Judgment The 1st respondent (for short ‘the respondent’) filed O.S No. 997 of 2003 in the Court of XI Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the appellant and the 2nd respondent for eviction from the suit schedule properties. It was pleaded that the respondent is the absolute owner of the suit schedule premises comprising an open land of 550 square yards and that the same was leased out to the appellant in the year 1978 initially at a rent of Rs.105 per month and by 1986, it was enhanced to Rs.250/-. It was pleaded that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 do not apply to the tenancy since what was leased is only an open land. The respondent pleaded that Ex.A-2 quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued on 27-07-2003 and in spite of receiving the same, the appellant did not vacate the premises. The appellant filed a written statement opposing the suit. It was pleaded that the respondent is not the owner of the premises and that the Government of Andhra Pradesh filed L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 before the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, the Act’) in respect of the suit schedule property as well as considerable extent in the neighbourhood against several persons and that an order of eviction was passed in the L.G.C. He pleaded that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court decreed the suit through its judgment dated 17-01-2008. Aggrieved by that, the appellant filed A.S No. 57 of 2008 in the Court of Special Judge for Trial of Offences under S.Cs & S.Ts (POA) Act-cum-VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-XX Additional Chief Judge, Secunderabad. The appeal was dismissed through judgment dated 20-11-2013. Hence this second appeal. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the suit schedule property was the subject matter of L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 and once the Special Court has taken up adjudication of the matter, a civil Court cannot entertain the suit in respect of that very property. Hence this second appeal. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the suit schedule property was the subject matter of L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 and once the Special Court has taken up adjudication of the matter, a civil Court cannot entertain the suit in respect of that very property. He submits that the order of eviction was passed in the L.G.C and challenging the same, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 26599 of 2011 and that an order of interim stay was granted in W.P.M.P No. 32831 of 2011 on 27-09-2011. He submits that though these important facts were pleaded before the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, they were not taken into account, at all. He submits that even otherwise, the relationship between the appellant and the respondent as lessee and lessor was not established and a stray sentence in the cross examination in relation to Ex.A-3 which was said to be a reply, was treated as the basis for existence of relationship. Sri R. Chandrasekhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellant was the lessee of the respondent for the past several decades, and when Ex.A-2 quit notice was issued by the respondent, the appellant gave a reply Ex.A-3 admitting the lease pleading certain grounds for not vacating the premises. He contends that though an effort was made by the appellant during the course of trial to disown Ex.A-3, the same was not successful. Learned counsel submits that L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 was filed by the Government, obviously at the instance of some of the lessees of the respondent, with a view to knock away the property and the very fact that the respondent was not made a party to the L.G.C discloses the collusion on the part of the concerned persons. He submits that in identical situation, this Court dismissed Second Appeal No. 346 of 2008 through judgment dated 14-08-2012. The respondent filed the suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit schedule properties on the basis of a quit notice Ex.A-2. The trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: “1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits? If so, at what rate? The trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: “1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits? If so, at what rate? 3) Whether there is no cause of action to entertain the suit? 4) To what relief?” The following additional issue was also framed: “Whether the defendant is not the tenant of the plaintiff?” On behalf of the respondent, PW 1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-21 were filed. The appellant deposed as DW 1 and he filed Exs.B-1 to B-16. The suit was decreed and in A.S No.57 of 2008, the lower appellate Court framed the following points for consideration: “1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for eviction as prayed for? 2. Whether there is no relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the parties? 3. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for? 4. To what relief?” The appeal was dismissed. Two principal contentions were advanced before this Court. The first is about the alleged nonexistence of relationship of lessee and lessor between the parties herein and the second is about the proceedings initiated under the Act. The relationship between the parties is not governed by any written document. In the absence of any written document, oral evidence or other evidence can be adduced to establish the same. In the plaint itself, the respondent pleaded that the lease commenced several years ago and that quit notice Ex.A-2 was issued. It was also mentioned that the appellant issued reply in Ex.A-3. Though in his written statement, the appellant pleaded that Ex.A-3 was not issued by him, in the cross examination, he made an attempt to feign ignorance about it. He pleaded that Ex.A-3 was got issued at a time when he was seriously ill. Even if that is true, mere illness does not falsify a reply issued to notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court have examined in detail this plea and found that the relationship between the parties as lessor and lessee is established beyond any pale of doubt. Before this court also, the learned Senior Counsel has not explained as to how Ex.A-3 can be ignored. The second aspect is about the institution of proceedings under the Act. Before this court also, the learned Senior Counsel has not explained as to how Ex.A-3 can be ignored. The second aspect is about the institution of proceedings under the Act. The respondent owned vast extent of land in the neighbourhood of the suit schedule property. L.G.C No. 175 of 1997 was filed by the Government against several lessees of the respondent. However, the respondent was not made a party. A person with a surname ‘Cheekoty’ was impleaded and there was hardly any contest from him. At least when a quit notice is issued or when a suit was filed, the appellant ought to have got the respondent impleaded in the L.G.C. No such steps were taken. The effort of the parties to L.G.C appears to be, to first get the land, which is the subject matter of that case, declared as government property and thereafter, to get pattas by approaching the politicians. The instances are not lacking where the proceedings under the Act were initiated for cross purposes and to commit fraud on genuine landowners. Once the respondent is not a party to the L.G.C., the mere fact that the appellant is pursuing the proceedings before this Court by filing a writ petition does not make any difference. Similar plea raised in Second Appeal No. 346 of 2008 wherein the respondent herein was the sole respondent, was rejected and the second appeal was dismissed. This Court does not find any substantial question of law in the second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this second appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.