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2014 DIGILAW 1020 (MAD)

Karthick Theodre v. State

2014-04-30

P.N.PRAKASH

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. The sole accused Karthick Theodre was tried for offences under Section 417 and 376 IPC in S.C.No.202/2009 by the Sessions Court [Mahila Court] Tiruchirappalli and was convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC by judgment dated 29.09.2011 and sentenced to undergo 7 years Rigorous Imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, he has preferred this appeal before this Court. 2. The dramatis personae in this case is the prosecutrix. P.W.1 is admittedly a girl born in New Delhi and who had her education in India and Australia, where her father [P.W.2] was running a restaurant. She settled down in Sydney, Australia some time in 2003 and came into contact with the accused, who is also an Indian citizen of Tamil origin, but employed in Sydney, Australia. They seem to have fallen in love some time in 2006-07 and they had their betrothal in Sydney on 07.09.2007. Thereafter, they decided to have their wedding on 19.12.2007 and hence on 09.11.2007 they notified the Registry of Birth, Deaths and Marriages as required under the Australian Laws. They perhaps did not have patience to wait till 19.12.2007 and they started living together even prior to their marriage. The wedding did not take place on 19.12.2007 and after a gap of about 2 years, the accused came to Chennai for marrying one Immaculate Leno in Trichy. (a) The prosecutrix followed the trail and played spoilsport by lodging a complaint [Ex.P1] on 13.07.2009 to the Inspector of Police [P.W.5], All Women Police Station, Cantonment, Trichy, who registered a case in Cr.No.38 of 2009 under Sections 417, 294(b) and 506(i) IPC and prepared the printed FIR [Ex.P5]. The accused was arrested on the same day by police. The prosecutrix was sent for chemical examination to Mahathma Gandhi Memorial Government Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Prasanna Lakshmi on 15.07.2009. Dr. Prasanna Lakshmi [P.W.4] in her evidence as well in the Accident Register [Ex.P4] has stated as follows: "Alleged to have been living together and had sexual contact many times with 1 known person after engagement between November 2007 - April 2008, September 2008 -November 2008 at Australia. That person is said to have refused to marry now and planning to marry another girl. O/E Patient conscious/oriented. Answering coherently. Attained menarche - 13 years. That person is said to have refused to marry now and planning to marry another girl. O/E Patient conscious/oriented. Answering coherently. Attained menarche - 13 years. MH 4 -5/30 LMP - last week of July Breast Normal Axillary & pubic hair normal P/ASoft P/VCx ^ ut RV, NS, FF Opinion: Victim has lost her virginity as hymen is not intact and easily admits 2 fingers. Suggested: USG pelvis -Normal study Urine preg - test - Negative Patient is not pregnant at present." (b) The accused was also sent for chemical examination for potency test and by Certificate Of Examination dated 17.07.2009 [Ex.P6], Dr. A.Karthikeyan, Police Surgeon of KAP Viswanatham Government Medical College, Trichy has given the following opinion: ''Opinion: I am of the opinion that the individual examined that there is nothing to suggest that he is not capable of taking part in sexual intercourse.'' (c) Since the accused was arrested only for offences under Section 417, 294(b) and 506(i) IPC, he was released on bail by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Trichy on 17.07.2009, but his passport was directed to be handed over to the learned Magistrate. The prosecutrix was not happy with this and so she started making allegations against the police that they had not properly recorded her statement. She alleged that she was raped by the accused in Australia and contended that the police had not properly investigated the case. She engaged a lawyer and filed Crl.O.P.[MD] No.5377 of 2009 before this Court with the following prayer: "To direct the respondent to record the statement of the petitioner in accordance with law by taking into account all the documents that are in possession of the petitioner and thereafter to alter the relevant provisions of the penal code in the FIR based on the said statement of the petitioner in a manner known to law.'' (d) The police naturally panicked and had her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.3, Trichy on 03.08.2009. On 10.08.2009, when Crl.O.P.No.5377/2009 came up for final disposal, this Court passed the following order: "3. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that on 03.08.2009 as prayed by the petitioner, the statement of the petitioner is recorded and the same is acknowledged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. On 10.08.2009, when Crl.O.P.No.5377/2009 came up for final disposal, this Court passed the following order: "3. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that on 03.08.2009 as prayed by the petitioner, the statement of the petitioner is recorded and the same is acknowledged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Hence, the petition become infructuous and this Criminal Original Petition is disposed of." (e) Based on Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement given by the prosecutrix, the police sent an alteration report dated 14.08.2008 [Ex.P8] to the learned Judicial Magistrate for altering Sections from 417, 294(b) and 506(i) IPC to Sections 376, 420 and 417 IPC. After completing the investigation, the police filed a final report against the accused for offences under Section 376 and 417 IPC before the learned Judicial Magistrate -2 Trichy, who took the same on file as PRC No.24/2009. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued process to the accused. On the appearance of the accused, the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. were complied with and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, Trichy made over the case to the Mahila Court, Trichy in S.C.No.202 of 2009, wherein two charges were framed against the accused. I am extracting the charges as framed by the trial Court: "Firstly: That you being in love with the witness from 2006 onwards performed betrothal for marriage with her on 07.09.2007 in the presence of parents and relatives of the witness, that you had sexual intercourse with her by compelling her and obtained her consent under a misconception that you will marry her and that you are liable to be punished u/s 376 IPC. Secondly: During the course of the same transaction you promised to marry the witness, by performing a betrothal on 07.09.2007 that you intentionally induced the witness by deceiving her, fraudulently, to have sexual intercourse with you, that the witness could not have consented for it but for the deception, that you refused to marry her subsequently and hence you are liable to be punished u/s 417 IPC." (f) When questioned, the accused pleaded not guilty to the said charges. The prosecution examined five witnesses and marked 9 Exhibits. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he gave a detailed written explanation explaining the various circumstances against him. The prosecution examined five witnesses and marked 9 Exhibits. When the accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he gave a detailed written explanation explaining the various circumstances against him. On his behalf, no witness was examined but the plaint copy in O.S.No.169 of 2010 was marked as Ex.D1. After considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate [crl.side]. 4. There is a serious legal and incurable defect in the entire prosecution case. The accused and the prosecutrix are Indian nationals. It is their case that the accused raped her in Sydney, Australia on 07.09.2007. It is also her case that they had their betrothal on 07.09.2007 and their marriage was fixed for 19.12.2007. Thereafter, only in July 2009, the accused comes to India for marrying Immaculate Leno on 10.07.2009. In other words, his marriage with the prosecutrix did not take place on the scheduled date, namely 19.12.2007. Assuming for a moment that getting betrothed to a person and not marrying her on the fixed day amounts to cheating punishable under Section 417 IPC, the offence is complete on 19.12.2007 itself. Even if the accused remains a bachelor without marrying Immaculate Leno, he still could have been prosecuted, if the action amounts to cheating within the meaning of Section 417 IPC. Therefore, even going by the prosecution case, both the alleged offences, namely offence under Section 376 IPC and under Section 417 IPC had taken place in Australia. Section 4 IPC states as follows: "4. Extension of Code to extra-territorial offences.- The provisions of this Code apply also to any offence committed by— (1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India; (2) any person or any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be. Explanation.- In this section the word ''offence'' includes every act committed outside India which, if committed in India, would be punishable under this Code. Illustration A, who is a citizen of India, commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in India in which he may be found.'' 5. Explanation.- In this section the word ''offence'' includes every act committed outside India which, if committed in India, would be punishable under this Code. Illustration A, who is a citizen of India, commits a murder in Uganda. He can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in India in which he may be found.'' 5. On account of Section 4 IPC, the accused can be prosecuted for offence in India, but with the following caveat, namely Section 188 Cr.P.C. Section 188 Cr.P.C. states as follows: ''188. Offence committed outside India. When an offence is committed outside India- (a) By a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) By a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India. He may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found: Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 6. A bare reading of this provision shows that, without the previous sanction of the Central Government, the trial Court ought not to have tried this case at all. The Supreme Court in Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India [ 1993 (3) SCC 609 ] has held that sanction from the Central Government can be obtained even after the Court in India had taken cognizance. In this case, even during trial no sanction under Section 188 proviso was obtained. It is also not a curable defect under Section 465 Cr.P.C. because Section 465 Cr.P.C. deals with error or irregularity in sanction and does not condone total absence of sanction. 7. Why should there be a sanction from the Central Government to try an Indian for the offence he committed abroad? One answer that comes to my mind is, the first principle in Criminal Jurisprudence is 'Lex Loci Delictus' the law of the place where the crime took place. The second principle is, if the trial is held in the place where the offence was committed, then both the sides will have a fair opportunity to examine their witnesses. One answer that comes to my mind is, the first principle in Criminal Jurisprudence is 'Lex Loci Delictus' the law of the place where the crime took place. The second principle is, if the trial is held in the place where the offence was committed, then both the sides will have a fair opportunity to examine their witnesses. By conducting the trial in India for an alleged offence that took place in Australia, the accused was seriously prejudiced because it would have been really impossible for him to get his witnesses from there. The Parliament in its wisdom has therefore empowered the Central Government to completely analyse every facet of a case and only after its sanction can Indian Courts try the offender. 8. Very recently in Thota Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P. [(2012) 1 MLJ (Crl) 341 (SC)] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "Although the decision in Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India and others (supra) was rendered in the background of a conspiracy alleged to have been hatched by the accused, the ratio of the decision is confined to what has been observed hereinabove in the interpretation of Section 188 Cr.P.C. The proviso to Section 188, which has been extracted hereinbefore, is a fetter on the powers of the investigating authority to inquire into or try any offence mentioned in the earlier part of the Section, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The fetters, however, are imposed only when the stage of trial is reached, which clearly indicates that no sanction in terms of Section 188 is required till commencement of the trial. It is only after the decision to try the offender in India was felt necessary that the previous sanction of the Central Government would be required before the trial could commence." On this short score alone, this appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant acquitted. 9. I do not want to rest on my oars by adopting this shortcut method to acquit the accused and therefore, I plodded into the evidence to find out if at all there is a case to convict the accused for the said offences. 10. The evidence of the victim has been recorded by the trial Court in English and therefore, that saves the trouble of translation and distortion. I am extracting verbatim certain portions from the Chief Examination of the prosecutrix. 10. The evidence of the victim has been recorded by the trial Court in English and therefore, that saves the trouble of translation and distortion. I am extracting verbatim certain portions from the Chief Examination of the prosecutrix. (a) "Now I am residing with my parents at 100, Portland Street, Croydon Park, New South Wales -2133, Australia. I am 29 years old. I was born and brought up at New Delhi. I have finished my B.Sc., Degree Course in Womens Christian College, Chennai. I have worked in the HDFC Bank, in New Delhi from 2002 to September 2003. I joined with my father in September 2003 along with my mother and younger sister in Sydney, Australia. I pursued my higher education M.B.A. [Accounting] in the Australian Catholic University in North Sydney. After completing my study I joined in the Common Wealth Bank, in April 2007. I and my family members met few Tamilians in Sydney near my house. Among them the accused Karthik Theodre one of the Tamilian." This part of her evidence clearly shows that the prosecutrix is not an Indian village belle oscillating between adolescence and adulthood, caught in the grips of romantic fantasies exhibited in Indian films and TV soap operas. (b) In the latter part of her evidence she says that, the accused fell head over heels for her and after great persuasion by him, she agreed to love him. (c) Then coming to the betrothal part, P.W.1 says: ''The engagement took place on 7.9.2007 in the presence of relatives and well wishers. P.W.1's father Balraj [P.W.2] also corroborates her by saying that about 25 of his relatives were present on 07.09.2007 for the betrothal function. It is the case of the prosecutrix and her father that the parents of the accused was not present because, the accused was saying that his parents may object to he, being a Christian, marrying a Hindu girl. 11. Coming to what transpired after betrothal, it is the case of the prosecutrix that after the betrothal on 07.09.2007, they took a separate shared household in Ashfield, Sydney, Australia. This is what P.W.1 says: "After the engagement, Karthik asked me again to come and live with him in a separate shared household. During the engagement we have exchanged our rings and took photos of the engagement function. I refused to oblige Karthick since my parents objected. This is what P.W.1 says: "After the engagement, Karthik asked me again to come and live with him in a separate shared household. During the engagement we have exchanged our rings and took photos of the engagement function. I refused to oblige Karthick since my parents objected. Karthik took me to Church and we exchanged rings in front of the altar of God. And he promised me that he has taken me as his wife. He started calling me as his wife from then on. Due to Karthick's continuous compulsion to move out with him in a separate shared household organized by him at Ashfield. On 07.11.2007 I moved out to a separate shared household organized by him." So P.W.1 says that after the betrothal, the accused started calling her as his wife and despite her resistance, he managed to take a house on 07.11.2007 itself and moved into it. She has marked Ex.P2, the Rental Agreement signed by both (accused and the prosecutrix) in favour of one Jay Z.Murray. The accused and the prosecutrix are being shown as tenants in the said rental agreement which is dated 07.11.2007, which is also the date of betrothal. The Rental Agreement commences from 09.11.2007 for a period of six months ending on 09.05.2008. The prosecutrix in the witness box says as if the accused had taken the house on the date of betrothal and she moved into the house on the very same day, but whereas her own document Ex.P2 clearly states that, the house has been taken on rent by both of them and it is effective only from 09.11.2007. Dictates of common sense states that one cannot search for a house, locate the house, negotiate with the landlord, enter into agreement and also move into a house on a one single day especially 07.11.2007 being their betrothal day. Obviously both of them must have gone about scouting for a house through rent agents and after finding a suitable accommodation and negotiating with the landlord, they would have entered into a Rental Agreement. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act permits me to draw such an inference based on common course of natural events and human conduct. 12. On a cursory examination of Ex.P2 it is clear that, one L.J. Hooker, Ashfield has acted as the house agent for fixing the premises for the parties. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act permits me to draw such an inference based on common course of natural events and human conduct. 12. On a cursory examination of Ex.P2 it is clear that, one L.J. Hooker, Ashfield has acted as the house agent for fixing the premises for the parties. Therefore, I am unable to subscribe with the statement of the prosecutrix that she was lured into a separate household by sweet words of the accused. 13. The next question that nags my mind is, when the prosecutrix is an Indian girl of Tamil origin, why should she leave her parents immediately after the betrothal to have a shared household with the accused even before the wedding? Of course, live in relationship is neither an offence in India nor in Australia, but it is definitely considered as a social taboo in India unlike in Australia. It is not her case that she wanted to have a rehearsal for a post marriage celibate life like Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and Saradha Devi and that all her dreams of blossoming into a Saradha Devi was spoiled by the accused by subjecting her to coitus. 14. Now coming to the allegation of rape, this is what the prosecutrix has stated: ''On the same night Karthick approached me with romantic gestures by calling me his darling wife. His approach was in such a way that he wanted to have a first night with me, for which I refused. He started saying that he has done everything for me and what else can he do to share the bed with me. He fell upon me and overpoured my physical power and I gave in myself due to his psychological allurements. He convinced me that I was his wife. After this act of Karthick I cried bitterly and demanded him to marry me as soon as possible." "On the same night" refers to the night on 07.11.2007. As stated by me earlier, the agreement for the house was entered into only on 07.11.2007 and the tenancy was to commence only from 09.11.2007 as could be seen from Ex.P2. The charge has been framed by the trial Court as if the rape had taken place on 07.11.2007, ignoring the fact that they could have entered into the shared household only on 09.11.2007. The charge has been framed by the trial Court as if the rape had taken place on 07.11.2007, ignoring the fact that they could have entered into the shared household only on 09.11.2007. I can take judicial note of the fact that in places like Australia these rental agreements are followed in letter and spirit by the parties and in the absence of any evidence by the prosecutrix that the landlord had permitted her to occupy the house even two days prior to 09.11.2007, I am unable to hold that they both had entered into the shared household on 07.11.2007. 15. Assuming that out of inadvertence the prosecutrix had stated that the accused had ravished her on 07.11.2007 instead of 09.11.2007, the following answers given by her in the cross examination completely demolishes her case. ''The last sex I had with the accused is around January or February 2009. How many times I had sex with the accused is unlimited." She has further confessed; ''It is true that I had sex with the accused many times on a single day.'' It is clear that she blurted out the truth and after realizing that she has committed a mistake, she has added the following rider. "The witness voluntarily adds that the accused used force against her will." If the accused had been forcibly having sex with her many times on a single day, what prevented a woman of 26 years to go to the Australian Police and lodge a complaint? In the cross examination, on this aspect she had stated as follows: ''In July 2009 when I came to understand that the accused had cheated me and returned to India, I did not give any complaint in Australia. Rape is an offence in Australia also. It is incorrect to say that I did not give complaint against accused in Australia because if I give complaint, police would have investigated and found out that the accused did not have sex with me and that I way lying." 16. It may be necessary to recapitulate that the prosecutrix came to India and in her complaint [Ex.P1] she had not stated anything about the accused committing rape on her. She has only stated that the accused is not marrying her and is marrying someone else. It may be necessary to recapitulate that the prosecutrix came to India and in her complaint [Ex.P1] she had not stated anything about the accused committing rape on her. She has only stated that the accused is not marrying her and is marrying someone else. That is why the Inspector of Police [P.W.5] registered a case under Section 417, 294(b) and 506(i) IPC and there was no Section 376 IPC at that point of time. When the prosecutrix was examined by the Doctor, there also she has not alleged that she was raped, as could be seen from the evidence of Dr. Prasanna Lakshmi [P.W.4] and the Wound Certificate [Ex.P4]. The defence in the cross examination of the prosecutrix has confronted her with these contradictions in her previous statements in the complaint and to Dr. Prasanna Lakshmi [P.W.4] in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The prosecutrix has not given any satisfactory explanation for these contradictions. Only after the release of the accused within a period of 5 days from his arrest, the prosecutrix felt that she should have to make out a case of rape and started alleging that the police did not properly record her statement. After obtaining legal advice, she has given 164 Cr.P.C statement, wherein for the first time she has spoken about the allegations of rape. 17. After reading the chief examination of the prosecutrix, I asked myself whether she has made out a case of rape against the accused. The yardstick for appreciating the evidence of a witness has been succinctly laid down by Sir Stephens in the definition of the word "proved", in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act: "A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists." One is required to appraise the evidence not from the standpoint of a genius like Albert Einstein or from the standpoint of an idiot like Don Quixote, but analyse it from the standpoint of a prudent man. From the point of a prudent man, if her chief examination alone is analysed, I am unable to convince myself to uphold the conviction of the accused. 18. From the point of a prudent man, if her chief examination alone is analysed, I am unable to convince myself to uphold the conviction of the accused. 18. While appreciating the evidence, the Judge is not required merely to read the deposition of the witness and decide the case. Sir Stephens in the definition of the word "proved" has used the expression "After considering the matters before it." The word "matters' is larger than the expression "evidence", because presumption in Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act permits a Judge to use his common sense while appreciating a piece of evidence. A highly educated city bred girl of 26 years goes to Australia; studies there, gets engaged to the accused, leaves her father and takes up a shared household with the accused but turns around and says that the accused subjected her to sexual assault without her consent. This is indeed unbelievable and incredible. 19. For maintaining a charge under Section 417 IPC, it should be seen whether the accused had the intention to deceive the victim from the beginning. The prosecutrix has admitted that she was in love with the accused from the year 2006 onwards. They had their engagement on 07.09.2007 in the presence of friends and relatives of the prosecutrix. Thereafter, they both had gone to the Registering Office of marriages and have given a notice of intended marriage in terms of the Marriage Act, 1961 of Australia. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused did not have the intention to renege from his commitment after the betrothal. 20. In Ex.P3 it is clearly stated that the date of wedding will be 19.12.2007 and the notice of expiry is 09.05.2009. The accused came to India to marry Immaculate only in July 2009. In his explanation in 313 Cr.P.C. the accused has stated the reasons for his breaking with the prosecutrix. It is his contention that after the betrothal, they both started living in the separate household and the prosecutrix would go for Disco Dance in the night clubs and return late in the night. I cannot take this statement of the accused given under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as 'proof of the fact that the prosecutrix was going to night clubs', but I can construe it as a plausible explanation given by the accused for breaking the affair. I cannot take this statement of the accused given under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as 'proof of the fact that the prosecutrix was going to night clubs', but I can construe it as a plausible explanation given by the accused for breaking the affair. Had the accused really cheated her, the prosecutrix would have taken some action against him either in civil or criminal law in Australia, but she did not. Her conduct is very much relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of her father [P.W.2] is to the effect that, after 07.11.2007 he persuaded his daughter not to take a separate household, on the ground that it is against the Indian culture. Inspite of this, the Prosecutrix had left her father and gone with the accused to live separately in a shared household. Thereafter, to allege that the accused had sex with her forcibly in the shared household, appears hard to believe. 21. Recently in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 7 SCC 675 ] while considering the allegation of a 19 year old girl that the accused had cheated her on the false promise of marriage and had sex with her, the Apex Court held as follows: "26. To conclude, the prosecutrix had left her home voluntarily, of her own free will to get married to the appellant. She was 19 years of age at the relevant time and was, hence, capable of understanding the complications and issues surrounding her marriage to the appellant. According to the version of events provided by her, the prosecutrix had called the appellant on a number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre- decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived she went with him to the Karna lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at this stage and made no complaints to any one. Thereafter, she also went to Kurukshetra with the appellant, where she lived with his relatives. Here to, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the appellant. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the appellant at the Birla Mandir. Thereafter, she also went to Kurukshetra with the appellant, where she lived with his relatives. Here to, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the appellant. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the appellant at the Birla Mandir. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the appellant to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married in court at Ambala. However, here they were apprehended by the police. 27. If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to marry the appellant, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, we fail to understand on what basis the allegation of "false promise of marriage" has been raised by the prosecutrix. We also fail to comprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be leveled against the appellant, in light of the afore-mentioned fact situation." The fact situation in this case is still worse. A 26 year old woman entered into a live in relationship with the accused and when the relationship became sour, started crying hoarse. 22. After having the Appellant arrested the prosecutrix went to the electronic media and gave interviews tarnishing his name which she admitted in the cross examination -"I admit that I gave interview to Kalaignar TV in the Boothakannadi programme. In that programme two persons Balamurugan, Vinsent are my family friends." It appears that after the arrest of the accused, his marriage with Immaculate is also broken and his Indian passport has also not been returned to him. 23. In fine, the moral of this story is, our youngsters should imbibe the Work culture of the West and the Social culture of the East and not vice versa if they want to succeed in life. The appellant brought upon himself his own ruination by his sheer indiscretion. 24. In the result, I hold that the appeal should be allowed and the accused acquitted. I am not giving any benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitting him, but I am holding that the accused has disproved the prosecution case and has earned this acquittal. I direct the Courts below to immediately return to the accused, his Indian Passport. 25. This appeal is allowed. I am not giving any benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitting him, but I am holding that the accused has disproved the prosecution case and has earned this acquittal. I direct the Courts below to immediately return to the accused, his Indian Passport. 25. This appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Sessions Judge (Mahila Court), Tiruchirapalli in S.C.No.202 of 2009, dated 29.09.2011 is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all charges levelled against him.