also corroborative in the shape of recovery of weapon of offence. 63. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and/or in complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.