ORDER : Anjana Mishra, J. The present intra Court appeal arises out of the judgment and order, dated 03.04.2013, passed, in CWJC No. 11988 of 2006, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby and where under the writ petition, filed by the petitioner (respondent herein), has been allowed and the order, dated 14.01.2006, passed by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department, State of Bihar, has been quashed. 2. By the order impugned in this appeal, it has been further directed that the petitioner (i.e., respondent herein) shall be given first time bound promotion, Second Assured Career Progression and other financial benefits by treating the date of his appointment as 25.01.1979. 3. In view of the fact that during the pendency of the writ application, namely, CWJC No. 11988 of 2006, petitioner No. 1 therein, namely, Manohar Lal Burnwal, died and this fact having been brought to the notice of the learned single Judge after making of the impugned order, the name of Manohar Lal Burnwal was deleted vide order, dated 15.04.2013. Thus, this appeal proceeds only against Sri Deo Narayan Singh, the sole respondent herein. 4. The State of Bihar, being aggrieved by the order, impugned in the present appeal, has challenged the said order with a categorical assertion that the respondent was appointed only on 15.09.1983 and, hence, the date of his joining cannot be legally shifted back to 25.01.1979. 5. While considering the present appeal, what needs to be born in mind is that Unemployed Engineers and Diploma Holders were, on the occasion of Republic Day, called to Patna, on 26.01.1979, for handing over to them appointment letters by the State Government. On 30.01.1979, eighty persons were short listed and appointed, as Assistant Engineer (Mechanical), in the then Irrigation Department, now known as Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, in the manner as indicated herein-before, On 03.02.1979, another select list of 26 persons, including the writ petitioners, was prepared and sent to the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Bihar, for being appointed; but on 26.02.1979, the Department of PHED returned these names stating that there were only 13 vacancies available therein and, as such, only 13 names may be resent; accordingly, a list of 13 persons was sent to PHED, which did not contain the names of the writ petitioners including the sole respondent herein. 6. 6. As a consequence of the fact that the names of the respondent herein, namely, Deo Narayan Singh, and Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) did not figure in the list, so sent to the PHED, the respondent herein, along with Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased), challenged the same in a writ petition, bearing CWJC No. 326 of 1979, which was disposed of, on 29.6.1981, with a direction to the Government to take a decision in the matter. Pursuant to the aforementioned direction, issued by this Court (Annexure 4 page 59 of the writ petition), the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) were appointed, on 15.09.1983, on ad-hoc basis, for six months, as Assistant Engineer (Mechanical), which was to take effect from the dates of joining their respective posts (Annexure 5 of the writ petition). Subsequently, the services of the writ petitioners came to be regularised with effect from the dates of their appointments, i.e. 15.09.1983, vide order, dated 30.12.1986. None of the writ petitioners, including the sole respondent herein, raised any objection either to their appointment with effect from the date of their joining i.e., 15.09.1983 or to the regularisation of their services with effect from 15.09.1983. 7. Thereafter, provisional gradation list was published by the Department of Public Health Engineering, on 30.10.1993, wherein the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) were shown to be junior to the appointees of 1979; but in the final gradation list, published, on 11.9.2003, by the Department concerned, the writ petitioners aforementioned were accorded seniority since the year 1979. In the meanwhile, a writ application, bearing CWJC No. 10196 of 1993, was preferred by the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal claiming payment of salary for the period from 1979 to 1983, time bound promotion and seniority with effect from 1979. On 16.09.1993, the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) were granted his first time bound promotion with effect from 15.09.1983, i.e., the date on which they had completed ten years of service. This Court, vide order, dated 28.09.2005, passed in CWJC No. 10196 of 1993, issued a direction to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, to examine the claim of the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased). This Court, vide order, dated 28.09.2005, passed in CWJC No. 10196 of 1993, issued a direction to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, to examine the claim of the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased). It is important to indicate here that since the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) had already been given his seniority, by the final gradation list, the claim of seniority was not pressed by them. 8. Pursuant to the aforementioned direction, issued by order, dated 28.09.2005, the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department, rejected, on 14.01.2006, the claim of the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) on the ground that the actual appointments of the respondent herein, namely, Deo Narayan Singh, and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) were with effect from 15.09.1983 and in view of the fact that they were not even born in the cadre, in question, in the year 1979, they could not have been given the benefits of promotion, etc, inasmuch as the Circulars, regarding time bound promotion or Assured Career Progression, lay down that the time bound promotion and Assured Career Progression would be available only on completion of fixed period of ten years or twenty years of service, as the case may be. It is also indicated in the order, dated 14.01.2006, aforementioned that the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) would not be entitled to receive salary for the period from 1979 to 1983 (Annexure 21 of the writ petition). It is this order passed by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Water Resources Department, which came under challenge in CWJC No. 11988 of 2006. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent. 10. In a nut-shell, the sole respondent herein claims his salary for the period from 1979 to 1983, a period in which the respondent, though selected, had not been appointed on account of want of vacancies. The second relief, sought for by the respondent herein, is with regard to grant of first time bound promotion with effect from 25.01.1979, a date on which other similarly situated persons had been appointed in pursuance of the same selection process, though the respondent herein had not been appointed on 25.01.1979. 11. The second relief, sought for by the respondent herein, is with regard to grant of first time bound promotion with effect from 25.01.1979, a date on which other similarly situated persons had been appointed in pursuance of the same selection process, though the respondent herein had not been appointed on 25.01.1979. 11. The contention of the writ petitioners was that since they had, now, been given the due seniority in the final gradation list, they are also entitled to the salary for the period from 1979 to 1983 and any act of the appellants herein to deprive the respondent herein and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) of the said benefits to hostile discrimination and against the letter and spirit of the judgment, dated 28.09.2005, passed by this Court in CWJC No. 10196 of 1993. The said order, dated 28.09.2005, passed in CWJC No. 10196 of 1993, has been marked as Annexure 9 to the writ application. 12. We have perused the order, dated 28.09.2005. The order, under reference, merely directs the respondent No. 2, namely, Secretary-cum-Commissioner, to examine the claims of the writ petitioners, including the respondent herein, for the purpose of grant of monetary benefits on account of promotion and restoration of their seniority. The relevant portion of order, dated 28.09.2005, passed in CWJC No. 10196 of 1993, reads as under: “The Secretary-cum-Commissioner having examined the claims of the petitioners shall pass necessary reasoned order in accordance with law within a period of three months”. 13. It is apparent from a plain reading of the directions reproduced herein above that this Court had merely directed respondent No. 2 to examine the case of the writ petitioners, namely, respondent herein, namely, Deo Narayan Singh, and the said Manohar Lal Burnwal (since deceased) in the light of the relevant rules within the time frame fixed by the Court and that no positive direction for grant of the reliefs, which the writ petitioners were claiming, had been granted by the learned single Judge, while passing the order on 28.09.2005 aforementioned. So far as the time bound promotions of the writ petitioners were concerned, the Court had also issued similar direction for consideration of the cases of the said two writ petitioners. 14. So far as the time bound promotions of the writ petitioners were concerned, the Court had also issued similar direction for consideration of the cases of the said two writ petitioners. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellants (respondents in the writ petition) submits that the appellants have filed the present appeal contending clearly that the earlier direction, issued by the Court, required the appellants herein to examine the matter relating to grant of salary for the period from 1979 to 1983 to the writ petitioners and also to examine the writ petitioners’ claim for grant of time bound promotion in the light of the relevant rules. Accordingly, after due consideration, the appellant No. 2 passed the impugned order, dated 14.01.2006, rejecting the case of the writ petitioners for grant of salary as it was contended that since the writ petitioners had not worked for the aforementioned period inasmuch as the posts were, on the date, in question, not in existence, the question of granting of monetary benefits could be considered only on the basis of the date of joining and not on the basis of date of selection. 15. It is also contended that the writ petitioners were appointed only on 15.09.1983 and, hence, the date of their joining cannot be shifted back to 25.01.1979 and that the date of their selection, as reflected by the select list, does not give an appointee, such as the writ petitioners, an indefeasible right to claim salary, promotion or Assured Career Progression on the basis of the select list or on the basis of the fact that the select list mentions the name of the appointee concerned. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants (respondents in the writ petition) further submits that the impugned order was passed by the appellant No. 2 after taking into consideration all the relevant rules and also the date of joining of the writ petitioner-respondent herein and it had been clearly stated, in the order, dated 14.01.2006 aforementioned, that the salary would be payable to the writ petitioners-respondent herein only from the date of his joining and not from the date of selection. 17. The appellant No. 2 herein had, thus, rejected the plea of the petitioner and passed the impugned order, which came to become the same subject matter of challenge in CWJC No. 11988 of 2006. 18. 17. The appellant No. 2 herein had, thus, rejected the plea of the petitioner and passed the impugned order, which came to become the same subject matter of challenge in CWJC No. 11988 of 2006. 18. It is submitted, on behalf of the appellants, that the respondent herein was appointed, on 15.08.1993, after the post became available for his appointment and only persons, who were appointed and had joined in the year 1979, were the ones, who had been given salary and other service benefits with effect from 25.01.1979 and since the respondent herein had joined only in the year 1983 and he, having worked since 16.09.1983, was not entitled to claim that he shall be treated as an appointee of the year 1979 and considering them to have joined on 16.09.1983, the writ petitioners had been granted first time bound promotion in the year 1993. The respondent No. 2, in the impugned order, has also clarified that the two persons, who were junior to the petitioners, had been in service since 1979 as they had been appointed in the reserved category against the available vacancies in the year 1979. 19. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned single Judge, while interfering, in the writ application, with the order impugned, has overlooked the basic fact that the promotional and monetary benefits are admissible to a Government employee only on the basis of the date of their joining and not on the basis of date of selection. Further-more, the principle of no work, no pay also applies to such appointees and the writ petitioners having, admittedly, not worked, between the period 1979 and 1983, could not have claimed the salary as per the extant Financial Rules. 20. Another ground urged by the appellants, while assailing the order of the learned single Judge, is that the seniority list (final gradation list) was prepared by the authorities on the basis of the merit in the selection list and not on the basis of the date of joining and it was in these circumstances that the respondent herein was placed higher in the gradation list on the basis of the merit list of the year 1979. Further-more, the appointees, who were said to be junior to the writ petitioners, were, in fact, appointed prior to the appointment of the writ petitioner in the year 1979 itself; whereas the respondent herein was appointed only in the year 1983 and by no stretch of imagination, his date of joining can be shifted to 25.1.1979. 21. Repelling the above submissions made on behalf of the appellants, what is contended, on behalf of the sole respondent herein, is that having shown the writ petitioner-respondent herein as senior to some others in the gradation list, he ought to have been given salary and other benefits from the dates candidates, lower in merit, were appointed. 22. Having considered the rival submissions made before us, we are of the view that the date of joining of the respondent herein cannot be shifted back to a date on which the respondent was not even borne in service merely because the respondent herein had been shown as senior to some other appointees in the final gradation list. 23. In the factual background of the present case, we are clearly of the view that the learned Single Judge has seriously erred in failing to appreciate that mere inclusion of a person’s name in a select list does not give him an indefeasible right to be appointed and claim of the writ petitioners to make available to them service benefits from a date prior to the dates of their appointment and joining (which in the instant case is 15.09.1983) could not have been sustained. 24. In the case at hand, reference may be made to the decision in Ramesh Kumar v. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 104 ), wherein the Supreme Court laid down as follows: “19. In view of the above, as it remains admitted position that petitioner Ramesh Kumar had secured 46.25% marks in aggregate and as he was required only to have 45% marks for appointment, Writ Petition (C) No. 57 of 2008 stands allowed. The connected writ petition filed by Desh Raj Chalia as he failed to secure the required marks in aggregate, stands dismissed. The respondents are requested to offer appointment to petitioner Ramesh Kumar, at the earliest, preferably within a period of two months from the date of submitting the certified copy of this order before the Delhi High Court. The connected writ petition filed by Desh Raj Chalia as he failed to secure the required marks in aggregate, stands dismissed. The respondents are requested to offer appointment to petitioner Ramesh Kumar, at the earliest, preferably within a period of two months from the date of submitting the certified copy of this order before the Delhi High Court. It is, however, clarified that he shall not be entitled to get any seniority or any other perquisite on the basis of his notional entitlement. Service benefits shall be given to him from the date of his appointment. No costs. 25. From the law laid down in Ramesh Kumar (supra), it becomes transparent that mere notional entitlement of a person cannot be made a basis for ante dating his appointment and giving him thereby monitory or other benefits. 26. Having considered the matter in its entirety and after perusing the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we find and hold that the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from serious error of law inasmuch as the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the writ petitioner, respondent herein, had not joined or discharged his duties until before he was appointed, as already indicated, in the year 1983. Since the respondent herein had not functioned and discharged his duties, as an Assistant Engineer, with effect from 25.01.1979, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to make payment of his salary, with effect from 25.01.1979, is wholly against the settled principles of law and cannot be sustained. 27. We accordingly set aside the impugned order, dated 03.04.2013, passed, in CWJC No. 11988 of 2006. 28. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. 29. No order as to costs. I.A. Ansari, J. While completely agreeing with the observations made, and the conclusions reached by Anjana Mishra, J., I may add that it is impossible to ignore the fact that on receiving his appointment in September, 1983, the respondent herein did not challenge his appointment made in the year 1983 by contending that he ought to have been treated as having been appointed, in the year 1979, on the date on which other persons were appointed from the select list. The respondent had not even challenged his regularisation of service with effect from 15.09.1983. The respondent had not even challenged his regularisation of service with effect from 15.09.1983. In fact, it was only after publication of the final gradation list that the claim for salary from the year 1979 to 1983 was raised along with other service benefits. Merely because of the fact that the name of the writ petitioners found place in the select list, they could not have been given the benefit of extended salary and other service benefits from 21.05.1979, when the writ petitioners were not even born in the cadre of Assistant Engineers. 31. Coupled with the above, it is not worthy that pursuant to a direction, issued in CWJC No. 3264 of 1979, that the case of the respondent herein be examined, the respondent came to be appointed on 15.09.1983 and, on that basis, his service was regularised with effect from 15.09.1983, vide order, dated 30.12.1986. As against his order of appointment made on 15.09.1983 and/or his date of regularisation with effect from 15.09.1983, the respondent herein, as already mentioned above, never expressed any grievances and it was only on publication of the final gradation list, in the manner as indicated above, that the claim for payment of salary and other service benefits, with effect from 25.01.1979, were raised and, hence, the same were, in our considered view, rightly rejected by the appellant No.2. 32. It is also difficult to appreciate as to how respondent herein could have been legally appointed in the year 1983, when the selection process was of the year 1979, and all the vacancies stood filled up by persons, who were placed in the select list above the respondent herein. Strictly speaking, therefore, no case for claiming of payment of salary and/or other service benefits could have been raised with effect from 1979, when the respondent herein were not even born in the cadre of Assistant Engineers. 33. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed.