Oral Judgment: 1. This Application is under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("Cr.P.C." in brief). Admit. Heard learned counsel for Applicant and learned counsel for Respondent, finally. 2. This Application has been filed by original Accused, who is facing trial under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, being S.C.C. No.9 of 2011, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kalamnuri. In the matter, the oral evidence of the Complainant, present Respondent, was recorded. According to the Applicant, in cross-examination the Complainant deposed that handwriting on the cheque is of the Applicant-Accused and that Accused has written the same in presence of the Complainant. The Complainant denied the suggestion that handwriting of the cheque was not of the Accused. Applicant claims that he filed Exhibit 65 asking to send the cheque for opinion of the handwriting expert as handwriting on the cheque was liable to be examined by the handwriting expert. 3. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kalamnuri rejected the Application Exhibit 65 by observing that perusal of cross-examination shows that it is not the case of the Accused that contents of the cheque are written by Complainant. It was further observed that in the cross examination complainant has stated that contents of cheque are in the handwriting of Accused and that in order to prove the said fact Accused intends to refer the cheque in question for opinion of handwriting expert. It was observed that for a moment if it is presumed that contents of cheque are not in the handwriting of Accused then also it does not absolve the Accused from criminal liability. 4. Learned counsel for Applicant submitted that in the cross-examination of the Complainant, suggestion was put to the complainant that cheque is not in the handwriting of the Accused and that signature one the same is not of Accused. The said suggestion was denied by the Complainant and thus according to the counsel, the Accused desires to obtain the opinion of the handwriting expert and this right could not have been denied to the Accused. Learned counsel relied on the case of T. Nagappa vs. Y.R. Muralidhar, reported in A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 2010 followed in the case of BaburaoMadhavrao Munnemanik vs. Vishwajit Pratapsing Pardesh and another, reported in 2011(4) A.I.R. Bom. Learned counsel relied on the case of T. Nagappa vs. Y.R. Muralidhar, reported in A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 2010 followed in the case of BaburaoMadhavrao Munnemanik vs. Vishwajit Pratapsing Pardesh and another, reported in 2011(4) A.I.R. Bom. R., 84, to submit that the Accused has right to establish his defence and in the interest of fair trial, the request of the Accused should have been allowed. 5. Learned counsel for Respondent submitted that the Applicant-Accused had earlier made an application to refer the cheque to the handwriting expert to determine the age of contents written on the cheque and thereafter report had come from the Forensic Science Laboratory that there was no forensically validated standard method universally available for determining either absolute or relative age of ink/writing. Counsel submitted that if the Applicant-Accused was not admitting the handwriting and signature on the cheque, at that time itself the Accused could have made a request to send the cheque for such verification also, but this was not done. Now, to protract the matter, such application has been moved. Learned counsel for Respondent submitted that the Applicant-Accused does not dispute that the cheque is from his account but effort is being made to protract the trial. Learned counsel submitted that Complainant himself has to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and if the Complainant fails, Accused will get benefit of doubt and Complainant would suffer the consequences. 6. The learned counsel for Applicant relied on the case of "T. Nagappa" (cited supra). In that matter, application was moved for referring the cheque for examination by the Director of Forensic Science Laboratory for determining the age of signature of the accused contending that the complainant had obtained a signed cheque from him in the year 1999 as a security for a hand loan, which had been paid back, but instead of returning the cheque, the same had been misused by entering a huge amount. The request for referring cheque for opinion of handwriting expert for determination of age of the signature of accused, was rejected and in that contingency, it was found that the cheque should have been forwarded for the opinion of handwriting expert. In the matter of "Baburao Madhavrao Munnemanik" (cited supra), also the request was for sending the cheque to determine age of the ink, signature and other format on cheque. In the matter of "Baburao Madhavrao Munnemanik" (cited supra), also the request was for sending the cheque to determine age of the ink, signature and other format on cheque. Thus, the matters relied on by the learned counsel for Applicant were with reference to the determination of the age of the ink. In the present matter, this exercise has already been done when Accused moved application for the same and report has also been received. 7. In the matter of "T. Nagappa" (cited supra) it was observed in Para 7 that:- "7. When a contention has been raised that the complainant has misused the cheque, even in a case where a presumption can be raised under Section 118(a) or 139 of the said Act, an opportunity must be granted to the accused for adducing evidence in rebuttal thereof. As the law places the burden on the accused, he must be given an opportunity to discharge it." In Para 8 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- "8. What should be the nature of evidence is not a matter which should be left only to the discretion of the Court. It is the accused who knows how to prove his defence. It is true that the Court being the master of the proceedings must determine as to whether the application filed by the accused in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code is bona fide or not or whether thereby he intends to bring on record a relevant material. But ordinarily an accused should be allowed to approach the court for obtaining its assistance with regard to summoning of witnesses etc. If permitted to do so, steps therefor, however, must be taken within a limited time. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the accused should not be allowed to unnecessarily protracting the trial or summon witnesses whose evidence would not be at all relevant". Para 7 of the Judgment observes that "an opportunity" should be given. Para 8 shows that Court needs to see if application is bona fide or made for protracting. I have already recorded that once exercise of sending cheque to determine age of contents was already over. 8. Now at the subsequent stage of proceedings, Applicant-Accused again made request to send the cheque for getting examined the handwriting on cheque. Para 8 shows that Court needs to see if application is bona fide or made for protracting. I have already recorded that once exercise of sending cheque to determine age of contents was already over. 8. Now at the subsequent stage of proceedings, Applicant-Accused again made request to send the cheque for getting examined the handwriting on cheque. I find that there is no reason why, when earlier the Accused moved the Court for sending the cheque to determine the age of the ink, if he was disputing the handwriting, request was not made for examining the same also. Although learned counsel for Applicant submitted that Accused was challenging the handwriting as well as signature and wanted to get the same examined, if Exhibit 65 filed by him is perused, he applied only to get handwriting in respect of name of complainant and amount written in cheque in words, examined. Trial Court dealt with the application accordingly. Thus, in trial Court Accused still kept his cards close to his heart to later ask for examining "signature". After earlier an opportunity had been given to get cheque examined from handwriting expert, such application to check 'A' aspect, then 'B' aspect and so on must be said to be abuse of process. 9. I find that the second application moved by the Accused before the trial Court was not bona fide and it was merely a device to protract the matter. The trial Court has rightly rejected the application of the Applicant-Accused. 10. For the reasons mentioned above, this Criminal Application is rejected.