JUDGMENT : In this writ application petitioner has prayed for quashing of order of the Disciplinary Authority (Respondent No.2) dated 08.10.2002 (Annexure-13), by which he has been awarded punishment of dismissal. He has further prayed for quashing of order of the Appellate Authority (Respondent No.1), as communicated to the petitioner through respondent no.2 (Annexure-15), by which his appeal has been dismissed. He has further prayed for consequential reliefs thereafter, by way of reinstatement in service with back wages, increments, seniority etc. 2. Petitioner was appointed as an assistant in the Judgeship of Nalanda at Biharsharif on 21.03.1985 and was confirmed in service by order dated 19.04.1999 from initial date of his joining itself. In due course of posting, he was posted as office clerk in the court of 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda. While he was functioning as such, on 05.12.1987 memo no.12010 of the High Court was received, containing an order dated 30.11.1987 passed by the High Court in Cr.Appeal No.582 of 1987, directing for release of two appellants, namely, Muneshwar Singh and Ramashish Singh on furnishing bail bond of Rs.7,000/- with two sureties each in connection with Sessions Trial No.273 of 1985. On the dictation of the Presiding Officer he recorded the order in the order sheet of the Sessions Case which was initialed by the Presiding Officer. Thereafter on the same day, bail bond was furnished which was verified by the Bench Clerk, who found the same in order and accordingly the Presiding Officer passed orders for release of the accused. 3. When the said criminal appeal was taken up for hearing by this Court, it was informed to the Court that Ramashish Singh was on bail. The Court found that the bail of said Ramashish Singh was rejected by order dated 30.11.1987 and there was no bail order passed in his favour subsequently. Hence, this Court called for a report from the court below by order dated 31.07.2002, which was submitted. The Court found that the bail of said Ramashish Singh was rejected by order dated 30.11.1987 and there was no bail order passed in his favour subsequently. Hence, this Court called for a report from the court below by order dated 31.07.2002, which was submitted. After perusal of the report, this Court found that, in spite of rejection of bail of said Ramashish Singh by order dated 30.11.1987, in the order dated 05.12.1987, recorded in the order sheet of Sessions Trial No.273 of 1985, it had been recorded that an order of the High Court dated 30.11.1987 had been received directing both the accused to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.7,000/- with two sureties and accordingly they had been released on furnishing bail bonds. This Court took up the matter seriously, and by order dated 05.08.2002, directed the District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda to ascertain the identity of office clerk, who wrote the order dated 05.12.1987 in the aforesaid manner and submit necessary report to this Court by 10.08.2002. It also directed that, if the clerk was still in service, he should be placed on suspension and disciplinary action should be taken against him. It also directed that if he had retired, action may be taken for stopping of his pension on account of misconduct and unsatisfactory service record in terms of Rule 43B and 139 of the Bihar Pension Rules subject to result of enquiry. On receipt of this order of the Court, the District & Sessions Judge passed orders dated 06.08.2002 putting the petitioner under suspension, framed charges and appointed one Additional District & Sessions Judge as Enquiry Officer for conducting the proceeding against him. Proceeding was held and finally a report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 03.10.2002 in which petitioner was found guilty of the charges. The District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda, who was the disciplinary authority, thereafter passed orders on 08.10.2002 awarding him punishment of dismissal from service, Accordingly, petitioner filed his appeal on 01.11.2002 under Rule 19 of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and IV) Rules, 1998 against the order of punishment, which was considered and rejected by the High Court. In the circumstances, petitioner has filed this writ application in this Court challenging the said order of dismissal as well as the order of rejection of his appeal. 4. In the circumstances, petitioner has filed this writ application in this Court challenging the said order of dismissal as well as the order of rejection of his appeal. 4. In support of challenge of the petitioner to the said two impugned orders, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire proceeding was initiated and concluded with a pre-conceived notion of guilt of the petitioner. He submitted that the High Court in its order dated 05.08.2002 (Annexure-2) passed in criminal appeal, had directed the District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda “……to acertain the identity of office clerk who wrote the order dated 5.12.1987 in the aforesaid manner and submit necessary report to this Court by 10.8.2002. If the clerk is still in service, he should be placed under suspension and disciplinary action taken against him.……..” He submitted that this order of the High Court shows that even before any enquiry was initiated, High Court had concluded that it was the concerned office clerk who was solely responsible for recording of the said order dated 05.12.1987. Hence, he submitted that, the District & Sessions Judge had no other option than to initiate proceeding against the petitioner and finally punish him. He submitted that before this order, a report was called for, which was placed before the High Court and taken into account for passing the said order. He submitted that any enquiry leading to the said report was held ex-parte and the report itself had neither been placed on the records of the proceeding nor was ever supplied to the petitioner nor has been placed on the records of the present case. Hence, petitioner is in complete dark as to under what circumstances the said report found the petitioner responsible for any act of manipulation. 5. Learned counsel next submitted that on the basis of the said order of this Court, the District & Sessions Judge framed charges against the petitioner (Annexure-4) in which itself he held the petitioner guilty and responsible for manipulating the records of the Sessions Trial. 5. Learned counsel next submitted that on the basis of the said order of this Court, the District & Sessions Judge framed charges against the petitioner (Annexure-4) in which itself he held the petitioner guilty and responsible for manipulating the records of the Sessions Trial. He submits that the language “Whereas you ..……… has (have?) been held responsible for the manipulation in the record of S.T.No.273/85 in such a way that you managed release on misrepresentation of an order dated 30.11.1987 of Cr.Appl.582/87 with respect to Ramashish Singh………..” shows that the respondents had already fixed up responsibility of manipulation of records on the petitioner without enquiry and therefore entire proceeding against him was farce. He further submitted that the language of the charge was in fact picked up as it is from the order of this Court dated 05.08.2002, which did not specify the specific act on the part of the petitioner, which could amount to playing fraud on the court. He submitted that “manipulation in such a way” is too vague an expression to form a valid ground for framing of the charge. He submitted that manipulation in records could be in several ways and, in absence of any specific act alleged on the part of the petitioner amounting to playing fraud mentioned in the charge, the same was too vague to be sustained in law. 6. He submitted that in the enquiry no presenting officer was appointed and the Enquiry Officer himself acted as presenting officer and cross-examined the witnesses, which had vitiated the entire proceeding. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha [ (2010)2 SCC 772 ], a judgment of this Court in the case of Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of Bihar [ 2013(2) PLJR 251 ] and an order of this Court dated 06.08.2010 passed in C.W.J.C. No.17303 of 2008. He further submitted that in the enquiry petitioner held inspection of the records of Sessions Trial and submitted an application on 03.09.2002 (Annexure-6) for supply of certain documents. State of Bihar [ 2013(2) PLJR 251 ] and an order of this Court dated 06.08.2010 passed in C.W.J.C. No.17303 of 2008. He further submitted that in the enquiry petitioner held inspection of the records of Sessions Trial and submitted an application on 03.09.2002 (Annexure-6) for supply of certain documents. On the said application, orders were passed by the Enquiry Officer on 10.09.2002 (Annexure-7) by which, out of four documents, two were ordered to be supplied, but his prayer for supply of certified copy of the report of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Nalanda and the memo of the High Court, which had been seen by the Presiding Officer, and the envelope bearing the said memo, were refused on the ground that the same appeared to be irrelevant documents for the purposes of enquiry. He submitted that these documents were vital for the purposes of proving the defence of the petitioner as the said report of the 2nd Additional Sessions, Nalanda was the basis for order of this Court dated 05.08.2002 and had already been marked as Ext.-X in the enquiry. He submitted that the envelope and the memo were also very vital documents in support of defence of the petitioner that the order had been seen by the Presiding Officer himself and thereafter he had dictated the order dated 05.12.1987 to the petitioner. He submitted that non-supply of copies of these material documents to the petitioner clearly amounted to violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrama Tewari Vs. Union of India [1989 Supp. SCC 518]. He further submitted that the petitioner had filed applications for calling for some witnesses including the then Presiding Officer of the court and had also filed an application for issuing summons to them (Annexures-9 and 9/1). However, the Enquiry Officer refused to summon the witnesses by order dated 18.09.2002 (Annexure-10) on the ground that all the relevant papers were before him and therefore there was no necessity to call the persons for oral evidence. By the said order, the Enquiry Officer granted liberty to the petitioner to produce his own witnesses. However, the Enquiry Officer refused to summon the witnesses by order dated 18.09.2002 (Annexure-10) on the ground that all the relevant papers were before him and therefore there was no necessity to call the persons for oral evidence. By the said order, the Enquiry Officer granted liberty to the petitioner to produce his own witnesses. He submitted that, from the very beginning, petitioner had taken a stand that he had recorded the said order dated 05.12.1987 on the dictation of the then Presiding Officer of the court only, and the Presiding Officer himself had seen the envelope and order of this Court on the basis of which he had dictated the said order. Hence, he submitted that the examination of the Presiding Officer in the proceeding to ascertain this fact was very vital. He submitted that if the Presiding Officer would have denied of having dictated the order or having not dictated the order in the manner recorded, then only any responsibility could be fixed on the petitioner of having recorded a wrong order in the order sheet and thereby manipulating the records resulting into release of said Ramashish Singh on bail. If, on the other hand, the Presiding Officer would have admitted to have seen the order of this Court and then to have dictated the order to this petitioner in the manner recorded, clearly petitioner could not be held responsible for the same, as the order, which later on was found to be fake, must have had its origin somewhere else. Hence, he submitted that a very important aspect of the matter was overlooked by the Enquiry Officer which was again violative of Principles of Natural Justice and Fair Play. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prakash kumar Tandon [ AIR 2009 SC 1375 ]. 7. He further submitted that, after the report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges, copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner and no opportunity was allowed to him to file his representation against the findings in the report and the Disciplinary Authority straight away passed orders of punishment (Annexure-13) only five days after the receipt of the report. He submitted that the punishment order, therefore, was also passed in clear violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and hence was fit to be quashed. In support of this submission, learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar [ AIR 1994 SC 1074 ]. 8. He further submitted that in the enquiry report the Enquiry Officer proceeded totally on wrong premise that “…….as in my view, in this departmental enquiry, the onus lies upon the shoulder of the delinquent to prove his innocence…..” He submits that after the order of this Court was passed in the appeal, records were inspected and it was found that the order of this Court rejecting the bail to Ramashish Singh with an envelope without any seal of Dispatch Section of this Court was on the records of the Sessions Trial. He submitted that it is true that the petitioner was custodian of records at the relevant point of time and some time more. But unless this was established that the envelope with the seal of Dispatch Section of this Court with the said memo and fake order of bail was initially placed on record when the petitioner had taken custody of the record after acceptance of bail bonds and release order, and thereafter the records remained in exclusive custody of the petitioner till the preliminary enquiry on the orders of the High Court, it cannot be conclusively held that the petitioner manipulated the record by removing the said fake order and the envelope and replacing the same with the genuine order of this Court and a plain envelope. He submitted that the very foundation of raising this presumption of manipulation against the petitioner has not been proved in the enquiry and therefore entire foundation for holding the petitioner guilty of manipulation of record is wiped out and no onus can be put on the petitioner to prove his innocence in the circumstances. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar Vs. Bihar State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. [ 2000(3) PLJR 10 ]. 9. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kumar Upendra Singh Parimar Vs. Bihar State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. [ 2000(3) PLJR 10 ]. 9. He submitted that the petitioner had filed his appeal taking specific plea against the manner in which enquiry held and punishment order passed, in which, inter alia, he had claimed that he was not supplied with the copy of the enquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority and he was awarded punishment without any opportunity to him to file his defence against findings in the enquiry. However, the Appellate Authority did not consider the stand of the petitioner in his appeal and rejected the same by a non-speaking order, which was communicated by the letter of the District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda dated 12.07.2005 (Annexure-15). He submitted that since petitioner had filed statutory appeal taking specific grounds with specific pleadings against the order of punishment and findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Appellate Authority was required in law to consider the same and pass a speaking order. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chander Vs. Union of India [ (1986) 3 SCC 103 , in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ AIR 2006 SC 1748 ] and in the case of Kameshwar Singh Vs. Canara Bank through its Managing Director [ 2013(3) PLJR 303 ]. 10. Mr. Mrigank Mauli, learned counsel appeared for the respondents. He submitted that the petitioner had admitted of having recorded the order dated 05.12.1987. The said order was not supported by the order of this Court passed in criminal appeal and in fact was recorded on the basis of some forged order. Hence, it amounted to admission on the part of the petitioner of having manipulated the order sheet of the court to enable the release of said Ramashish Singh on bail. He submitted that the petitioner was custodian of the records. Hence, onus was on him to establish his innocence and the circumstances under which the fake order was replaced on the records of the case subsequently by the true order of the Court. He submitted that the petitioner was custodian of the records. Hence, onus was on him to establish his innocence and the circumstances under which the fake order was replaced on the records of the case subsequently by the true order of the Court. He submitted that in view of his admissions in his reply to the charges, non-examination of the Presiding Officer and non-supply of the documents did not cause any prejudice to him and in fact he did not pursue the matter any further. Hence, even if prayers of the petitioner were denied, it did not vitiate the proceeding. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala Vs. S.K.Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ] and in the case of Chandrama Tewari Vs. Union of India [1987 supp. SCC 518]. He submitted that the enquiry report submitted to the Court was based only on documents available on record which was perused by the petitioner. Hence, non-supply of the report to the petitioner did not cause any prejudice to him. He submitted that the Enquiry Officer had only put questions to the witnesses, which were clarificatory in nature and was not in fact by way of cross-examination, though inadvertently he had mentioned the word “……..”. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on an order of the Apex Court dated 31.07.1969 passed in C.A. No.1956 of 1968 and a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mulchandani Electrical & Radio Industries Ltd. Vs. Workmen [ (1975) 4 SCC 731 , which was followed by Bombay High Court in O.O.C.J.W.P. No.1584 of 2000 and by Delhi High Court in W.P.(c) No.19046 of 2006 and 10615 of 2009. He further submitted that in every case non-supply of enquiry report does not amount to violation of Principles of Natural Justice and does not vitiate the order of punishment. He submitted that now it is a settled law that the delinquent has to prove that by non-supply of enquiry report, prejudice was caused to him, in which circumstances only, order of punishment becomes unsustainable. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the said judgment of the Apex Court in the said case of ECIL Vs. B.Karunakar (Supra) and a judgment of this Court in the case of Kameshwar Singh Vs. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the said judgment of the Apex Court in the said case of ECIL Vs. B.Karunakar (Supra) and a judgment of this Court in the case of Kameshwar Singh Vs. Canara Bank [ 1993(1) PLJR 1 ]. He submitted that even if on account of any procedural irregularity punishment order is quashed, there need not be an order of reinstatement of the delinquent in the facts and circumstances of the case. For this proposition, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of LIC Vs. A. Masilamani [ (2013) 6 SCC 530 ]. 11. A few facts from the counter affidavit of respondent no.1 as well as counter affidavit of respondent no.2 require to be noticed. From the counter affidavit of respondent no.2, it appears that the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents were substantially based on the pleadings made therein. However, from the counter affidavit of respondent no.1 it appears that, after the memo of appeal filed by the petitioner was forwarded by the District & Sessions Judge to the High Court, through memo no.1767 dated 05.11.2002, by memo no.2139 dated 11.03.2003 the District & Sessions Judge was requested to submit parawise comments on the same. The District & Sessions Judge, by memo no.916/03 dated 03.04.2003, submitted parawise comments. Thereafter, by memo no.5961 dated 01.08.2003 the District & Sessions Judge was asked to send certain papers. From paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit of respondent no.1, it appears that five documents were called for by this Court from the District & Sessions Judge, namely, (1) photo copy of entire order sheet of Sessions trial No.273/85; (2) photo copy of memo no.12010 received on 05.12.1987 and the order dated 03.11.1987 passed in Criminal Appeal; (3) photo copy of bail bond and release order; (4) photo copy of envelope containing memo no.12010 dated 02.12.1987; and (5) photo copy of enquiry report dated 03.10.2002. 12. It is significant to note that during enquiry petitioner had also asked for a copy of the envelope bearing memo no.12010 dated 02.12.1987 but the Enquiry Officer had denied the same. The enquiry report was also called for by the Appellate Authority vide said memo, which was admittedly never supplied to the petitioner. 12. It is significant to note that during enquiry petitioner had also asked for a copy of the envelope bearing memo no.12010 dated 02.12.1987 but the Enquiry Officer had denied the same. The enquiry report was also called for by the Appellate Authority vide said memo, which was admittedly never supplied to the petitioner. However, by memo no.1591 dated 16.08.2003 all the papers called for by the High Court was submitted by the District Judge except the release order, which was reported to be not available in the Jail. Thereafter, appeal of the petitioner was considered by the Standing Committee on 22.03.2005 and it found that the punishment awarded to the petitioner did not call for any interference. Hence, it dismissed the appeal. Petitioner was accordingly informed by the District & Sessions Judge by Annexure-15. 13. During hearing of this case, records were available with the learned counsel for the respondents, who perused the same and very fairly accepted that pleadings made by the petitioner in paragraph 11 of his memo of appeal, to the effect that enquiry report had not been supplied to him and he was not given opportunity to prove his innocence by issue of second show cause notice, was not taken notice of by the District & Sessions Judge, while submitting his parawise comments to this Court to the memo of appeal of the petitioner, through letter no.916/03 dated 03.04.2003. In the circumstances, in view of this admitted position it is clear that the Appellate Authority was never informed by the District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda that the enquiry report had not been supplied to the petitioner and he had not been given any opportunity to file his defence disputing the findings of the Enquiry Officer, which was essentially required to be considered by the Appellate Authority at the first instance. Then only the respondents were at liberty to defend their actions under “no prejudice” theory propounded by the Apex Court in ECIL (Supra). 14. In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the matter requires reconsideration by the Appellate Authority in the light of the pleadings and grounds taken by the petitioner in his memo of appeal in respect of procedural irregularities etc. and the submissions made by the learned counsel in support of them before this Court and noticed above. 14. In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the matter requires reconsideration by the Appellate Authority in the light of the pleadings and grounds taken by the petitioner in his memo of appeal in respect of procedural irregularities etc. and the submissions made by the learned counsel in support of them before this Court and noticed above. Since in his memo of appeal, petitioner has specifically raised the issue that enquiry report was not supplied to him and he was not given opportunity to meet the findings in the report against him before he was awarded punishment on that basis, about which admittedly no attention was drawn of the Appellate Authority by the District & Sessions Judge in his parawise comments, this Court is of the opinion that it must be considered by the Appellate Authority at the first instance, before any plea of the respondents under “no prejudice” theory, propounded by the Apex Court in ECIL (Supra), should be considered by this Court. This Court is of the opinion that, had the petitioner not raised that issue in his memo of appeal and would have raised it for the first time before this Court, then only this Court, in terms of the said judgment of the Apex Court, was required to apply “no prejudice” theory and confront the petitioner with the enquiry report and call upon him to establish prejudice caused to him. But once he raised this plea before the Appellate Authority, it was under legal obligation to consider it first. 15. As a result, this application is allowed. Order of the Appellate Authority, as communicated to the petitioner through the letter of the District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda, dated 12.07.2005, contained in Annexure-15, is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration of the appeal of the petitioner afresh. 16. Any order, in respect of status and consequential benefits to the petitioner, shall await the decision of the Appellate Authority.