JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra,J.: - This bunch of writ petitions have been filed challenging various notifications issued in exercise of powers conferred upon the State by Section 6(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953, (for short, Act) which have been delegated by the Government Order No. 8313/IA-813/1954 dated 19.10.1956 upon the Director of Consolidation, cancelling the notifications issued under Section 4 (2) of the Act whereby various villages were brought under consolidation operations. All the petitions in this bunch challenge similar notifications which have been issued regarding various villages which had earlier been brought under the consolidation operations. 2. I have heard Shri Anu Pratap Singh, Shri Anurag Shukla, Shri Tripathi B.G. Balak Prasad, Shri Jai Singh Chauhan and Shri Shikandar Jath, who appear for the petitioners in various petitions in this bunch. I have also heard Shri Vinay Bhushan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the State respondents. 3. The following points have been argued by various learned counsels for the petitioners: 1. The Consolidation operations have been going on for a substantial period of time and the same were nearing completion or have already completed with possession having been delivered over the chaks carved out. 2. Once the stage of issuance of notification under Section 24 of the C.H. Act is reached, the consolidation operations cannot be cancelled and, therefore, the notification under Section 6(1), which have been issued subsequent to the notification under Sections 24, are liable to be quashed. 3. All the notifications have been issued on an approved proforma and they do not assign any reasons why the consolidation operations are being cancelled. 4. There are hundreds of the tenure-holders (chak-holders) in each unit but the notifications cancelling the consolidation operations have been issued, citing interim orders granted by this Court in one or two cases, which are said to have held up the consolidation operations for a substantial period of time. This reason has been disclosed either in the counter affidavits that have been filed or this information has been provided to the petitioners under the Right to Information Act. 5. In Writ Petition No. 64 of 2013, the additional submission made is that only 35 percent of land in the unit is fit for agriculture and that the notification has been issued at the instance of powerful political persons and is not an independent exercise of the authority concerned. 5. In Writ Petition No. 64 of 2013, the additional submission made is that only 35 percent of land in the unit is fit for agriculture and that the notification has been issued at the instance of powerful political persons and is not an independent exercise of the authority concerned. 6. In Writ Petition No. 684 of 2012, it has been submitted that the unit in question has never been under consolidation operations earlier: the notification assigns no reason for cancelling the consolidation operations and, lastly, that none of the grounds, which have been specified in the sub Rules of Rule 17, where under the consolidation operations can be cancelled, have been spelled out. 4. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Shri Vinay Bhushan has supported the notifications impugned on the ground that notifications which either bring a unit under consolidation operations or which cancel the consolidation operations have been held to be a conditional legislation by a Division Bench in the case of Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Limited vs. State of U.P., reported in 1976 RD, page 35. The same Division Bench has also held that no reasons need to be assigned for issuing such a notification and thus this Court cannot quash such notifications which are conditional legislation because any direction issued by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would amount to issuing directions to the State Government to legislate in a particular manner which is not permissible under law. He has lastly submitted that the conditions specified in the various sub-rules of Rule 17 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules are only indicative or inclusive and are not exhaustive. 5. Several judgments have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and I shall proceed to consider each of the judgments consecutively. It would however be appropriate to quote Section 6 of the Act which reads as follows: - "6. Cancellation of notification under Section 4: - (1) It shall be lawful for the State Government at any time to cancel the notification made under Section 4 in respect of the whole or any part of the Area specified therein. It would however be appropriate to quote Section 6 of the Act which reads as follows: - "6. Cancellation of notification under Section 4: - (1) It shall be lawful for the State Government at any time to cancel the notification made under Section 4 in respect of the whole or any part of the Area specified therein. (2) Where a notification has been cancelled in respect of any unit under sub-section (1), such area shall, subject to the final orders relating to the correction of land records, if any, passed on or before the date of such cancellation, cease to be under consolidation operations with effect from the date of the cancellation." Rules 17 which is also relevant for the purposes of the dispute involved in these writ petitions is extracted below: "17. Section The [notification] made under Section 4 of the Act, may among other reasons, be cancelled in respect of whole or any part of the area on one or more of the following grounds, viz., that- (a) the area is under a development scheme of such a nature as when completed would render the consolidation operations inequitable to a section of the peasantry; (b) the holdings of the village are already consolidated for one reason or the other and the tenure-holders are generally satisfied with the present position; (c) the village is so torn up by party factions as to render proper consolidation proceedings in the village very difficult; and (d) that a co-operative society has been formed for carrying out cultivation in the area after pooling all the land of the area for this purpose." 6. The first judgment relied upon is reported in 1984 RD 110 Jeevan Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others. The first judgment relied upon is reported in 1984 RD 110 Jeevan Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others. This judgment considered the import of the words "at any time" used in Section 6 and it was held as follows: "..the scope of Section 6 of the Act is to issue notification upto the stage of correction of land records and not after finalization of records and conferments of new rights on the tenure-holders in their respective chaks under Section 30 of the Act." The judgment further went on to hold that the grounds on which the notification under Section 6 was issued, were not covered by Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act and the notification were found to be mala fide, arbitrary and without jurisdiction and were therefore quashed. In none of the writ petitions before me it has been submitted that the notification under Section 30 of the Act had already been issued prior to the issuance of notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act. Under the circumstances, the petitioners cannot get any benefit from the ruling aforesaid. Although, in the aforecited case, the notification under Section 6(1) was quashed but that was primarily on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of that case the grounds for issuance of the notification were not covered by Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act. The petitioners are however not entitled to the benefit in pursuance of the afore-cited decision for the following two reasons. First, the relief was granted in that case in the peculiar facts and circumstances available on record. As far as the second reason that the grounds on which the impugned notification was issued not being covered by Rule 17 of the Rules is concerned, in my considered opinion, I am not inclined to agree with the said reasoning for the simple reason that the words of Rule 17 read as follows: 17. As far as the second reason that the grounds on which the impugned notification was issued not being covered by Rule 17 of the Rules is concerned, in my considered opinion, I am not inclined to agree with the said reasoning for the simple reason that the words of Rule 17 read as follows: 17. Section 6 -- The [notification] made under Section 4 of the Act, may among other reasons, be cancelled in respect of whole or any part of the area on one or more of the following grounds, viz., that- (a) the area is under a development scheme of such a nature as when completed would render the consolidation operations inequitable to a section of the peasantry; (b) the holdings of the village are already consolidated for one reason or the other and the tenure-holders are generally satisfied with the present position; (c) the village is so torn up by party factions as to render proper consolidation proceedings in the village very difficult; and (d) that a co-operative society has been formed for carrying out cultivation in the area after pooling all the land of the area for this purpose." "...the notification under Section 4 of the Act may among other reasons be cancelled ?..". Thus it can be recorded that the grounds given in rule 17 are illustrative and not exhaustive. 7. The next authority that has been heavily relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners is 2007 (25) LCD 844 , Madan Shah and others versus DDC and others. This judgment also considered the decision in the case of Jeevan Singh's case (supra) and rightly recorded that the question involved in the Jeevan Singh's case was about the "stage" at which consolidation operations could be cancelled and the effect of the notification upon the final orders passed in title proceedings. This judgment also considered the decision in the case of Jeevan Singh's case (supra) and rightly recorded that the question involved in the Jeevan Singh's case was about the "stage" at which consolidation operations could be cancelled and the effect of the notification upon the final orders passed in title proceedings. This decision deals with as to what is a final order relating to correction of land records, specially in terms of Sections 6(2), 9, 11 and 48 and goes on to hold that in cases where final orders have been passed sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that the cancellation of the consolidation operations shall be subject to such final orders and therefore holds that where final orders relating to correction of land records have not been passed that the proceedings of a pending suit in which the order of the abatement has been passed shall stand revived. In cases where a final order relating to correction of land records have been passed, such final order would not be affected by the notification. 8. It is therefore clear that this Court in the case of Madan Shah was dealing with the effect of issuance of a notification under Section 6(2) of the Act and the same is not a authority as to whether a notification under Section 6(1) can be quashed by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The third decision relied upon by the petitioners Counsel is 2007 (2) SCC 640 , Ashoka Smokeless Coal India Private Limited vs. Union of India, wherein it has been held that a policy decision of a Government is open to judicial review. Relying upon this judgment it is sought to be submitted that the issuance of an notification under Section 6(1) is a policy decision taken by the authority which is open to judicial review and, therefore, the various aspects which have been argued for challenging the said notification are liable to be considered. The impact of this decision shall be considered at the appropriate place in this judgment. 9. Coming to the authorities cited on behalf of the State, it is appropriate to refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the Case of the Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Limited vs. State of U.P. reported 1976 RD page 35. The impact of this decision shall be considered at the appropriate place in this judgment. 9. Coming to the authorities cited on behalf of the State, it is appropriate to refer to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the Case of the Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Limited vs. State of U.P. reported 1976 RD page 35. In this case it was held that the notifications issued either under Section 6 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are not in exercise of an executive function but a legislative function. This judgment records as follows : "As already held, the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act are issued by the State Government in exercise of conditional legislative powers. It cannot be conceivably contended that this Court can issue a mandamus to the legislature to legislate on any subject or to apply any law to any area. It was observed by the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar Sir Kamleshwar Singh(2): " It cannot possibly have been intended that the legislature should be under an obligation to make a law in exercise of that power, for no obligation of that kind can be enforced by the Court against a legislative body." Similarly this Court could not pass an order which would make it obligatory on the State Government to enforce the scheme of consolidation in an area where in its opinion such scheme should not be enforced. It would amount to compel the State Government to exercise its power of conditional legislation." 10. The Second judgment relied upon by the State is 1990 RD 175 Dev Nath Kewat vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation. This judgment, relying upon the ratio laid down in the case of Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Limited (supra), has held as follows: - "The scope of writ of mandamus is by now well settled that unless there is some denial of the statutory duty cast upon the State and authority and the State has refused to carry out the statutory duty, in that event writ of mandamus cannot be issued. In the instant case by refusing to issue notification under Section 6(1) of the Act it cannot be said that the State Government has refused to carry out any statutory duty imposed upon it. In such matters no writ of mandamus can be issued. In the instant case by refusing to issue notification under Section 6(1) of the Act it cannot be said that the State Government has refused to carry out any statutory duty imposed upon it. In such matters no writ of mandamus can be issued. However, it is open to the petitioners to approach the State Government with their representation if so advised." 11. It is thus clear that the instant case was dealing with the issue as to whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus directing the authorities not to proceed with the consolidation operations in the village in question. It was in the context of this relief that the judgment was passed. It is therefore clear from the judgments cited on behalf of the State that the law is well settled that notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are conditional legislations and any interference in the same by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would amount to directing the State to legislate in a particular manner which is not permissible under law. The judiciary does not have any power to compel the State Government or any legislative authority to legislate in a particular manner. 12. In the light of the judgments noticed above it would now be proper to consider various grounds that have been taken for challenging the impugned notifications. 13. The primary and most strident contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the consolidation operations have been continuing for a sufficiently long period of time and have reached a very advanced stage or have been virtually completed. Even chak revisions have been finalized, possession over the chaks carved out have been handed over to the respective tenure holders, chak roads and chak guls have been constructed and only the final records are in various stages of finalization. On the strength of these facts it is contended that all these actions taken shall come undone if the impugned notifications are not quashed. This contention though attractive, in fact, works against the petitioners themselves because it is specifically provided in Section 6(2) of the Act that by issuance of notification, canceling consolidation operations the provisions of the said Act will cease to apply to the area governed by the notification under section 4, subject to what has already attained finality. This contention though attractive, in fact, works against the petitioners themselves because it is specifically provided in Section 6(2) of the Act that by issuance of notification, canceling consolidation operations the provisions of the said Act will cease to apply to the area governed by the notification under section 4, subject to what has already attained finality. It is therefore clear from a bare reading of provision itself that all matters that have attained finality prior to the issuance of notification under Section 6(1) are saved and therefore this contention lacks substance. 14. In so far as the contention that all the notifications have been issued in an approved proforma, it would suffice to record that what is important is the content and not the form. In case the authority concerned has the power to issue the notification, it is immaterial as to the format or proforma in which it is issued. It has also been specifically held by the Division Bench in case of Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate Limited (supra) that no reasons are required to be given for issuance of the notifications under Section 6. In view of the said decision the question of the notifications being issued in a set proforma is of no consequence. Coming to the next submission of the counsel for the petitioners that notifications under Section 6 cannot be issued once the record has been finalized is concerned, it may be noted that the submission primarily was that since the proceedings had reached the stage of carvation of chaks and delivery of possession over the chaks, it necessarily implied that the Section 9 stage had already been attained. It was argued that it is at the Section 9 stage that the records are corrected and finalized and only thereafter the allotment proceedings can be and are resorted to and therefore the consolidation operations could not be cancelled. This argument is being raised, relying upon the judgment in the case of Jeevan Singh (supra), wherein it has been held that consolidation operations cannot be cancelled once the record of rights has been prepared. In my opinion, this contention proceeds upon an incorrect interpretation of the law laid down in the case of Jeevan Singh referred to above. This argument is being raised, relying upon the judgment in the case of Jeevan Singh (supra), wherein it has been held that consolidation operations cannot be cancelled once the record of rights has been prepared. In my opinion, this contention proceeds upon an incorrect interpretation of the law laid down in the case of Jeevan Singh referred to above. The contention / interpretation as provided by the learned counsel for the petitioners is fallacious because it ignores the fact that the final record of rights is prepared after the allotment proceedings have been finalized, the chak appeals and revisions have been decided and the allotments made have attained finality and the same are incorporated in the revenue records. This in fact is the final record of rights. It is in this context that the judgment in Jeevan Singh's case refers to the notification under Section 30 of the Act. It has been neither been pleaded nor argued in any of the writ petitions in this bunch that notification under Section 30 has been made and therefore even this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners lacks merits. 15. The other submissions that the basis of the issuance of notification under Section 6 being a single case or that only a small percentage of the land in the unit is fit for agriculture or that consolidation operations which were notified for the first time in the unit and have been cancelled midway entail factual controversies which cannot be addressed or decided in a writ petition. It is settled law that disputed questions of fact cannot be decided by the writ Court. Even otherwise, the Division Bench has held that the issuance of notification under Section 6 is conditional legislation and the State is under no obligation to record reasons for exercising its legislative powers in a particular way. Moreover, since the power to issue a notification cancelling consolidation operations has been held to be a legislative function and the notification itself has been held to be conditional legislation, the same can be challenged only on the grounds on which any legislation can be challenged as has been laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Agricultural and Industrial Syndicate (supra), which is binding this Court. Also, therefore, the petitioners' reliance upon the decision of the Apex court in the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal (supra) is of no avail as therein it has been held that a policy decision is open to judicial review but issuance of a notification under section 6(1) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is not a policy decision but conditional legislation. 16. During the course of arguments, repeated queries by the Court to each and every counsel who appeared for the petitioners as to what specific injury was caused to the petitioners which had prompted them to challenge the notification, the persistent refrain was that the consolidation operations had been in progress for a sufficiently long period of time and the petitioners were given to understand that as a result of the impugned notifications all proceedings that had taken place till the time the consolidation operations were cancelled, would be set at naught. Apart from the aforesaid, no other specific injury could be pointed out by various counsel, who have made submissions for quashing the impugned notifications. When confronted with the provisions as contained in sub section (2) of the Section 6, some of the counsel conceded that they would be satisfied if the writ petitions were disposed of with an appropriate observations regarding the provisions as contained in sub section (2) of Section 6. This aspect of the matter has already been dealt with herein above. Section 6(2) provides that on issuance of an notification 6(1) of the Act, the unit would cease to be under consolidation operations with effect from the date of notification "subject to the final orders relating to the correction of land records, if any, passed on or before the such notification." The contention that the notifications under Sections 6 (1) are policy decisions was pleaded on behalf of the State in earlier petitions wherein similar notifications have been challenged. It was held therein that the notifications under Section 4 or under Section 6(1) of the Act are not policy decisions but are conditional legislation. It would be relevant to elaborate on the term 'conditional legislation' as used in various decisions by this Court. The Act, a complete code in itself, provides the procedure and conditions for issuing the notifications. It was held therein that the notifications under Section 4 or under Section 6(1) of the Act are not policy decisions but are conditional legislation. It would be relevant to elaborate on the term 'conditional legislation' as used in various decisions by this Court. The Act, a complete code in itself, provides the procedure and conditions for issuing the notifications. The Government or its delegate, on the basis of its subjective satisfaction, only enforces these provisions in a particular area or unit, hence the term conditional legislation. 17. In view of the above it can safely be recorded that the writ petitions have been filed on a misconception of the legal provisions of law. There is a mere apprehension that the provisions as contained in sub section (2) of section 6 regarding finality of final orders relating to correction of land records will be given a go-by or will be ignored by the parties or the authorities concerned. The apprehension is wholly unfounded. In any case, if such an incorrect or illegal interpretation is resorted to by anyone, it will always be open for the aggrieved party to avail such legal remedy as may be available to such aggrieved party, under law for obtaining corrective action in this regard. The impugned notifications cannot be quashed only on an apprehension that the legal provisions will not be correctly interpreted or applied. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons given above, there appears no justification for quashing the impugned notifications which are conditional legislation and not policy decisions. Conditional legislation or any legislation can be questioned only on the ground of being ultra vires, on the ground of lack of competence or on the ground of unreasonableness. No such ground has either upon pleaded or urged before me. The factual issues raised that a very small area of the village is under agricultural operations or that consolidation operations have been cancelled on account of a single interim order of this Court it would suffice to record that all these are issues to be considered by the concerned authority whose subjective satisfaction is required before cancelling the consolidation operations. No material has been placed to show that the impugned notifications have been issued without the authority having been satisfied that it was expedient to cancel the consolidation operations. No material has been placed to show that the impugned notifications have been issued without the authority having been satisfied that it was expedient to cancel the consolidation operations. Accordingly and for the reasons given above, the writ petitions are found to be devoid of merits and are dismissed.