Judgment : Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 12.1.2009, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 11-N/7 of 2006, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Kamla Devi & another, whereby appellant-accused Kamla Devi stands convicted for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.10,000/- for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and fine of Rs.5000/- for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC, she has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. Case of prosecution, emerging from the records is that on 22nd September, 2005 at about 10.15 a.m., Smt. Sajji Devi (deceased) had gone to cut grass. On her way back she was stopped by accused Kamla Devi who was standing in the courtyard of her house. Kamla Devi made inquiries with regard to dirt around the water tank and threw a glass full of acid on the face and body of Sajji Devi resulting into severe and serious burn injuries. Master Anil, aged 3, who was playing close-by also suffered burn injuries. The incident was witnessed by Smt. Gumani Devi (PW-1) and Smt. Geeta Devi (PW-2). Sh. Rabhubir Sharma (PW-3) husband of Smt. Sajji Devi took her to the hospital at Paonta Sahib, where Dr. Kamal Pasha (PW-8) after medical examination, finding the patient to be serious, referred her for treatment, vide MLC (Ext. PW-8/A), to the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, where she was medically examined by Dr. Deepak Kalia (PW-15). Ultimately on 24.10.2005, Smt. Sajji Devi succumbed to her burn injuries. Post mortem of her dead body was conducted by Dr. D. K. Singh (PW-14), who issued Post Mortem Report (Ext. PW-14/B). Initially Dr. Kamal Pasha (PW-8) had informed the police hence SI-Gurdeep Singh (PW-19) from Police Station Paonta Sahib reached the hospital at Paonta Sahib where he recorded statement (Ext. PW-10/A) of Smt. Sajji Devi. Const. Narain Singh (PW-10) took ruka to Police Station, Shillai where F.I.R. No. 51 of 2005, dated 22.9.2005 (Ext. PW-21/A) was registered against the accused under the provisions of Sections 341 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code. PW-10/A) of Smt. Sajji Devi. Const. Narain Singh (PW-10) took ruka to Police Station, Shillai where F.I.R. No. 51 of 2005, dated 22.9.2005 (Ext. PW-21/A) was registered against the accused under the provisions of Sections 341 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code. S.H.O. of the concerned Police Station Sh. Shyam Lal Thakur (PW-21) visited the spot and conducted necessary investigation. Accused Kamla Devi who was arrested on 23.9.2005, produced glass (Ext. P-5) used for throwing the acid, in the presence of independent witness Sh. Sant Ram (PW-5), which was seized by the police vide seizure memo (Ext. PW-5/B). Investigation revealed Kamla Devi had procured the acid from accused Amarjeet Singh. In the incident Kamla Devi was also injured as drops of acid had fallen on her clothes. She was also got medically examined from Dr. S. N. Sachan (PW-13) who issued MLC (Ext. PW-13/B),injuries being simple in nature. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused Kamla Devi was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302, 324 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas accused Amarjeet Singh was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 109 read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as twenty-one witnesses and statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. were recorded in which accused Kamla Devi took up the following plea: “The prosecution witnesses Smt. Gumani and Geeta have falsely implicated me in this case, none of them were present at the time of occurrence except my father in law, the deceased and myself. P.C. were recorded in which accused Kamla Devi took up the following plea: “The prosecution witnesses Smt. Gumani and Geeta have falsely implicated me in this case, none of them were present at the time of occurrence except my father in law, the deceased and myself. Since I belong to a schedule caste and the witnesses Smt. Gumani and Geeta are from the caste of deceased Smt. Sajjo and are related to each other.” … … … “This case has been foisted on me as they wanted to save the deceased who had come to my courtyard with a glass in her hands in order to cause injuries to my person and while she was attempting to throw the acid on my person, I caught hold of her hands and in the scuffle acid fell on her person as well as that of mine. I am innocent.” To probablize her defence, she examined her father-in-law Sh. Bhajnu (DW-1). 5. Appreciating the testimony of prosecution witnesses, trial Court convicted accused Kamla Devi for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced as aforesaid. 6. Accused Amarjeet Singh stands acquitted of the charged offences. Undisputedly no appeal against the judgment of his acquittal stands filed by the State. 7. We have extensively heard learned counsel appearing on both the sides and perused the record. 8. Assailing the judgment Mr. Vinay Thakur, learned counsel has argued that (i) defence of appellant stands probablized through the testimony of DW-1;(ii) accused is a victim of caste war in the village;(iii) testimony of witnesses do not disclose any motive germane to the alleged incident; and (iv) with regard to the exact place of occurrence of the incident, witnesses have contradicted themselves, rendering the prosecution version to be false and defence of the accused to be probablized. In support, learned counsel has referred to the following decisions rendered by different Courts of the land: State of U.P. vs. Madan Mohan & others, (1989) 3 SCC 390 ; State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manohar Lal, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 1108; P. Mani vs. State of T.N., (2006) 3 SCC 161 ; Bhag Nargu & another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Latest HLJ 2005 (HP)(DB) 652. 9. Rebutting the submissions so made, Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. 9. Rebutting the submissions so made, Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. Advocate General, invited our attention to the testimonies of eye witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) and the dying declaration (Ext. PW-10/A). 10. The fact that Smt. Sajji Devi received burn injuries from the acid on 22.9.2005 is not in dispute. We find that Smt. Sajji Devi was first medically examined by Dr. Kamal Pasha (PW-8). This was the very same day at about 3 p.m. Doctor proved MLC (Ext. PW-8/A), which records the injuries to be sustained on account of throwing of acid. Nature of injuries is grievous with 45% coercive burns. The victim was conscious, oriented to time, place and person. Doctor categorically opined that:- “Alleged H/O throwing of acid. O/E. Pulse 60/min. BP-110/80 m.Hg. CNS- conscious, oriented to time, place and person. Pupil-Left eye, reacting to light. L.E. – Chorrosive burns, deep grade 4 Dermocuticle. Edema (+), browning (+), involved whole right side of forehead, neck both ventral and dorsal aspect, right temporal region of scalp, right side of face, chin, lips, nose and right eye also, Burn also inculled right shoulder, ventral and dorsal aspect, right arm ventral aspect, right forearm ventral aspect whole of abdomen ventral aspect, left forearm ventral aspect, both thighs ventral aspect. For eye consult eye surgeon. Opinion – 45% corrosive burn. Nature of Injuries: grievous hurt. Probable duration of injuries: fresh @ 6 hours.” [Emphasis supplied] 11. Sajji Devi (deceased) was referred for further treatment to the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh where she was administered treatment by Dr. Deepak Kalia (PW-15). Unfortunately she expired on 24.10.2005 and post mortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. D. K. Singh (PW-14) who proved report (Ext. PW-14/B), recording the cause of death to be “respiratory failure due to burn injuries”. Thus Sajji Devi died as a result burn injury sustained by her stands established on record. Uncontroverted testimony of the Doctors clearly establish such fact. In any case it is also not disputed by the appellant. 12. Accused was also got medically examined from Dr. S. N. Sachan (PW-13) who proved MLC (Ext. PW-13/B). Injuries sustained by her are minor and not on the vital part of her body. 13. In the instant case we find that apart from the testimonies of eye witnesses Smt. Gumani Devi (PW-1) and Smt. Geeta Devi (PW-2) there is dying declaration (Ext. S. N. Sachan (PW-13) who proved MLC (Ext. PW-13/B). Injuries sustained by her are minor and not on the vital part of her body. 13. In the instant case we find that apart from the testimonies of eye witnesses Smt. Gumani Devi (PW-1) and Smt. Geeta Devi (PW-2) there is dying declaration (Ext. PW- 10/A) of the deceased. 14. SI-Gurdeep Singh (PW-19), upon receiving information about the incident visited the hospital. He moved application (Ext. PW-8/B) for recording the statement of Sajji Devi. Doctor (PW-8) certified the patient to be fit. Thereafter in the presence of the very same Doctor, SIGurdeep Singh recorded the statement of the deceased (dying declaration – Ext. PW-10/A). The said statement stands certified to have been recorded in the presence of the Doctor. This statement was taken to the police station by Constable Narayan Singh (PW-10) where F.I.R. No. 51 of 2005, dated 22.9.2005 (Ext. PW-21/A) was registered against the accused. 15. Before we discuss the evidence we deem it appropriate to discuss the law on the issue of Dying Declaration. 16. It is a settled position of law that if there are more then one dying declarations then the Court has to scrutinize all of them to find out if each one of them pass the test of trustworthiness. The Court must further find whether different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. 17. There can be more than one dying declarations and if there is no inconsistency between them, all can be used against the accused for proving the guilt. [ State of Karnataka vs. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 and (1982) 1 SCC 700 , Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani vs. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 ]. 18. This view further stands reiterated in Jaishree Anant Khandekar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647 , where the Apex Court was dealing with five dying declarations, which were found not to be in variation with each other. 19. But however, where there is variation in the dying declaration (two in question), the Apex Court has held that there cannot be conviction based on them [ Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 69 and Sanjay vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148 ]. 20. 19. But however, where there is variation in the dying declaration (two in question), the Apex Court has held that there cannot be conviction based on them [ Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 69 and Sanjay vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148 ]. 20. Further in (2010) 6 SCC 516, Apex Court has again summarized its view in the following terms:- “The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in replying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. When there are more than one dying declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. Such a trend will be extremely dangerous. However, the courts below are fully entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass all the above tests. The court has to weigh all the attendant circumstances and come to the independent finding whether the dying declaration was properly recorded and whether it was voluntary and truthful. The courts must bear in mind that each criminal trial is an individual aspect. If after careful scrutiny the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it a basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Emphasis supplied)” 21. In Jaishree Anant Khandekar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647 , a comparative study of laws of various countries on the point of dying declaration was done by the Apex Court. It was held that: “17. (Emphasis supplied)” 21. In Jaishree Anant Khandekar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 647 , a comparative study of laws of various countries on the point of dying declaration was done by the Apex Court. It was held that: “17. The law relating to dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule. The rationale behind admissibility of a dying declaration was best expressed, not in any judgment, but in one of the soliloquies in Shakespeare's King John, when fatally wounded Melun wails: ‘Have I met hideous death within my view, Retaining but a quantity of life, Which bleeds away even as a form of wax, Resolveth from his figure 'gainst the fire? What in the world should make me now deceive, Since I must lose the use of all deceit? Why should I then be false since it is true That I must die here and live hence by truth?' (See King John, Act V, Scene IV.) 18. Both Taylor and Wigmore in their treatise on Evidence took refuge to the magic of Shakespeare to illustrate the principles behind admissibility of dying declaration by quoting the above passage. 19. Among the judicial fraternity this has been best expressed, possibly by Lord Chief Justice Baron Eyre (See. R. Vs. Woodcock, (1789) 1 Lea.502, and which I quote (ER p.353): - "...That such declarations are made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation, equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice." 20. The test of admissibility of dying declaration is stricter in English Law than in Indian Law. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1876 brought out a ‘Digest of the Law of Evidence' and its introduction is of considerable interest even today. The author wrote that English Code of Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. In the words of the author: "In the autumn of 1872 Lord Coleridge (then Attorney General) employed me to draw a similar code for England. I did so in the course of the winter, and we settled it in frequent consultations. The author wrote that English Code of Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872. In the words of the author: "In the autumn of 1872 Lord Coleridge (then Attorney General) employed me to draw a similar code for England. I did so in the course of the winter, and we settled it in frequent consultations. It was ready to be introduced early in the Session of 1873. Lord Coleridge made various attempts to bring it forward, but he could not succeed till the very last day of the Session. He said a few words on the subject on the 5th August, 1873, just before Parliament was prorogued. The Bill was thus never made public, though I believe it was ordered to be printed. It was drawn on the model of the Indian Evidence Act and contained a complete system of law upon the subject of evidence." 21. In that book, Article 26 sums up the English law relating to dying declaration as under:- "Article 26. Dying Declaration as to Cause of Death . - A declaration made by the declarant as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is deemed to be relevant only in trials for the murder or manslaughter of the declarant; and only when the declarant is shown, to the satisfaction of the judge, to have been in actual danger of death, and to have given up all hope of recovery at the time when his declaration was made. Such a declaration is not irrelevant merely because it was intended to be made as a deposition before a magistrate, but is irregular." (emphasis supplied) 22. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act the underlined portion is not there. Instead Section 32 (1) is worded differently and which is set out: "32. Such a declaration is not irrelevant merely because it was intended to be made as a deposition before a magistrate, but is irregular." (emphasis supplied) 22. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act the underlined portion is not there. Instead Section 32 (1) is worded differently and which is set out: "32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant - Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured, without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) When it relates to cause of death - When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be he nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." (emphasis supplied) 23. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard Vs. The Queen, 1982 (1) The All England Law Reports 183 (Privy Council), while hearing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, made a comparison of the English Law and Indian Law by referring to the underlined portions of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act at page 187 of the report. Sir Owen Woodhouse, speaking for the Privy Council, pointed out the different statutory dispensation in Indian Law prescribing a test of admissibility of dying declaration which is distinct from a common law test in English Law. 24. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic truthfulness of human character at the dying moments of one's life, admissibility of dying declaration is also based on the doctrine of necessity. In many cases victim is the only eye witness to a crime on him/her and in such situations exclusion of the dying declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends of justice. In many cases victim is the only eye witness to a crime on him/her and in such situations exclusion of the dying declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends of justice. American Law on dying declaration also proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty of death leading to an intrinsic faith in truthfulness of human character and the necessity principle. 25. On certainty of death, the same strict test of English Law has been applied in American Jurisprudence. The test has been variously expressed as ‘no hope of recovery', ‘a settled expectation of death'. The core concept is that the expectation of death must be absolute and not susceptible to doubts and there should be no chance of operation of worldly motives. (See Wigmore on Evidence page 233-234). 26. This Court in Kishan Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 3062 , held that under English Law the credence and the relevance of the dying declaration is admissible only when the person making such statement is in hopeless condition and expecting imminent death. Justice Willes coined it as a "settled hopeless expectation of death" (R Vs. Peel, (1860) 2 F. & F. 21, which was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R Vs. Perry, (1909) 2 KB 697). Under our Law, the declaration is relevant even if it is made by a person, who may or may not be under expectation of death, at the time of declaration. (See para 18,page 3066). However, the declaration must relate to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.” 22. In Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 , the Apex Court has further held that:- “Sometimes, attempts have been made to equate a dying declaration with the evidence of an accomplice or the evidence furnished by a confession as against the maker, if it is retracted, and as against others, even though not retracted. But in our opinion, it is not right in principle to do so. But in our opinion, it is not right in principle to do so. Though under S. 133 of the Evidence Act, it is not illegal to convict a person on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Act, lays down as a rule of produce based on experience, that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless his evidence is corroborated in material particulars and this has now been accepted as a rule of law. The same cannot be said of a dying declaration because a dying declaration may not, unlike a confession, or the testimony of an approver, come from a tainted source. The same cannot be said of a dying declaration because a dying declaration may not, unlike a confession, or the testimony of an approver, come from a tainted source. If a dying declaration has been made by a person whose antecedents are as doubtful as in the other cases that may be a ground for looking upon it with suspicion, but generally speaking, the maker of a dying declaration cannot be tarnished with the same brush as the maker of a confession or an approver.” “It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence that other pieces of evidence; a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as for as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the lying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” “In order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. The aforesaid decision came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Harbans Singh and another vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 and after taking into account its earlier decision in Ram Nath vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420 , affirmed the aforesaid view. 24. In Paniben (Smt.) vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 , the Court has further reiterated and laid down the following principles:- “A dying declaration is entitled to great weight. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring-corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.” “However, since the accused has no power of cross-examination, which is essential for eliciting the truth, the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail”. “Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to occurrence, it is not to be rejected. Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. But a dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.” “(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Mannu Raja v. State of U.P. (1976) 2 SCR 764 ) ( AIR 1976 SC 2199 ). (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 ; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 ). (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 ). (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1974 SC 332 ). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1982 SC 1021 ). (Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1974 SC 332 ). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1982 SC 1021 ). (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., 1981 SCC (Crl) 581). (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 ). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505 ). (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912 ). (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519 ). 19. In the light of the above principles, we will consider the three dying declarations in the instant case and we will ascertain the truth with reference to all dying declarations made by the deceased Bai Kanta. This Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839 held: "where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred." Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, they have to be accepted.” 25. However, where the prosecution version differs from the statement of deceased, dying declaration cannot be used for convicting the accused [ Paniben (supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another, (2013) 12 SCC 255]. 26. However, where the prosecution version differs from the statement of deceased, dying declaration cannot be used for convicting the accused [ Paniben (supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Shravan Ram and another, (2013) 12 SCC 255]. 26. The aforesaid view has been reiterated in Jai Karan vs. State of Delhi (MCT), (1999) 8 SCC 161 , Sham Shankar Kankaria vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165 and Mohammed Asif vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 11 SCC 497 . 27. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , while considering the conflict in Paparambaka Rosamma vs. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 69 5 and Koli Chunilal Savji vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562 , came to the conclusion that law laid down in the latter was the correct law and simply because the Doctor has not recorded/made endorsement that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement in question, other material on record to indicate that the deceased was fully conscious and capable of making statement cannot be ignored. This view has been reiterated in Ravi and another vs. State of T.N. (2004) 10 SCC 776 ; and Kamalavva and another vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 614 . 28. The apex Court in Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 310 , has held as under: “18. Now we proceed to examine the principle of evaluation of any dying declaration. There is distinction between the evaluation of dying declaration under the English law and that under the Indian law. Under the English law, credence and the relevancy of a dying declaration is only when person making such statement is in hopeless condition and expecting an imminent death. So under the English law for its admissibility, the declarant should have been in actual danger of death at the time when they are made, and that he should have had a full apprehension of his danger and the death should have ensued. Under the Indian law the dying declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. Under the Indian law the dying declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. Under the English law, the admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The general principle on which this species of evidence are admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak only the truth. If evidence in a case reveals that declarant has reached this state while making declaration then within the sphere of the Indian law, while testing the credibility of such dying declaration weightage can be given. Of course depending on other relevant facts and circumstances of case.” 29. It is a settled position of law that conviction can be founded solely on the basis of dying declaration, if the same fully inspires confidence. [See: Parbin Ali and another v. State of Assam, (2013) 2 SCC 81 and Krishan vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 3 SCC 280 ]. 30. In Shaik Nagoor vs. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2008) 15 SCC 471 , the Apex Court held that where the Judicial Magistrate and the Police officer had given detailed description and witnesses were not cross-examined on the point of fitness of the deceased to give dying declaration plea taken by the accused that the deceased was not fit to make the statement, under the circumstances of that case, was untenable. 31. In Maiben D/o Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria vs. State of Gujarat, (2007) 10 SCC 362 , the Court was dealing with a case where death had taken place 25 days after recording of the statement of the deceased and the same was taken to be a dying declaration. 32. 31. In Maiben D/o Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria vs. State of Gujarat, (2007) 10 SCC 362 , the Court was dealing with a case where death had taken place 25 days after recording of the statement of the deceased and the same was taken to be a dying declaration. 32. Further in Sohan Lal alias Sohan Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 534 , State of Karnataka vs. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , Dayal Singh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 452 and Kanti Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 498 , it has been held that it is not necessary that dying declaration is to be recorded before the Magistrate. The same can be recorded even before or by the police official. This view stands reiterated in Gulam Hussain and another vs. State of Delhi, (2000) 7 SCC 254 . 33. In Mohan Lal and others vs. State of Haryana (2007) 9 SCC 151 , the Court disbelieved the statement made by the wife of the accused on the ground that not only it was vague but also there was no contemporaneous documentary or other material to prove dowry demands prior to the incident. 34. In Jayabalan vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199 , the Apex Court was dealing with the case of an accused who was charged of having poured kerosene oil on his wife and then set her on fire. The accused husband was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. The accused assailed the findings of conviction on the ground that prosecution had examined only interested witnesses and also dying declaration was tutored, promoted and product of the imagination of deceased. In the proven facts of that case repelling the contention, it was held as under:- “We are of the considered view that in case where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency . The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency . The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. In Sukanti Moharana vs. State of Orissa, (2009) 9 SCC 163 , the Court was dealing with a case where the dying declaration was challenged on the ground that it did not contain thumb impression or signatures of the deceased. The challenge was repelled on the ground that medical evidence proved that the deceased was having 90% burn injuries on the thumb and therefore was in no position to sign the dying declaration. The Apex Court further reiterated its decision in Nallapati Sivaiah vs. SDO, (2007) 15 SCC 465 , in the following terms:- "18. …This Court in more than one decision cautioned that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion." 36. This view stands reiterated in Ongole Ravikanth vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 647 . 37. In Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur, (2011) 13 SCC 125 , the Court has held as under: “20. There can be no dispute that the dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, however, such a dying declaration has to be roved to be wholly reliable, voluntary and truthful and further that the maker thereof must be in a fit medical condition to make it. The oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence, where the exact words uttered by the deceased are not available, particularly because of the failure of memory of the witnesses who are said to have heard it…………….” [See also: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master and others, (2010) 12 SCC 324 ]. 38. The oral dying declaration is a weak kind of evidence, where the exact words uttered by the deceased are not available, particularly because of the failure of memory of the witnesses who are said to have heard it…………….” [See also: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master and others, (2010) 12 SCC 324 ]. 38. Dying declaration need not be in the form of question and answer. Principles required to be adopted for recording the statement of deceased stand reiterated in Ram Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1998) 4 SCC 517 , State of Karnataka vs. Shariff (2003) 2 SCC 473 and K.Ramachandra Reddy and another vs. The Public prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 . 39. In Ashabai & another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 224 , apex Court while dealing with a case of dying declarations, four in number, observed as under: “15. About the evidentiary value of the dying declaration of the deceased, it is relevant to refer to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc. is relevant. – Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: (1) When it relates to cause of death. – When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. (2) - (8) * * *” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. (2) - (8) * * *” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that her statement relates to the cause of her death. In that event, it qualifies the criteria mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor is it required to be recorded only by a Magistrate. As a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assessed independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variations in the other.” 40. The apex Court in Muthu Kutty & another vs. State by Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 has discussed the exceptions so contained in Section 32 to the general rule against hearsay evidence elaborated in Section 60 of the evidence Act, 1872. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in the legal mazim “ nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire – a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in the legal mazim “ nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire – a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. 41. In the instant case we find that on 22.9.2005, the Doctor had clearly recorded the patient to be conscious, oriented to time, place and person. She was also reacting to light. She was certified to be fit for recording her statement. 42. Statement (Ext. PW-10/A) reads as under: “Stated that I am permanent resident of village Tatiyana and at present reside at Bass Jatari along with my family. Today, on dated 22.9.2005, at about 10.00 a.m., I was returning home from the ghassani with grass and at about 10.15 a.m. when I reached on the way near the house of Kamla Devi w/o Kundia Ram r/o Jatari, I met Kamla Devi who suddenly came and stopped me from proceeding further and pushed the grass down carried by me and sprinkled acid on my body from the glass which she was holding in her hands. As a result of acid, my body got burnt from face to knees. To protect myself, I screamed loudly on which Gumani Devi w/o Ram Chander and Gita Devi w/o Kanthi Ram r/o Jatari came to me and by carrying me brought me home and thereafter my husband alongwith Kanthi Ram etc brought me in a vehicle to the hospital at Paonta Sahib. Yesterday on 21.9.2005, I and Kamla Devi had some verbal altercation regarding water at Jatari near the water tank. Because of this Kamla Devi keeps a grudge with me. Legal action be taken against Kamla Devi.” 43. Close scrutiny of the testimonies of PW-8 and PW-19 would only establish the statement to have been truly recorded as per the version so narrated by the deceased. Testimonies of the witnesses remain unshattered. They have truthfully deposed and narrated the events as they unfolded. Thus prosecution has been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the factum of recording of dying declaration (Ext. PW-10/A), which in our considered view fully inspires confidence and can be said to be the version so narrated by the deceased prior to her death. 44. Noticeably, dying declaration is signed by the deceased. It is not the case of the respondent that such statement was made in the presence of her husband, or covillagers. PW-10/A), which in our considered view fully inspires confidence and can be said to be the version so narrated by the deceased prior to her death. 44. Noticeably, dying declaration is signed by the deceased. It is not the case of the respondent that such statement was made in the presence of her husband, or covillagers. We find the statement to have been made truthfully, uninfluenced and voluntarily. The narration of events is clear and unambiguous. Reason for crime is also disclosed therein and we see no reason to disbelieve the statement. 45. Presence of PW-1 and PW-2 is recorded in the statement of the deceased. Also perusal and appreciation of testimonies of these witnesses fully establishes the prosecution case, beyond reasonable doubt. Except for minor improvements their testimonies cannot be said to be shaky or uninspiring in confidence. 46. Simply because version of PW-1 that she had accompanied the deceased to collect the grass appears to be an improvement in Court, this fact alone would not render her testimony on other material facts to be false. This witness clearly states that she saw the accused throw acid on the body of the deceased when Anil (aged 3 years) was also injured in the incident. She categorically denies the deceased to have come to the house of the accused for throwing acid or that when the deceased tried to throw acid and accused tried to save herself the same fell on the deceased resulting into severe burn injuries. Significantly this witness is not related to the deceased and there is nothing on record to establish any caste war or hostility prevailing in the village, prompting her to falsely depose in court. We find her testimony to be corroborated by Smt. Geeta Devi (PW-2). No doubt in her statement so recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C., with which she was confronted, it was not got recorded that she was walking on the path at the relevant time and place of the incident, but however in her unrebutted testimony she categorically states that “It is correct that the entire incident took place in the courtyard of accused Kamla”. 47. The apex Court in C. Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 , has held as under: “85. 47. The apex Court in C. Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 , has held as under: “85. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (vide Sohrab & Anr. v. The State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 2020 ; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR 1985 SC 48 ; Bharwada Bhogini Bhai Hirji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 ; State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash AIR 2007 SC 2257 ; Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 588 ; State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 626 ; and State v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151).” 48. Further, in Thoti Manohar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 7 SCC 723 , the apex Court held as under: “38. The learned counsel for the appellant has endeavoured hard to highlight certain discrepancies pertaining to time, situation of the land, number of persons, etc., but in our considered opinion, they are absolutely minor in nature. The minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the matter cannot bring discredit to the story of the prosecution. Giving undue importance to them would amount to adopting a hyper-technical approach. The Court, while appreciating the evidence, should not attach much significance to minor discrepancies, for the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case are to be ignored. Giving undue importance to them would amount to adopting a hyper-technical approach. The Court, while appreciating the evidence, should not attach much significance to minor discrepancies, for the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case are to be ignored. This has been so held in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [ AIR 1985 SC 48 ]; Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat [ AIR 1988 SC 696 ]; Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1999 SC 3544 ]; State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj and another [ (2000) 1 SCC 247 ]; Laxman Singh v. Poonam Singh [ (2004) 10 SCC 94 ] and Dashrath Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2004) 7 SCC 408 ]” 49. The aforesaid law stands reiterated in Kuriya and another v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 . 50. Thus witnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 have fully established the prosecution case, without reasonable doubt. 51. Testimony of Sh. Liaq Ram (PW-9), father of Master Anil is hearsay in nature, but however he has proved the factum of his son having sustained injuries with acid. 52. Also we find that prosecution has been able to establish recovery of the container i.e. steel glass (Ext. P-5). Perusal of testimony of witness of recovery (PW-5) only establishes the same to have been handed over by the accused to the police. Testimony of this witness goes unrebutted. 53. Witness SI-Shyam Lal (PW-21) has clarified that path where the incident took place is just adjoining to the courtyard of the house of the accused. As such, place of occurrence cannot be disputed. 54. The only irresistible conclusion which can be drawn from the aforesaid discussion is that prosecution has been able to establish its case, beyond reasonable doubt. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses, fully inspiring in confidence, are free from contradictions, embellishments, exaggerations and improvements. Even if version of PW-1 and PW-2 is to be discarded, we find the dying declaration to have been fully proven on record, free from any doubt. Deceased sustained injuries which were grievous in nature. Acid was thrown on the vital parts of her body i.e. face and chest. Safely it can be held that accused had knowledge of the fact that by throwing sulphuric acid, on vital parts of body deceased is likely to suffer serious burn injuries which would cause her death. Deceased sustained injuries which were grievous in nature. Acid was thrown on the vital parts of her body i.e. face and chest. Safely it can be held that accused had knowledge of the fact that by throwing sulphuric acid, on vital parts of body deceased is likely to suffer serious burn injuries which would cause her death. The intent and the act to murder the deceased evidently stands established on record. 55. In order to establish her defence accused examined her father-in-law Sh. Bhajnu (DW-1). Having perused his testimony we do not find the defence to have been probablized. He does not state existence of any caste war or hostility in the village. That apart, he states that Sajji Devi took out a tin container and tried to throw acid on Kamla Devi, who in a bid to save herself caught Sajji Devi and thus acid fell on Sajji Devi. We do not find such version to be inspiring in confidence. Kamla Devi herself had handed over the container i.e. glass (Ext.P-5) to the police. Also witness did not disclose the incident to anyone. No complaint was lodged by him or his wife with the police. Witness denies presence of any third person on the spot except for son of Liaq Ram (PW-9), which version stands belied not only from the dying declaration but also testimonies of PW-1 & PW-2. 56. Thus, applying the principles of law to the given facts, it can safely be held that prosecution has been able to establish its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, to prove the guilt of accused. 57. Judgments referred to by learned counsel for the appellant are clearly inapplicable and need not be referred to in view of the law already discussed. It is not the position of law that absence of motive entitles the accused for acquittal, though in the instant case reason for assault stands explained. 58. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity, incorrect and/or complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Findings of conviction cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity, incorrect and/or complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Findings of conviction cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back.