Judgment Heard the learned counsel for appellant and learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The appellant is the Insurance Company seeking to question the award of compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as ‘W.C. Act’, for brevity). The substantial question of law raised in this appeal is whether the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation was justified in assessing the loss of earning capacity at the rate of 100% as against the compensation of disability at the rate of 30% assessed by the Medical Practitioner, which is in consonance with the injuries mentioned at Serial No.36 of Part -II Schedule – I of the W.C. Act. The accident is of the year 2009. It is on record that the claimant – respondent was a driver of a lorry and had lost the vision in his left eye, as a result of the accident, during and in the course of employment, and therefore, the claim for compensation having been contested, the Commissioner has overlooked the assessment made by the Medical Practitioner as well as the Schedule prescribing the loss of earning capacity and has proceeded to accept the contention that there is 100% loss of earning capacity as the workman was employed as a driver and by virtue of the injury and disablement he was no longer capable of continuing as a driver and has concluded that this has resulted in 100% disability. Such a conclusion arrived at is not on the basis of any evidence tendered as regards total disablement, but only on the premise that the avocation in which the workman was engaged was as a driver, and that he was no longer capable of driving a lorry. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would place reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shivalinga Shivanagowda Patil and Others versus Erappa Basappa Bhavihala and Others, ILR 2004 Kar 193, to contend that the questions that were considered in the said decision were as follows: (i) Whether the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act can assess the loss of earning capacity without or in-disregard of the assessment of a qualified medical practitioner? (ii) What is the procedure to be followed by the Commissioner for determining the compensation payable to the workmen in cases where neither the workman nor his employer has produced any medical evidence to show the extent of loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury sustained by the former? (iii) Whether the determination of the loss of earning capacity has to be by reference to the work, which the workman was performing at the time of the accident, or by reference to his capacity to do any other work after he has sustained the disability? (iv) Whether the Commissioner can while determining the amount of compensation, award a compensation under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act for an injury that falls under Section 4(1)(c)(i) r/w Part II of Schedule I to the Act?” 4. Question No. (i) & (iii) are pertinent and relevant to the present appeal. The Full Bench has squarely answered the same, to hold that the loss of earning capacity cannot be relatable to only the work that he was performing at the time of the accident and the assessment should be with reference to all work that a workman was capable of undertaking. And that this is the reason why the Schedule in respect of such injuries prescribes the minimum percentage of disability while it is open for a workman to tender evidence and to establish that the loss of earning capacity would be much more than what is indicated in the Schedule. Apart from this leeway, there is no discretion available to the Commissioner to assume that the loss of earning capacity was in excess of what has been assessed by the Medical Practitioner, and therefore, would rest his case on the contention that the loss of earning capacity could not be at the whim and fancy of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation in attributing any larger loss of earning capacity than what has been determined by a Medical Practitioner, in the case on hand. 5. The percentage of disability was assessed by the Medical Practitioner at 30%, which is in consonance with the percentage of disability in the Schedule to the Act with reference to the particular injury, and therefore, would submit that the compensation awarded would have to be substantially modified in accordance with law. 6. 5. The percentage of disability was assessed by the Medical Practitioner at 30%, which is in consonance with the percentage of disability in the Schedule to the Act with reference to the particular injury, and therefore, would submit that the compensation awarded would have to be substantially modified in accordance with law. 6. While the learned counsel for the respondent would seek to justify the reasoning of the Commissioner with reference to several decided cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The respondent No.1 would draw attention to a Four Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo versus Srinivas Sabata and Another, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 222, and also on the decision of K. Janardhan versus United India Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2384 and S. Suresh versus Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another, 2010 ACJ 497 . 7. In the light of the above contentions, the law as laid down in the said decisions of the Supreme Court would certainly appear to support the reasoning of the Commissioner. In Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case, the Four Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, after noticing the definition of expression “total disablement” under Section 2(i)(1) of the Act, which reads as, follows: ‘Total disablement’ means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement.” 8. The apex court has proceeded to opine that the injured workman in that particular case was a carpenter by profession, who had lost his left hand above the elbow and he had been evidently rendered unfit for work as a carpenter and as the work of carpentry could not be done with one hand alone, the Court was of the opinion that there was disablement to the extent of 100%. 9. Insofar as the decision in S. Suresh’s case is concerned, the Two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has merely followed the ratio in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case, wherein they were dealing with the case of a driver whose leg had been amputated and accordingly had opined that on the reasoning of the Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case, the appellant therein would also be entitled to claim 100% disability. So also is the case in K. Janardhan versus United India Insurance Company Limited, which was a case of a tanker driver and whose right leg was amputated upto the knee joint. Therefore, the three cases are on the same reasoning as to whether a workman is said to have suffered 100% disability because he was no longer capable of carrying on that particular avocation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident. 10. Incidentally, the Full Bench decision of this Court has specifically referred to Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case and Amar Nath Singh versus Continental Constructions Limited, 2001 ACJ 643. The full bench has pointed out that the Supreme Court itself in Amar Nath Singh versus Continental Constructions Limited has expressed as follows:- “3. The contention put forth before this Court is that the reduction made by the High Court is improper. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), wherein the case of amputation of left arm from the elbow causing total disablement to perform the work of carpenter was discussed and contended in the present case that there is a loss of one eye and the earning capacity of the appellant has been reduced from what he was capable of earning at the time of the accident, as a result of disablement. Learned counsel for the respondent refuted this contention and submitted that as the appellant himself as the appellant himself has been claiming that he was fit for work and his evidence discloses the same and in the circumstances the view taken by the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation is incorrect and that of the High Court is justified. The decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata (supra), turned on its own facts, therefore, the principles therein cannot be extended to the present case.” 11. Further, insofar as the position of law is concerned, the Full Bench has expressed its opinion, after a review of the case law at length, as follows:- 19. In this context it is useful to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of PRATAP NARAIN SINGH DEO v. SHRINIVAS SAB ATA AND ANR. Further, insofar as the position of law is concerned, the Full Bench has expressed its opinion, after a review of the case law at length, as follows:- 19. In this context it is useful to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of PRATAP NARAIN SINGH DEO v. SHRINIVAS SAB ATA AND ANR. After considering the definition of 'total disablement' in Section 2(1)(1) this is what the Supreme Court has observed:- "It has not been disputed before us that the injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement to the respondent and the question for consideration is whether the disablement incapacitated the respondent for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. The Commissioner has examined the question and recorded his finding as follows:- "The injured workman in this case is carpenter by profession.... By loss of the left hand above the elbow, he has evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only." This is obviously a reasonable and correct finding. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to assail it on any ground and it does not require to be corrected in this appeal. There is also no Justification for the other argument which has been advanced with reference to Item 3 of Part II of Schedule I, because it was not the appellant's case before the Commissioner that amputation of the arm was from 8" from tip of acromion to less then 4½" below the tip of olecranon. A new case cannot therefore be allowed to set up on facts which have not been admitted or established." 20. The cases relied upon are not applicable as the Apex Court has nowhere said that the Commissioner has no Jurisdiction. As discussed, strictly speaking, all the aforesaid decisions were rendered on facts and no law as such has been laid down. The cases relied upon are not applicable as the Apex Court has nowhere said that the Commissioner has no Jurisdiction. As discussed, strictly speaking, all the aforesaid decisions were rendered on facts and no law as such has been laid down. If at all what has been laid down is that if an injury falls within Schedule I, the percentage of permanent total disablement to the extent specified therein must be deemed to have occurred without any further proof because the Act is a piece of welfare legislation, social legislation which has to be construed in a more liberal sense in favour of the workman so that the assessment of loss of earning capacity made in the Schedule could be taken as the minimum compensation payable to the workman. If the workman disputes the extent and nature of disablement and consequently the assessment of loss of earning capacity and leads independent evidence to show that the injury which he has suffered is of a grave nature which disables him from performing any work, let alone the work which he was performing before the accident, it is open to the Commissioner under the Act to take note of that evidence and award suitable compensation in excess of what is stipulated in Schedule I read with Schedule IV. In that view of the matter, even if the injury complained falls within Part II of Schedule I if evidence is adduced to show that such an injury has resulted in permanent total disablement on evidence, it is open to the Commissioner to consider the loss of earning capacity and to hold that notwithstanding what is contained in Part II of Schedule I, the injury in question has resulted in permanent total disablement. 21. But, the question which still remains to be answered is in law what is the position; in law what a permanent total disablement means. For that it is necessary to look into the definition as contained in Section 2(1)(1) of the Act which is extracted above. 21. But, the question which still remains to be answered is in law what is the position; in law what a permanent total disablement means. For that it is necessary to look into the definition as contained in Section 2(1)(1) of the Act which is extracted above. The words which would signify the intention of the legislature are as under:- "as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement." Interpreting the aforesaid provision in the case of GENERAL MANAGER OF THE GIP RAILWAY, BOMBAY vs. BHANKAR, AIR 1950 NAGPUR 201, it has been held as under: "But this inability did not imply his inability to do other work. Disablement must be of such a character that the person concerned is unable to do any work. The reasoning of the learned Commissioner has proceeded as if the words were 'for the work which he was performing at the time of the accident' in place of the words which I have underlined for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident". 22. Primarily the language employed is the determining factor of intention. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found from the words used in the Legislation itself. Each word, phrase or sentence is to be construed in the light of general purposes of the Act itself. It is the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy but it is not allowable to interpret when there is no need for interpretation. The language best declares without more the intention of the law giver and is decisive of it. A construction which will leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. The paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object. The words employed must be given their proper and plain meaning. 23. A construction which will leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. The paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object. The words employed must be given their proper and plain meaning. 23. Now the words employed in Section 2(1) make it clear that in order to determine the total disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, what is to be seen is whether the injury complained of incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement. Therefore, it is clear the question is not whether the workman is incapacitated to do the work which he was doing before the accident. Even though he was doing a particular work if he was capable of performing other work at that point of time, the question is whether after the accident even though he is disabled from performing the work which he was performing before the accident whether he is able to perform the other work which he was capable of performing before the accident. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to accept the contention that once it is shown that the injured is not capable of doing the work which he was performing before the accident, it amounts to total disablement. 24. In fact, a reading of the injuries mentioned in Part II of Schedule I, such as injuries like amputation below middle thigh to 8.89 cms. Below knee, amputation below knee with stump exceeding 8.89 cms. Not exceeding 12.70 cms., amputation below knee with stump exceeding 12.70 cms, amputation of one foot resulting in end bearing, where the percentage of loss of earning capacity has been held to be only between 50 to 60% clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was not to treat those injuries as a case of permanent total disablement because in any of those cases any person who was doing his work with the assistance of legs will not be able to do the work thereafter. Therefore, a driver who has to make use his legs for driving purposes after the said injury will never be able to drive again. Therefore, a driver who has to make use his legs for driving purposes after the said injury will never be able to drive again. If the intention of the legislature was to treat such injury resulting in permanent total disablement they would not have included these injuries in Part II of Schedule I and declare that the loss of earning capacity on account of the said injury is only between 50 to 60% as against 100%. Therefore, the said provision cannot be construed by Courts in such a fashion which would negate the intention of the legislature. But, as held in the aforesaid Siddappa's case even if an injury falls within Part II of Schedule I and the injured is entitled to loss of earning as stipulated in the Schedule it is still open to him to lead independent evidence before the Commissioner and contend that on account of the accident he is prevented from doing any work and in a given case if he is able to demonstrate the said fact it is well within the Jurisdiction of the Commissioner to hold that such an injury notwithstanding what is mentioned in Part II of Schedule I amounts to permanent total disablement and award compensation on the basis of such assessment. As stated earlier, in the aforesaid two Division Bench judgments of this Court, the cases are decided on admitted facts and on facts those judgments are perfectly valid and legal and we do not find any inconsistency between the aforesaid two judgments. 25. In view of the discussions and for the reasons mentioned above, we answer the reference accordingly. We answer the points referred number-wise, which are as under:- (i) The Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot assess the loss of earning capacity without the assistance of the assessment made by qualified medical practitioner regarding loss of assessment or in disregard of the assessment of a qualified medical practitioner. We answer the points referred number-wise, which are as under:- (i) The Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot assess the loss of earning capacity without the assistance of the assessment made by qualified medical practitioner regarding loss of assessment or in disregard of the assessment of a qualified medical practitioner. But, if the assessment made by the qualified medical practitioner is disputed by any one of the parties, the Commissioner is competent to sit in judgment over the assessment of the qualified medical practitioner and pronounce upon the same if material by way of assessment of another qualified medical practitioner is placed and he is accepting the said assessment having regard to the nature and extent of the disablement and the loss of earning capacity, he can disregard the earlier assessment of the medical practitioner disputed by the parties. (ii) In the event of neither the workman nor his employer producing any medical evidence to show the extent of loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury of the former, Section 11 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to get the injured workman examined at any time by a qualified medical practitioner and to assess the nature and extent of disablement as well as the loss of earning capacity on the basis of such assessment to be furnished by the qualified medical practitioner. (iii) Determination of the loss of earning capacity has to be with reference to "all the work" which the workman was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement and not with reference to the work which the workman was performing at the time of the accident. However, this is subject to the condition that in case the workman establishes by acceptable evidence that after the injury not only he is not able to do the work which he was performing before the accident but he is not able to do any other work, the loss of earning capacity could be assessed on the basis of such evidence. (iv) In the case of an injury specified in Part II of Schedule I which falls under Section 4(1)(c)(i) read with Part II Schedule I, the Commissioner has the power to determine the amount of compensation awardable under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act provided the injured by adducing independent and acceptable evidence establishes the case that the injury which he has sustained results in a permanent total disablement and not merely permanent partial disablement. 12. In the present case on hand, having regard to the above legal position, which takes into account the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case and the subsequent judgments applying the said decision, the position of law is made clear that the Commissioner would not be in a position to make an assessment inconsistent with the opinion of the Medical Practiioner as to the percentage of disability and inconsistent with the percentage of disability indicated in the Schedule to the Act, and therefore, in the present case on hand, there was no scope for the Commissioner to have proceeded to conclude that the workman was suffering a 100% disability by virtue of the loss of vision in the left eye, when the percentage of disability as assessed by the Medical Practitioner and as found in the Schedule to the Act is only 30%. Though the learned counsel for respondent would point out that there is an attempt on the part of the workman to establish that there was a larger loss of earning capacity than as assessed by the Medical Practitioner, the scope for any variance with the percentage of disability would be marginal unless there was a further medical opinion. In the absence of which this Court in the interest of justice opines, especially having regard to the avocation of the workman, that if the compensation amount is enhanced by a further 10% though the disability is assessed only at 30%, it would not result in any prejudice to the appellant. Accordingly, notwithstanding the established legal position as formally expressed by this Court in the above Full Bench decision, the appeal is allowed in part. Accordingly, notwithstanding the established legal position as formally expressed by this Court in the above Full Bench decision, the appeal is allowed in part. The amount of compensation awarded is scaled down and modified to Rs.1,71,350/-instead of Rs.4,28,376/-on the basis that there is loss of earning capacity at 40% and the said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum, one month from the date of accident, till the date of payment. The amount in deposit be withdrawn by the claimant – respondent to the extent aforesaid. The remaining amount be refunded to the appellant.