Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 103 (GUJ)

ASIA BROWN BOWERY LTD. v. PRESIDING OFFICER

2014-01-23

JAYANT PATEL

body2014
ORAL JUDGMENT 1. As in all the matters, common questions and common issues are involved, they are being considered simultaneously. 2. All the petitions are directed against the order passed by the Labour Court below application for recovery of the amount under section 33(C)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), whereby the petitioner is directed to pay the amount with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. 3. The short facts of the case are that the respondent No.2 in each of the petition, were working with the petitioner company. In the year 1990, scheme of voluntary retirement (VRS) was introduced by the petitioner for its employees. Thereafter, in the year 1992, another modified scheme of voluntary retirement was introduced. The respondent concerned of the respective petitions applied for VRS in the prescribed form. The said proposal of the respondent No.2 was accepted by the petitioner and thereafter, the agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent no.2 concerned and the aforesaid agreement came to be executed and as per the agreement, the amount was paid. On 26.04.1992, another modified scheme for VRS was floated by the petitioner company which provided for additional benefit. 4. The respondent no.2, in the year 1994, made an application under section 33 (C)(2) of the Act for recovery of the amount as per scheme prevailing prior to the date of retirement as per agreement and even as per the scheme introduced subsequently on 26.04.1992 contending that they would be entitled to get the additional amount which has not been paid. The Labour Court ultimately passed separate orders in each of the applications of the respective respondents, whereby the recovery application has been allowed and the petitioner company is directed to pay the amount. Under the circumstances, the present petitions before this Court. 5. I have heard Mr.Pranav Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for M/s Trivedi and Gupta for the petitioner and Mr.Mayank Desai for the concerned respondent workman in all the matters. 6. The scope and jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33(C)(2) of the Act is by now well settled. If any right is crystallised and the payment has not been made by the employer, such may fall within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. 6. The scope and jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33(C)(2) of the Act is by now well settled. If any right is crystallised and the payment has not been made by the employer, such may fall within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Whereas, if the right is not crystallised or the adjudication of the rights for entitlement of the amount is yet to be made, such would be outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Act. The copy of one of the agreements in SCA No.14442/06 which has been entered into by the respondent workman with the petitioner company shows that as per clause (ii), it has been stated as under: “having retired voluntarily with effect from 29.02.1992, the beneficiary shall cease to be an employee of the company and his name shall stand removed from the company’s employee’s register.” 7. Such would mean that the relationship between the employer and the employee had come to an end on the date as mentioned in the agreement and the amount of compensation was received. 8. The respondent workmen were not covered by the scheme which was floated on 26.04.1992 since admittedly, when they applied under the scheme, there was no existence of the scheme floated on 26.04.1992. Further, as per the scheme which was in existence prior to their retirement, whether the respondents-concerned workmen would be entitled to additional amount of compensation or not would essentially require the adjudication of the matter because at the time when the scheme was opted and the amount of compensation was received by the respective workman, they did not object about the calculation nor they accepted the amount under protest and on the contrary, express agreement did provide for cessation of the relationship of the employee and the employer from the date mentioned in the agreement. Under these circumstances, unless there is adjudication about the entitlement of the additional amount of compensation, the matter could not be considered below the application under section 33(C)(2) of the Act. The reasoning recorded by the Labour Court in the impugned order also shows that the Labour Court was not clear about the concluded entitlement of the amount under the scheme which prevailed prior to the retirement as per the agreement. 9. The reasoning recorded by the Labour Court in the impugned order also shows that the Labour Court was not clear about the concluded entitlement of the amount under the scheme which prevailed prior to the retirement as per the agreement. 9. In my view, in absence of any adjudication about the right of the respondent workmen by any other competent forum, the application under section 33(C)(2) of the Act for recovery of the amount could not be granted by the Labour Court and the impugned order therefore can be said as beyond the jurisdiction. 10. Hence, it can be said that the Labour Court exercised the power beyond the scope of section 33(C)(2) of the Act and thereby, committed jurisdictional error which may be a case for interference in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, the impugned order passed by the Labour Court for directing the petitioner to pay the amount is set aside. However, it is observed that the present order shall not prejudice the rights if any of the respondent workman to resort to appropriate proceedings for adjudication of the issue for entitlement of the amount as per the VRS prevailing prior to their entering into agreement for VRS or may be thereafter, on 26.04.1992. At that stage, rights and contentions of both the sides shall remain open. 12. The petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.