JUDGMENT : Ravi R. Tripathi, J. Respondent No.5 herein addressed letters to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on various dates which are on record of the case along with the office submission. One of the letters is dated 27.05.2013, wherein he requested the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to see that the present Second Appeal is heard at an early date, setting out the reason for such prayer. The second letter is dated 07.06.2014 and the office has made the following submission:- "Applicant Mr. Kantibhai Punjabhai Solanki of Prantiya (village), Tal-Dist. Gandhinagar (At present residing at Ahmedabad) has stated in this application dated 06/06/2014 (received on 09/06/2014) that he is respondent No.5 in Second Appeal No. 33/2008 pending in this Court with regard to dispute of a property (land) situated at Prantiya Village. Applicant has also stated that the Government had undertaken the process for handing over possession of said land to original owners, including the applicant, but the appellant in Second Appeal No. 33/2008 has been delaying hearing in said Appeal by filing sick notes and leave notes and thereby he has been making attempts to see that applicant and others may not get possession of said land. Applicant has further stated that he is an aged, handicapped, poor and landless person. Applicant has requested to fix an early date of hearing in the matter, so that he can earn livelihood from said land by getting its possession and also to direct the appellant in said Appeal to complete his arguments at the earliest in the matter. (NOTE: Since earlier application dated 27/05/2013 of the applicant was ordered to be referred to the Registrar (Judicial), if Your Lordship approves, this application may also be ordered to be referred to Registrar (Judicial) for doing the needful in the matter.)." 1.1. On 09.09.2014, one Smt. Lilaben Kantilal Solanki-wife of respondent No.5 remained personally present and requested this Court for the Second Appeal to be heard at an early date. The Court kept the matter on 10.09.2014 and learned Advocate Mr. Jitendra M.Patel was requested to make it convenient to come with the Second Appeal. On 10.09.2014, the Court passed the following order:- "Parties-in-Person are personally present before the Court. Learned advocate Mr. Satyam Y.Chhaya to inform learned advocate Mr. Jitendra M.Patel for the appellant about the next date of hearing. The matter is kept on 15.09.2014." 1.2. Jitendra M.Patel was requested to make it convenient to come with the Second Appeal. On 10.09.2014, the Court passed the following order:- "Parties-in-Person are personally present before the Court. Learned advocate Mr. Satyam Y.Chhaya to inform learned advocate Mr. Jitendra M.Patel for the appellant about the next date of hearing. The matter is kept on 15.09.2014." 1.2. These facts are set out so that even remotely it is not alleged that the Court gave undue priority to a Second Appeal of the year 2008 when Second Appeal more than two decades old are pending before the Court. 2. Coming to the merits of the matter, the present Second Appeal is filed being aggrieved by judgment and order dated 16.10.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Gandhinagar in Regular Civil Appeal No.50 of 2006, whereby the learned Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by the present appellant and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge in Special Civil Suit No.61 of 2001 dated 01.05.2006. 2.1. The very fact that it is a Second Appeal is suggestive of the fact that the parties are in High Court after having fought before the trial Court and thereafter before the 1st appellate Court. Had that been the only facts, the things would have been different, but present is a case which gives a very gloomy picture of the justice delivery system because in the present case, the present respondents are dragged in litigations on more than one occasion for the same subject matter, i.e. land bearing Block Nos. 62, 69, 70 paiki, 73 paiki and 77 paiki of village Prantiya. 2.2. This Court is of the opinion that if this Second Appeal is entertained and allowed, that will be an illustrious example of miscarriage of justice. This Court has no hesitation in reminding itself that substantial justice is the ultimate goal to be achieved by every judicial system and no amount of technicality should be allowed to obstruct the judicial system in achieving that object. 3. In this case, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jitendra M.Patel for the appellant with all vehemence at his command and with all knowledge of law tried to convince this Court by advancing all possible arguments that the Second Appeal should be allowed and let the justice be sacrificed. 3. In this case, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jitendra M.Patel for the appellant with all vehemence at his command and with all knowledge of law tried to convince this Court by advancing all possible arguments that the Second Appeal should be allowed and let the justice be sacrificed. Learned Advocate cited as many as 13 judgments in support of his contention, which is the main contention, that under O-41 R-31 of the Civil Procedure Code, the 1st appellate Court is under obligation to see that R-31 is strictly followed. R-31 provides as under:- "The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) whether the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled." 3.1. Except one judgment our of the 13 judgments, in all cases, the 1st appellate Court was pleased to reverse the judgment of the lower Court, meaning thereby that the underlying idea in all these judgments is that whenever the 1st appellate Court is reversing the judgment of the Court below, it must follow the aforesaid requirements so that when the judgment of the 1st appellate Court goes to the higher Forum, the higher Forum is able to make out as to on what basis the 1st appellate Court is pleased to reverse the judgment of the lower Court. 3.2. Learned Advocate for the appellant, read, re-read and re-read not only the judgment and order of the 1st appellate Court but also that of the learned trial Judge to bring home the point that the 1st appellate Court has not followed the aforesaid requirements of R-31 of O-41 of the Civil Procedure Code and even the trial Court has committed an error in dismissing the suit without there being any evidence led by the defendants in the suit. 4. This Court is of the opinion that it will be easy to appreciate the desperate attempts on the part of the appellant if few facts are set out. The facts of the case which are necessary to be appreciated are as under:- 4.1. The land in question is bearing Block Nos. 62, 69, 70 paiki, 73 paiki and 77 paiki of village Prantiya, Tal.-Dist. Gandhinagar. The facts of the case which are necessary to be appreciated are as under:- 4.1. The land in question is bearing Block Nos. 62, 69, 70 paiki, 73 paiki and 77 paiki of village Prantiya, Tal.-Dist. Gandhinagar. The very fact that the village is in the vicinity of the capital of the State attaches a different value to the land in question. This land was given to the ancestors of the defendants, viz. Shri Punjabhai Amthabhai Bhangi. The Court does not require to emphasis that the very name suggests that he belongs to the down-most possible strata of the society. The said Shri Punjabhai Amthabhai had five heirs and legal representatives, viz. Nathabhai, Shivabhai, Kantibhai and Bhagwanbhai of these, two, viz. Nathabhai and Shivabhai are alleged to have entered into a 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale) which is dated 06.12.1983. The date is also significant because 1983 is not a matter of past when the lands were available just for peanuts. Still the present appellant was able to see that 'Banakhat' is executed for the land measuring more than 44000 sq. mtr. for an amount of Rs. 1,96,101/-. Again this is important because if per sq. mtr. price is calculated on the basis of the amount for which the land was agreed to be sold it comes to roughly about Rs. 4 per sq. mtr. An agricultural land, having no way in compromising position on its fertility, having an added value because of its location in the vicinity of the capital of the State was agreed to be purchased for a peanut price of Rs. 4 per sq. mtr. in the year 1983. It may not be viewed as an emotional statement, but the Court is sure that in 1983, a good quality of paper having an area of 1 sq. mtr. was not available for Rs. 4 per sq. mtr. If required, this can be ascertained from the judgments and orders passed by this Court in the matters of land acquisition of the same area. Be that as it may, that 'Banakhat' was retained by the present appellant without any action thereon until he filed the present suit for specific performance in the year 2001 being Special Civil Suit No.61 of 2001. 4.2. Be that as it may, that 'Banakhat' was retained by the present appellant without any action thereon until he filed the present suit for specific performance in the year 2001 being Special Civil Suit No.61 of 2001. 4.2. One will wonder as to what this appellant was doing with this 'Banakhat', waiting to get itself multiplied and then filing a suit in the year 2001 for specific performance thereof. The suit came to be dismissed; the matter was carried in appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No.50 of 2006, which came to be dismissed; against which the present Second Appeal. This is one stream of litigation. Before that, there was another stream of litigation and that was in the year 1989, as the land in question was a new tenure land and was the subject matter of restrictions under Sections 43 and 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ("the Tenancy Act" for short). The Mamlatdar and ALT, Gandhinagar initiated proceedings under Section 84-C of the Tenancy Act being Tenancy Case No.5870 of 1988. the said case was decided by order dated 23.02.1989 and the Mamlatdar and ALT held that, the execution of 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale) in favour of the appellant was in violation of Sections 43 and 63 of the Tenancy Act. As a necessary consequence, the land was ordered to be confiscated to the Government. Not only that, pursuant to that, Revenue entry No.1127 was posted in village form No.6 on 15.01.1991. 4.3. The appellant was bound to be aggrieved by that and therefore, only after 7 years preferred appeal before the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) under Section 74 of the Tenancy Act being Tenancy Appeal No.28 of 1996. That appeal came to be rejected by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by order dated 28.08.1997. 4.4. The appellant carried that order of the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) in revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by filing Revision Application No. TEN/BA/429/1998. The Tribunal, after careful consideration, dismissed the revision application by order dated 17.01.2000. 4.5 The order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was challenged before this Court by filing Special Civil Application No.1918 of 2000. The said SCA was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 16.01.2001. 4.6. The aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge was challenged before the Division Bench by filing LPA (Stamp) No. 1474 of 2004. 4.5 The order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was challenged before this Court by filing Special Civil Application No.1918 of 2000. The said SCA was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 16.01.2001. 4.6. The aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge was challenged before the Division Bench by filing LPA (Stamp) No. 1474 of 2004. As there was delay in filing LPA, application seeking condonation of delay being Civil Application No.8163 of 2004 was filed. That Civil Application was dismissed by the Division Bench and therefore, LPA also stood dismissed/disposed of. That order became final because the matter was not carried any higher by the present appellant. 4.7. As if this was not enough, despite the fact that possession of the land was taken by the authorities on 23.10.2001 and entry was made bearing No.1397 in revenue records, the appellant, to see that his ill-designs are given a concrete shape, filed the suit in question. 4.8. The logical outcome is that the order of confiscation passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT on 23.02.1989, confirmed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by order dated 28.08.1997, confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by judgment and order dated 17.01.2000, confirmed by the learned Single Judge by judgment and order dated 16.01.2001 became final after LPA was not entertained on Civil Application seeking condonation of delay having been dismissed. 5. Least it be said that the Court is dictating this judgment and order while it is emotionally charged. Let it be recorded that the conduct of the appellant is required to be deprecated by the Court as it is found to be not only unreasonable but also improper. 5. Least it be said that the Court is dictating this judgment and order while it is emotionally charged. Let it be recorded that the conduct of the appellant is required to be deprecated by the Court as it is found to be not only unreasonable but also improper. 5.1 While the suit for specific performance was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 01.05.2006, Regular Civil Appeal was dismissed by judgment and order dated 16.10.2007 and after the Second Appeal was admitted by this Court and Civil Application (for stay) was dismissed, the appellant had an audacity to file another application being Civil Application No.7061 of 2010 praying that:- "restrain respondents, their man, agent, servant from interfering from disturbing or taking possession of agricultural land bearing S. No. 60/1 and 60/2 admeasuring Acre 1-16 gunthas, S. No. 66/1 admeasuring Acre 1-06 gunthas, S. No. 55/2 admeasuring Acre 2-38 gunthas, S. No. 63 and 64 admeasuring Acre 2-3 gunthas which are given Block No. 62, 69, 70, 73 and 77 situated in the sim of village Prantiya Tal & Dist. Gandhinagar". 5.2 It can be verified form the memo of Civil Application No.7061 of 2010 that all relevant and material facts were suppressed by the appellant and an order of stay was obtained on 13.07.2010. It was only when the present respondents filed their detailed reply, the Court was pleased to modify order dated 13.07.2010 and confined the same to only 'pakka' construction made of bricks bearing block No. 1311/1, 1311/2 and 1311/3 and the other part of the order of stay was vacated. It is also a matter or record that the Court was constrained to observe in its order dated 11.08.2010 as under:- "In view of aforesaid facts and circumstance of case, since ad interim relief was obtained by suppressing material fact from this Hon'ble Court, the appellant in my view is not entitled to claim interim relief as prayed for in the Application." (emphasis supplied) 6. Agony of the present respondents is not over. There is still third stream of litigation in which they are dragged by the present appellant and that is by way of Tenancy Case No. 32-P-6/1988 before the Mamlatdar and ALT, who passed an order of re-grant of the land in question in favour of the present respondents and its family members. Agony of the present respondents is not over. There is still third stream of litigation in which they are dragged by the present appellant and that is by way of Tenancy Case No. 32-P-6/1988 before the Mamlatdar and ALT, who passed an order of re-grant of the land in question in favour of the present respondents and its family members. The present appellant was aggrieved by that and he carried that order by way of appeal before the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) by filing SR No. 43 of 2011, which came to be dismissed by order dated 08.10.2012. That order of the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) was carried in revision before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by filing Revision Application No. TEN/BA/288 of 2012, which came to be dismissed by order dated 07.05.2014 and as if the agonies are infinite in character, the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal is the subject matter of Special Civil Application No. 7912 of 2014 filed by the very appellant before this Court. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Satyam Y. Chhaya for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 made available a copy of order dated 11.06.2014 passed by this Court in the aforesaid SCA No. 7912 of 2014, which reads as under:- "1. Heard Mr. Shelat, learned Senior Counsel with Ms. Nayar, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Chhaya, learned advocate for Mr. Brahmbhatt, learned advocate for the private respondent No. 2. 2. Mr. Rakesh Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent-State submitted that he has been served with advance copy of the petition, and therefore, Notice may be issued to the respondents. 3. Notice returnable on 19.06.2014. 4. Mr. Chhaya, learned advocate for Mr. Brahmbhatt, learned advocate has waived service of notice for the private respondent No. 2 and Mr. Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader has waived service of notice for the respondent-State. 5. Time until 18.06.2014 is granted and the respondent-authorities to file reply, if they so desire. If any reply with reference to the order in question is not filed then appropriate order will be passed on the next date." 8. It is in light of the aforesaid long drawn litigation, which by no standard can be said to be less than a battle between the parties, the present Second Appeal is taken up for consideration. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. It is in light of the aforesaid long drawn litigation, which by no standard can be said to be less than a battle between the parties, the present Second Appeal is taken up for consideration. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. Patel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the plaintiff had filed the suit for specific performance of 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale) dated 06.12.1983 and also of document dated 02.03.1984. It is the case of the appellant that this 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale) was executed by the father of defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 along with defendant No. 4. Learned Advocate submitted that the defendants, except filing written statement in two groups, i.e. written statement Exh.12 filed on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and written statement Exh.32 filed on behalf of defendant Nos. 5 to 7, did not enter the witness box and therefore, according to him, there was no evidence against the plaintiff and the learned trial Judge was under a bounden duty to decree the suit for specific performance. In this regard, learned Advocate for the appellant placed heavy reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the matter of Aijaz Hussain v. Hans Raj, reported in AIR 1954 Allahabad 221 and submitted that the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has held, as referred to in Head Note-(c) that, "A plea in a written statement is no evidence in the case". Learned Advocate for the appellant also invited attention of the Court to para-3 of the judgment and submitted that as there was nothing else than the written statement on the record of the learned trial Judge, the learned trial Judge ought to have decreed the suit. 10. Learned Advocate for the appellant also invited attention of the Court to para-3 of the judgment and submitted that as there was nothing else than the written statement on the record of the learned trial Judge, the learned trial Judge ought to have decreed the suit. 10. True it is that if there is a case like that, pleaded by the defendants only in the written statement which is required to be substantiated by leading evidence may be oral as well as documentary then the aforesaid proposition of law does have an application, but when the defendants are relying upon the judgments and orders passed by the Forum adjudicating upon the rights of the parties then whether that proposition will be applicable is a question and this Court is of the opinion that the said proposition of law will not be applicable and the learned trial Judge has not committed any error in taking into consideration all relevant aspects of the matter and all relevant documents and having dismissed the suit. 10.1 This Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Judge has not committed any error in dismissing the suit for specific performance which was filed almost after two decades after execution of the 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale). The 'Banakhat' (agreement to sale) is dated 02.03.1984 and the suit for specific performance is filed in the year 2001. Not only that, what about order which was passed by the Mamlatdar and ALT, confirmed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, confirmed by the learned Single Judge, against which the LPA was not entertained may be on the ground of delay as Civil Application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed by the Division Bench. 10.2 Only because the plaintiff entered the witness box and deposed, in fact, he is suppressing more rather than deposing and then to say that the suit ought to have been decreed is too tall a claim which can be entertained by this Court. 11. Learned Advocate for the appellant relied upon the following decisions:- I. Mukkara Budrappa Chetti v. Karvetnagar Trust Estate, reported in AIR (34) 1947 Madras 360(1). II. State Bank of India & Anr. v. M/s. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr., reported in AIR 2011 SC 2906 . III. H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (dead) by LRS., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 243 . IV. II. State Bank of India & Anr. v. M/s. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr., reported in AIR 2011 SC 2906 . III. H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (dead) by LRS., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 243 . IV. Parimal v. Veena, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1150 . V. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanwal Nain Sachdeva & Ors., reported in (1999) 9 SCC 193 . VI. Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors., reported in AIR 2001 SCA 2171. VII. M/s. Gojer Brothers (P) Ltd. v. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, reported in AIR 1974 SCA 1380. VIII. Dumala Vahpara Gram Panchayat v. Chunilal Tribhovandas Patel & Ors., reported in 1999 (2) GLH 959 . IX. Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla and Brothers, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 785 . X. H. Siddiqui (dead) by L.RS v. Ramalingam, reported in 2011 (2) GLR 1429 . XI. Anil Synthetics Ltd. v. Babubhai Becharbhai, in Special Civil Application No.6558 of 2002 decided on 09.03.2004. XII. Sait Tarajee Khimachand & Ors. v. Yelamarti Satyam & Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SCA 1865. 12. It was requested to learned Advocate Mr. Chhaya to ascertain as to in how many of the aforesaid cases, the 1st appellate Court has confirmed the order passed by the trial Court. The learned Advocate, with all responsibility, makes a statement that in all these cases, the 1st appellate Court was pleased to reverse the order passed by the trial Court and there being no compliance of the aspect set out in R-31 of O-41, the aforesaid decisions are rendered. 13. This Court has no hesitation in holding that these decisions will have no application to the facts of the present case because if the 1st appellate Court was to reverse the decision of the trial Court, there has to be a clearcut reasoning for that reversal, but when the Court is just endorsing the view of the learned trial Judge, that could be in a manner in which the 1st appellate Court has done in the present case. 13.1. 13.1. Not even for a minute, this court is giving certificate of 'best judgment writing' to the 1st appellate Court or to the learned trial Judge, but at the same time, this Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that ultimately both the learned Judges were alive to the facts of the case; they were alive to the evidence on record; they were alive to the controversy between the parties; they were alive to the adjudication of the rights of the parties before the revenue authorities and if after being alive to all this, the suit and the Regular Civil Appeal are dismissed, this Court finds that there is no injustice done to the appellant. In fact, this Court is also of the opinion that the conduct of the appellant is required to be deprecated and it is accordingly deprecated. 14. The Court is not able to restrain itself from observing that until people like appellant continues to misuse the justice delivery system, justice reaching to the people like the present respondents is going to remain a 'day dream'. The poor respondents, belonging to the down most possible strata of the society are deprived of their valuable land. It is nothing but subjecting them to the greatest injustice possible. This Court is of the opinion that for no technicality, the present Second Appeal is required to be entertained and relief prayed for is required to be granted to this appellant. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Taking into consideration the fact that the appellant is not going to improve upon, the Court restrains itself from imposing any cost on him. Appeal dismissed.