PROF. H. B. WALIKAR v. CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITIES IN KARNATAKA AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF KARNATAKA
2014-11-27
H.BILLAPPA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : H. Billappa, J. In these writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs: (i) Quash the impugned notification dated 12.09.2014 vide Annexure-H issued by the Respondent No.1 and all further proceedings pursuant to Annexure-H. (ii) Quash the impugned Inquiry Report dated 23.09.2014 vide Annexure-L. (iii) Quash the impugned letter dated 01.10.2014 vide Annexure-N issued by the respondent No. 1. (iv) Quash the impugned letter dated 01.10.2014 vide Annexure-P issued by the respondent No. 1. (v) Quash the impugned FIR with complaint in Dharwad Lokayukta Police Station Crime No. 11/2014 vide Annexure-R which has been registered by respondent No.2 as per the directions stipulated in Annexure-N issued by respondent No. 1. 2. It is stated, the petitioner was appointed as Vice Chancellor of the Karnataka University, Dharwad, on 25.10.2010. The petitioner is an eminent scholar having very good academic and administrative excellence, he has respect and regard in the Society. 3. Under Section 14(1) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 (for short "the Act"), the Vice Chancellor of the University is a whole time Officer. He has been enlisted as Officer of the University as per Section 11(c) of the Karnataka State Universities Act. The petitioner does not come under the ambit of employees of the University. 4. It is stated, some discredented, unconnected persons having personal agenda and political affiliation met the first respondent on 9.9.2014 and had a discussion with first respondent regarding administration of the petitioner. It has appeared in various newspapers including Vijaya Vani daily newspaper. 5. On the basis of the malicious and personally interested representation, the first respondent appointed Hon'ble Justice B. Padmaraj, former Judge, High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, to hold an inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner exercising power under Section 8(1) read with Section 12 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000, vide notification bearing No. GS 3 KUM 2014 dated 12.9.2014. The notification is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner being an Officer of the University does not come under Section 8 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000. Therefore, the appointment of inquiry Officer was beyond the scope of the Karnataka Universities Act, 2000, and without authority of law or jurisdiction. 6.
The notification is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner being an Officer of the University does not come under Section 8 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000. Therefore, the appointment of inquiry Officer was beyond the scope of the Karnataka Universities Act, 2000, and without authority of law or jurisdiction. 6. It is stated, the Government has power and jurisdiction to appoint Inquiry Officer under Section 14(8) of the Karnataka Universities Act, 2000. The Government has not appointed any such Inquiry Officer. All matters relating to Vice Chancellor are required to be dealt under Section 14. The petitioner through letter dated 17.9.2014 ascertained from the State Government as to whether the Government has requested the first respondent to hold an inquiry against the petitioner. The State Government through its letter dated 17.9.2014 has informed the petitioner that no proposal has been sent to the first respondent. The Government has not sent any proposal to the first respondent to appoint an Inquiry Officer. 7. Through notification dated 12.9.2014 vide annexure-11 the first respondent has directed the petitioner not to proceed with any recruitment including issue of appointment order, award of lender for construction works and purchase till Inquiry Report is submitted. The petitioner has complied with the said directions. 8. The Hon'ble Justice B. Padmaraj, Inquiry Officer appointed by the first respondent arrived at Karnataka University campus at Dharwad on 17.9.2013. Thereafter, from 18.9.2013 till 23.9.2013 he secured documents and information from various sections/ departments of Karnataka University, Dharwad and concluded the inquiry. Thereafter, the report has been submitted to the first respondent as per Annexure-L. On arrival of Hon'ble Justice B. Padmaraj, Inquiry Officer, the petitioner has given representation dated 22.9.2014 submitting his explanation and requesting to provide him an opportunity of hearing and to submit his objections/explanation. In spite of that, no opportunity was given to the petitioner. The inquiry has been conducted behind the back of the petitioner and in violation of principles of natural justice. The report submitted by the Inquiry Officer is bad in law and cannot be sustained in law. 9.
In spite of that, no opportunity was given to the petitioner. The inquiry has been conducted behind the back of the petitioner and in violation of principles of natural justice. The report submitted by the Inquiry Officer is bad in law and cannot be sustained in law. 9. Based on the report of inquiry Officer through letter dated 01.10.2014 bearing No.GS3KUM 2014, the 1st respondent has directed the Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwad under Section 9 of the Act to lodge a complaint against the petitioner and others for abuse of office, criminal misconduct, breach of trust etc., under Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC. Even after the receipt of the inquiry report, the 1st respondent has not sought for explanation from the petitioner or no show cause has been issued and no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner. In fact, copy of the inquiry report has not been furnished to the petitioner. All opportunities have been denied to the petitioner. 10. It is stated, the 1st respondent issued direction to the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act bearing No.GS5KUM 2014 dated 01.10.2014 directing the petitioner not to convene any meetings of the authorities of the university such as Syndicate, the Academic Council, the Finance Committee, the Board of Studies, the faculties etc., and not to issue any appointment orders, contracts etc., till further orders. 11. Through letter dated 05.10.2014 the petitioner sought for supply of copies of allegations made against the petitioner, copy of inquiry report with documents. Sofar, the copies have not been supplied to the petitioner. It is stated, in the inquiry report recommendation and action to be taken are given at page Nos. 33 to 35 and no where it has been recommended to initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioner. Even then, the 1st respondent has issued direction to the Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwad to lodge the complaint against the petitioner. It is highly arbitrary. As per the direction of the 1st respondent, the Registrar of Karnataka University has submitted a complaint dated 02.10.2014 to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Dharwad and Lokayukta Police have registered a case against the petitioner in Crime No. 11 2014 on 7.10.2014 for the offences punishable under Sections 13(l)(c) and (d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988 and Section 409 of IPC.
1988 and Section 409 of IPC. Aggrieved by Annexures-H, L, N, P and R the petitioner has filed these writ petitions. 12. The 1st respondent has filed statement of objections contending that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. The contention of the petitioner that he is an officer, Section 8 of the Act is not applicable and the appointment of the Commission of inquiry is without authority of law stems from an incorrect interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression 'employee' occurring in sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Act cannot be construed in a narrow sense and cannot be understood as in the sphere of labour law legislation's. The word employee has to be understood in the background of the aims and objects of the Act. The interpretation which defeats the purpose of the Act has to be eschewed. The power of discipline, inspection and control relating to the University is conferred on the Chancellor under Section 8 of the Act. It has to be construed harmoniously with the powers conferred under cognate provisions, such as Sections 9, 10 and 12 of the Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 12 of the Act declares that the Chancellor is the head of the University. He is required to maintain discipline in all matters relating to the University by causing inspection and exercising control. Therefore, the Chancellor's power extends to maintaining control and enforcing discipline on all the employees of the University including the officers of the University specified in Section 11 of the Act. The dichotomy pleaded by the petitioner that all matters relating to Vice-Chancellors can be dealt with only under Section 14 of the Act is unacceptable. It would result in consequences not envisaged by the Act defeating the very object of vesting powers on the Head of the University. Sub-Section (6) of Section 14 of the Act provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall hold office subject to the pleasure of the Chancellor and sub-Section (7) provides for removal of the Vice-Chancellor from his office. The present case is not one of removal of the petitioner from the office held by him and sub-Section 8 of Section 14 of the Act has no application. The grounds urged are based on an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Act.
The present case is not one of removal of the petitioner from the office held by him and sub-Section 8 of Section 14 of the Act has no application. The grounds urged are based on an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the Act. It is stated, the Chancellor received several complaints from various organisations and individuals regarding serious irregularities committed by the petitioner as the Vice-Chancellor. The Registrar of the University also reported that the functioning of the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor was not in conformity with the rules and regulations. In addition, the media highlighted malfunctioning and maladministration in the University with specific reference to irregularities in recruitment of the staff of the University and award of contracts for construction works in violation of the provisions of the Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements Act, 1999. The Chancellor who is the lead of the University had taken note of the complaints received and after due application of mind and in exercise of power conferred under Section 8 and cognate provisions of the Act has appointed Justice B. Padmaraj, former Judge of the High Court of Karnataka to hold an inquiry into the allegations made against the petitioner. Therefore, no fault can be found with the action taken by the Chancellor which is in the interest of the Karnataka University and public interest. 13. The contention of the petitioner that he ought to have been heard before the Commission of Inquiry is contrary to the unambiguous terms of Section 8 of the Act and law settled by the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Sub-Section (1) of Section (8) of the Act docs not provide that a person against whom specific allegations are made must be heard before the Chancellor exercises his statutory power of appointing a Commission of inquiry to enquire into the allegations. Natural justice is not an unruly horse, not a lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure and that unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case is erroneous. In the present case, after receiving complaints of serious irregularities committed by the petitioner, the law did not require the Chancellor to give the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before taking action. It is to be noticed that the Commission did not record statements of witnesses, unlike in an inquiry under the Commission of inquiry Act. 1952.
In the present case, after receiving complaints of serious irregularities committed by the petitioner, the law did not require the Chancellor to give the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before taking action. It is to be noticed that the Commission did not record statements of witnesses, unlike in an inquiry under the Commission of inquiry Act. 1952. Therefore, the Commission after inspecting the relevant records and after receiving information from the officials concerned, made its recommendations. In this background, there is no breach of principles of natural justice. 14. It is stated, the petitioner who had notice of Annexure-H issued under Section 8(1) r/w Section 12 of the Act appointing the Commission of inquiry did not make a request to hear. The said notification is dated 12.09.2014 which was published in the Karnataka Gazette. Though, the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor has knowledge of the commencement of the proceedings by the Commission, he did not make a request to the Commission to hear him. Therefore, the petitioner has waived his right and cannot have any grievance in this regard. The direction dated 01.10.2014 issued under Section 9 of the Act to the Registrar to lodge the complaint is well within the knowledge of the petitioner. On the same day direction was issued to the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor not to convene meetings of the authorities of the University. If the petitioner was aggrieved, he ought to have availed of the remedies in law. Having elected not to do that, the petitioner is precluded from questioning the validity of the direction after compliance by the authority to whom the direction was issued. The report of the Commission of inquiry recommends actions to be taken regarding the serious irregularities committed by the petitioner. The Commission records serious irregularities committed by the petitioner and recommends in-depth inquiry into the financial irregularities by an independent agency which is an immediate need to set right the affairs of the University more particularly the matters involving financial implications and relating to audit objections. The further recommendation is that concrete steps are to be taken immediately to hold the defaulting officers personally liable for the huge financial loss caused to the University and to take immediate action to streamline the entire affairs of the University.
The further recommendation is that concrete steps are to be taken immediately to hold the defaulting officers personally liable for the huge financial loss caused to the University and to take immediate action to streamline the entire affairs of the University. Section 9 of the Act empowers the Chancellor suo-motu to issue such directions as may be necessary or expedient in the interest of both administration and academic functioning of the University and to protect the property and finance of the University. Based on the findings of Inquiry Commission and recommendation made, the Chancellor has issued direction to the Registrar of the University. The exercise of power by the chancellor is in the interest of University and also public interest. Therefore, the impugned orders, notification etc., do not call for interference. The writ petitions may be dismissed. 15. The 1st respondent has filed additional statement of objections contending that the petitioner had applied for grant of bail in Criminal Petition No. 101754/2014 and recording his solemn statement that he would appear before the Investigating Authority on the fixed days as and when required and that he would co-operate with the investigating agency and that he would not tamper with the evidence, this Court by its order dated 03.11.2014 has granted conditional bail to the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the investigating agency. The interim prayer was refused by this Court. 16. It is stated, the petitioner by consciously consenting to submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating Authority has waived his right to prosecute the writ petition questioning the legality of the investigation. The petitioner has with full knowledge, unconditionally assented to the continuation of the investigation with his co-operation. Therefore, the rule of acquiescence and waiver apply and the petitioner cannot question the validity of the investigation and anterior proceedings. The conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to any relief and therefore, the writ petition may be dismissed. 17. The 3rd respondent has filed statement of objections contending that Section 14(1) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 provides that Vice-Chancellor of the University is a whole time Officer. Under Section 1 of the Act the Vice-Chancel is one of the Officers.
17. The 3rd respondent has filed statement of objections contending that Section 14(1) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 provides that Vice-Chancellor of the University is a whole time Officer. Under Section 1 of the Act the Vice-Chancel is one of the Officers. Section 14(1) of the Act clearly provides that the Vice-Chancellor is a whole time Officer of the University in contrast to the nature of the word Officer in respect of Chancellor and Pro-Chancellor who are also defined as Officer under Section 11 of the Act. The whole time Officer of the University is basically an employee of the University. Section 14(11) of the Act provides that if a Professor in the service of University in the State is appointed as Vice-Chancellor his terms and conditions of service as Professor shall not be revised to his disadvantage during his tenure as Vice-chancellor and he shall retain lien to his post. Since the petitioner was the Professor in Post Graduate Department of Mathematics/Computer Science, Karnataka University, Dharwad and subsequently appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the University, by virtue of his Professor post and the description contained in Section 14(11) of the Act, the petitioner is an employee of the University and there exists the relationship of employer and employee between the Karnataka University and the petitioner. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that Vice-Chancellor does not come under the scope and ambit of employee of the University cannot be accepted. 18. It is stated, the notification dated 12.09.2014 issued by the 1st respondent indicates that 1st respondent had received plethora of complaints from various organisations, individuals and also from the office of the Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwad. The Registrar, Karnataka University, Dharwad communicated to the Department of Higher Education (Universities), Government of Karnataka and to the office of the Chancellors of the Universities the grave irregularities committed by the petitioner in the year 2014. Further, the office of superintendent of Police Lokayukta, Dharwad vide letter dated 28.05.2014 sought some relevant records/documents from the registrar, Karnataka University pertaining to the irregularities committed by the petitioner. It clearly indicates that the statutory investigation agency has already set in motion to investigate the grave regularities committed by the petitioner during his tenure as the vice-Chancellor of Karnataka University. 19.
It clearly indicates that the statutory investigation agency has already set in motion to investigate the grave regularities committed by the petitioner during his tenure as the vice-Chancellor of Karnataka University. 19. It is stated, the petitioner on the advice of the Chancellor deleted the name of Sri.Vijay Sankeshwar for the conferment of Honorary Doctorate degree in Annual Convocation of the University held in February, 2012. Subsequently, the petitioner recommended and also conferred the Honorary Doctorate on Sri.Vijay Sankeshwar in the Annual Convocation held in the month of March 2014. The award of Honorary Doctorate degrees to 9 individuals would itself give rise to a suspicion due to the reason that as per the requirements of Section 29 (2) of the Act, the academic council as well as the Syndicate have simply approved the sealed cover containing the names of persons for the Honorary Doctorate in the Convocation of the University held in March 2014. In fact, one Syndicate Member representing the office of the Commissioner, Collegiate Education, Dharwad has made a dissent for this blind approval of the names of the Honorary Doctorates and the same was recorded in the Minutes of the Syndicate Meeting held on 21.03.2014. 20. The Chancellor of the University i.e. the 1st respondent by virtue of power conferred under Section 8 of the Act constituted One Man Inquiry Commission to look into the irregularities committed by the petitioner during the period from 2010-14. The Chancellor has initiated the inquiry with a view to ensure the transparency and accountability in running the affairs of the University. It was a subject matter of controversy in the minds of public as noticed from the media. The purpose of constituting Inquiry Commission is in the interest of the University. The power conferred on the Chancellor under Section 8 of the Act is wider than the powers conferred on the State Government. Based on the findings of the Inquiry Commission, the Chancellor has issued direction under Section 9 of the Act to initiate prosecution on the ground of wilful omission and commission of misdeeds by the petitioner as a Vice-Chancellor. The direction of the Chancellor not to proceed with any recruitment, award of tender and purchase till the inquiry report is submitted is done with a clear intention to save the University from further irregularities.
The direction of the Chancellor not to proceed with any recruitment, award of tender and purchase till the inquiry report is submitted is done with a clear intention to save the University from further irregularities. The manner in which the petitioner conducted himself indicates the ulterior motives on the petitioner's conduct in having utter disregard to the future financial position of the University. The University is already mining in deficit of finances for the past several years and the Chancellor was compelled to issue direction as per Annexure-P. The Chancellor has power under Section 9 of the Act to issue direction as may be necessary in the and to protect the property and finances of the University. By virtue of this provision the Chancellor has directed the 3rd respondent to file criminal complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Lokayukta, Dharwad for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. The lokayukta Police has initiated investigation and the matter is under investigation. Therefore, the writ petitions may be dismissed. 21. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is not an employee of the University and he does not come under Section 8 of the Act. The proceedings are vitiated in law. Annexure-H issued by the 1st respondent is without jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor is not an employee of the University. It is only the Government which can appoint the Commission of inquiry under Section 14 of the Act and not the Chancellor. The appointment of the inquiry Commission by The Chancellor is without authority of law and illegal. The consequential inquiry report and further proceedings pursuant to inquiry report need to be quashed. The Chancellor exercising power under Section 9 of the Act can issue certain directions, but cannot appoint an Inquiry Commission. Except Sections 8 and 14 of the Act, no other provision provides for appointment of Commission of inquiry. The Commission of inquiry appointed by the first respondent is without authority of law. The Inquiry Commission did not issue any notice to the petitioner and no opportunity was given to the petitioner. Therefore, no action can be taken based on the commission report. It is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order, notification, directions, inquiry report, first information report etc., are all without authority of law and cannot be sustained in law. 22.
Therefore, no action can be taken based on the commission report. It is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned order, notification, directions, inquiry report, first information report etc., are all without authority of law and cannot be sustained in law. 22. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh And Others, AIR 1964 S.C. 358 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that the other methods of the performance are necessarily forbidden. 23. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Babu Vargheseand Others v. Bar Council Of Kerala And Others, AIR 1999 S.C. 1281 and State Of U.P, Lucknow Development Authority v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumar Devi, AIR 1989 S.C. 1997, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that all actions of the State and its authorities should have a legal pedegree. 24. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa And Others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that exercise of power which is ultra-vires of the provisions in the statutes cannot be attempted to be resuscitated on general power reserved in a statute. An illegality or any action contrary to law does not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the chief executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the persons exercising the power. 25. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Bombay. v. Dilipkumar Ragha Vendrana Nadkarni And Others, AIR 1983 S.C. 109 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that right to reputation is a facet of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The findings recorded in the inquiry report directly affects the reputation of the petitioner. The findings have been recorded without any opportunity to the petitioner. Therefore, it violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 26.
The findings recorded in the inquiry report directly affects the reputation of the petitioner. The findings have been recorded without any opportunity to the petitioner. Therefore, it violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 26. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Of Bihar v. L.K.Advani, 2003(8) S.C.C. 36 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that an inquiry report affecting the reputation of the citizen, in violation of principles of Natural Justice is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of Articles 21 and 14. 27. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India, AIR 1978 S.C. 597 , the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that whenever inquiry is held resulting in civil consequences the concerned person should be given an opportunity to present his case. The principles of Natural Justice should be read into the statute and violation of principles of Natural Justice straight away renders the action arbitrary and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 28. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gorkh Security v. Government Nct Delhi, 2014(9) S.C.C. 105 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the inquiry report makes sweeping remarks against the petitioner without giving any opportunity to the petitioner and therefore, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 29. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kum. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 S.C. 537 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that every action of the State and its authorities must answer the basic requirement of fairness, non-arbitrariness, so as to satisfy the basic requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 30. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 9 cannot be resorted to when Section 14(8) specifically deals with abuse of the office by the Vice-Chancellor and provides procedure to deal with the same. 31.
30. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section 9 cannot be resorted to when Section 14(8) specifically deals with abuse of the office by the Vice-Chancellor and provides procedure to deal with the same. 31. Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goa Foundation v. Union Of India, 2014(6) S.C.C. 590 the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order at Annexure-N is passed based on the findings recorded in the Inquiry commission report vide Annexure-L. Admittedly, the findings in Annexure-L are recorded in violation of Principles of Natural Justice. Therefore, the prosecution initiated based on the inquiry report cannot be sustained in law. He therefore, submitted that the impugned order, notification, directions, inquiry report, first information report etc., cannot be sustained in law and liable to be quashed. 32. As against this, the Learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. Vijay Shankar appearing for the first respondent submitted that the petitioner has waived his right to challenge the first information report having acquiesced himself to the investigation. The petitioner is an employee of the University for the purpose of Section 8(1) of the Act. Though, the Vice-Chancellor is enumerated under Section 11 of the Act, the word 'employee' cannot be narrowly construed. Sections 8, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 20 of the Act have to be read harmoniously. The Chancellor in exercise of his power, suo-motu, under Section 9 of the Act has issued direction to lodge a complaint and it is well within the power of the Chancellor. Further, he submitted that the Chancellor has power under Section 8(1) of the Act to cause an inquiry. Section 8 of the Act does not provide for any opportunity or notice. It is not a condition precedent. There was no need to hear the petitioner before issuing Annexure-H and it is strictly in accordance with law. Further, he submitted that the petitioner had ample opportunity, but he has waived it. The principles of natural justice are not applicable to the present case. The orders are reasoned orders. Therefore, the impugned order, notification, direction, inquiry report and first information report do not call for interference. Annexure - P is well within the power and scope of Section 9 of the Act. 33.
The principles of natural justice are not applicable to the present case. The orders are reasoned orders. Therefore, the impugned order, notification, direction, inquiry report and first information report do not call for interference. Annexure - P is well within the power and scope of Section 9 of the Act. 33. Placing reliance on the decision in M/s. Pannalai Binjraj v. Union Of India, AIR 1957 S.C. 397 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the petitioner has subjected himself to the investigation and therefore, he is estopped from questioning the legality of the proceedings. 34. Further, placing reliance on the decision in Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Council, (2008)12 S.C.C. 401 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the petitioner by his conduct has waived his right for equitable remedy. 35. Further, placing reliance on the decision in Ajay maken v. Adesh Kumar Gupta, (2013) 3 S.C.C. 489 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that contextual interpretation has to be made for the term 'employee'. Statute 2(a) of the Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules defines the term 'Employee' as any person appointed to any class of post in the University. This includes Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, Registrar, thereby making them officers of the University though not named in Section 11 of the Act. If the petitioner's contention is accepted, then the Chancellor can exercise his power under Section 8(1) of the Act only insofar as Group-C and Group-D employees are concerned. 36. Placing reliance on the decision in Union Of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971(SC) 40 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the principles of Natural Justice cannot be read as a condition precedent for exercise statutory power. 37. Further, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in B.Gangadhar v. State Of Karnataka And Others, ILR 2000 KAR 622 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that applicability of the principles of natural justice depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 38. Further, placing reliance on the decisions Prof H.H.Annaiah Gowda v. Chancellor, (1990) 6 LAWS(KAR) 41 and Dr.
38. Further, placing reliance on the decisions Prof H.H.Annaiah Gowda v. Chancellor, (1990) 6 LAWS(KAR) 41 and Dr. M. Venkataramanappa v. The Chancellor, Bengaluru University, Raj Biiavalv, Bangalore-I and others, ILR 2007 KAR 2212 the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the Chancellor has exercised his power in the interest of the institution and he has power to order an inquiry and issue directions under Sections 8(1), 9 and 12 of the Act against the Vice-Chancellor also. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order, notification, direction, inquiry report and first information report are in accordance with law and they do not call for interference. 39. The Learned Counsel for the second respondent submitted that the first respondent is the removing authority and therefore, the first respondent has the authority to direct the Registrar to lodged complaint. Accordingly, the complaint has been lodged and investigation is taken up. Therefore, the investigation does not call for interference. 40. The Learned Counsel for the third respondent submitted that he adopts the arguments of the first respondent. 41. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the parties. 42. The points that arise for my consideration are: (1) Whether the petitioner is an employee of the university? (2) Whether the inquiry initiated by the first respondent under Section 8(1) R/w Section 12 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 is proper? (3) Whether the impugned notification, orders, directions, inquiry report and first information report vide Annexures-H, L, N, P and R call for interference? (4) Whether the petitioner has acquiesced for investigation and therefore, he has waived his right to challenge the investigation and the proceedings? 43. Point No.1: Whether the petitioner is an employee of the University? 44. The Act does not define the term 'employee' of the University. Therefore, we have to look into the relevant Rules and Provisions of the Act to find out whether the petitioner is an 'employee' of the University. 45. The relevant Rules are, the Statute Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules and Statute Karnataka University Employees Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1998. Statue 2(a) of the Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules defines the term "Employee" as; "Employee" means any person appointed to any class of post in the University. 46.
45. The relevant Rules are, the Statute Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules and Statute Karnataka University Employees Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1998. Statue 2(a) of the Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules defines the term "Employee" as; "Employee" means any person appointed to any class of post in the University. 46. Statute 1(c) of the Karnataka University Employees Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1998 (for short 'CCA Rules') defines the term "Employee" as; "Employee" means employee of the University. 47. Statute 3(1) of CCA Rules deals with classification. It says, the University services shall consist of four classes namely: (i) University Services, Group-A (ii) University Services, Group-B (iii) University Services, Group-C (iv) University Services, Group-D 48. Statute 4 of CCA Rules deals with Appointing Authority. It says, the appointment to the various classes of services of the University shall be made by the Syndicate or the Vice-Chancellor as envisaged in Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. 49. Statute 1 (a) of CCA Rules provides as follows: (a) Appointing Authority in relation to the services of the University employees means: (i) the authority empowered to make appointment to the respective classes of services; (ii) the authority which has appointed the University employees to such services, grades or posts as the case may be i.e., the syndicate or the Vice-Chancellor. 50. Statute 1(b) of CCA Rules provides as follows: (a) "Disciplinary Authority" in relation to imposition of penalty on an employee of the University means the authority competent under these statutes to impose on him that penalty i.e., the Syndicate, Vice-Chancellor, Registrar and other officers empowered to impose minor penalties. 51. Chapter-VIII of the Act deals with Appointment of Teachers and Other Employees of the University: Section 53 provides for Appointment of Teachers, Librarians. It reads as follows: (1) There shall be a Board of Appointment for selection of persons for appointment as teachers and librarians in the University. (2) Every such Board for selection,- (a) to the post of Professors, Readers and Assistant Professors and Librarian shall consist of; (i) The Vice-Chancellor as ex-officio Chairman and other members under clause (ii) and (iii). (b)to the post of Lecturers, (i) the Vice- Chancellor as ex-officio Chairman and other members under clause (ii), (iii) and (iv). (3) The Registrar shall be the Member Secretary of the Board. 52. Section 57 provides for Appointment of Non- teaching, Ministerial and other Staff.
(b)to the post of Lecturers, (i) the Vice- Chancellor as ex-officio Chairman and other members under clause (ii), (iii) and (iv). (3) The Registrar shall be the Member Secretary of the Board. 52. Section 57 provides for Appointment of Non- teaching, Ministerial and other Staff. (1) There shall be constituted a Board of Appointment to select the candidates for appointment to non-teaching, ministerial and other posts in the University. (2) The Board shall consist of; (i) the Vice-Chancellor as ex-officio Chairman and other members under clause (ii) to (viii). 53. From the combined reading of Statute 2(a) of the Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules and Statute 1(c), 3(1), 3(4), 1(a) and 1(b) of Karnataka University Employees Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1998 and Sections 53 and 57 of the Act what emerges is an 'employee' of the University means, any person appointed to any class of post in the University. There are four classes of posts in the University Services i.e., Group-A, Group-B, Group-C and Group-D. The employees of the University are appointed under Chapter-VIII and Sections 53 and 57 of the Act. Under University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules and Classification. Control and Appeal Rules, 1998, the Vice-Chancellor is one of the Disciplinary Authorities. Under Sections 53 and 57 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor is the ex-officio Chairman of the Boards which select the candidates for appointment. The Syndicate makes the appointments. It is clear, the University employees are appointed under Chapter VIII and Sections 53 and 57 of the Act. 54. Section 14 of the Act provides for Appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. It reads as follows; 14. The Vice-Chancellor.- (1) The Vice- Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University. (2) The State Government shall constitute a Search Committee consisting of four persons of whom, one shall be nominated by the Chancellor, one by the University Grants Commission, one by the State Government and one by the Syndicate. The State Government shall appoint one of the members as the Chairman of the Committee. The Secretary to Government incharge of higher education or his nominee not below the rank of the Deputy Secretary to Government shall be the convenor of the Search Committee. (3) No person connected with the affairs of the State Government, the University or any college or institution affiliated to the University shall be nominated as the member of the Search Committee.
(3) No person connected with the affairs of the State Government, the University or any college or institution affiliated to the University shall be nominated as the member of the Search Committee. (4) The Search Committee shall submit to the Slate Government a panel of three persons who are eminent academicians, in the alphabetical order. The State Government shall forward the panel to the Chancellor who shall keeping in view merit, equity and social justice and with the concurrence of the State Government, appoint one person from the pane as the Vice-Chancellor: Provided that ************* (5) No person shall be appointed or hold office of the Vice-Chancellor if he has attained the age of sixty seven years. (6) The Vice-Chancellor shall, subject to the pleasure of the Chancellor and the provisions of sub-section (5) hold the office for a period of four years. He shall not be eligible for reappointment, for a second term. (7) The Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provisions of this Act or for abuse of the powers vested in him and on the advice tendered by the Nate Government on consideration of the report of an inquiry ordered by it under sub-section. (8) For the purposes of holding an inquiry under this section the State Government shall appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The inquiry authority shall hold the inquiry after giving an opportunity to make representation by the Vice-Chancellor and shall submit a report to the State Government on the action to be taken including penalty, if any, to be imposed, and the State Government shall on consideration of the report advise the Chancellor. The Chancellor shall act in accordance with such advice, as far as may be, within six months. (9) ********** (10) ********** (11) ********** 55. It is clear, the Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor under Section 14 of the Act with the concurrence of the State Government Section 14(1) says that the Vice-Chancellor shall be a whole time officer of the University. 56. Section 11 of the Act says that the Vice-Chancellor along with the others i.e., the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Registrar, the Registrar (Evaluation) and others are the Officers of the University. 57.
56. Section 11 of the Act says that the Vice-Chancellor along with the others i.e., the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Registrar, the Registrar (Evaluation) and others are the Officers of the University. 57. Section 15 of the Act which deals with the powers of the Vice-Chancel says that the Vice-Chancellor shall be the Principal Executive and Academic Officer of the University and shall exercise general control over the affairs of the University. 58. It is clear from Sections 14, 11 and 15 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor with the concurrence of the State Government and the an Officer of the University. The employees of the University are appointed under Chapter VIII and Sections 53 and 57 of the Act. The Vice-Chancellor is the ex-officio Chairman of the Boards which select the candidates for appointment of University employees. The term 'employee' delined under Karnataka University Employees Service (Conduct) Rules or Karnataka University Employees Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1998 does not include Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, it is dear, the Vice-Chancellor is not an 'employee' of the University and he is an Officer of the University. Point No. 1 answered, accordingly. 59. Point No.2: Whether the inquiry initiated by the first respondent under Section 8(1) R/w Section 12 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 2000 is proper? 60. The first respondent has initiated inquiry against the petitioner under Section 8(1) R/w Section 12 of the Act. Section 8(1) of the Act reads as follows: 8. Discipline, Inspection and Control.-(1) The Chancellor may suo motu or on the recommendation of the State Government cause an inspection to be made by a Commission of Inquiry consisting of one or more persons as he may direct, of the buildings, Laboratories, Libraries, Museums, Workshops and equipments of any institution maintained, administered, recognised or approved, by the University and also of the examinations, teaching and other work conducted or done by the University and into any specific allegations against any employee of the University in like manner in respect of any matter connected with or ancillary thereto. 61.
61. It is clear, the Chancellor can suo motu or on the recommendation of the State Government can cause an inspection to be made by a Commission of inquiry consisting of one or more persons as he may direct, of the buildings, Laboratories, Libraries, Museums, Workshop and equipments etc., and into any specific allegations against the employee of the University. 62. Section 8(2) of the Act provides that the Commission directed to make an inspection or inquiry under sub-Section (1) shall have access for that purpose to the related institutions, premises and to such accounts or other records as may be necessary. 63. Section 8(3) of the Act provides that the Commission shall submit a report of the result of the inspection or inquiry to the Chancellor and shall forward a copy thereof to the State Government. 64. Section 8(4) of the Act provides that soon after the receipt of the report, the Chancellor shall record his findings thereon and send the same to the State Government for taking further action, as may be necessary or as directed by him. 65. Section 8(5) of the Act provides that the State Government shall direct the Vice-Chancellor to initiate such action as has been directed by the State Government with respect to the findings in the report of inquiry or inspection and the Syndicate shall implement the directions of the Government. 66. Section 8(6) of the Act provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall communicate to the State Government a report of action taken in compliance with the directions of the State Government as specified in the orders of the State Government. 67. Section 8(7) of the Act provides, if the Vice-Chancellor fails to comply with the directions of the State Government, then, it shall be reported to the Chancellor whose order shall be final and shall be implemented by the Vice Chancellor within such time as set out in the orders of the Chancellor. 68. A combined reading of Section 8(1) to 8(7) of the Act makes it is clear that Chancellor suo-motu or on the recommendation of the State Government can initiate inquiry into specific allegations against any employee of the University. The inquiry commission shall submit its report to the Chancellor with a copy thereof to the State Government.
68. A combined reading of Section 8(1) to 8(7) of the Act makes it is clear that Chancellor suo-motu or on the recommendation of the State Government can initiate inquiry into specific allegations against any employee of the University. The inquiry commission shall submit its report to the Chancellor with a copy thereof to the State Government. On receipt of the report, the Chancellor shall record his findings and send the same to the State Government for further action as may be necessary or as directed by him. Thereafter, the State Government shall direct the Vice-Chancellor to initiate such action as has been directed by the State Government with respect to the findings in the report of inquiry or inspection and the Syndicate shall implement the direction of the State Government. Therefore, when an inquiry is initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act, the report shall be submitted to the Chancellor. The Chancellor after recording his findings on the report must send it to the State Government for taking further action. In the present case, the Chancellor on receipt of the report from the Commission, based on the findings of the Commission, has acted himself and he has not sent the report recording his findings to the State Government for taking further action as required under Section 8(4) of the Act. 69. There is clear violation of Section 8(4) of the Act. Under Section 8(5) of the Act the Vice-Chancellor is the implementing authority. It is clear from Section 8(1) to 8(7) of the Act that under Section 8(1) of the Act inquiry can be initiated against the employee of the University and not against the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor is an officer of the University. Therefore, the inquiry initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act against the petitioner who was the Vice-Chancellor of the University is without authority of law and not proper. 70. Section 12 of the Act provides that (1) The Governor of Karnataka shall by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University. (2) He shall be the Head of the University and shall when present, preside at any convocation of the University. (3) He shall have such other powers as may be conferred on him by or tinder this Act. 71. It is clear from Section 12(3) of the Act that the Chancellor can exercise power conferred on him by or under the Act.
(3) He shall have such other powers as may be conferred on him by or tinder this Act. 71. It is clear from Section 12(3) of the Act that the Chancellor can exercise power conferred on him by or under the Act. The Chancellor cannot exercise power which is not conferred under the Act. Section 8(1) of the Act does not confer any power to the Chancellor to initiate inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. It is Section 14 of the Act which provides for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. Section 14(7) and (8) of the Act read as under: (7) The Vice-Chancellor shall not he removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provisions of this Act or for abuse of the powers vested in him and on the advice tendered by the State Government on consideration of the report of an inquiry ordered by it under sub-section (8). (8) For the purpose of holding an inquiry under this section the State Government shall appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The inquiry authority shall hold the inquiry after giving an opportunity to make representation by the Vice-Chancellor and shall submit a report to the State Government on the action to be taken including penalty if any to be imposed, and the State Government shall on consideration of the report advise the Chancellor. The Chancellor shall act in accordance with such advice, as far as may be within six months. 72. It is clear from Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor cannot be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provisions of this Act or for abuse of the powers vested in him and on the advice tendered by the State Government on consideration of the report of an inquiry ordered by it under sub-Section (8). 73. Under sub-Section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. It is the State Government which shall appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court.
73. Under sub-Section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. It is the State Government which shall appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. The inquiry authority shall hold an inquiry after giving opportunity to make representation to the Vice-Chancellor and submit report to the State Government on the action to be taken including the penalty if any to be imposed and the State Government on consideration of the report shall advise the Chancellor. The chancellor shall act in accordance with such advise, as far as may be within six months. 74. In the present case, the first respondent has appointed inquiry commission under Section 8(1) of the Act which is without authority of law. When law says that a particular act should be done in a particular way the act must be done in that way only. Reference can be made to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh And Others, AIR 1964 S.C. 358 , Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa And Others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 , State Of U.P, Lucknow Development Authority v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumar Devi, AIR 1989 S.C. 1997, State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh And Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows at para Nos. 7 and 8: "7. In Nazir Ahmed's case, 63 Ind App 372: ( AIR 1936 PC 253 ) the Judicial Committee observed that the principle applied in Taylor v. Taylor (91876) 1 ch. D 426 to a Court, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applied to judicial officers making a record under section 164 and, therefore, held that magistrate could not give oral evidence of the confession made to him which he had purported to record under section 164 of the Code.
It was said that otherwise all the precautions and safe-guards laid down in sections 164 and 364, both of which had to be read together, would become of such trifling value as to be almost idle and that "it would be an unnatural construction to hold that any other procedure was permitted than that which is laid down with such minute particularity in the sections themselves. " 8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 ch D 426 is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted. A magistrate, therefore, cannot in the course of investigation record a confession except in the manner laid down in Section 164. The power to record the confession had obviously been given so that the confession might be proved by the record of it made in the manner laid down. If proof of the confession by other means was permissible, the whole provision of Section 164 including the safeguards contained in it for the protection of accused persons would be rendered nugatory. The section, therefore, by conferring on magistrate the power to record statements or confessions, by necessary implication, prohibited a magistrate from giving oral evidence of the statements or confessions made to him. " 75. In State Of U.P., Lucknow Development Authority v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh And Another, AIR 1989 S.C. 1997 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that all actions of the State and its Authorities should necessarily have legal pedegree. 76 Similarly, in Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows at para 52. "52. Section 65 the overall power reserved in Government to give such directions to the Authority as it considers expedient for carrying out any purpose of the Act was another provision relied to support an order which is otherwise unsupportable.
"52. Section 65 the overall power reserved in Government to give such directions to the Authority as it considers expedient for carrying out any purpose of the Act was another provision relied to support an order which is otherwise unsupportable. An exercise of power which is ultra-vires the provisions in the Statute cannot be attempted to be resuscitated on general powers reserved in a Statute for its proper and effective implementation. The Section authorises the Government to issue directions to ensure that the provisions of law are obeyed and not to empower it itself to proceed contrary to law. What is not permitted by the Act to be done by the Authority cannot be assumed to be done by State Government to render it legal. An illegality cannot be cured only because it was undertaken by the Government The Section authorises the Government to issue directions to carry out purposes of the Act. That is the legislative mandate should be carried out. And not that the provision of law can be disregarded and ignored became what was done was being done by State Government and not the Authority. An illegality or any action contrary to law does not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the duel Executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the person exercising the power. " 77. It is clear from the above decisions when a statute provides that certain thing must be done in a particular way that thing must be done in that way only. In the present case, Section 8(1) of the Act, provides to initiate inquiry into allegations against the employee of the University. Section 8(3) of the Act provides that the commission after enquiry shall submit a report to the Chancellor and shall forward a copy to the Government. Under Section 8(4) of the Act. the chancellor after receipt of the report shall record his findings and send the same to the Government for taking further action, as may be necessary or as directed by the Chancellor. The requirement of Section 8(4) of the Act has not been complied with. The Chancellor, based on the findings of the Commission has acted himself. It is in clear violation of Section 8(4) of the Act.
The requirement of Section 8(4) of the Act has not been complied with. The Chancellor, based on the findings of the Commission has acted himself. It is in clear violation of Section 8(4) of the Act. Apart from this, Section 8(1) of the Act docs not provide for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. Further, the statute provides that Chancellor can remove the Vice-Chancellor by an order passed on the ground of wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provision of this Act or for abuse of the powers vested in him and on the advice tendered by the State Government on consideration of the report of an inquiry ordered by it under sub-Section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. The inquiry authority shall be appointed by the State Government. But in the present case, the inquiry commission has been appointed by the Chancellor under Section 8(1) of the Act. It is without authority of law. 78. It was contended by the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent that the Chancellor has power under Sections 9 and 12(2) of the Act to issue such direction as may be necessary. Therefore, it is well within the authority of the Chancellor to appoint an inquiry commission to inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner. Reliance was placed on the following decisions: (i) ILR 1990 KAR 2360; and (ii) ILR 2007 KAR 2212. 79. In Prof. H.H. Annaiah Gouda v. Chancellor (supra) the inquiry was initiated against the Professor of English and Head of the Department of English, University of Mysore who was an employee of the University. Similarly, in Dr. M. Venkataramanappa v. Chancellor (supra) the inquiry was initiated on the allegation of plagiarism by exercising power under Section 9 of the Act. This Court has held that it is well within the power of Chancellor. It has nothing to do with the inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. 80. When the statute provides for inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor under Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act, the inquiry initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act is without Authority of Law. 81. The Inquiry Commission after making inquiry has submitted its report to the Chancellor. Under Section 8(4) of the Act, the Chancellor after receipt of the report, after recording his findings, send the same to the State Government for further action as may be necessary.
81. The Inquiry Commission after making inquiry has submitted its report to the Chancellor. Under Section 8(4) of the Act, the Chancellor after receipt of the report, after recording his findings, send the same to the State Government for further action as may be necessary. Instead of that, the Chancellor himself has acted based on the findings of the inquiry commission which is totally incorrect. If the report was sent to the Government as required under Section 8(4) of the Act, it was for the Government to take further action in accordance with law. That has not been done. On the other hand. The Chancellor has acted himself and has directed the third respondent to lodge a complaint. Serious allegations have been made against petitioner in the inquiry report. At any stage of the inquiry or subsequent to it. there was no opportunity for the petitioner. 82. It was contended by the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent that Section 8(1) of the Act does not provide for any opportunity. When statute does not provide for any opportunity there was no need to give any opportunity to the petitioner. Reliance was placed on the following decisions. (i) AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (ii) (1998)8 SCC 227 ; and (iii) ILR 2000 KAR 622. 83. In Union Of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha And Another, AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 4: "It is true that if a statutory provision can be read constantly with the principles of natural justice, the Court should do so because it must be presumed that the legislature and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature on the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. 84. In MRF Ltd., v. Inspector Kerala Govt. And Others, (1998)8 SCC 227 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 23; "The principles of natural justice cannot be imported in the matter of legislative action.
84. In MRF Ltd., v. Inspector Kerala Govt. And Others, (1998)8 SCC 227 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 23; "The principles of natural justice cannot be imported in the matter of legislative action. If the legislature in exercise of its plenary power under Article 245 of the Constitution, proceeds to enact a law, those who would be affected by that law cannot legally raise a grievance that before the law was made, they should have been given an opportunity of a hearing. " 85. In B.Gangadhar v. State Of Karnataka And Others, ILR 2000 KAR 622, (supra), this Court has observed as follows in para 19; "Principles of natural justice are basically a requirement of fair play in action. 18. (1998)8 SCC 227 That is why it is not possible to define them precisely. The requirements of fair play may change with the change in circumstances and, therefore, natural justice has to be adjusted to a given situation. It is capable of being moulded according to the exigencies of the situation. " 86. While it is true, there can be no quarrel with regard to the principles suited in above decisions. But, the fact situation in the present case must be seen. The petitioner was working as a Vice-Chancellor of the University. He was accused of mismanagement, mal-administration etc., There are serious allegations of irregularities. The inquiry was initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act. Section 8(1) of the Act does not provide for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. The statute provides for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor under Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act. If the inquiry was held under Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act, it provides for an opportunity to the petitioner. It is deviated. Therefore, the first respondent cannot contend that Section 8(1) of the Act does not provide for any opportunity. The action taken by the first respondent is without jurisdiction and authority of law. 87. The petitioner was the Vice-Chancellor of the University. The inquiry' report makes serious allegations. Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act provide for inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. The inquiry is initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act. The requirement of Section 8(4) of the Act has not been complied with. There was no opportunity to the petitioner at any stage.
The petitioner was the Vice-Chancellor of the University. The inquiry' report makes serious allegations. Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act provide for inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. The inquiry is initiated under Section 8(1) of the Act. The requirement of Section 8(4) of the Act has not been complied with. There was no opportunity to the petitioner at any stage. Without any opportunity to the petitioner, the inquiry has been initiated and inquiry report has been submitted. In fact, the petitioner has requested for an opportunity and it has been denied. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 88. It is relevant to refer to some of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In State Of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani And Others, AIR 2003 SC 3357 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: "It may be noticed that the amendment was brought about, about 20 years after passing of the main Act itself The experience during past two decades must have made the Legislature to realize that it would but be necessary to notice a person whose conduct the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into during the course of the inquiry or whose reputation is likely to be pre-judicially affected by the inquiry. It is further provided that such a person would have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. Thus the principle of natural justice was got inducted in the shape of statutory provision. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to give an opportunity to a person, before any comment is made or opinion is expressed which is likely to pre-judicially affect that person. Needless to emphasis that failure to comply with principles of natural justice renders the action non-est as well as the consequences thereof. " 89. In Smt Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India And Another, AIR 1978 S.C. 597 , (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed proceedings which involve civil consequences, the principles of natural justice is applicable. 90 In Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa And Others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that an illegality or any action contrary to law docs not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the Chief Executive of the State. No one is above law.
90 In Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S.Muddappa And Others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that an illegality or any action contrary to law docs not become in accordance with law because it is done at the behest of the Chief Executive of the State. No one is above law. In a democracy what prevails is law and rule and not the height of the person exercising the power. 91. From the above decisions, it is clear, an opportunity needs to be given when serious civil consequences will follow and the reputation of the person is involved. In the present case, no opportunity was given to the petitioner. Apart from this, the inquiry has been , initiated under Section 8(1) r/w. Section 12 of the Act. Section 14(7) and 14(8) of the Act provide for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the action of the first respondent in initiating inquiry under Section 8(1) r/w. Section 12 of the Act is without authority of law. Point No. 2 answered accordingly. 92. Point No. 3: The impugned notification dated 12th September, 2014 vide Annexure 'H' has been issued by the first respondent under Section 8(1) R/w Section 12 of the Act. It is without authority of law. Section 8(1) of the Act does not provide for an inquiry against the Vice-Chancellor. Pursuant to Annexure-11 inquiry has been held and the Commission has submitted its report as per Annexure-L. Sweeping allegations have been made in Annexure-L. There was no opportunity to the petitioner. Therefore, the commission report cannot be sustained in law. Annexure-N has been issued pursuant to Annexure-L. As Annexures-H and L cannot be sustained in law, the investigation pursuant to Annexure-N also cannot be sustained in law. The impugned notification, the commission report, first information and investigation vide Annexures H, L, N and R cannot be sustained in law. 93. Point No. 4: It was contended by the Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent that the petitioner has acquiesced for investigation and has submitted to the jurisdiction of the investigating agency. Therefore, the petitioner has lost his right to challenge the investigation. Reliance was placed on the following decisions; (i) AIR 1957 SC 397 (Messrs Pannalal Binjraj and others v. Union of India and others).
Therefore, the petitioner has lost his right to challenge the investigation. Reliance was placed on the following decisions; (i) AIR 1957 SC 397 (Messrs Pannalal Binjraj and others v. Union of India and others). (ii) (2008)12 SCC 401 (Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation and others); and (iii) (2003)6 SCC 195 (Union of India v. Prakash P.Hinduja and another); 94. In M/s. Pannalal Binjraj And Others v. Union of India And Others, AIR 1957 SC 397 (supra), petitioners had not raised any objections to their cases being transferred and had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officers. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme court has held that the petitioners had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officers. In Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation And Others, (2008)12 SCC 401 (supra), the appellant despite notice had not filed any objections and therefore, taking into consideration the conduct of the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that he has waived his right to equitable remedy. 95. In Union Of India v. Prakasii P. Hindvja And Another, (2003)6 SCC 195 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if the CBI committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken up by the Learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge sheet could not be set-aside. 96. In the present case, the petitioner had challenged the action of the first respondent. When the matter was pending, the petitioner was arrested. The interim prayer was not considered because of the statutory bar. Therefore, the petitioner had moved for bail. The bail was granted subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions was that the petitioner must co-operate with the investigation. Therefore, the petitioner has participated in the investigation. By that, it cannot be inferred that the petitioner has acquiesced for investigation. The decisions relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the first respondent are not applicable to the fact situation of the present case. In the present case, the petitioner had challenged the action and it was pending before this Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has acquiesced for investigation and waived his right to challenge the action of the first respondent or subsequent events. Point No. 4 answered accordingly. 97.
In the present case, the petitioner had challenged the action and it was pending before this Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has acquiesced for investigation and waived his right to challenge the action of the first respondent or subsequent events. Point No. 4 answered accordingly. 97. It is clear, the inquiry initiated by the first respondent under Section 8(1) r/w. Section 12 of the Act is without authority of law. Therefore, the inquiry report, first information and investigation also cannot be sustained in law. 98. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned notification dated 12.09.2014 vide Annexure-H, inquiry report dated 23.09.2014 vide Annexure-L, letter dated 01.10.2014 vide Annexure-N and FIR with complaint in Cr.No. 11/2014 of Dharwad Lokayukta Police Station vide Annexure-R are hereby quashed. Annexure-P has become ineffective and therefore, there is no need to quash it. However, liberty is reserved to the first respondent. Government or the concerned authorities to take action in accordance with law. Quashing of Annexures-H, L, N and R will not come in the way of the first respondent, Government or the concerned authorities in taking appropriate action in accordance with law.